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Abstract
“The Adjudicatory State” traces the collision between the federal legal vision for
the early American West and the preexisting laws and customs that governed the region.
To administer the vast region it obtained in the 1783 Treaty of Paris, the United States
created the territorial system, under which federal officials would temporarily govern
western “territories” until they achieved statehood. The federal government would also
survey and sell the public domain to private purchasers. But these grand plans ran afoul
of territorial realities. Both the Northwest Territory, encompassing much of the present-day
Midwest, and the Southwest Territory, encompassing present-day Tennessee, were
borderlands, places where Native peoples, French settlers, Anglo-American intruders,
and land companies contended for sovereignty and property. Instead of crafting a new
legal order, federal officials found themselves barraged with preexisting claims.
The polyphony of claims played out especially clearly in the contests over land
and so-called “Indian affairs.” In the territories, title derived from a complicated blend of
Native, French, British, and state law. It fell to federal officials to understand and
translate these plural rights of ownership into the single federal title that would undergird
the federal land system. In Indian affairs, federal officials embraced a vision of federal
sovereignty in which federal law would serve as the impartial arbiter in conflicts between
Native nations and U.S. citizens. Yet early American law encompassed too much
ambiguity and localism for centralized authority to succeed. Instead of relying on law,
federal officials ultimately attempted to secure both peace and allegiance through liberal
payments of federal funds to both Natives and U.S. citizens.
The federal government’s role in the territories as an adjudicatory state adhered
neither to an account that emphasizes federal power’s inexorable westward march nor to
a straightforward narrative of federal failure against local customary practice. Through
resolving claims, federal government slowly accreted authority, but in ways that defied
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classification as strong or weak. The process traced here also blurred the sharp
dichotomy between informal and formal law, and suggests how the rise of federalism
helped channel the plural claims of the borderlands into a framework of dual sovereignty.
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Introduction 
In 1783, two Anglo-American settlers, William McCormick and Edward Lucas, 
recorded legal land claims known as preemption rights before the local court.  
McCormick and Lucas lived in a tiny settlement along the Cumberland River formerly 
known as French Lick, recently renamed Nashville, described by one visitor as a 
“recently founded place” with only two real houses.  The court was labeled the District 
Court, North Carolina Cumberland District, since Nashville was nominally part of North 
Carolina, though in fact the court existed without any formal state authorization. Later 
that year, the court’s presiding officer and the town’s founder, James Robertson, entered 
a contract with the North Carolina politician William Blount.  Blount was to obtain as 
many military land rights as he could, probably fifty or one hundred thousand acres, for 
Robertson to locate around Nashville.1    
Two hundred miles north, residents of the town of Vincennes along the Wabash 
River—a nearly century-old French settlement that had recently become part of the 
expansive territory of Virginia—were also engaged in routine legal transactions.  
Dominque Burguant, Josete Poirer, and Vital Bouche had entered a land contract, 
recorded in French and sworn before a local notary, that sold a lot “of the depth of one 
street to the next” for 2,000 livres in pelts.  A couple of years earlier, Thomas Jefferson, 
Virginia’s governor, had sent a letter to Vincennes.  It was for Jean Baptiste Ducoigne, a 
leader of the local Piankeshaw nation.  Jefferson assured the Piankeshaws that the “great 
                                                
1 “Cumberland District Ct. Records,” 3R, January 20, 1783, Reel 224, Tennessee State Library and Archives; ibid., May 6, 1783; 
“Col. James Roberson to William Blount, Articles of Agreement” October 30, 1783, Folder 1, MSS49353, William Blount Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress [hereinafter WBP:LC].  On early Nashville, see Kristofer Ray, Middle Tennessee, 1775-
1825 : Progress and Popular Democracy on the Southwestern Frontier (Knoxville, Tenn. : University of Tennessee Press, 2007); an 
older and somewhat romantic account can be found in Harriette Simpson Arnow, Seedtime on the Cumberland,  (East Lansing, MI, 
USA: Michigan State University Press, 2013). 
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council in Philadelphia” would see “justice done you.”  Responding to Piankashaw 
complaints about “the want of goods,” Jefferson informed Ducoigne that he would try to 
send them ammunition and other items, but that after the war’s end the Piankashaws 
would “be well supplied through the rest of your lives.”  This diplomacy reflected the 
long-standing regional custom of using gifts to cement relationships between Natives and 
non-Natives.2  
While the residents of Nashville and Vincennes practiced everyday law, they 
likely had only a vague sense that, much further east, across the Atlantic, representatives 
of the United States were concluding a treaty that purported to determine the question of 
sovereignty over both settlements, along with much of the rest of North America.  
Ultimately, the agreement they reached, the 1783 Treaty of Paris, ended the 
Revolutionary War between Britain and the United States and ceded the United States all 
British territory east of the Mississippi River, north of Spanish Florida and south of 
British Canada.3   
To the leaders of the United States, the Treaty represented a watershed, a 
validation of their long struggle for independence, nationhood, and territory.  For the next 
twenty years, the United States would struggle to determine what, exactly, sovereignty 
and ownership over such an enormous swath of the continent meant.  There were 
                                                
2 “Land Sale Contract Between Dominque Burguant and Josete Poirier and Vital Bouche” (typescript translation), December 24, 1782, 
I.164, Lasselle Family Papers, L127, Indiana State Library, Manuscripts & Rare Books Division, Indianapolis, Ind.; “Advertisement 
from Johnas Scoggan,” April 26, 1783, Laselle Family Papers, L127, Indiana State Library, Manuscripts & Rare Books Division; 
“Draft of a Petition of Officers in the Continental Line of the Army to the President and Delegates of the United States in Congress 
Assembled,” May 7, 1783, Box 4, Folder 2, Series I: Business Records, Manuscripts and Documents of the Ohio Company of 
Associates, Special Collections, Marietta College Library, Marietta, Ohio; Speech to Jean Baptiste Ducoigne, June 1781, in Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson: Main Series, 6:60-64[hereinafter PTJ:MS].  On the history of Vincennes, see Andrew R. L. Cayton, Frontier 
Indiana (Bloomington, Ind.” Indiana University Press, 1998); Denise Marie Wilson, “Vincennes: From French Colonial Village to 
American Frontier Town, 1730-1820” (Ph.D. Dissertation, West Virginia University, 1997); Carl J. Ekberg, French Roots in the 
Illinois Country: The Mississippi Frontier in Colonial Times (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998). 
3 Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Great Britain, September 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 84. 
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extensive debates over how the United States should govern such vast and distant 
expanses.  Gazing west from Philadelphia and New York, politicians and statesmen 
crafted visions for national expansion that they codified in the Northwest Ordinance and 
U.S. Constitution.  These foundational charters created the territorial system.  After states 
ceded their claims of both property and jurisdiction over western lands to the national 
government, that government would divide these lands into “territories,” appointing 
governors, judges, and federal officials to oversee them until they were ready for 
statehood on equal terms with the existing states.  The federal government would also 
carve up the territorial lands into neatly gridded parcels, which it would then sell to 
private purchasers.  The Northwest Territory was the first of these federally administered 
governments, created in 1787 from the vast lands north of the Ohio River ceded by 
Virginia.  The Southwest Territory soon followed in 1790 when North Carolina ceded the 
federal government its claim to jurisdiction and ownership of lands in present-day 
Tennessee.4 
But while Congress built schemes and systems, the residents of the newly 
proclaimed “territories”—in towns like Vincennes; Nashville; Chota, the Cherokee 
“beloved town”; and the “Glaize,” the polyglot Native village of the upper Miami 
                                                
4 For considerations of visions of the West during this period, focusing particularly on the state territorial cessions, see Peter S. Onuf, 
The Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States, 1775-1787 (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Peter S. Onuf, “Liberty, Development, and Union: Visions of the West in the 1780s,” The William and 
Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 43, no. 2 (April 1, 1986): 179–213.  Explorations focused specifically on the territories include John 
Porter Bloom, ed., The American Territorial System (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1973); Jack Ericson Eblen, The First and Second 
United States Empires; Governors and Territorial Government, 1784-1912. ([Pittsburgh]: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968); 
Stefan Heumann, “The Tutelary Empire: State- and Nation-Building in the 19th Century United States” (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of Pennsylvania, 2009).  For the implications of the constitution for territorial governance, see Gary Lawson and Guy 
Seidman, The Constitution of Empire: Territorial Expansion and American Legal History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).  
Studies of the Northwest Ordinance are especially numerous, clustered around its bicentennial. See Peter S Onuf, Statehood and 
Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). R. Douglas Hurt, “Historians and the 
Northwest Ordinance,” The Western Historical Quarterly 20, no. 3 (1989): 261–80; Frederick D. Williams, ed. The Northwest 
Ordinance: Essays on Its Formulation, Provisions, and Legacy, (East Lansing, Mich: Michigan State University Press, 1989); Denis 
P. Duffey, “The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document,” Columbia Law Review 95, no. 4 (1995): 929–68. 
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country—continued living under their own ideas of law and governance.  For them, the 
visions dreamed up by distant officials were largely an irrelevancy.  They had seen such 
self-proclaimed sovereigns come and go with grand plans unrealized: their homes were 
both the crossroads and the graveyard of empires, and the territory the federal 
government now claimed had been fought over for centuries among the French, Spanish, 
and British, as well as Virginia, North Carolina, Connecticut, and Georgia.  Out of the 
thin soil of the few official papers left behind by these mostly absent governments—laws, 
deeds, and treaties—a hothouse growth of local customary law and practice had 
flourished.  Despite, and in part because of, forty years of war, the regions’ dominant 
sovereigns remained Native nations, who still owned and controlled nearly all the lands 
within the territories.  The few long-standing Euro-American settlements like Vincennes 
remained remote outposts in this Native land; they had survived largely due to the norms 
and close relationships they had established with surrounding Native nations.  More 
recent arrivals like the Nashville residents, who settled on dubiously obtained land in 
1779, might have more jaundiced views of their Native neighbors and wished to exert 
power over them, but they, too, found themselves thrust into adapting to prevailing 
norms.  This did not mean peace; violence often accompanied coexistence.  But Natives 
and non-Natives employed a shared vocabulary and diplomatic framework to interpret 
and resolve such conflicts. For all the residents of the territories, these quotidian issues—
who owns this parcel of land? how could an unsanctioned killing be remedied? —loomed 
larger than the questions of constitutions and governments that dominated in 
Philadelphia.5 
                                                
5 For a fuller discussion of the prior histories of the regions that became the territories, see the Prologue.  
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This dissertation recounts what happened when these worlds of high federal law 
and policy and territorial reality collided.  Over the course of the late 1780s and 1790s, 
officials dispatched by the federal government arrived in the territories, satchels full of 
laws, ordinances, and instructions on how to govern.  What they encountered confused 
and frustrated them, as they found themselves attempting to reshape along federal lines a 
world that they only dimly understood.  Often, they felt powerless in the face of a 
cacophony of claims and demands, produced by autonomous peoples who seemed to 
have little respect for the federal government or its representatives.   
Nonetheless, federal officials were reshaping the territories, albeit not in ways that 
they necessarily intended or even realized.  Those in the territories may have given little 
thought to matters of state, but they cared a great deal about having their claims—to land, 
to justice, to protection—honored and acknowledged by some sort of authority.  Here, 
formal law and custom fused: the federal government’s claim to sovereignty often made 
it the only definitive pronouncement available. Even sovereign Native nations looked to 
the federal government to affirm their rights, particularly against other Native nations.  In 
this sense, the federal government in the territories functioned as what might be termed 
an “adjudicatory state”—one in which the government sifted through and resolved 
contending claims.  The result was the accretion of federal authority almost by default.  
As Arthur St. Clair, governor of the Northwest Territory, stated, dimly acknowledging 
this role, “[T]here is perhaps nothing that contributes more to induce an affectionate 
  6 
Submission to any power, than the habit of looking up to that power as the depositary and 
dispenser of Justice in the last resort.”6  
This process played out in two intertwined areas that dominated territorial 
governance.  The first was land.  Beginning with the Land Ordinance of 1785, Congress 
established a template for subdividing and then selling the public domain.  But territorial 
land was not vacant.  Claims to title covered enormous swaths of land that federal 
officials had believed empty, derived from a profusion of sources—Native title, 
purchases from Natives, state land schemes, preexisting Euroamerican laws, 
improvement rights, federal military bounty rights.  The federal government’s initial 
effort to sweep aside this thorny tangle and create a new land system of government-
sanctioned land companies ended up heightening, rather than resolving, the profusion of 
land rights.    As a result of all this confusion, federal officials spent most of the next 
decade and a half sifting through these claims, often with great reluctance, rather than 
selling the public domain.  But all this effort worked to translate this crazy-quilt of 
sources of ownership into title that rested on federal authority, which increasingly 
became the basis for all land rights in the former territories.7 
                                                
6 Gov. Arthur St. Clair to Secretary of State, December 15, 1794, in The Territorial Papers of the United States, Vol. II, The Territory 
Northwest of the River Ohio, 1787-1803, ed. Clarence Edward Carter (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1934), 499-500 
[hereinafter TP: Vol. II].  Gordon Wood briefly uses the phrase “adjudicatory state” to describe James Madison’s vision for the new 
federal government, contrasting it with Hamilton’s more aggressive interpretation of federal authority.  Gordon S Wood, Empire of 
Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 91, 103, 148.  As the history presented 
here suggests, however, adjudication did not necessarily imply a limited or passive role for government; in the territories, adjudication 
involved a considerable and at times aggressive expansion of national state authority. 
7 Paul Frymer offers the most current account of the role of the public land system in the exercise of federal state authority, in which 
he stresses the ways in which the federal government could use the availability and access to land as a method to govern and control 
westward expansion without expending financial or military resources.  Paul Frymer, “‘A Rush and a Push and the Land Is Ours’: 
Territorial Expansion, Land Policy, and U.S. State Formation,” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 01 (March 2014): 119–44.  Though 
Frymer’s convincing account of land as a instrument of governance coincides with some of the contentions made here, he arguably 
overstates the extent to which the federal government was successful in its effort to police access to title, at least during the early 
period.  As Frymer’s account implicitly notes, the federal government was just as frequently constrained to honor the title of 
preexisting settlers as it was able to govern by distributing public lands.  This dynamic has largely been absent from histories of the 
public domain, and ignores the complicated interplay between constraint and authority suggested by the federal government’s role as 
adjudicator of preexisting private land claims. 
  7 
The second area was what federal officials called “Indian affairs.”  This was a 
broad category, encompassing all the issues that implicated the relationship between the 
United States and Native nations: treaties, trade, warfare, and cross-cultural crime.  Here, 
too, the federal government embarked on a bold effort to recast long-standing practices.  
Through federal Indian treaties, the Trade and Intercourse Acts, and the Constitution, the 
national government sought to end seemingly interminable cross-cultural violence by 
inserting the federal government as an arbiter between Natives and non-Natives in the 
territories, promising impartial justice.  But conflict continued, in large part because 
federal officials’ insistence on the clarity and supremacy of federal law was ill-matched 
to the ambiguities both of early American law and of the territories.  When justice failed, 
federal officials turned in desperation to a readier source of authority than law—money.  
Throughout the 1790s, federal funds flowed into the territories, both as compensation for 
unpunished crimes and as an attempt to purchase the tenuous loyalties of both Native and 
non-Native territorial residents through presents and protection, respectively.  Though a 
crude, expensive, and often ineffective tool, federal money reoriented the territories 
around federal policy, as both Natives and non-Natives came to look to the federal 
government, and its treasury, for redress of wrongs committed by the other. 
 By the time the Southwest Territory became the state of Tennessee in 1796 and a 
portion of the Northwest Territory became Ohio in 1802, much of law and governance 
now flowed from the federal government.  This is not to suggest that the federal 
government could rule by dictate: adjudication often produced conflict, not submission or 
affection, and citizens of the new states proved remarkably adept at using federal power 
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to secure goals at odds with federal policy.  Statehood and its aftermath also provoked 
some of the fiercest contentions over national authority, as the federal government and 
newly minted states struggled bitterly to control both lands and Indian affairs.  These 
controversies underscore how much territorial governance and the process of state 
admission had channeled polyvocal struggles over local custom and law into a frame of 
dual state and federal sovereignty.  The showy efforts to resist federal control also 
suggest just how much the federal government had insinuated itself into the lives of 
territorial citizens, who simultaneously disliked federal involvement and yet craved 
federal sanction and support.  Whether welcomed or despised, federal law and authority 
had become inescapable. 
* * * 
 How historians have interpreted the territories and the early American West more 
generally in the first few decades of the early republic has depended on where they 
grounded their perspective and centered their narratives. Some have followed the gaze of 
Anglo-American politicians westward from Philadelphia, while others have rooted 
themselves in the particularities of the multiethnic communities of the Ohio and 
Tennessee countries.  The result has been diverging narratives, especially about the 
“state”—a somewhat abstract term rarely used in early America that has nonetheless 
become the subject of considerable historiographical discussion. 
Views on the early American state have shifted.  A traditional narrative depicted 
the early American national state as small, weak, and insignificant—a “midget institution 
in a giant land,” in John Murrin’s memorable phrase. In this earlier account, the great 
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transformations wrought between the American Revolution and the Civil War, especially 
the rapid expansion of the United States across North America into lands owned by 
Native peoples and foreign empires, reflected an inexorable demographic force that swept 
across the landscape, dragging a reluctant federal government in its wake.  But 
increasingly, historians and political scientists have rejected this vision of early American 
statelessness as a “myth,” propagated in part by early Americans themselves, that ignored 
the substantial role of the federal government throughout American society.  Drawing 
from the literature on early modern state-building in Europe, they have found striking 
parallels between the United States and the centralizing European nations of the same 
era.8 
 Though these scholars point to evidence of federal strength throughout the United 
States, the region early Americans labeled the “West,” the lands between the 
Appalachians and the Mississippi River, looms especially large in their argument.  No 
other region, these scholars convincingly claim, was as reliant on the federal government, 
which governed Indian affairs, territorial administration, the public domain, the national 
                                                
8 For examples of the older history of the state, see Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State : The Expansion of National 
Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Richard Franklin Bensel, Yankee Leviathan : 
The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877 (Cambridge [England] ; Cambridge University Press, 1990); John 
Murrin, “A Roof Without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity,” in Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution 
and American National Identity (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987); John M. Murrin, “The Great Inversion, or 
Court versus Country: A Comparison of the Revolution Settlements in England (1688-1721) and America (1776-1816),” in Three 
British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776, ed. J. G. A. Pocock (Princeton, N.J., 1980).  Instances of the newer history that emphasizes the 
reach and scope of the early American state, especially the federal government, see William J. Novak, “The Myth of the ‘Weak’ 
American State,” The American Historical Review 113, no. 3 (June 2008): 752–72; William J Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and 
Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Gary Gerstle, Liberty and 
Coercion: The Paradox of American Government from the Founding to the Present / (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015); 
Max M. Edling, A Hercules in the Cradle: War, Money, and the American State, 1783-1867 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2014); Max M. Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making of the American State 
(Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in 
Nineteenth-Century America (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  The political science literature on 
American political development is large, though its focus on early American history is limited.  For an overview, see Richard R. John, 
“Governmental Institutions as Agents of Change: Rethinking American Political Development in the Early Republic, 1787-1835,” 
Studies in American Political Development 11 (Fall 1997): 347–80; Richard R. John, “American Political Development and Political 
History,” in Oxford Handbook of American Political Development, ed. Richard Valelly, Suzanne Mettler, and Ronald Lieberman 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Ira Katznelson, “Flexible Capacity: The Military and Early American Statebuilding,” in 
Shaped by War and Trade: International Influences on American Political Development, Ira Katznelson and Martin Shefter, eds. 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2002), 82-110. 
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military, and foreign relations, all of which had an outsized impact in the early American 
West.  Taken altogether, these scholars conclude, “The territories, not the capital, were 
the repository of national authority.”9 
 Yet standing apart from these debates over the comparative strength of the early 
American state is a third narrative strand, in which the state is conspicuous by its 
absence.  These historians focus on the early American West not as a colony of the 
federal government but as a borderland—a place where multiple peoples and sovereigns 
collided in an often-violent struggle for coexistence and power.  These histories, too, put 
the United States in an internationalist frame, in this case in a comparative context 
against global experiences of encounter and empire.  In these narratives, the United States 
and its federal government are rarely central protagonists. Rather, other peoples held the 
power to dictate events, particularly the Native peoples who dominated the continent well 
into the nineteenth century, a time long after earlier histories had described Native 
autonomy as already in eclipse. In the borderlands, the plans and visions concocted in 
distant imperial capitals melted away, and governments frequently appeared the hapless 
pawns of complicated local dynamics of power and interrelationship that they little 
understood and could not control. As two recent commentators summarized the field, 
“Borderlands history is everything that state-centered histories are not.”10 
                                                
9 Balogh, A Government Out of Sight, 154.  For additional works that focus on the strength of the federal state in the early American 
west, see William H. Bergmann, The American National State and the Early West (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012); Jeff Pasley, “Midget on Horseback: American Indians and the History of the American State,” Common-Place 9, no. 1 
(October 2008), http://www.common-place.org/vol-09/no-01/pasley/; Paul Frymer, “Building an American Empire: Territorial 
Expansion in the Antebellum Era,” U.C. Irvine Law Review 1 (2011): 913; Stephen J. Rockwell, Indian Affairs and the Administrative 
State in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Heumann, “The Tutelary Empire.” 
10 Quotation from Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett, “On Borderlands,” Journal of American History 98, no. 2 (September 1, 
2011): 338–61.  The literature on the early American borderlands has grown enormously in the last decade.  For some examples, see 
Juliana Barr and Edward Countryman, eds., Contested Spaces of Early America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2014); Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: 
Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); Michael J. Witgen, An 
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 There is, however, an unspoken narrative about the state embedded in much of 
borderlands history.  These works extend to the frontier the story famously related by 
Hendrick Hartog of free-range pigs roaming the streets of New York in defiance of 
municipal ordinances and judicial decrees outlawing the practice: custom prevails over 
the state’s formal edicts, thanks to what Hartog terms the “implicit pluralism” of 
American law.  This narrative of the failure of the centralized state to overcome the local 
and the particular has considerable currency, even outside historical circles.  Two of the 
foremost proponents of this account in different fields—James Scott, describing abortive 
efforts to recast traditional land structures along rational lines, and Hernando de Soto, 
depicting how customary practices overcame formal titling schemes—both rely on the 
history of land in the early American West to illuminate this overarching point about state 
failure.11 
 These portrayals of the early American West as a region simultaneously 
dominated by the state and yet outside state control seem paradoxical and contradictory, 
but the scholars of the state and of the borderlands are mostly talking past each other.  
This problem has several layers.  One is that, when closely examined, the early American 
“state” slips like sand through fingers, devolving into its diverse constituent parts, many 
of which looked almost nothing like the archetypal images of hierarchical bureaucracies.  
                                                                                                                                            
Infinity of Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early North America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012); 
Juliana Barr, Peace Came in the Form of a Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas Borderlands (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2007); James Brooks, Captives & Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands 
(Chapel Hill [N.C.]: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). 
11 Hartog’s famous argument on pluralism appears in Hendrik Hartog, “Pigs and Positivism,” Wisconsin Law Review 1985 (1985): 
899–935.  For Scott’s substantive discussion of the federal land system, see James C. Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes 
to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 11–52; Scott also places a picture of the 
federal land system’s rectangular western grid on his book’s cover.  For De Soto’s discussion, see Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of 
Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 105–152.  A similar 
account appears in Eduardo Moisés Peñalver and Sonia Katyal, Property Outlaws: How Squatters, Pirates, and Protesters Improve 
the Law of Ownership (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 55-63 
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Much of the early American state seems indistinguishable to modern eyes from “the 
people,” as then defined: white propertied men serving on juries or in the militia, 
selecting members of local elites as magistrates and officers.  Other, seemingly familiar 
parts of the state—legislatures and the executive, for instance—played unfamiliar roles as 
quasi-judicial bodies, expending inordinate amounts of time resolving individual claims 
when not engaged in what present-day standards would deem breathtaking acts of 
venality and self-dealing.  And the closest analogs of present-day bureaucracies, places 
like the War Department or the Land Office that dealt with matters of enormous concern, 
often consisted of a handful of clerks in makeshift rooms.  This unfamiliarity of the 
origins and nature of state authority in early America can often blind us to when and how 
it was exercised.12 
This challenge carries over into sources.  Because of the federal government’s 
often slapdash early recordkeeping, the history of the early American state in the 
territories cannot be written solely from Washington; retelling this past requires delving 
into the records that survive scattered in regional archives throughout the former 
territories.  By the same token, because so much of federal authority was exercised 
through local institutions, understanding federal power involves juxtaposing the 
documents of high policy with the correspondence, deeds, warrants, lawsuits, and 
petitions that together comprised the stuff of governance in the territories.  This 
perspective also shifts understandings of which historical actors mattered: even histories 
                                                
12 Similar arguments about the challenge of observing aspects of the early American state appear in Novak, “The Myth of the ‘Weak 
American State’”; Novak develops and elaborates on many of these arguments in William J Novak, “The Concept of the State in 
American History,” in Boundaries of the State in US History, ed. James T. Sparrow, William J. Novak, and Stephen W. Sawyer 
(Chicago ; London: University Of Chicago Press, 2015), 325–49.  Novak in particularly criticizes the tendency to anthropomorphize 
and reify the state, stressing work that argues that the “the state is not ‘a thing.’”  Ibid., 337.  On the role of legislatures as adjudicative 
bodies in early America, see Christine A. Desan, “The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early American 
Tradition,” Harvard Law Review 111 (1998): 1383. 
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that emphasize the importance of Natives, intruders, and others in the construction of the 
federal state often present them as subjects of federal policy, transforming a dialogue into 
a univocal process of subjugation.  For their part, borderlands historians have been adept 
at delving deep into the records produced in the peripheries, reading them against the 
grain to illuminate the experiences of Native peoples and other marginalized groups who 
produced few records of their own.  But in the process, they have sometimes then missed 
the insights to be gained by interpreting these documents with the grain: that is, to read 
them as the administrative documents that they were, illustrating how early American 
institutions functioned when pressed with claims by Natives and others. 
Another, and related, problem is the challenge of figuring out how to assess state 
authority and power in practice. Historians and political scientists have increasingly 
eschewed earlier labels of states as “strong” or “weak” to focus on finer distinctions.  
Some scholars have stressed the contrast between “despotic power,” the state’s ability to 
impose its agenda unfettered, and “infrastructural power,” the state’s authority to 
“implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm”; others have similarly 
emphasized how the early American state operated “out of sight,” or was “light and 
inconspicuous.”  Yet even these careful typologies fail to capture fully the often 
counterintuitive and paradoxical ways that the early American national state exerted 
power and influence.  Federal authority was ubiquitous in the territories, literally written 
into every land grant, passport into Indian country, or territorial court case.  Moreover, in 
dealing with land, the territories, and Indian affairs, the federal government was operating 
where it enjoyed extensive and often exclusive constitutional responsibility.  But, to an 
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extent scholars have not appreciated, this pervasiveness often failed to provide the power 
to impose policies, either through coercion or the subtler power of infrastructure.  Federal 
officials often felt put-upon and helpless, unable to shape events or resist the demands 
made of them.  Yet ironically, territorial citizens and Natives also spoke of their 
powerlessness, bemoaning their dependence on a federal government that they 
nonetheless were remarkably able to twist to their own ends.13   
This seeming contradiction reflected the fact that federal authority in the 
territories only rarely dictated outcomes and controlled policy; it consisted, rather, of 
defining the rules and norms that governed territorial conflicts.  Territorial inhabitants 
were right to complain that they could not escape federal authority: even as they resisted 
federal law, the inhabitants enhanced its legitimacy and scope by implicitly accepting the 
federal government’s legislative and adjudicatory power.  But federal officials were right, 
too, that in practice their interpretations of federal law rarely prevailed over the dissenting 
views of territorial residents.  In this sense, the federal government in the territories was 
not simply weak in some ways but strong in others.  Rather, the cause of federal 
powerlessness in the territories—its seeming inability to control how territorial 
inhabitants exploited federal authority and resources—was also simultaneously the 
source of federal government’s primary power: territorial inhabitants’ craving for, and 
dependence on, the legitimating role of federal law.   
                                                
13 The contrast between despotic and infrastructural power appears in Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its 
Origins, Mechanisms and Results,” European Journal of Sociology 25, no. 2 (1984): 185–213; that the federal government operated 
“out of sight” and lightly and inconspicuously are the claims of Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight, and Max Edling, A 
Revolution in Favor of Government.  Efforts to capture how the federal government was both strong and weak appear in Gerstle, 
Liberty and Coercion; James T. Sparrow, William J. Novak, and Stephen W. Sawyer, eds.,“Introduction,” in Boundaries of the State 
in US History, 1–19. 
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Grounding “the state” more firmly in these historical particulars, this dissertation 
suggests, offers an interpretation of governance and borderlands not as antithetical and 
antagonistic, but as mutually constitutive.  It was the proliferation of polities and 
jurisdictions deemed legitimate that created the borderlands as places marked by multiple 
centers of power, authority, and sources of rights.  Yet at the same time, the constant 
conflict and violence among multiple claimants led many in the borderlands to seek an 
arbiter with some claim to legitimacy and sovereignty.  The early national state in the 
U.S. territories, in short, was as much a product of the borderlands as it was of the capital.  
If its authority came to suffuse much of everyday law and practice in the territories, it 
was often because so many borderlands residents—Native, French, and Anglo-
American—wished it to, if only to defend what they believed to be their own rights and 
entitlements. 
* * * 
 To capture these complicated dynamics of early American governance, this 
dissertation employs a different focus from the existing literature on the territories and 
state-building, which has seen substantial growth in recent years. One difference is the 
attention given the Southwest Territory.  Nearly all the current work fixates on the 
Northwest Territory and the Ohio River Valley.   The Southwest Territory appears, to the 
limited extent that it does, as a negative counterpoint, a largely stateless realm that 
reflects the failure of federal state-building.  In fact, sustained comparison suggests that 
the broad structural forces at work in the two territories were strikingly similar, and that 
the federal state was present along the southwestern borderlands to a degree current 
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scholarship downplays.  That the Southwest Territory was deemed a failure while the 
Northwest Territory was lauded as a success is itself a historical artifact that reflects the 
contentions of the territorial period and requires exploration.14 
 This dissertation also differs from prior work by adopting as its interpretive frame 
the allied concepts of law and administration.  For early Americans, law constituted the 
state in ways difficult to capture now, when law has been mythologized as a specialized 
and technical discipline dominated by experts.  For late eighteenth-century Anglo-
Americans, law was not an arcane abstraction, but a language and habit of thought that 
suffused their everyday lives: most white men routinely went to court to sue or be sued, 
court day was the center of community social and economic life, and criminal law was 
regarded as a reflection of community will.  Legality was fundamental to how territorial 
residents understood authority and government. Law’s centrality encompassed Natives as 
well: Native perceptions of Anglo-American law, and Anglo-Americans’ perceptions of 
                                                
14 For a sampling of works that focus on the state in the Northwest Territory and the Ohio Valley, see Bethel Saler, The Settlers’ 
Empire: Colonialism and State Formation in America’s Old Northwest (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014); Lucy 
Eldersveld Murphy, Great Lakes Creoles: A French-Indian Community on the Northern Borderlands, Prairie Du Chien, 1750-1860 
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Patrick Griffin, American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary 
Frontier (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007); Andrew R. L. Cayton and Stuart D. Hobbs, eds., The Center of a Great Empire: The Ohio 
Country in the Early American Republic (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2005); Heumann, “The Tutelary Empire”; John Robinson 
Harper, “Revolution and Conquest: Politics, Violence, and Social Change in the Ohio Valley, 1765—1795” (Ph.D. Dissertation, The 
University of Wisconsin — Madison, 2008). 
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Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee; a Study in Frontier Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
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Tennessee Press, 2015).  
Comparisons of the Southwest and Northwest Territories that emphasize the differences between the two territories include Andrew R. 
L. Cayton, “‘Separate Interests’ and the Nation-State: The Washington Administration and the Origins of Regionalism in the Trans-
Appalachian West,” The Journal of American History 79, no. 1 (June 1, 1992): 39–67; Andrew R. L Cayton, “‘When Shall We Cease 
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Southwest and Northwest Territories: A Comparison, 1787-1796,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 49, no. 3 (October 1, 1990): 188–
96.  I consider the arguments of these works more fully in Chapter 6.. 
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Native law, helped structure the relationship between Native nations and the United 
States.15   
Understanding law in the territories requires taking institutions seriously, 
particularly early American administration. As a new generation of legal historians has 
emphasized, administration—in this instance, officers of the executive branch appointed 
by the federal government—was often where questions of law were worked out.  This 
was particularly true in the territories, where federally appointed officials like territorial 
governors, Indian agents, and army paymasters had to resolve a remarkable array of 
important legal questions both in dialogue with and outside of courts.  In the context of 
both land rights and Indian affairs, this was often because the federal government was 
creating legal rights, or at least formalizing inchoate rights, a task for which courts were 
often ill-equipped. In thinking through late eighteenth-century administration, we should 
not read the large literature on the twentieth-century “administrative state” backward in 
time.  As it then existed, federal administration was barely organized, and often consisted 
of loose and fluid networks of personal relationships.  But what is striking, and 
surprising, about early American administration, especially when set against later 
developments, is how this small handful of officials often managed to exercise 
disproportionate influence.16 
                                                
15 For considerations of law’s constitutive role in colonial American communities, see Peter Charles Hoffer, Law and People in 
Colonial America, Rev. ed (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Bruce H. Mann, Neighbors and Strangers: Law and 
Community in Early Connecticut, Studies in Legal History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987).  Other works trace 
this continuity after the American Revolution, albeit in very different contexts.  For instances, see Laura F Edwards, The People and 
Their Peace: Legal Culture and the Transformation of Inequality in the Post-Revolutionary South (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2009); Novak, The People’s Welfare; Hendrik Hartog, “Abigail Bailey’s Coverture: Law in a Married Women’s 
Consciousness,” in Law in Everyday Life, ed. Austin Sarat and Thomas R Kearns (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993). 
16 For older works focusing on administration, see Leonard Dupee White, The Jeffersonians : A Study in Administrative History, 1801-
1829 (New York : Macmillan, 1951); Leonard Dupee White, The Federalists : A Study in Administrative History (New York, N.Y. : 
Macmillan, 1956).  Newer works that are part of the resurgence of the interest in administrative history include Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One Hundred Years of American Administrative Law (New Haven: Yale 
  18 
Law in the territories was also “legally pluralist”—a term of art that refers to the 
coexistence of multiple legitimate sources of law within a single jurisdiction.  As a large 
literature on law and empire underscores, legal pluralism was particularly rife in imperial 
borderlands, where the law promulgated by imperial powers had to accommodate the 
diverse legal practices of other peoples and sovereigns, whether through formal structures 
or implicit acknowledgment.  As an analytic, legal pluralism offers a helpful tool with 
which to think through the processes that unfolded in the U.S. territories, and it also 
points to similarities between the United States and other global empires.  The process of 
centralization traced here follows in some respects the legal history of empire offered by 
Lauren A. Benton, in which the proliferation of claims produced by pluralism tended to 
strengthen, rather than undermine, the central state.17   
But, while useful, legal pluralism should also not be employed uncritically or as a 
default explanatory model.  The risks are twofold.  First, many scholars, particularly in 
U.S. context, have followed Hartog’s use of legal pluralism as a synonym for the well-
worn dichotomy between customary and formal law.  This version casts legal pluralism 
as antithetical to state-ordered legal systems.  In fact, as the comparative literature on law 
and empire demonstrates, so-called “strong” legal pluralism exists when plural law 
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becomes formal law—when, as in colonial India, multiple legal orders are granted formal 
recognition and institutionalized within state law and courts.  Exploring pluralism in the 
territories, in other words, does not require concluding that customary practice thwarted 
state orderings.18   
Related to this risk of conflating pluralism and weak state authority is the 
assumption that borderlands and legal pluralism are inevitably twinned concepts.  In fact, 
the U.S. Constitution made the American borderlands formally less legally plural than the 
rest of the nation.  Federalism created overlapping jurisdictions with multiple legitimate 
sources of law throughout the United States—except in the territories, where the federal 
government was the sole sovereign, at least outside of Indian country.  And, for most 
practical purposes, Indian country—legally, the land that remained under Native control 
and jurisdiction—was foreign territory under federal law, mapmakers’ pretensions 
notwithstanding.19 
In this sense, the legal complexities of the territories stemmed more from 
neighboring as  overlapping jurisdictions—from, in other words, the challenge of 
borders.  In both the Northwest and Southwest Territories, the United States abutted 
foreign jurisdictions that it could not control, including Native nations as well as the 
British and Spanish empires.  Accordingly, issues of diplomacy infused territorial law.  
But even with respect to the proliferation of neighboring foreign jurisdictions, the 
                                                
18 Benton, for instance, contrasts “strong” legal pluralism, where governments attempt to fix rules on the relationships between 
different sources of law, and “weak” legal pluralism, where alternate sources of law receive implicit recognition.  Benton, Law and 
Colonial Cultures, 10-11. 
19 Besides the territories, the largest spaces where the federal government had sole sovereignty, the federal government also held sole 
and exclusive jurisdiction over federal enclaves like federal arsenals and fortresses, and over the District of Columbia.  For a 
discussion of D.C., see Kate Masur, An Example for All the Land: Emancipation and the Struggle over Equality in Washington, D.C. 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012). 
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territories were distinctive but not unique: the nation’s long northern, southern, and 
maritime borders often posed similar challenges. 20   
The legal history of the territories, in short, is not a simple account of how 
diversity and customary practices thwarted arbitrarily drawn national boundaries.  On the 
contrary, the role of federal government as an adjudicatory state emphasizes how formal 
jurisdictional borders, however abstract and artificial, became meaningful and real to 
ordinary citizens, who relied on official exercises of federal jurisdiction to resolve and 
confirm their plural rights. 
    
This dissertation also differs from other works in what it omits.  Unlike prior 
studies, it does not rely on political partisanship as a fundamental explanatory paradigm.  
To be sure, there were deep ideological differences among early Americans about how 
the United States should govern the territories, distribute lands, and negotiate with Native 
peoples, and, by the late 1790s, these positions were associated with contending political 
parties labeled as Federalists and Democratic-Republicans.  But this paradigm obscures 
as well as illuminates, especially when pushed backward in time to the much more fluid 
and uncertain period of the late 1780s and early 1790s.  Fixating on high politics ignores 
what we might call the politics of the everyday—the quotidian clashes over self-interest, 
individual personalities, and shifting allegiances that were often far more consequential 
than ideological divides.  This was especially true in the territories, where partisan labels 
                                                
20 For a consideration of the northern, southern, and maritime borders, see Alan Taylor, The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers and the 
Northern Borderland of the American Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006); J. C. A. Stagg, Borderlines in Borderlands: 
James Madison and the Spanish-American Frontier, 1776-1821 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); Eliga H. Gould, Among 
the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the Making of a New World Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 2012).Nathan Perl-Rosenthal, Citizen Sailors: Becoming American in the Age of Revolution, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 
2015). 
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were often applied post hoc to factions grounded in intensely personal disagreements.  
Moreover, interpreting territorial government through partisanship ignores the role of 
empire and of administration.  The most meaningful divides were often those between 
periphery and center: the fractious Washington Cabinet pursued a strikingly unified 
approach to territorial governance, even as many territorial citizens embraced a clear, and 
often very different, set of expectations for federal rule.  Territorial officials fell in 
between.  As a result, their politics were often more administrative than ideological, 
reflecting their acute role-consciousness of negotiating between the instructions of distant 
superiors and the demands of those they governed.21 
This dissertation also considers only briefly the issue of slavery.  This may seem 
counterintuitive, since the presence or absence of slavery was perhaps the most glaring 
difference between the two territories: Congress extended the Northwest Ordinance to the 
Southwest Territory verbatim except for the Ordinance’s ban on slavery, an action 
required by North Carolina’s cession.  But this contrast should not be overdrawn.  As 
much excellent work traces, slavery existed north as well south of the Ohio, where it was 
the subject of intense legal and political struggles.  Meanwhile, the Southwest Territory 
was far from the plantation society that central Tennessee in particular would later 
become: most of the population was then clustered in present-day eastern Tennessee, a 
region where slavery remained relatively marginal through the Civil War.  This is not to 
downplay the extent to which slavery was central to the early history of both territories, 
                                                
21 Explorations of the public lands and Indian policy that emphasize partisanship include Daniel Feller, The Public Lands in 
Jacksonian Politics (Madison : University of Wisconsin Press, 1984); John Robert Van Atta, Securing the West: Politics, Public 
Lands, and the Fate of the Old Republic, 1785-1850 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); David Andrew Nichols, Red 
Gentlemen & White Savages: Indians, Federalists, and the Search for Order on the American Frontier (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2008).  Feller, however, argues for a shift toward partisanship from regionalism over the 1820s.  For an argument that 
even the high politics of the 1790s were organized around personalities, see Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in 
the New Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). 
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where enslaved Africans and Natives were both ubiquitous and entangled in relationships 
between Natives and the United States.  But there is also a danger of reading the 
territories’ early history in light of mid-nineteenth-century preoccupations over the 
ostensibly sharp boundaries between slave and free territory and the scope of federal 
power over slavery.  This approach risks obscuring the work of empire that the federal 
government engaged in in both the Southwest and Northwest Territories—the process of 
dispossessing Native peoples and making land alienable.  In this sense, the 
accomplishments of federal power in the late eighteenth century were the necessary 
precondition to the rapid spread of imported labor, both enslaved and free, that followed 
over the next half-century.22 
* * * 
 For all the work on the early American West in the last several decades, the 
process of its transformation from borderland to “bordered land,” in the memorable 
phrase of Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, still remains somewhat mysterious.  The 
broad causes of this shift in power are apparent: the rising demographic, military, and 
financial might of the United States, coupled with the waning of alternate sources of 
power and patronage in the borderlands.  Yet, notwithstanding these factors, there were 
good reasons to doubt that a federal government hobbled by internal divisions, weak 
allegiances, and a miniscule cadre of officials could overcome its rivals to secure its 
                                                
22 For the existence of slavery in the Northwest Territory, notwithstanding the prohibition in the Northwest Ordinance, see John Craig 
Hammond, Slavery, Freedom, and Expansion in the Early American West (Charlottesville : University of Virginia Press, 2007); 
Matthew Salafia, Slavery’s Borderland: Freedom and Bondage Along the Ohio River (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2013); Paul Finkelman, “Slavery and the Northwest Ordinance: A Study in Ambiguity,” Journal of the Early Republic 6, no. 4 (1986): 
343–70; Paul Finkelman, “Evading the Ordinance: The Persistence of Bondage in Indiana and Illinois,” Journal of the Early Republic 
9, no. 1 (1989): 21–51..  For studies of Native slaves in both the Northwest and Southwest Territories, see Carl J Ekberg, Stealing 
Indian Women: Native Slavery in the Illinois Country (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007); Brett Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance: 
Indigenous and Atlantic Slaveries in New France (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012); Christina Snyder, 
Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing Face of Captivity in Early America (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010), 
152-81. 
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tenuous hold on the trans-Appalachian West—an outcome that Francois Furstenberg 
justifiably dubbed the “most unlikely scenario of all.”23   
 The history explored here suggests one way the federal government managed to 
gain the borderlands: with the help of its residents themselves.  This is at odds with 
standard accounts of the relationship between the peoples of the borderlands, especially 
Native peoples, and the United States, which is usually portrayed as one of resistance. As 
the history that follows shows, there was plenty of struggle against the federal 
government and its policies in the territories.  But these clashes should not blind us to the 
reality that many of the same people who fought the federal government also at times 
welcomed and relied on it, reinforcing its authority and legitimacy in the process.  In 
hindsight, perhaps, this gamble on federal power seems a mistake on the inhabitants’ part, 
as federal authority rarely proved a boon for most borderlands residents, whether Native, 
French, or impoverished white settlers.  But this judgment imposes an unrealistic 
expectation of foresight on people in difficult and constrained circumstances; it also 
obscures the federal government’s contradictory dual role as both agent of and occasional 
check on expansionist impulses.  At the time, federal officials held out both the promise 
of resolving lengthy and tedious conflicts and the possibility that federal law would 
protect some modicum of residents’ deeply felt rights.  For many, this offer was too 
tempting to resist. 
                                                
23 Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North 
American History,” The American Historical Review 104, no. 3 (1999): 814–4; .Francois Furstenberg, “The Significance of the Trans-
Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History,” The American Historical Review 113, no. 3 (2008): 647–77.  One response has been to 
deny the “narrative closure” of this arc—to emphasis the persistence of autonomy and agency for many supposedly colonized peoples 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  See Hämäläinen and Truett, “On Borderlands,” 338–61.  But while this critique has 
much to recommend it, it is also somewhat disingenuous.  No doubt, many peoples confronted by the growing power of the United 
States nonetheless maintained independence and control.  But this was likely cold comfort to once-powerful peoples and nations 
uprooted from their homelands by the whim of distant federal officials.  Understandably, they themselves understood this history in 
terms of loss and tragedy. 
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A Note on Terminology 
Part of the challenge of the territories is the difficulty of applying terms that 
suggest rigid boundaries onto more fluid situations and identities.  In general, I favor the 
term Native to describe the descendants of the indigenous peoples of North America, and 
I capitalize it to signify its status as a marker of national status—as a member of a Native 
nation—as well as of ethnicity.  At times I use the term “Indian,” the more common 
parlance of the time, particularly when I speak of the views of federal officials and 
others.  Consistent with the usage of the time, especially in formal diplomacy, I refer to 
Native “nations,” though I occasionally also employ “tribe” or “tribal.”  I use Natives’ 
national affiliations when speaking of a single nation or its members.  Following the 
practice of many federal officials, particularly on formal occasions, I often refer to “U.S. 
citizens” more broadly and “territorial citizens” more specifically, in contradistinction to 
Native peoples, though the meaning and scope of U.S. citizenship was still hazy at this 
time.  I generally use “Anglo-American” to describe the U.S. citizens who arrived and 
settled in the territories, who mostly, although not solely, traced their ancestry to the 
British Isles; this ancestry distinguished them from the territories’ pre-existing French 
residents, who were also legally U.S. citizens.  I also at times describe U.S. citizens of 
European descent as “white,” a racial category well known and understood at the time to 
distinguish Euro-Americans from Native peoples.   
There are also the challenges of labeling historical institutions and concepts. To 
ease comprehension, I refer to the federal government or national government.  Both 
terms were used at the time, though not as often as the now less familiar “general 
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government.”  Finally, many in the late eighteenth century employed the term 
“sovereignty,” though many now criticize the term for being overly abstract or even 
quasi-metaphysical.  For early Americans, sovereignty conveyed both jurisdiction—the 
power to set and determine the laws for a given territory or people—and autonomy.  But 
sovereignty’s abstract aspect also appealed to many at the time: like “independence,” 
“sovereignty” was at once protean while also conveying a powerful sense of national 
dignity and status. 
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Prologue 
The regions that the United States classified as the territories had older names, as 
Anglo-Americans bastardized indigenous terms into English forms well known to early 
Americans.  In what became the Northwest Territory, the hilly, forested Ohio Country 
stretched from Lake Erie down to the Ohio River, the region’s main waterway; the river 
and the region’s name derived from the Seneca word “ohiiyo’,” used as the name for 
what is now the Allegheny River in western Pennsylvania.  Further west were the 
Wabash and Illinois Countries— versions of the Miami river name “waapaahšiiki” and 
the Miami tribal name “lenweewa,”—where flatter lands hinted at the prairies further 
west.  Much of the future Southwest Territory went under the name of the Tennessee 
Country, named after its principal waterway, the Tennessee River, itself a version of the 
Cherokee town name “Tanasi.”  The Tennessee flowed from the stony foothills of Smoky 
Mountains along North Carolina down to the Ohio and ultimately the Mississippi.1 
All these regions were, first and foremost, Native spaces. “Indians is all we see, 
know or hear of," one army officer reported; “they are thick as Bees in this part of the 
World,” another officer stated.  North of the Ohio, this Native world was marked by 
mobility and the legacy of eastern colonization.  Alongside long-standing residents such 
as the Miamis and the Wabash Confederacy lived more recent arrivals like the 
Delawares, whose ancestral homelands lay in eastern Pennsylvania and New Jersey; the 
Shawnees, who had lived further south; and the Wyandots, who moved south from the 
western Great Lakes.  Many of these newcomers now lived in multi-ethnic, polyglot 
                                                
1 William Bright, Native American Placenames of the United States (Norman : University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 344, 181, 537,  
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towns alongside other Native nations.  Ties of trade and diplomacy linked the Ohio and 
Illinois countries in all directions—east to the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois), west and north 
to the Anishinaabe (known to early Americans as the Ottawas, Chippewas, and 
Potawatomies), and also to the south, to the nations of the Tennessee Country.2   
The Tennessee Country lay within what historians and anthropologists have 
labeled the Mississippi Shatter Zone.  From the collapse of the hierarchical Mississippian 
societies that had long occupied the Native Southeast, new Native groups began to 
emerge in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the Choctaws in present-day 
Mississippi, the Chickasaws in present-day western Tennessee, the Creeks in present-day 
Alabama and Georgia, and the Cherokees in present-day eastern Tennessee and northern 
Georgia.  More populous and centralized than the nations north of the Ohio, these Native 
polities were nonetheless often subdivided based on geography into “upper” and “lower” 
towns that seemed to American observers only loosely affiliated.  The Southwest 
Territory itself lay within the “Tennessee Corridor,” a long-standing trade, hunting, and 
diplomatic route shared among the four nations that connected the Native southeast with 
the Ohio country.3 
                                                
2 Jonathan Heart to William Judd, October 14, 1787 (typescript copy), Jonathan Heart Papers, VFM 5748, Ohio Historical Society; 
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(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004); Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 1750-1830, Indians of the 
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Euro-American settlements within these Native homelands were few and 
scattered.  In the mid-eighteenth century, the French had established the remote military 
and trading outposts of Vincennes, Kaskaskia, and Cahokia along the Mississippi and 
Wabash Rivers; these small villages survived transfer to the British after the Seven 
Years’ War, and were again seized during the American Revolution, this time by 
Virginians.  A few white settlers had begun to venture down the Ohio River from western 
Pennsylvania into the Ohio Country, joined by settlers who had crossed the river from 
“Ken-tuck-ee,” rapidly populating with Virginians.  In the Tennessee Country, which lay 
south of Kentucky, Euro-American settlements were divided.  To the east, in Cherokee 
territory along the headwaters of the Tennessee River, North Carolinians began to arrive 
from across the mountains in the early 1770s, in a region later designated the Washington 
and Hamilton Districts.  Several hundred miles to the west, separated from Washington 
and Hamilton by the Cherokee homelands, lay the nascent settlement of Nashville on the 
Cumberland River, established in 1779 by a few hundred North Carolinians travelling 
south from Kentucky, and known as the Cumberland or Mero District.4 
In 1783, the British transferred sovereignty over this region—the entire trans-
Appalachian West east of the Mississippi, south of the Great Lakes, and north of 
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Florida—to the United States.  Competing European empires, though, still surrounded 
these newly American regions.   Directly across the Mississippi from the Illinois Country 
lay Spanish Louisiana, populated by fledging settlements such as St. Louis as well as, 
downriver, the commercial hub of New Orleans.  The Spanish also controlled the Gulf 
Coast.  Somewhere south of the Tennessee Country, in lands owned by the Creek, 
Chickasaw, and Choctaw nations, lay the uncertain and disputed boundary between 
American and Spanish territory.  North of the Ohio and Illinois Countries lay British 
Canada, still closely linked to the Illinois and Wabash countries by commercial ties.  The 
commercial, diplomatic, and regional hubs of Detroit and Michilimackinac further north 
formally belonged to the United States under the Treaty of Paris, but the British, alleging 
American violations of the treaty, had not ceded control.5 
Sovereignty over the lands within the borders of the United States was claimed by 
the states.  By dint of its purported conquest as well as its charter rights, Virginia asserted 
sovereignty over all the lands north of the Ohio River to the Canadian border, a claim 
disputed by Connecticut and Massachusetts.  Virginia also claimed Kentucky, south of 
the Ohio River; beyond that, North Carolina held formal jurisdiction over the Tennessee 
Country, even though the region’s residents were constantly plotting to secede from what 
they regarded as a highly neglectful North Carolinian government.  The lands south of 
the Tennessee Country ostensibly fell within Georgia’s jurisdiction.6 
                                                
5 On some of these borderlands in the aftermath of the American Revolution, see Kathleen DuVal, Independence Lost : Lives on the 
Edge of the American Revolution (New York: Random House, 2015); Catherine Cangany, Frontier Seaport: Detroit’s Transformation 
into an Atlantic Entrepôt (Chicago ; London: University Of Chicago Press, 2014); Carl J. Ekberg, François Vallé and His World: 
Upper Louisiana before Lewis and Clark (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2002); Jay Gitlin, The Bourgeois Frontier: French 
Towns, French Traders, and American Expansion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); Alan Taylor, The Divided Ground: 
Indians, Settlers and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006). 
6 For scholarly treatments of state land claims and cessions, see Peter Onuf, “Toward Federalism: Virginia, Congress, and the Western 
Lands,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 34, no. 3 (July 1, 1977): 353–74; Peter S. Onuf, The Origins of the Federal 
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Over the course of the 1780s, states ceded many of their land claims to the United 
States, motivated by a desire to be freed from the burdens of administration as well as by 
considerable pressure by Congress and the states without western lands.  Virginia was 
among the first: in 1784, it ceded “all right title and claim as well of soil as jurisdiction 
which this Commonwealth hath to the Territory or Tract of Country” north of the Ohio 
River to the federal government (the state retained control, however, over Kentucky).  
After offering and then retracting a cession in 1784, North Carolina finally ceded “all 
right, title and claim which this State has to the Sovereignty and territory of the Lands” in 
the Tennessee Country in 1789.7 
These state acts of cessions were less unilateral gifts than complicated and 
carefully negotiated contracts with the federal government.  They contained elaborate and 
detailed provisions that required that the federal government honor prior and even future 
state land grants, guarantee the persistence of certain state laws, and protect territorial 
residents.  They also stipulated that the ceded lands ultimately be admitted as separate 
states with the same rights of “Sovereignty, Freedom and Independence as the other 
States.”8 
The federal government slowly established its authority in the ceded regions.  In 
the 1780s, a small federal military force created several forts along the Ohio River, and 
federal negotiators met the Ohio Country tribes to negotiate treaties.  Congress did not 
create a government for Virginia’s ceded lands until 1787, when it enacted the Northwest 
                                                                                                                                            
Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States, 1775-1787 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); 
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Ordinance.  Styled a compact between the territorial residents and the United States, the 
Ordinance established a government with a federally appointed governor, secretary 
(effectively lieutenant governor), and three territorial judges; together, the governor and 
judges would initially constitute the territorial legislature.  It also stipulated that, once the 
territory had reached 60,000 inhabitants, it, or some portion of it, would be entitled to 
admission to statehood, and guaranteed territorial residents certain fundamental rights.  In 
1790, when Congress accepted North Carolina’s cession, it largely extended the 
Northwest Ordinance over the newly created Southwest Territory.9 
 In 1788, Congress selected as governor of the Northwest Territory Arthur St. 
Clair, a Scottish-born Pennsylvanian, Revolutionary War general, and former President 
of Congress.  One territorial citizen recollected St. Clair as a man of “grate humanity & 
Sencibility,” but also a man who “could not beare dictation by inferiors or those of Under 
rank to him.”  As territorial secretary, Congress appointed Winthrop Sargent, a surveyor 
from Massachusetts.  In the Southwest Territory, the federal government relied on 
prominent locals. The President selected William Blount, a politically influential North 
Carolinian who had served in the Constitutional Convention and the Continental 
Congress, as governor.  North Carolina’s congressional delegation all concurred that 
Blount was the “properest man,” though Blount’s extensive land speculations had led the 
Creeks to dub him “Fushe Micco”—the “Dirt King.”  Daniel Smith, a Nashville surveyor 
                                                
9 Northwest Ordinance, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50 (1789). 
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and the “ablest and best character there,” in one congressman’s estimation, secured 
appointment as territorial secretary.10  
This handful of federal officials confronted the world that the United States had 
inherited: regions of jurisdictional uncertainty, with unclear and contested boundaries, 
where formal sovereignty had passed and repassed between competing would-be imperial 
powers, and where effective sovereignty remained in Native hands.  The clearest 
consequence of the century of imperial struggle and contest for control over eastern 
North America that preceded the creation of the federal territories was a jumble of claims 
to property, sovereignty, and jurisdiction—a tangle that it now fell to these often 
beleaguered officials to resolve. 
 
                                                
10 Ichabod Nye, “Journal” (typescript), p. 62, Folder 2, Box 3, Marietta Ohio Collection, Ohio Historical Society; “Recommendations 
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PART I: LAND 
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Chapter 1: Sources of Title in the Territories 
 
 In 1785, Thomas Jefferson helped create the first law governing federal lands.  
The Land Ordinance of 1785 laid out a plan for the expansive territory that the federal 
government came to own as states ceded their land claims.  Long hailed by historians as 
the origin point for the federal land system, the law envisioned transforming vacant 
public domain into rigidly rectangular parcels, divided by federal surveyors into lines that 
hewed to the four points of the compass, which would then be sold at public auction. 1 
In practice, as Thomas Jefferson soon discovered, the federal government had 
obtained more a property morass than a public domain.  Six years after the Ordinance, 
Jefferson, now serving as Secretary of State in a new federal government, sent a detailed 
document to President George Washington:  “a report on the lands of the U.S. within the 
North Western and South Western territories, unclaimed either by Indians, or by citizens 
of these states.”  Ostensibly intended to chart “the residuary unclaimed mass” of land that 
could be sold by the federal government, the report actually recorded the tangled state of 
ownership in the territories.2 
                                                
1 Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), 28: 
375-81.  For histories that stress the centrality of the 1785 Land Ordinance, see Paul W. Gates, History of Public Land Law 
Development (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1968), 59–74; Robert V. Hine and John Mack Faragher, Frontiers: A Short 
History of the American West (Yale University Press, 2007), 41–43; Peter S Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest 
Ordinance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 21–43; Malcolm J. Rohrbough, The Land Office Business: The Settlement 
and Administration of American Public Lands, 1789-1837 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1968), 6–11.  The rectangular survey 
in particular has received considerable scholarly attention:  see, e.g., William David Pattison, “Beginnings of the American 
Rectangular Land Survey System, 1784-1800,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1957); Hildegard Binder Johnson, Order 
upon the Land: The U.S. Rectangular Land Survey and the Upper Mississippi Country, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); 
Andro Linklater, Measuring America: How the United States Was Shaped by the Greatest Land Sale in History (New York: Plume, 
2003); Bill Hubbard, American Boundaries: The Nation, the States, the Rectangular Survey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2009).  There has also been a vigorous debate over Jefferson’s role in creating the Ordinance: while earlier scholarship asserted that 
Jefferson—a member of the committee assigned to craft the Ordinance—was its primary drafter, later scholars have challenged this 
claim.  For an overview, see George W. Geib, “The Land Ordinance of 1785: A Bicentennial Review,” Indiana Magazine of History 
81, no. 1 (March 1, 1985): 1–13. 
2 “Report of the Secretary of State to the President,” November 8, 1791, in The Territorial Papers of the United States, Vol. IV, The 
Territory South of the River Ohio, 1790-1796, ed. Clarence Edward Carter (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1936) 
[hereinafter TP, Vol. IV], 85-100. 
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As measured by Jefferson’s report, the Land Ordinance of 1785 was a failure. 
Harassed by Natives who rejected Anglo-American assertions of ownership, federal 
surveyors had only slowly surveyed a small corner of the Northwest Territory known as 
the “Seven Ranges.”  And only a portion of those lands—just over 150,000 acres—had 
actually been purchased.3  
While federal policy floundered, the territories did not lie vacant and 
“unclaimed.”  On the contrary, Jefferson chronicled dozens of claims to territorial lands.  
Nearly all of the Southwest Territory still legally belonged to the Cherokee and 
Chickasaw Nations; Native title had been “cleared,” in Jefferson’s parlance, only in two 
small regions.  Jefferson estimated that every acre of this purchased land—as well as 
large tracts that the Cherokees and Chickasaws still owned under federal law—had been 
sold or granted by North Carolina, transactions the federal government was obligated to 
honor under the terms of North Carolina’s cession. Besides these claimants, there were 
also white settlers throughout the territory who asserted ownership “without Right or 
License.”4    
The Northwest Territory was similar.  The Delawares, Shawnees, Miamis, and 
other Native nations still owned most of the Territory.  Treaties with these nations, with 
ill-defined boundaries, purported to sell some land to the federal government, but many 
Natives disputed their validity.  Nonetheless, there were already myriad claimants for the 
purchased lands, as Jefferson traced: “Ancient Companies” (companies that had 
                                                
3 Jefferson’s report put the amount sold at 150,896 acres.  Ibid.  Instances of Native resistance to surveying the Seven Ranges appear 
in “Message from the Indian Nations to the United States,” 1786, Indians of North America Collection, Burton Historical Collection, 
Detroit Public Library; George Brickell and Thomas Girty, “Deposition,” September 13, 1786, vol. 3, Josiah Harmar Papers, Clement 
Library, University of Michigan [hereinafter JHP] 
4 “Report of the Secretary of State to the President,” 85-100. 
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purchased from the Indians before the Revolution), French villagers in the Illinois 
Country, the state of Connecticut, Moravian Indians, Canadian refugees, Revolutionary 
War veterans, and others.  All told, claims by non-Natives amounted to 13 million acres 
of the land Virginia had ceded to the federal government.5   
As Jefferson’s report demonstrated, though the Continental Congress may have 
envisioned the territories as vacant land awaiting transformation into a neat grid, neither 
the Northwest nor Southwest Territory was an empty space to be molded by federal 
policy.  Both teemed with people who advanced myriad, and contested, property claims 
that predated federal involvement.  In short, much of this new “federal” land was not only 
already owned but also purportedly owned several times over.  But by focusing on the 
expansive “visions” of eastern policymakers and politicians, many historians of property 
have ignored the messy realities that lurked below this westward gaze.6 
 In both territories, the complicated tangle of claims Jefferson traced resulted from 
property pluralism—the proliferation of multiple sources of ownership with disputed 
legitimacy.  Historians have often cast narratives of property in early America as a 
contest between vernacular, anti-statist “squatters” and positivist government officials 
and speculators.  But the fight over property in the territories was not primarily a struggle 
                                                
5 Ibid. 
6 With the exceptions of “squatters,” standard histories of the federal land system, fixating on federal laws, have largely ignored the 
messy realities of sorting out land in the territories, particularly omitting any discussion of state or Native claims.  See, e.g., Onuf, 
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American definitions of Native ownership without exploring how those rights in turn shaped state and federal land systems in early 
America.  Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2005); Blake A. Watson, Buying America from the Indians: Johnson v. McIntosh and the History of Native 
Land Rights (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012).  To the extent a standard scholarly narrative exists, it assumes that the 
federal domain was “created” when states ceded their western lands—see, for instance, Merrill Jensen, “The Creation of the National 
Domain, 1781-1784,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 26, no. 3 (December 1939): 323.  And the history of land in the 
Southwest Territory has received almost no scholarly attention, with the exception of a handful of specialist articles, including Thomas 
B. Jones, “The Public Lands of Tennessee,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 27, no. 1 (April 1, 1968): 13–36; L. D. Smith, “Land 
Laws of Tennessee,” Tennessee Law Review 1 (1922): 30.  There have, however, been studies of land speculation in the Southwest 
Territory: see Kristofer Ray, “Land Speculation, Popular Democracy, and Political Transformation on the Tennessee Frontier, 1780-
1800,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 61, no. 3 (October 1, 2002): 161–81. 
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between customary norms sanctioned by long-standing community practice and formal 
statutory law.  In practice, most of the sources of ownership on the frontier were neither 
deeply rooted nor informal.  Most land claims in the territories were recent, stemming 
from the 1780s; the claims Jefferson labeled as “ancient” stretched all the way back to 
1775.  And although many of these claims reflected deep-seated views about property, 
nearly all had some grounding in positive law, especially state statutes; all claimants 
cared deeply about—and fought over—formal law.  Even Native land rights, though 
grounded in immemorial usage, were refracted through Anglo-American statutes and 
precedent, and, for Anglo-Americans at least, increasingly rested on formal legal 
recognition.7 
 In short, the territories’ property pluralism resulted from too much, not too little, 
law. In the Revolution’s confusing aftermath, issues of jurisdiction and sovereignty 
remained highly unsettled.  This was especially true west of the Appalachians, where 
grand if poorly defined abstractions such as federalism and Native nationhood overlaid 
local factionalism, producing schisms and secessionist movements.  As a result, 
throughout the 1780s multiple authorities all claimed, and exercised, authority over 
property law in what became the federal territories.  These contending governments 
favored different claimants with differing concepts of ownership. Even as Native nations 
insisted on their sovereign land rights, expansionist states strongly endorsed the claims of 
                                                
7 The narrative of customary practice prevailing over formal law implicitly forms the plotline of the most productive area of property 
law history in the early republic—the large body of work on “squatters.”  This has been true both for historical monographs, see 
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Shankman, The Routledge Worlds (New York: Routledge, 2014), 324–45; and for legal scholarship using this history to cast light on 
current property questions, see Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Property Outlaws: How Squatters, Pirates, and Protesters Improve the Law 
of Ownership (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the 
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white settlers.  State statutory schemes originally constructed to benefit smallholders 
were twisted by self-interested legislators to facilitate massive and dubious land grabs.8 
  Precisely because little was settled or well-established, the territories presented 
the fundamental question about which sources of ownership would be recognized and 
deemed legitimate in early America.  As Jefferson’s report indicated, the responsibility 
for addressing this question ostensibly fell within the newly established jurisdiction of the 
federal government.  But the federal government was hampered.  State cessions shielded 
many land claims, even contingent future claims, from federal involvement.  Just as 
substantially, the federal government was not monolithic, and legislators and officials 
disagreed fiercely over how federal title should be defined.  Local disputes within the 
territories over the sources and nature of ownership found their echo in debates between 
cabinet officers and local territorial officials, or among members of Congress.  The result 
of these diverging views was that federal land law often seemed inconsistent and 
oscillating, as politicians debated which features of earlier land regimes to preserve and 
which to reject. 
To the extent a federal land policy emerged from these contentions, its core was a 
strong preference for clarity, finality, and the absence of conflict—the administrative 
virtues.   Abhorring the property disorder they watched unfold in the territories and 
throughout the early American borderlands, federal officials sought to use their 
ownership of federal lands to craft explicit chains of title.  Federal lands, one booster of 
                                                
8 On the confusing scramble for jurisdiction over the early American West, see Peter S. Onuf, The Origins of the Federal Republic: 
Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States, 1775-1787 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Christian G. 
Fritz, American Sovereigns: The People and America’s Constitutional Tradition Before the Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 11–47.  Like other historians, Onuf emphasizes that state cessions resolved the jurisdictional controversies 
under the Articles. 
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the Northwest Territory optimistically if inaccurately wrote, had a “great advantage” over 
lands elsewhere:  “the Title is indisputable.” Similarly, a senator from North Carolina 
argued that his state’s “cession is not nor ever has been viewed . . . as valuable to the 
[federal] government, but . . . only desireable in as much as the clashing claims and 
encroachments of the St[ates] on their Constitutional powers are thereby silenced and the 
government freed from the disgrace and expences enivitably attendant on disputes with 
the Indians.”  The handful of land statutes the first Congress enacted reflected this 
embrace of clarity, particularly in Indian affairs.9 
 Yet even when the federal government could reach an agreement enshrined 
through formal law, it was still only minimally successful at recasting ownership in the 
territories.  The property mess in the territories proved too tangled, and there were too 
many other legitimate sources of land law, for new concepts of ownership dictated from 
Philadelphia to succeed.  Rather than a resolution, state cessions of the territorial property 
morass to the federal government marked merely the beginning of a decades-long 
struggle over the source and nature of title in early America. 
* * * 
As Jefferson’s report illustrated, title in early America began with Native nations, 
who owned the lands Anglo-Americans came to label the Northwest and Southwest 
Territories.  These owners included, among others, the Cherokees who lived in the 
foothills of Blue Ridge Mountains, the Chickasaws who lived south and west of the 
                                                
9 Samuel Holden Parsons to His Children, January 7, 1786, Folder 6, Samuel Parsons Papers, Connecticut Historical Society, Hartford, 
Conn.; Benjamin Hawkins to William Blount, April 24, 1792, Folder 4: 1792, William Blount Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress [hereinafter WBP:LC].  Arguably the most important piece of land legislation enacted by the First Congress was the Trade 
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Cumberland River, and the Wyandots, Miamis, Shawnees, and Delawares who lived 
along the rivers of present-day Ohio and Indiana.10 
By the 1760s and 1770s, when the first Anglo-American settlers settled in the 
Indian country that would become the U.S. territories, earlier debates over the nature and 
validity of Native land claims had given way to the near-ubiquitous practice of 
purchasing Native property rights.  In the 1770s, the earliest settlers of Washington 
County, North Carolina, which became part of the Southwest Territory, recorded a series 
of individual purchases of land from the Cherokees.  In Vincennes, a long-standing 
French settlement along the Wabash River in present-day Indiana, settlers routinely 
purchased lands from the local Piankeshaw Indians.  An Anglo-American visitor to the 
town in 1789 noted that many of the town’s titles rested on “purchases made from 
Individual Indians.”11 
The legal controversy over Indian land sales that came to engulf the U.S. 
territories, then, was not over whether Natives owned land that they could sell.  Rather, 
during and after the Revolution, an intense debate raged over the meaning and nature of 
Native “consent” to land sales.  Both Natives and Anglo-Americans regarded some 
indication of Native consent to a transaction necessary for it to be legally valid.  But, 
despite widespread and shared use of the term “consent,” there was little agreement about 
what such consent required or what form it should take.  Not only did Natives and Anglo-
Americans often disagree, but, throughout the 1780s and ‘90s, Anglo-Americans also 
                                                
10 For an overview of the histories of these diverse Native nations, see the prologue. 
11 Records of Washington County Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions, Volume Book 1, 1778-1798 (Nashville, Tenn.: Historical 
Records Survey, Works Progress Administration, 1938), 20; Indian Land Sale Contract, 20 May 1786, Doc. I.214, Lasselle Family 
Papers, L127, Indiana State Library, Manuscripts & Rare Books Division, Indianapolis, Ind.; Land Contract, 22 May 22, Doc. I.215, 
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fiercely struggled among themselves over how to define legitimate Native consent.  This 
conflict manifested in three interrelated legal debates centered in the territories: the 
legality of private purchases from the Indians, the validity of the doctrine of conquest, 
and the extent of the federal obligation to conform to Native law on consent. 
 
Cherokee, Delaware, and other Native nations’ concepts of consent appeared 
largely through the complaints they voiced to Anglo-Americans when they felt their 
norms had been violated.  Despite their diversity, these nations shared fundamental 
structures of authority, and long interaction with Europeans had led to a strong sense of 
what a legitimate transaction looked like. By the late eighteenth century, Natives, like 
Anglo-Americans, insisted on written recordation of land sales. “Writings, when they are 
justly executed never Lye,” a group of Miamis told a federal official in reference to past 
land sales. “Let them therefore be respected.” Native representatives placed great 
emphasis on what the “just execution” of such documents required.  It was not enough for 
a treaty to be written; the terms of the agreement had to be fully explained and accurately 
translated to them for their consent to be valid. 12   
Natives’ most substantial concern—one that caused endless frustration for Anglo-
American interlocutors—was that those selling the land possess the proper authority to do 
so.  Native political culture relied heavily on discussion among councils; one group of 
Cherokee representatives described how a land matter had been “fully discussed before 
                                                
12 “A Journal of the Proceedings at a Council Held with the Indians of the Wabash and Illinois at Post Vincents, by Brigadier General 
Putnam,” October 1792, in Rowena Buell, ed., The Memoirs of Rufus Putnam and Certain Official Papers and Correspondence 
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147 chiefs” before a definitive resolution could be reached.  In Native eyes, a land sale 
was only valid if those who entered it had the requisite authority to agree, and if a council 
subsequently ratified their actions.  Without such endorsement, Native nations had not 
truly consented to the land sale. One Miami chief condemned the sale at the Treaty of 
Fort Harmar of 1789, which, he observed, had been made not by “chiefs, neither 
delegates” but by “only young men without authority and instruction from their chiefs”; 
consequently, the sale would “not be approved.”  An Indian agent in Cherokee territory 
noted that another purported sale was almost certainly invalid, as none of the “principal 
Chiefs, knows anything of the matter.”13 
The allocation of authority within tribes was central to Native conceptions of 
consent.  Most nations of the eastern woodlands divided authority between chiefs, who 
exercised control over peacetime affairs, and the “warriors” or “war chiefs,” who 
governed military matters.  Anglo-Americans well-versed in Indian affairs understood 
this distinction, addressing letters to tribe’s “headmen and warriors.”  Federal Brigadier 
General Rufus Putnam discovered the significance of the division when a chief of the 
Wabash Confederacy refused to negotiate with a U.S. army major on the ground that he 
was “no more then a war Capttain”; the chief would only permit his brother, a war 
captain to go, as “it was proper one War Captain should Speek with another.” Putnam 
accordingly shed his military uniform for civilian attire, and adopted the title of agent 
rather than general.14 
                                                
13 James Winchester, “Surveying Notebook,” 1797-1800, Box 4, Folder 16. James Winchester Paper, Tennessee State Library and 
Archives; “Report of Antoine Gamelin,” May 17, 1790, in SCP, 155-60; Joseph Martin to Patrick Henry, July 2, 1789, 2XX30, Draper 
Manuscripts, Reel 116, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wis. 
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Traditionally, land sales had fallen within the chiefs’ purview.  But this division 
was shifting.  The ceaseless invasions of Indian country, and the interconnection between 
land and violence, gave the war chiefs increasing influence over these decisions.  “[O]n 
the present occasion no lands will be purchased without the consent of the warriors,” one 
agent among the Cherokees wrote.  “The Chiefs are governed by them, especially in the 
sale of lands.”  Matters among the Delawares, Wyandots, and Shawnees were similar.  
According to informants in Indian country, the “Warrior Chiefs” of those tribes were 
proclaiming that “their Old Counsellors & Kings have given up the land to the Big Knife 
[the Anglo-Americans], But we the Chiefs of the Warriors have not given our Consent.”  
The warriors repudiated the purchases and vowed to “fight for our land while we have a 
Man.”15 
Many Anglo-Americans cared a great deal about satisfying Native conceptions of 
consent. In Vincennes, for instance, Indian land sales, like other land sales, were 
conducted before the notary and enshrined in a written land contract.  But unlike other 
land sales, the transactions’ witnesses signed only after the interpreter translated the 
contract to the Native sellers, “th[e]y understanding him and consenting.” For his part, 
Brigadier General Putnam noted that Anglo-Americans might find the distinction 
between chiefs and warriors “trivial” or even “Laughable,” but he considered it highly 
important.  “[W]e ought to accommodate our selves to their ideas of propriety,” Putnam 
wrote, “especially those which they consider as binding on them.”  These efforts to 
                                                
15 Colonel Ore to John Sevier, May 31, 1798, in Messages of the Governors of Tennessee, ed. Robert H. White (Nashville: Tennessee 
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conform to Native ideas about consent were rooted in pragmatism.  Anglo-Americans 
needed to have land sale agreements that Natives would acknowledge, if only to avoid 
conflict and violence.  The simplest way to achieve this goal was to follow Native law.16 
 
Not all Anglo-Americans, however, were as scrupulous to obey Native consent 
norms as Putnam.  For many speculators, the important issue was whether the purported 
sale of land would be recognized under Anglo-American land law, which focused on the 
written terms of agreement memorialized in land sale records.  As a result, questionable 
Indian deeds tracing back to the 1770s and ’80s proliferated in the territories.  Outwardly, 
these documents seemed to conform to the formalized requirements of consent, 
frequently recording large payments for the land.  But “in reality,” one Miami chief 
reported, “none of these titles have cost more than a Gallon of Rum.”  The chief also 
complained that those selling the land “were never trusted by Indians with any part of 
their affairs either in War or peace.”  Allegations like these led one Anglo-American to 
denounce such sales as “barefaced pocket picking.” Of course, such fraud and deception 
were rife in early American land practice, and many white owners poorly understood the 
documents they signed.  But Natives were uniquely vulnerable, because Anglo-
Americans often had no ready way to determine their legitimate consent, which required 
a deep knowledge of Native authority, and Natives had little access to legal redress.17 
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Because of these opportunities for deception, private purchases of Native land had 
always enjoyed a dubious legal status.  Many colonies had heavily regulated them from 
the seventeenth century onward. In 1763, at the end of the Seven Years’ War, the British 
imperial government, citing the “great Frauds and Abuses . . . committed in purchasing 
Lands of the Indians,” issued a proclamation asserting its sole authority to purchase 
Native lands, known as the right of preemption.18 
This proclamation little altered actual practice.  By the middle of the eighteenth 
century, Native consent had become the legal foundation not merely of small-scale local 
transactions, but also of speculative schemes to engross enormous chunks of the Ohio, 
Illinois, and Tennessee Countries.  Land companies—usually unincorporated associations 
of wealthy and politically powerful individuals—mushroomed in the years before the 
Revolution.  These companies pooled assets to buy western territory from Native tribes.   
Two of the most significant purchases happened on the eve of the Revolution in what 
would become the U.S. territories.  In 1775, North Carolinian Richard Henderson, the 
head of the Transylvania Company, bought “several millions of Acres” of Cherokee land, 
including much of present-day central Tennessee, for “large sums in valuable goods, 
wares, and merchandise” at the Treaty of Sycamore Shoals, even though Cherokee 
leaders later repudiated the agreement.  The same year, the Illinois & Wabash Company 
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made its second of two purchases of a similarly enormous tract of land in present-day 
Illinois from the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians.19 
The companies defended these transactions against charges of illegality by 
pointing to concepts of Native consent.  As proprietors of their lands, the Indians had the 
right to freely alienate them, British restrictions notwithstanding.  The companies took 
great pains to demonstrate the legitimacy of Native consent and the absence of fraud.  
The Henderson Company partners insisted that their purchase had occurred in “the most 
fair and open manner,” and, demonstrating their familiarity with the division of Cherokee 
authority, stressed that the purchase had occurred “with the consent of the head men and 
warriors as [well as] of the said [Cherokee] Nation at large.”  For its part, the Illinois and 
Wabash Companies argued that consideration for the purchases was valid, the negotiation 
“of the most public notoriety,” and the “meaning and interpretation of the parties were 
interpreted and explained by persons duly qualified.”20   
As long as British law governed, these arguments had little chance at success.  
But with the American Revolution, the debate over private purchases recurred, only now 
within the states that formally enjoyed sovereignty over the Illinois and Tennessee 
Countries.  A heated discussion at Virginia’s 1776 constitutional convention resulted in a 
provision requiring all purchases to be made under public authority, seemingly dooming 
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the designs of the Illinois & Wabash Company. North Carolina’s 1776 Constitution also 
banned purchases from Indians; in 1783, the state invalidated Henderson’s purchase, 
while awarding him 200,000 acres elsewhere as compensation.  After Virginia and North 
Carolina’s cessions to the federal government, though, the speculators pressed their case 
to the newly created national government, hoping for better results.21 
The private purchasers had good reason to anticipate success, for the new federal 
government in the 1780s was itself engaged in a bold legal experiment to write Native 
consent out of Anglo-American land law altogether, through the so-called doctrine of 
conquest.  A legal theory founded on bluster and arrogance, this approach claimed that, 
because many Native nations had sided with the British, the United States had conquered 
them and now owned their land by virtue of Britain’s cession at the Treaty of Paris.  
“You joined the British King against us, and followed his fortunes; we have overcome 
him, he has cast you off, and given us your country,” congressional commissioner 
Richard Butler told 1,000 Shawnees, Delawares, and Wyandots gathered in the Ohio 
Country.  “We plainly tell you that this country belongs to the United States.” North 
Carolina similarly invoked its supposed conquest of Native lands when it enacted a law 
limiting the Cherokees to a small parcel of land within the state’s borders.22 
Given this hostility toward the long-standing principles of Native consent, the 
politically powerful representatives of the Illinois Company had several moments of near 
success in persuading the federal government to recognize their land claim. In its waning 
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days, the Continental Congress stated that, “however improper it may be in general to 
countenance private purchases from the Indians,” this transaction appeared to be “fairly 
conducted.”  Another Wabash & Illinois Petition secured similar support in the House of 
Representatives, where a committee concluded that “principles of justice and equity” 
merited relief; the proposal ultimately failed in the Senate.  The prospect that ratification 
of the Constitution, and especially the creation of the federal judiciary, would reanimate 
claims based on these earlier land sales was hotly debated at the Virginia ratification 
convention in 1788; James Madison described the topic as one of the “principal topics of 
. . . discussion and intrigue” there.23 
But at the same time that the Illinois Company seemed to be nearing success, the 
United States was discovering that Natives refused to allow it to write their consent out of 
the law.  In their negotiations with the United States, Natives “expressed the highest 
disgust, with the principle of conquest,” and rebutted the legal claims of the United 
States.  “If . . . a bare march, or reconnoitering a country is sufficient reason to ground a 
claim to it,” the Cherokee leader Corn Tassel argued, then the Cherokees now owned the 
North Carolinians’ settlements, since “we had last marched over [their] territory.”  To the 
north, Ohio Country Natives similarly disdained conquest theory as a “lye.”  As a group 
of Wyandots told a Quaker traveler, “the land belonged to them, and the King of England 
could not dispose of them . . . they looked upon themselves as a free people & not 
obliged to part with their lands.”  When Shawnee and Delaware leaders made the same 
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argument to congressional commissioner Samuel Parsons, he confessed, “[T]here appears 
to me so much Reason in their Observations that I scarcely know a Sufficient Answer.”24   
Natives’ legal arguments mattered because Native nations retained considerable 
power.  The prospect of the United States taking “their [Native] lands from them without 
their consent” led “many nations” to unite to form a “powerful” and “formidable” 
confederacy.  Ultimately, the consequence was an extremely costly war in the Northwest 
Territory that consumed five-sixths of the federal budget and resulted in two cataclysmic 
defeats for the nascent federal military.  Both Natives and federal officials attributed the 
conflict to the federal effort to abolish Native consent.  “[T]he doctrine of conquest is so 
repugnant to their feelings,” Secretary at War Henry Knox concluded, “that rather than 
submit thereto, they would prefer continual war.”  A chief of the Wabash Confederacy 
put it more succinctly: “[I]f your people had not told the Indians that their lands belonged 
to you,” he told a federal emissary, “you would have had no war.”25 
These tremendous costs led the United States to retreat to Native consent as the 
foundation of its land law.  As “the main spring of the distressing War on our frontiers,” 
federal officials insisted, conquest theory “cannot be too explicitly renounced.”  Instead, 
to comport with “fundamental Laws of Nature,” Secretary of War Henry Knox urged the 
passage of a law protecting Native property.  “The Indians being the prior occupants 
possess the right of the Soil—It cannot be taken from them unless by their free consent, 
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or by the right of Conquest in case of a just War.”  (Knox was clear that he did not regard 
the claims of conquest from the Revolution as “just.”).  Echoing Knox, the Northwest 
Ordinance provided that Indians’ “lands and property shall never be taken from them 
without their consent.”   Knox reiterated this principle in a letter to Haudenosaunee leader 
Joseph Brant, which he asked Brant to convey to the western tribes at war with the 
United States.  “[T]he United States require no Indian lands,” he stated, “but those which 
have been ceded by treaties made with the full understanding and free consent of the 
Chiefs.”26 
The return to Native consent led Congress and the executive to reject private 
purchases of Native land decisively.  The law Henry Knox had called for became one of 
the first statutes enacted by Congress, the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790.  The law 
barred private purchases of Indian lands, unless through federal treaty; subsequent 
versions made such purchases criminal and punishable by a fine.   The federal embrace of 
preemption was, in some sense, overdetermined.  It bolstered the power of the federal 
state even as it provided a powerful tool to obtain Native lands at below-market rates.  
Yet federal officials insisted the purpose of preemption was to safeguard the integrity of 
Native land sales.  The “design” of these laws, one prominent Washington administration 
official stated, “is to protect the Indian Lands [a]gainst . . . bad men,” who “wish[ed] to 
cheat . .  the Indians.”  Though cast as benevolence, this was a hardheaded recognition 
that the proliferation of dubious treaties would provide neither peace nor security of title.  
Private purchases by “unprincipled persons” had produced “misunderstandings, quarrels, 
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and wars with the Indians,” James Madison warned on the renewal of the Trade and 
Intercourse Act.  It was therefore “highly important that this whole business should be 
under the absolute and sole direction of the public authority.”27    
The law’s success at recasting title in the territories was mixed.  Though the 
Illinois Company continued to press its claims, Congress proved hostile.  Speculators 
who had hoped to follow the Transylvania and Illinois Companies by making enormous 
purchases from Indians similarly despaired; since they depended on federal recognition, 
the Trade and Intercourse Act “entirely deranged [their] Plans.”28   
But for many in the territories, the statute merely forced their schemes 
underground, leading them to keep their plans to purchase Native lands “a profound 
Secret.”  Those engaged in this “Wildest of all Wild Speculations,” as one observer 
described the widespread trade in Indian deeds, hoped to persuade or dupe some authority 
into honoring their bargains.  At federal treaty negotiations, speculators lurked on the 
margins to prevail upon Natives. Illinois country settlers remained confident that 
Congress would still endorse the Illinois Company’s purchase.  Even local territorial 
officials themselves purchased interests in ongoing Indian purchases of “immense 
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extent,” as they anticipated using their connections with higher-ups to secure 
confirmation—albeit through secret letters that they urged then be burned.29 
Others defied the law more openly.  Some tried to avoid its strictures by leasing 
land, a ploy criminalized in 1796.  Despite this change, a traveler passing through the 
Tennessee country shortly afterward stayed with a man who rented his land from the 
Cherokees “at 600 per annum.”  Other would-be purchasers, echoing the arguments of 
prerevolutionary speculators, rejected federal authority altogether: one group leasing 
from the Kaskaskias in the Illinois Country said that “Congress has nothing to do with the 
lands but that they belong to the Indians who may dispose of them as they please.”30 
By the 1790s, the formal law on private purchases from Indians was remarkably 
clear, given earlier confusion: they were illegal, and punishable under federal law.  
Native consent, however, had proved too durable a legal concept in the territories to be 
transformed by federal edict alone.   
 
As the debate over Indian deeds demonstrated, Anglo-American land law often 
turned on arguments about the meaning and scope of Native consent from which Natives 
were excluded.  Yet Natives had their own views about their consent.  On the one hand, 
they were deeply suspicious of land speculators and often rejected these men’s claims to 
their lands as grounded in fraud.  On the other hand, Natives were keenly aware of the 
irony that preemption represented: a restriction on the scope of Native consent in the 
name of safeguarding that consent’s validity.  Natives argued that the federal government 
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had no authority to thus restrict their power to alienate their own lands.  “We have never 
parted with such a power,” Native leaders told federal commissioners who urged 
preemption on them.  They turned Anglo-Americans’ rhetoric of Native consent on its 
head: “[W]e consider ourselves free to make any bargain or cession of lands, whenever 
and to whomsoever we please.”31  
Natives also contended with the federal government about the precise meaning of 
their consent.  On paper, federal officials charged with overseeing Indian affairs, 
especially the Secretaries of War, were keenly concerned with obeying Native norms 
governing consent.  Native consent to the treaties required more than signatures, they 
instructed federal negotiators; it occurred only when Native leaders fully understood 
treaty terms and possessed proper authority to sell the land.  In 1790, Henry Knox wrote 
William Blount, governor of the Southwest Territory, informing him of the “explicit[] . . . 
direction of the president of the United States from which you must not depart” at an 
upcoming negotiation to purchase land from the Cherokees.  “However desireable” it was 
to obtain a cession, Knox commanded, lands could be purchased only “by the free and 
unconstrained consent of a full and fair representation of the Cherokees, who are the 
proper proprietors of the lands to be relinquished, and with their full understanding of the 
act they are performing, and the consideration they are to receive as an equivalent.”  
Knox’s successor Timothy Pickering sent similar instructions to Anthony Wayne in 
preparation for the 1795 Treaty of Greenville with the nations of the Ohio Country.  
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Wayne should keep careful lists of all the principal chiefs of the various nations, 
Pickering urged, as well as recording the statements of the chiefs as to whether there was 
an adequate representation from each nation.  Wayne also had to give the chiefs “strong 
and decided proofs that they are not under even the shadow of duress.”  “Let them feel,” 
Pickering wrote, “that they are at perfect liberty to speak their opinions and to sign or 
refuse to sign.”  Above all, Pickering insisted, “[o]ne great principle ought to govern all 
the negociations, a rigid adherence to truth.”32 
The Secretaries of War showed such solicitude for Native understandings of 
consent because, like earlier frontier negotiators, they believed adhering to Native law 
would benefit the United States in the end.  “The United States may conform to the 
modes and customs of the [I]ndians in the disposal of their lands,” Knox informed 
Congress, “without the least injury to the national dignity.”  In particular, following 
Native conceptions of consent would avoid “any difficulties arising from any after 
misconstructions on either side.”  Pickering made clear the sorts of “difficulties” he 
anticipated. Native “[sus]picions,” he urged, “occasion delays, and issue in discontents; 
[an]d these in depredations and war.”33    
In principle, then, Natives and federal leaders shared a set of norms—full 
understanding, the absence of duress, appropriate authority—that governed whether “free 
consent” had been obtained.  In practice, Natives and federal officials fiercely disagreed 
about whether particular treaty negotiations had satisfied those requirements.   Treaty 
commissioners and Native leaders offered divergent accounts of what transpired on the 
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treaty ground, leaving federal officials in Philadelphia to parse the truth.  In these 
deliberations, officials’ commitment to Native consent proved less meaningful than their 
desire to uphold federal authority and keep treaties settled.  
These considerations appear particularly clearly in the negotiations surrounding 
the Treaty of Holston, the subject of Knox’s instructions to William Blount.  In summer 
of 1791, Blount met the leaders of the Cherokee Nation at the confluence of the French 
Broad and Holston Rivers, at the site of what subsequently became the town of 
Knoxville.  There, Blount met a number of Cherokee leaders who reluctantly attended the 
treaty cession, most prominent among them John Watts and Nenetooyah, known to the 
Anglo-Americans as Bloody Fellow, the prominent leader of the Cherokee lower towns.  
After several weeks of discussions, the Cherokees agreed to a treaty that ceded large 
portions of the eastern Tennessee country, as well as a diamond-shaped tract forty miles 
around Nashville, for an annuity of $1,000.  In November, after Congress ratified the 
treaty, President Washington proclaimed the treaty as the law of the land.34 
For the Cherokees, and especially for Bloody Fellow, the treaty’s legality was 
more questionable.  Ownership of the area around Nashville, known as the Cumberland 
District, was especially contested.  Part of the purported 1775 Transylvania purchase 
from the Cherokees by Richard Henderson, the region was included within lands ceded 
by the Cherokees at the Treaty of Hopewell, and expanded at Holston.  Yet Bloody 
Fellow rejected this pat account of legality.  He argued that the North Carolinians who 
settled along the Cumberland River in the 1770s had done so “before [Cherokee] consent 
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was asked,” arriving stealthily and taking “possession by force.”  As for the cession at 
Hopewell and Holston, Bloody Fellow insisted that the agreements were not “free and 
lawful treaties,” even if the Americans tried to “make it appear” so.  The treaties were not 
“explained to the Indians,” who learned their contents only upon arriving home.  Nor did 
the treaties receive “the general consent of the nation.”  Using these “fraudulent means,” 
the Americans “usurped the lands of the Indians.”35 
Bloody Fellow’s complaints against the Treaty of Holston are particularly 
revealing of the complicated issues surrounding Native consent.  In one report that 
arrived from Indian country secondhand, Bloody Fellow alleged that Blount had 
committed outright fraud.  Bribing the interpreters to misrepresent the treaty to the 
Cherokees, Blount had allegedly changed material terms, reducing the promised annuity 
by half, changing the boundary around Nashville from ten to forty miles, and secretly 
adding provisions granting a road, navigation of the Tennessee, and a congressional right 
to regulate trade.36 
In another account, Bloody Fellow offered his own narrative of what had occurred 
at the treaty ground.  This version alleged, not blatant deception, but a more complicated 
negotiating dynamic that suggested more subtle limits to the “freedom” of Native 
consent.  In Bloody Fellow’s telling, the Cherokees had arrived at the Treaty anticipating 
only negotiations to end endemic frontier violence.  Instead, Blount demanded Cherokee 
lands for seven days nonstop; Blount’s insistence, Bloody Fellow reported, “made tears 
come into my eyes daily.”  Bloody Fellow and the Cherokee leaders raised a host of 
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objections, attempting to outlast Blount.  The Cherokee leader John Watts expressed 
skepticism about Blount’s selection as a federal representative.  The Carolinians, the 
Cherokees observed, “would not observe the orders of Congress or any body else”; any 
assurances Blount offered were worthless, since the Carolinians would “have their own 
way.”  Hoping to avoid dealing with Blount, Bloody Fellow demanded to go to Congress 
to see if he “could not obtain better satisfaction.”  Blount said there was no point, as he 
was a federal representative, and asked how Bloody Fellow would pay for the journey.37   
Blount’s rejection, Bloody Fellow reported, “struck me forcibly.”  Realizing that 
he and all the other Cherokees were “in his [Blount’s] power”—suggesting a fear of 
possible violence--Bloody Fellow agreed to part with a small parcel of land in return for 
safe passage.  This small concession immediately prompted intense bargaining.  Blount 
made extravagant demands, which Bloody Fellow repeatedly rejected; after “a good deal 
of dispute,” Blount finally pressed on the Cherokees a line along a mountain ridge in 
eastern Tennessee.38   
The negotiation then shifted to price.  Blount offered Bloody Fellow the annuity 
authorized by Knox—$1,000 annually.  The insulted Bloody Fellow told Blount that the 
annuity was too small: the sum “would not buy a breech clout [cloth] for each of my 
nation,” while the Creeks had gotten far more for a worse tract.  According to Bloody 
Fellow, Blount responded by reiterating the doctrine of conquest, emphasizing that the 
land had been “purchased with American blood”; Bloody Fellow pointed out that these 
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events were long past.  The impasse resolved when Blount promised to write to Congress 
to authorize more funds.  In the interim, Bloody Fellow and the other Cherokees signed 
the treaty.39 
Bloody Fellow relayed this narrative to Secretary of War Henry Knox in person in 
January 1792, in a visit he and a number of other Cherokees made to Philadelphia.  
Bloody Fellow’s trip made good his implicit threat to speak to federal authorities 
unmediated by Blount: “I am come to ask of you,” Bloody Fellow told Knox, “whether 
he [Blount] was authorized to purchase our lands.”  Aware of the importance of 
recordation, Bloody Fellow produced a string of wampum, which, he told Knox, 
“answer[s] the same purpose as letters with you, and [is] held in the highest estimation.”  
But he also asked that all speeches be done in writing, to be transmitted back to the 
nation, and brought George Miller, a Cherokee who knew English, to avoid dependence 
on the federal translator.40    
Knox proved surprisingly unsympathetic to Bloody Fellow’s complaints about the 
treaty.  Though Blount’s reported hard bargaining had not employed outright coercion, 
the governor had strayed far from Knox’s insistence that placating the Cherokees was 
more important than obtaining land, and his continued invocation of conquest was flatly 
at odds with federal policy.   Nonetheless, Knox told Bloody Fellow that the President, 
the Senate, and the cabinet all believed that the treaty was “a good satisfactory treaty, as 
well for the red as the white people,” and so “confirmed it, printed it as you here see” 
(Knox presumably displayed a copy), “and it has become the law of the land.”  To placate 
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the Cherokees, though, the United States agreed to increase the annuity to the $1,500 that 
Bloody Fellow had requested.41 
 Knox’s seemingly tepid response likely had several causes.  The surviving copy 
of the official treaty record, though it did not flatly contradict Bloody Fellow’s account, 
portrayed the Cherokee sales as far more consensual.  When Blount later read the record 
of Bloody Fellow’s meeting with Knox, he complained that the Cherokees “have 
egregiously lied as to the Means and Manner of [the treaty’s] being brought about.”  But 
Knox, ostensibly Blount’s superior, was also heavily dependent on Blount to enact Indian 
policy in the Southwest Territory, and so was careful not to undermine the governor’s 
authority.  Knox in fact reassured Blount that, although the Cherokees’ visit had 
constrained him to negotiate “separately from you,” the outcome “will tend to induce a 
more perfect confidence on the part of the Indians in your character.”  Blount would later 
use this official endorsement to crow about his authority to the Cherokees: “Thus you see 
you are no more to doubt the truth of what I have said, or shall say to you.”42 
 As Knox’ comments suggest, however, the sharpest divergence between his 
conception of consent and Bloody Fellow’s was the issue of finality.  For Knox, the 
treaty was settled and had become formal law; the time for deliberation had passed.  For 
their part, the Cherokees continued to try to renegotiate the treaty.  At a Cherokee council 
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in June 1792, Cherokee leaders still “murmured” about the boundary around Nashville; 
the influential chief Little Turkey, bemoaning that the treaty failed to address Native 
concerns, proposed moving the treaty boundary further east.  Reading these reports, Knox 
expressed “some doubts whether that part of the line [the Cumberland boundary] was 
agreeable to the opinion of the Cherokees generally—and it really appears to me that 
something will yet be to be arranged on that subject.”    Ultimately, Knox papered over 
the difficulty two years later—not by altering the line, but by more than tripling than 
Cherokees’ annuity to $5,000 per year, likely in an effort to placate the Cherokees.43 
  This constant reopening of settled law exasperated Anglo-Americans charged 
with dealing with Natives.  They viewed Native claims of coercion and deception as mere 
posturing, strategic behavior to extract more concessions.  James Madison, for instance, 
described a Native complaint that a treaty had been made by “parts only of the Nations 
whose consent was necessary” as mere “pretext,” the “usual” argument Natives made 
when they tried to wriggle out of agreements they disliked.  “When the White People 
give away a thing,” an evidently exasperated federal commissioner lectured a group of 
gathered Natives, “they never ask for it back again.”44 
 Though Native leaders were just as capable of acting strategically as Anglo-
Americans—even if few matched Blount’s contortions—their complaints were more than 
pretext.  The Cherokees understood the significance of written treaties, but they regarded 
them in relational rather than transactional terms, as an agreement between peoples rather 
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than a contract.  The text of the Treaty of Holston itself supported this interpretation: 
while Anglo-Americans fixated on the concrete boundary provisions, the document also 
made promises of “peace and friendship” as well as federal protection to the Cherokees.  
Because the Cherokees viewed consent as a process rather than a moment—an ongoing 
commitment to justice and fair-dealing—they sought to uphold those provisions just as 
firmly as Anglo-Americans insisted on the boundary lines.45   
These expectations are apparent in the aftermath of Bloody Fellow’s visit to 
Philadelphia.  Despite Knox’s hard-edged rhetoric, Bloody Fellow proclaimed himself 
satisfied: “[W]e rejoice in the prospect of our future welfare, under the protection of 
Congress.”  But the federal government failed to meet these expectations.  Reports from 
Indian country stated that the Cherokees waited six months for their grievances to be 
redressed, but received no relief.  “The bloody Fellow then said,” this informant related, 
“Congress are Liars general washington is a Liar & governour Blount is a Liar.”  Several 
months later, William Blount passed along intelligence to Henry Knox that Bloody 
Fellow was urging the Lower Cherokee towns to war against the United States.  The fear 
that violation of Native consent norms would produce violence seemed to have been 
realized.46 
 
In the wake of the American Revolution, consent became a critical foundation for 
Anglo-American law and political thought; relationships previously built on hierarchies 
                                                
45 On Native interpretations of treaties in this period, see Robert A. Williams, Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty Visions 
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46 “Conference of the Chiefs of the Cherokee Nation with the Secretary of War,” January 3-11, 1792; William Blount to Secretary of 
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became reconceived to require free assent.  Relations between the United States and 
Native nations were part of this process.  By the late eighteenth century, after centuries of 
contention over the scope and meaning of Native land rights, both Native leaders and 
their Anglo-American interlocutors largely shared a legal vocabulary and framework 
around property.  Most in the territories agreed that Natives owned their lands, and nearly 
all—Natives, land speculators, and, after the disastrous failure of conquest theory, federal 
officials as well—agreed that Native consent was necessary to alienate Native land.47  
But both in Indian affairs and in Anglo-American law more broadly, centering 
consent did not resolve the ambiguities of what consent required, and congruencies in 
language and law masked deeper disagreements. This existence of a shared framework 
merely channeled broader disputes into a legal arena, in which law defined the terms and 
scope of the debate.  In this case, the early American law of property focused the struggle 
around the legal meaning of Native consent, about which claimants sharply diverged.  
Land speculators merely sought Native signatures on a formal deed, a formulation that 
readily facilitated fraud. Washington Administration officials believed Native consent 
required more. Free consent, Knox and Pickering concluded, mandated that purchases 
occur in public treaties held under federal auspices, and they at least aspired to ensure 
requisite authority, full understanding, and uncoerced assent.  Native leaders required 
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those elements, too, and vociferously pointed out the frequent instances when federal 
officials failed to satisfy them.  But they also insisted that Anglo-Americans conform to 
Native understandings of authority and deliberation to conclude binding agreements.  
Native leaders recognized that even when they entered into treaties they well understood, 
they had not freely chosen them in any meaningful sense, as the threat of force always 
lurked behind federal negotiations with Native nations.  “[W]e are strong enough to take 
land,” William Blount told the Cherokees at Holston, “but will not do it because we will 
not be guilty of injustice.”  For their part, the Cherokees “objected to giving up so much 
land,” Bloody Fellow reported to Knox, “but, for the sake of peace and quietness, we did 
it.”48   
Judged by this standard, most Native “consent,” notwithstanding its position as 
the foundation of Anglo-American land law, was a legal fiction that disguised an ever-
more unequal reality.  Justice, particularly as construed by people as self-dealing as 
Blount, proved to be a thin reed for Native peoples.  But in the 1790s, Blount’s bluster 
concealed a deeper congruence between the two sides.  As the retreat from conquest 
theory shows, both Natives and federal officials feared violence, and so both made 
concessions to the others’ legal norms, less from principle than for the sake of “peace.”   
In the immediate term, the consequence of three different standards of Native 
consent was to produce three claims to ownership of the same land.  Speculators asserted 
ownership based on dubious Indian deeds; the federal government claimed title based on 
Indian treaties; Native nations confused Anglo-Americans by sometimes accepted the 
legitimacy of these transactions but, in other instances, insisting that their original rights 
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persisted.  Federal supremacy, through the assertion of preemption rights, was supposed 
to create unambiguous chains of title unmarred by fraud or abuse.  Instead, these 
triplicate claims crisscrossed the Northwest and Southwest Territories, spawning 
confusion—and violence—in their wake. 
* * * 
 If Native ownership was one source of confusion about title, state ownership was 
another. This was paradoxical, as the territories were the only part of the United States 
not incorporated within state borders.  But federal sovereignty did not itself ensure what 
was then called “right of soil,” or ownership.  In their acts of cession, both North 
Carolina and Virginia had required that the federal government would continue to honor 
state land grants within the Southwest and Northwest Territories.  North Carolina’s 
cession provided that all state land grants in the Tennessee Country would “have the 
same force and effect as if such cession had not been made,” while Virginia reserved a 
large tract of land north of the Ohio to satisfy the bounty claims of its war veterans, a 
region that became known as the Virginia Military District.49 
 These carve-outs bound large sections of the Southwest and Northwest Territories 
to state land-law systems.  Thomas Jefferson calculated that 5.4 million acres (8,391 
square miles) of the Southwest Territory had already been granted by North Carolina, 
which constituted 20% of the Territory’s entire landmass.  Jefferson believed that every 
piece of land legally purchased from the Natives had already been alienated.  In the 
Northwest Territory, the lands promised to Virginia amounted to 15% of the territory of 
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present-day Ohio, encompassing the valuable Scioto River Valley (another 11.7% of 
Ohio was reserved for Connecticut).50 
 Jefferson’s tidy lists can make it seem that the federal government was merely 
honoring well-established, vested property rights.  In fact, many of the lands were set 
aside to satisfy contingent future claims based on past governmental promises, while 
even those lands that had been “granted” were often in the midst of lengthy and highly 
contingent state processes for securing title.  The resulting fever of speculation, as 
dubiously legal land claims proliferated and were litigated, meant that owning land in the 
territories offered both the prospect of tremendous wealth and constant uncertainty.  Even 
smallholders who sought only self-sufficiency became participants, albeit unwillingly, in 
the tremendous scramble for legal ownership that characterized the territories. 
  
 The late-eighteenth-century property laws of Virginia and North Carolina were 
similar.  Both states employed the system known as “indiscriminate location,” enshrined 
in statute during and after the American Revolution.  Claiming land under this system 
involved a number of steps in which individuals would select tracts, pay a modest fee, 
and receive state confirmation of title, with disputes sent to the courts through a process 
known as caveat.   
North Carolina’s Land Law of 1783 was typical.  Claimants first appeared at the 
state-run land office with a written description of the land they wished to purchase based 
on nearby landmarks such as waterways and mountains.  Upon payment of the cost of the 
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lands—ten pounds per hundred acres claimed—as well as required fees, the entry taker, a 
state official appointed by the legislature, would record the claim and assign a number.  
Three months would follow for competing claimants to come forward and make what 
was known as a caveat—a challenge to the claim’s validity.51 
Barring a caveat, the entry taker would issue a land warrant—an order to the 
county surveyor, a local official paid by fees, to survey the land.  The county surveyor 
would survey the tract and make plats describing the tract’s boundaries, and record the 
number and date of the entry as well as the number of acres.  Completed plats were sent 
to the office of the state’s secretary, who would issue a land grant, authenticated by the 
governor and recorded in the secretary’s office, to the claimant.  Challengers to the 
survey could also seek a caveat from the governor, who could suspend the execution of a 
grant.  Otherwise, upon receipt of a grant, formal title to land vested in the claimant, who 
was obligated to record the grant in the local county.52 
Viewed in hindsight, such a loosely regulated system to administer land seems an 
invitation to confusion and contention, a judgment that many contemporaries, as well as 
subsequent historians, did not hesitate to render.  But the statute did try to police the 
system where it seemed most vulnerable to deception.  In a world where title hinged so 
heavily on written evidence, the law was exacting in specifying just how claims were to 
be preserved, even stipulating the size of paper to be used and the margins and spacing in 
the entry book.  Surveyors were to carefully record the date and number of entries 
because of the “many disputes [that] have, and may arise” from failures to do so.  The 
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governor’s authority to halt grants stemmed from the prospect of warrants being “secretly 
obtained on entries heretofore made by artful and designing men, for land to which they 
had no just title.”53 
Otherwise, though, the statute did nearly nothing to govern the process of actually 
locating land.  But to many at the time, this minimal oversight was a virtue.  From the 
perspective of government officials, it allowed them to open up land cheaply, with little 
administrative cost.  The government’s formal involvement was limited to an entry-taker 
and a couple of clerks, paid from fees, who ran the entire system from a single land 
office. Expense and risk fell largely on individual claimants.  Yet the system’s 
proponents also believed it would serve claimants well.  Indiscriminate location 
comported with notions of justice and fairness current on the eighteenth-century frontier 
by rewarding first occupants, whose knowledge of the best land might translate into 
entries.  Land’s low cost and universal availability enabled even those with modest means 
to obtain their own property, which would quickly increase in value.54   
Perhaps the most glaring deficiency of the system of indiscriminate location, both 
for contemporaries and historians, was the risk of conflicting claims.  Indiscriminate 
location, one New Jersey congressman complained, simply “create[d] law-suits” that 
ended up costing more than “would have been necessary to purchase all the land of the 
State.”  But for some, this reliance on local courts comported with an ideology of 
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ownership that valorized local knowledge in adjudicating property disputes.  In his report 
on territorial lands, Jefferson noted the spotty records and incomplete maps marking 
ownership under this system.  “[Y]et, on the Spot,” Jefferson argued, “these Difficulties 
exist but in a small Degree; the Individuals there employed in the Details of buying, 
selling, and locating, possess local Informations of the Parts which concern them, so as to 
be able to keep clear of each others Rights.”  When disputes did come up, the caveat 
system ensured they benefitted from this local knowledge by referring them to the county 
courts for resolution.  If a “Conflict of Claims should arise,” Jefferson observed, “a local 
Judge will doubtless be provided to decide them without Delay.”  In fact, the statute 
stipulated that local juries—the institutional arbiter of communal norms and customs, 
largely populated by neighbors—would ultimately determine these highly local questions 
of ownership.55 
The system of indiscriminate location, in short, rested on decentralization, 
localism, and close scrutiny of state officials—all features deeply rooted in the Anglo-
American legal tradition.  Despite a growing number of critics, the system had its 
defenders, too.  It had, after all, functioned well enough, if somewhat creakily, for nearly 
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two centuries under colonial rule.  In extending this law westward, North Carolina’s 
legislature was merely perpetuating earlier practice.   
 
 What followed, however, was not the continuation of earlier practice.  It was a 
chaotic land rush, an orgy of greed and speculation that swept North Carolina throughout 
the 1780s.  Within three years of the opening of the state land office, 4,393,945 acres of 
land had been entered.  Rather than being distributed to smallholders, much of this land 
was concentrated in the hands of a few powerful individuals.  As North Carolina’s 
governor would lament in 1799 as the state investigated the abuses of this era, the “[m]ost 
atrocious frauds and scandals have taken place. . . scheming and capable men executed 
their plans and swallowed up the property of the state.”56 
This outcome was not accidental; it resulted from what the 1783 Land Law 
stated—or, more exactly, from what the law did not address.  The limitations the law 
offered to prevent the massive engrossment of lands were feeble at best.  The law did 
attempt to limit any one entry to 5,000 acres, and it set a reasonable price—ten pounds 
(equivalent to forty dollars) per acre—that would also have made it difficult for 
speculators to amass enough specie to buy such huge tracts.  But speculators could easily 
circumvent such paper restrictions. They made multiple entries and obtained lands by 
using others’ names; a subsequent investigation also revealed mysterious erasures, 
forgeries, and unauthorized duplicate warrants in the record books.  As for price, the 
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statute ensured speculators’ dominance by providing that land could be paid for using 
North Carolina’s near-worthless debt certificates from the Revolution.  Using their 
connections and capital to buy up certificates for as little as 10% of face value, 
speculators obtained land at a real price of less than five dollars per hundred acres.  Other 
speculators took advantage of the military bounty lands that the statute set aside around 
Nashville for Revolutionary War veterans.  Unable or unwilling to uproot eight hundred 
miles, most veterans sold their rights.  As late as 1796, the “vast number of Milt[ary] 
Warrants in N. Carolina” sold for $10-$100; the land obtained could then be resold for as 
much as $640.  Others turned to fraud.  Nashville resident Andrew Jackson reported a 
scene in a tavern in the 1790s in which a major and captain, after initially refusing to sign 
military certificates to anyone “who was not entitled to it,” were plied with brandy, and 
“very much intoxicated,” signed nearly 500 forged certificates quickly redeemed for 
land.57 
The interconnection between title and government debt rewarded the well-
connected, who turned the state machinery to their own purposes.  No one proved more 
assiduous than the Blount family, especially the politically prominent William Blount.  
Soon after helping design the 1783 land law, Blount and his brothers John Gray and 
Thomas secured certificates, inveigled the entry taker, and served as brokers for others’ 
claims for a fee of one-quarter of all lands obtained.  The result was that the Blount 
                                                
57 “Land Law of 1783”; “List of Certificates Paid to Wm Blount Esq.,” 15 June 1785, Box 193.28, James Gray Blount Papers; 
“Abstract of Criminal Charges on Land Fraud,” 1806, Tennessee Supreme Court Cases, Tennessee State Library and Archives; 
Thomas Dillon to James McHenry, 22 May 1796, Box 1, James McHenry Papers, Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor, Mich.; Andrew Jackson, “Statement Regarding Land Frauds,” December 6, 1797, in PAJ, 1:157-58.  The exchange rate of four 
dollars to one pound derives from litigation of the time, where damages were expressed both in pounds and dollars.  See Thomas 
Hampton v. John Boyd and James Foster, November 1791, p. 48, “Minutes of the Superior Court of Law & Equity of the Mero 
District” (typescript copy), Tennessee State Library and Archives.  According to Richard Caswell, certificates sold for as little as 2 or 
3 shillings for every nominal pound of worth.  Richard Caswell to Brig. Gen. Caswell [his son], May 3,1784, Folder 3, Caswell 
Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; William H. Masterson, William Blount (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1954), 65–70. 
  74 
family came to own enormous tracts of the Tennessee Country.  By 1793, the Blounts 
and their relations held 79 square-mile tracts in the Cumberland District and 129 grants 
ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 acres in the territory’s western expanses--only a portion of 
the supposedly 2,760 entries made by Blount family members.58 
A similar process unfolded in the Northwest Territory’s Virginia Military District, 
where, as in North Carolina, the system of indiscriminate location was used to satisfy 
promises to veterans.  There, the most important actors were the surveyors, a profession 
that many in the Northwest Territory recognized provided excellent opportunities to 
speculate in land. “I do not hesitate to confess that I have views of other advantages than 
those arrising from the compensation,” wrote one supplicant seeking a surveying 
position, “and I presume you will find few if any of the applicants but what have them 
likewise.”  The surveyors who relocated to the Virginia Military District from Virginia 
quickly seized these “advantages,” engrossing large quantities of land.  One observer 
described the District as “a Country where there is more Sharpers than any I have been 
in.”  Many surveyors charged for their services in land, requiring a quarter or even a half 
of the tracts surveyed, leading some to complain of “extortionate” rates.  Just as in North 
Carolina, these surveyors also purchased heavily discounted military land warrants that 
they then patented themselves.  Through these means, surveyors amassed enormous 
holdings: Nathaniel Massie held 75,285 acres; Thomas Worthington, 18,273; Lucas 
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Sullivant, 68,785.  Taken together, the twenty-five largest acquisitions in the District 
amounted to over 1 million acres, 26% of the entire tract.59 
This enormous land grab did not go unremarked.  In 1794, a grand jury in 
Fayetteville, North Carolina, issued a presentment against William Blount’s brother John 
Gray Blount and a number of other supposed “land Jobbers,” who through “unsufferable 
monopoly” had “accumulated to themselves the vacant Lands of this State.”  They argued 
that the western lands, intended as an endowment for future generations, had gone to 
“establish an Imperious and unconstitutional Nobility.”60 
By that point, however, most of the Blounts’ lands no longer lay within North 
Carolina.  William Blount used his influence to pass North Carolina’s 1790 cession of the 
Tennessee Country to the federal government, and then exploited his connections to 
secure appointment as the governor of the new Southwest Territory.  Blount was thrilled 
at news of his new position.  “[M]y Western Lands have become so great an object to me 
that it had become absolutely necessary that I should go to the Western Country to secure 
them,” he wrote a confidant.  He was sure that “my present Appointment” would 
“enhance[] their Value.”61 
Cession served the speculators well.  The cessions that created the Southwest and 
Northwest Territories both contained grandiose language that the ceded land would be 
considered “a common fund for the use and benefit” of all the states.  Yet, in both the 
Northwest Territory and the Tennessee Country, the system of indiscriminate location 
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funneled the public domain to private speculators, whose access to credit, government, 
and networks of agents allowed them full advantage of the free-for-all.  By explicitly 
binding the federal government to earlier state land systems, the cessions made the 
federal government powerless to interfere.  At the same time, by the time North Carolina 
began to realize the enormity of the swindle that had been committed, the lands were 
largely out of the state’s control.  In this sense, the creation of the federal territories was 
less a testament to a national commitment to federal ownership than to the power of 
speculators, who could forum shop by shifting territorial control from one sovereign to 
another, and, in the process, convert an ostensibly national patrimony to their own 
interest.62 
 
If concentration of landed wealth was one consequence of the rapid and cheap 
sale of millions of ill-defined acres, confusion and uncertainty about title were another, 
even when the system was scrupulously administered.  Here again, the problem was what 
the law failed to say: other than exempting Cherokee lands south of the French Broad 
River, there were no geographical restrictions on land claims.  In other words, the statute 
threw open for ownership all of North Carolina’s territory to the Mississippi River, an 
area that encompassed present-day western North Carolina and all of present-day 
Tennessee.  North Carolina’s own claim to these lands, grounded in the right of conquest, 
was extremely flimsy: Chickasaw and Cherokee title had never been purchased, and the 
1785-86 Treaties of Hopewell subsequently enshrined Native ownership in federal law.  
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But setting aside the dubious title, the idea that a single land office hundreds of miles 
away could process claims to such an enormous region was a fantastical delusion. North 
Carolinians knew virtually nothing of the domain they purported to sell: it was nearly 
devoid of Anglo-American settlements, its topography barely known.  The warrants they 
entered into the land office reflected this ignorance.  Consider, for instance, warrant 
#1159, for 2000 acres of land in the western district of Tennessee, over 500 miles away 
from the land office.  The statutorily required description stated that tract lay “between 
the river Tennisee & Missippi [a roughly hundred mile distance] & upon a small river or 
Creek, lying on both sides inclosing a tree Mark M.B. standg among a parcel chopd & 
Deaded trees.”63 
The 1783 statute permitted such entries for only a brief two-year window.  In that 
time, bands of speculators frantically staked out similar claims across hundreds of 
thousands of acres of what they perceived as unmarked wilderness.  Their goal was 
simply to enter as many as entries as possible as quickly as possible.  In these 
circumstances, the checks that Jefferson and others believed would prevent 
indiscriminate location from devolving into a chaotic jumble— caveats, local knowledge 
and institutions—simply did not exist.  As North Carolina’s entrybooks filled with vague 
and arbitrary descriptions of parcels of land, there was no way to determine whether land 
had already been claimed, and by whom.   
The predictable result was myriad disputes, most of which only emerged years 
later.  Many settlers in the Southwest Territory told similar stories.  Having purchased 
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what they believed to be good title from speculators—often in the late 1780s when large 
numbers of settlers began to migrate into the Tennessee Country—these settlers had been 
happily living on their farms for several years when a stranger appeared at their door 
bearing a document that asserted ownership of the same land.  Others, less dramatically, 
learned of competing claims from their neighbors, while still others discovered the 
existence of other claimants only when they were hauled into court.  But the end result 
was usually the same: litigation.  Land disputes tracing to the 1780s clogged territorial 
court dockets.   
These lawsuits rarely conformed to the vision of expeditious justice advanced by 
Jefferson as well as the drafters of the 1783 statute.  The ejectment suits that filled the 
county courts—filed under the fictitious names of Richard Fenn, claimant, and John 
Denn, lessee, the real purpose of which was to determine title to fee simple land—dealt 
with land grants from years earlier.  Questions of title also predominated in many cases 
not explicitly about land; the delays in these cases were even longer.  Probate cases in 
particular reopened long-standing questions about the validity of title after the death of a 
purported owner; many of these cases began not with the land itself, but with long-
standing promissory notes and other debts that had paid for tracts of land, which then 
raised the question of the validity of title in a sale a decade earlier. The uncertainty of 
title, along with the vagaries of the land market, encouraged such litigation.  Plaintiffs 
often hoped that they could secure more in damages than the land was worth on the open 
market; one defendant alleged that the plaintiff had stated that “bringing Suit [and 
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securing damages]. . . would be the best way to Sell his land” and so refused to accept an 
otherwise valid land title to settle a dispute.64    
The wisdom of the local jury rarely resolved these disputes.   Ejectment suits 
might begin in county courts, but many appealed to the superior courts.  Even these 
decisions were not final: losers frequently challenged adverse judgments issued under the 
common law under a separate body of law known as equity, which allowed judges to set 
aside verdicts deemed inequitable.  These opportunities for second or third chances at 
success encouraged continued struggle rather than settlement: one litigant, instead of 
negotiating with the prevailing party after an adverse outcome, insisted that “he must 
have a pull or twist in Equity.”  Ostensibly, equity practice was less formal that actions at 
law, and admitted a wider range of evidence.  In the territories, however, equity 
jurisdiction rested with the more technical superior courts, where judges, not juries, 
decided equity cases on the basis of lengthy written pleadings, which inevitably required 
counsel.65 
The 1783 land law provided plenty of grist for the endless litigation that plagued 
the Southwest Territory and later, Tennessee.  The law created constant conflict, in 
myriad permutations.  One of the most straightforward, and common, occurred when 
there were two entries, and hence two land warrants, for the same tract.  The law dealing 
with such controversies was well established: the older (known as the “elder”) entry 
prevailed, leaving later claimants without title.  This bright line rule displeased the 
                                                
64 Arthur Campbell to Archibald Stuart, October 31, 1785, Box 1, Folder 1, Campbell Family Papers, Rubenstein Library, Duke 
University, Durham, N.C.; Newman v. Jones & Haworth (Hamilton District Court of Equity 1800), in Historical Records Survey, 
Transcription Unit, Division of Women’s and Professional Projects, Works Progress Administration, Records of Knox County, 
Superior Court Record Book “B”, 1797-1804 (Nashville: Historical Records Survey, 1939), 81-91. 
65 Newman v. Jones & Haworth.  On early American equity practice, see Stanley N. Katz, “The Politics of Law: Controversies over 
Chancery Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century,” Perspectives in American History 5 (1971), 257.  
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residents of the Southwest Territory, where the problem was widespread.  A number of 
inhabitants, including Andrew Jackson, appealed to the North Carolina legislature for 
relief, arguing that those holding later entries were “in justice” as entitled to “the benefit 
of their Warrant” as earlier entrants, as they had paid the state for their claims.66 
Savvy purchasers thought they knew how to avoid the problem of multiple 
entries.   One land speculator in the Southwest Territory insisted that the region’s “many 
disputes and litigations about Titles to land” could be avoided by relying on the “only 
sources that could be depended on,” copies of North Carolina’s entry books.  Access to 
these books, manuscript copies of which circulated throughout the territory, allowed 
claimants to ensure they held the oldest entry.  Still more common was to require that the 
seller of a parcel warrant that his claim to the land was the first and best entry.  Often, 
though, such guarantees simply converted disputes over title into debt controversies, as 
the legal question became whether contractual nonperformance would excuse refusal or 
failure to pay a note.  In Cuthbert v. Dotson, for instance, Cuthbert entered a 1794 
contract to purchase land from Dotson; Dotson warranted that he had the best title to the 
land. Cuthbert discovered that an old entry covered much of the land, and so refused to 
honor the contract.  Four years later, Dotson died, and his executors filed suit and 
recovered on the contract; Cuthbert accordingly sought equitable relief against the 
executors’ judgment.  (The case ended in a settlement).  Similar facts appeared in Carney 
v. Dunlap, where Anna Moore—the rare female landholder in the Southwest Territory—
                                                
66 “Petition from Inhabitants of TN, Miro District,” 1796, Petitions (Concerning Land), GASR Nov 1796-Dec 1796, Box 3, North 
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had sold her land in 1783, but then supposedly obtained a patent in her own name for the 
same tract before the purchaser could.  The dispute again hinged on settling payments 
years later.67 
Yet neither purchasing senior entries, nor securing title guarantees, necessarily 
protected purchasers, given both the haze of confusion and the informality of land 
practice in the 1780s.  The 1799 case King v. Daniel demonstrated these risks.   
According to the parties’ pleadings, Thomas King and John Blair were part of a 
small group of men who, in 1781 or 1782, traveled up the Holston River in present-day 
eastern Tennessee.  After the group informally subdivided a promising stretch of land 
along the river, King and Blair were assigned 700 acres, for which they then obtained a 
warrant from the North Carolina land office after the enactment of the 1783 law.  They 
subsequently sold this land to the settler James Daniel for two hundred pounds’ worth of 
horses.68   
Here, the accounts diverged. According to Daniel, King and Blair told him that 
the land was labeled number twenty-one in the entry book.  Because the warrants were 
numbered sequentially, the low number made it more valuable, as older claims were 
unlikely. King and Blair also allegedly guaranteed the warrant.  King along with Blair’s 
executor disputed this account.  The men had used the number twenty-one only in their 
informal subdivision of the Holston lands—in other words, it was only the 21st lot, not 
                                                
67 Dillon to McHenry, May 22 ,1796; Cuthbert v. Dotson (Washington District Superior Court of Law and Equity Sept. 1799), in 
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entry 21.  They did not know the warrant’s entry number, nor did they guarantee the title.  
All King and Blair sold Daniel, they insisted, was the right to the warrant itself.69   
The contract stipulated that King and Blair would survey the land and obtain the 
grant from the state.  A few years after the contract was concluded, in 1785 or 1786, a 
surveyor appeared at the house Daniel had built on the land.  Though the surveyor had a 
warrant for the land, he refused to show it to Daniel (it may not have mattered, as Daniel 
was illiterate).  Daniel assumed the surveyor had come to confirm Daniel’s title, per the 
contract.  Only later did he learn that the survey had been for Nicholas Perkins, not 
Daniel, on a different Warrant.  In a subsequent lawsuit, the court determined that 
Perkins’s claim was “earlier and better” than the entry made by King and Blair, and so 
evicted Daniel from his land.70 
As Daniel’s story suggests, smallholders, even when illiterate, well understood 
North Carolina’s land law, and sought to protect themselves from conflicting claims. But 
Daniel’s efforts to guard his title could not stop what was at best confusion and at worst 
deception. Ultimately, Daniel prevailed at law in a suit against King and Blair in a suit on 
the contract brought after Blair’s death years later, and he successfully defended that 
judgment against a suit in equity.  Nonetheless, Daniel argued, the damages he received 
for the land were only a portion of the current value of the land.  And Daniel doubtless 
spent considerable sums on attorneys in the multiple suits required to secure, and 
preserve, relief.71 
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Many landowners opted not to take Daniel’s approach.  To avoid the trouble and 
expense of a lengthy lawsuit, many simply bought out competing claimants, in essence 
paying for their land again.  James Berry did that for 640 acres he owned in Powell’s 
Valley, buying a competing entry for two hundred acres.  James Miller purchased a rival 
claim from a man named Hutchings, not because he thought Hutchings had the stronger 
claim but because “it was the easiest mode of quieting the title and saving any difficulty 
either in law or equity respecting the title” to his land.  Unsurprisingly, this practice only 
encouraged more claims, often founded on questionable rights: both Berry and Miller 
later confronted additional claimants to portions of their land.72   
North Carolina offered its own solution to the problem of conflicting entries.  
Under the terms of the state’s cession, those denied land rights by an earlier entry could 
obtain so-called “supernumerary” warrants, which could be entered on any vacant claims 
not included within another entry.  But with no ready way to determine which lands were 
encompassed, the supernumerary warrants merely became another potential source of 
ownership that floating throughout the Southwest Territory.73 
The case of Criswell v. Donalson, from 1800, demonstrates the confluence of the 
fraudulent possibilities of supernumerary warrants, North Carolina’s meager record-
keeping, and fruitless efforts to buy off adverse claims.  In 1783, a man named Gawen 
Leeper located 400 acres on the south side of the Holston River, which Stockley 
Donalson, a prominent land speculator, purchased.  Donalson resold Leeper’s entry to the 
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plaintiff, James Criswell, in 1787, in return for a slave; Criswell moved onto the land.  
After a delay in transferring the warrant occasioned by Leeper’s death, Donalson reported 
sending in the required survey plat and certificate to the land office, but stated that it had 
been mislaid.  In 1791, Criswell sent another plat, but heard nothing.  In 1795, he 
journeyed to North Carolina himself, but could discover no grant or warrant.  Hearing 
that the warrant was in the hands of a man named Mayberry—who had died—Criswell 
met Andrew Jackson, who held Mayberry’s papers; still no warrant.74 
Frustrated, Criswell applied to a man named Tyrell to assist him.  According to 
Criswell’s allegations, Tyrell, rather than helping, allegedly used a supernumerary 
warrant he held to claim 500 acres that included Criswell’s grant, knowing that Criswell 
lacked any documents showing title.  Criswell was forced to buy his land back from 
Tyrell in return for lands he held elsewhere.  But in the interim, a man named Evans—
who had purchased a portion of the land from Criswell, but engaged in some complicated 
negotiations with Tyrell—brought an ejectment suit in county court.  Criswell, lacking 
“any grant or title which could be admitted to read as evidence in a court of common 
law,” lost.  He filed an equity suit to overturn the judgment, but it was dismissed for 
insufficient notice.75 
Many of the same problems plagued the Virginia Military District in the 
Northwest Territory.   An especially pungent critique of the Virginian land warrant 
system, which encompassed the District, came from the state’s foremost jurist St. George 
Tucker.  “Patents for lands,” Tucker complained, “land-warrants, military rights to land, 
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certificates of survey, nay, even bonds to procure, survey, and patent lands, have . . . 
become a species of mercantile paper, passing from hand to hand”; Tucker likened this to 
the “vast influx of paper money, that has deluged the United States for some years past.”  
Virginia’s land system, Tucker argued, served only “[t]hose who wish only to deceive 
and defraud others, who buy, merely to sell; who regard not in what miseries or 
perplexities they may involve ignorant persons, and foreigners, will, until the bubble 
bursts, continue to traffic in parchment.”  Tucker urged that a settler who wished 
“peaceable possession of his lands” and the ability to “transmit them to his posterity” 
should look elsewhere.  Subsequent events bore out Tucker’s predictions.  As the Ohio 
Supreme Court—which heard sixty-four disputes involving Virginia Military District 
titles over the nineteenth century—observed in 1825, “the uncertainty of title, in the 
Virginia military district, is proverbial, and that in many cases it is impossible to ascertain 
the existence of conflicting claims, till they are set up by the claimants.”76 
Taken together, suits such as King v. Daniel and Criswell v. Donalson exemplify 
the factors that made bargaining in the shadow of the North Carolina’s land law so 
complicated.  In both cases, the validity of title hinged on handwritten records held 
hundreds of miles away.  And in both cases, disputes arose years after the initial 
transaction, highlighting the role of death in untangling webs of debt spun over a lifetime.  
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But they also demonstrate the fundamental unfairness and unpredictability of the North 
Carolina land system.  Both Daniel and Criswell sought scrupulously to comply with the 
law and guarantee their title; yet unreliable intermediaries, as well as the failure of the 
state itself, undermined their ownership. 
 
 Viewed from the present, it is easy to condemn the system of indiscriminate 
location for the confusion that it created.  But the system was not designed to produce 
clarity and finality.  It preserved, rather, the deep localism of early American 
understandings of property.  And it ostensibly enabled land ownership to be cheap, 
decentralized, and democratic, aspects that would benefit marginal claimants such as 
Daniel and Criswell.77  
 These principles, however, had little meaning or coherence when extended to the 
vast unknown spaces of the Tennessee and Ohio Countries.  For many early Americans, 
land stood for independence, as expressed by the Fayette County Grand Jury. Looking 
west, they anticipated that land would remain a valuable, secure, and stable asset.  But 
localism and constancy bore no relation to the abstract tracts of tens of thousands of land, 
barely known even by the surveyor, with which speculators filled the entry books.  Rather 
than supporting gradual accumulation, land became a source of possibly enormous wealth 
and equally rapid fall.  Purchases made in expectation of value could suddenly become 
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worthless.  Yet for speculators, this uncertainty proved an advantage.  Able to buy up 
warrants and certificates, with privileged access to state institutions, they tilted the system 
to their advantage. 
 Law played a critical role in this transformation of landed property.  In the 
territories, physical ground became far less important than title—some sort of 
authoritative governmental document that conferred the abstract right of ownership.  The 
endless litigation produced by state land law only furthered this process of abstraction.  
As litigants chased contrasting verdicts through appellate and equity courts, the idea that 
property exists only as far as the state acknowledged an individual’s right against all 
comers was no theoretical concept, but rather lived experience shared by many territorial 
citizens. 
 This conversion of land into title had few benefits for the smallholders who were 
the intended beneficiaries of state land systems.  Rather, even for men like James Daniel 
and James Criswell who bought primarily to settle and improve, western land became a 
speculative investment.  The abstraction of title swept them into the maw of the hungry 
land market, where their fortunes were entangled with the grand speculators like William 
Blount or Stockely Donalson.  And any purchaser, no matter how careful, could get 
dragged into prolonged, expensive legal disputes to protect their property rights. The 
resulting lawyers’ paradise corresponded little with the localist ideal, with the result that 
men like Daniel and Criswell, notwithstanding their illiteracy, were forced to become 
experts in the intricacies of state land law. 
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 There was a deep irony that these state land systems reached their full 
fluorescence outside the states, within the ostensibly federal jurisdiction and ownership of 
the territories. Federal territorial, not state, courts administered and adjudicated the 
disputes produced by North Carolina and Virginia’s decision to run their land offices on 
the cheap.  This frustrated distant federal officials like Jefferson, for whom such 
uncertainty was antithetical to the clear chains of title they wished to construct.  But the 
acts of cession had entrenched state land law, keeping large swaths of these ostensibly 
federal domains under state jurisdiction and authority.  State land law systems were 
embedded in an informal sense, as well, as the federal government had to contend with, 
and accommodate, the power of the local notables like William Blount whose 
prominence stemmed from their concentration of landed wealth.78   
There was another irony, as well.  As historians have stressed, the vision of 
surveyed and gridded lands enshrined in the Ordinance of 1785 did not lessen the 
conflation between land and title; if anything, it sought to remake the physical world to 
correspond with paper realities.  But the supposedly localist state land schemes, with their 
squiggly boundaries, had proved just as adept at converting land into an abstract 
commodity that could be bought and sold.  As these parallels suggest, how boundaries 
were drawn was less significant than the existence of land schemes that transformed 
ground into title.  
* * * 
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Though rarely served by state land grant schemes, smallholders did manage to eke 
out a property law doctrine that seemed to favor them: so-called “preemption rights.”  
“Preemption,” in this context, had a meaning different from its application in Indian 
affairs: it granted the first settlers of a particular tract of land, who had improved or 
modified it in some way, the first right to purchase it from the state, notwithstanding 
competing claims. 
In their origins, preemption rights rested on legal conceptions of ownership 
derived from sources other than positive law.   As an attorney argued in the 1794 
Southwest Territory case Blevins v. Shelby, “first occupancy agreeable to the Laws of 
nature gave . . . an Equitable title to the land.”  The principle that occupancy coupled with 
improvement—clearing, planting, or building on land—could yield title had deep roots in 
Anglo-American legal thought; it supported the earliest justifications of English 
colonization of North America in both theory and formal legal documents, and was 
enshrined in Locke’s labor theory of value.  Though few on the late eighteenth-century 
frontier had read Locke or earlier theorists, they shared the vision of the frontier as 
“almost a State of Nature,” free for the taking. The discourse of improvement thus served 
as vernacular property law in the unsettled borderlands, especially as formal titling 
schemes were slow to catch up with rapid settlement.79 
Struggles over preemption rights were nothing new. Colonial and imperial 
officials had long fought settlers they disdained as “intruders,” fruitlessly attempting to 
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extract payment for their lands.  Yet the late eighteenth century represented a moment of 
transition.  As the American Revolution dismantled older barriers, a more populist vision 
of property rights gained ascendance.  Impoverished first occupants consistently 
demanded, and largely received, low prices, generous payment terms, and explicit 
acknowledgment of their claims based on occupancy.  Privileging rapid settlement and 
widespread access over revenue and stability, state officials began to award preemption 
rights formal statutory recognition.  In 1777, North Carolina granted claimants who 
“possessed and actually improved” vacant lands the right to obtain 640 acres “in 
preference to all others.” Subsequent statutes, including the 1783 land law, reinforced and 
expanded this right.  In 1779, the Virginia legislature granted first settlers who had “built 
any house or hut, or made other improvements” the first right to purchase 1,000 acres of 
land at the nominal state price of roughly two cents per acre.80 
 Would-be claimants quickly sought to extend preemption rights into the 
territories, even though, at least in the Northwest Territory, they enjoyed no statutory 
protection.  This made little difference.  As a federal official in the Territory reported, 
“These Men upon the frontiers have hitherto been accustomed to seat themselves on the 
best of the lands, making a tomahawk right or Improvement as they term it, supposing 
that to be a sufficient Title.”  A federal surveyor in the Territory similarly observed that 
many settlers sought to “derive a Title to themselves by prior Occupancy according to the 
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Mode which has heretofore prevaild in Virginia & Pensylvania.”   “[F]rom this Idea,” he 
told a traveler, “you will find many Tracts of Land Survey'd & Mark’d.”81 
 But, though rooted in natural-law and customary practices, preemption rights soon 
became yet another source of ownership that freely floated throughout territorial land 
practice, particularly when formal law conferred them with legitimacy.  This was 
especially apparent in the Tennessee Country.  Preemption rights there were relatively 
formalized: like other land rights, they were recorded in local court records.  And like 
other promises of future title, preemption rights soon became the subject of a vigorous 
market where they were bought and sold.  As a result, like the mechanism of state land 
grants—of which they were a part—preemption rights purported to be about localism and 
protecting small claimants, but were often far more ambiguous.  In the 1795 suit of 
Tatum v. Winchester, for instance, Howell Tatum managed to secure land rights based on 
a 1784 inchoate preemption claim over a formal North Carolinian grant obtained by 
James Winchester in 1792, notwithstanding Tatum’s failure to make a survey to take any 
other steps to secure an official title.  Winchester was a prominent territorial citizen and 
land speculator, but Tatum was no smallholder either—he served as territorial treasurer 
and later as a state judge, and also speculated widely in lands.  In these circumstances, 
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preemption rights represented just another legal trump in the myriad contests to secure 
lands in the Southwest Territory.82 
  
Yet at the same moment improvement prevailed in state statutes, the creation of 
the federal domain opened a new arena for contestation.  Federal officials did not share 
the vision of ownership adopted by the states.  In particular, from nearly the moment the 
American Revolution ended, the cash-strapped national government envisioned using the 
ceded lands to repay the enormous sums the United States had borrowed to finance the 
war.  “The only adequate fund I can conceive for the payment of our debts,” a 
congressman wrote to John Adams, echoing the sentiments of many politicians, “are our 
western Lands.”83   
Preemption rights, and the vision of freely available property they represented, 
threatened to undermine the promise of revenue.  “[A]greeable to established customs in 
this Country, cutting down a few Trees planting three Hills Corn & fencing them gives a 
right of Soil to 400 acres & a preemption to 400 more,” Jonathan Heart, a captain in the 
U.S. army, wrote from his post in the Ohio Valley.   If “holding under this Tenure” were 
permitted, he argued, “the whole Federal Territory will not raise One thousand Pounds,” 
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as  “no Man would give 400 Dollars for a Farm which One Days work would serve.” The 
Northwest Territory’s governor, Arthur St. Clair, similarly observed that what were 
“commonly called improvements” in the region consisted of “marking or deadening a 
few trees, or throwing a few logs together in form of a cabin; in which way two or three 
persons, in a single week, would cover a large tract of country.”84 
Preemption rights threatened the public treasury in another way, as well.  Western 
lands were not in a state of nature; they were owned by Native nations.  Yet granting 
preemption rights to the first occupants encouraged Anglo-Americans to intrude into 
Indian country, anticipating that, when the lands were purchased from Natives (an event 
the settlers regarded as inevitable), they would have the first claim.  In 1784, shortly after 
Virginia’s cession, the Continental Congress forbade settlement in the Northwest 
Territory, north of the Ohio River, because it remained Indian territory.  But when 
George Washington visited later that year, he found that the proclamation made little 
difference. The “rage” for what he termed “forestalling of Lands” meant that “scarce a 
valuable spot . . . is left without a claimant.”  Washington’s proposed solution was to 
deem all steps to secure lands north of the Ohio as “null & void”—in other words, to 
negate settlers’ preemption rights. Senator Benjamin Hawkins made the connection 
between preemption rights and the flagrant violation of Indian ownership still more 
explicit.  “[H]itherto all our acts of No. Carolina seem to favour intruders,” he observed. 
“[W]henever the land office was opened special provision was made for intruders under 
the appellation of occupants.”  Thus it was, Hawkins lamented, “however strange it may 
                                                
84 Jonathan Heart to William Judd, Jan. 8, 1786, William Judd Papers; Jonathan Heart to William Judd, 7 February 1786, in Jonathan 
Heart Papers; Arthur St. Clair to Robert Buntin, 19 September 1796, in SCP, 198. 
  94 
seem . . . that by violating a solemn treaty these people could acquire this right of 
occupancy.”85 
Officials’ anxiety for protecting Native lands was not particularly altruistic.  
Rather, they feared, as Washington did, that the blatant violation of Indian title “would 
inevitably produce a war.”  Hawkins stated similarly of the Cherokees that the 
“encroachments on our part are the true cause of the hostilities on theirs, and as long as 
the first is suffered the latter may be expected.”  Preemption, in other words, was not free.  
“[G]ratify[ing] a few intruders,” Thomas Jefferson bemoaned about the Southwest 
Territory, would “cost the other inhabitants of the U.S. a thousand times” the land’s 
value, in the form of an Indian war.  It was cheaper and “more just,” Jefferson concluded, 
to “make war” against the intruders than the Indians.86 
In the 1780s and early 1790s, then, the federal government and, to a lesser extent, 
North Carolina began anew earlier struggles against occupancy claims.  This dispute 
focused on two separate regions within the territories.  In the Northwest Territory, 
officials and settlers contested for the north bank of the Ohio River.  Located just across 
from present-day Kentucky and West Virginia—then both part of Virginia, where 
preemption claims were legally recognized—these Ohio bottom lands were both fertile 
and well-located along the main riverine artery into the West.  In what became the 
Southwest Territory, North Carolinians poured into the valleys west of the Great Smoky 
Mountains.  This region, too, was defined by water: bounded by the Tennessee River to 
the west, the French Broad to the north, and the Big Pigeon to the east, it was usually 
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known simply as the “French Broad.”  The traditional homeland of the Upper Cherokees, 
this area contained many of their most important towns. 
 Under formal law, white settlement in both regions was illegal.  Congress had 
barred settling north of the Ohio, while North Carolina had specifically set aside the 
French Broad region for the Cherokees—the only portion of the entire state where white 
settlers could not stake a property claim.  These prohibitions had little effect.   In 1785, a 
federal army officer estimated that there were 2,100 white families settled on the north 
shore of the Ohio River, while in 1788 North Carolina’s governor placed the number of 
white families south of the French Broad at 1500. Officials, especially federal officials, 
had only contempt for these purported criminals, decrying them as “banditti” who “wish 
to live under no government.”  Their standard description for these “intruders” was 
“lawless.”87 
 Yet settlers disagreed with this characterization both of themselves and the law.  
They insisted that they were “faithful subjects of the common wealth of America” in the 
words of one memorial.  Government officers were surprised to find many of them 
submissive and obedient. “We do not pretend Claim Right or title to Land till we obtain 
in a Constitutional Manner,” one group of settlers along the Ohio assured a federal 
official.  Inhabitants south of the French Broad loyally committed their “lives and 
fortunes to support [North Carolina’s] laws and Constitution.”88  
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 In adopting these invocations of lawfulness, settlers were embracing a strategy 
that sought to enlist the government to acknowledge their rights.  Their claims to 
obedience appeared in what seemed an endless stream of petitions, in which their desire 
to obey the law served as prelude to pleas for indulgence, cooperation, and legalization.  
Sometimes settlers pleaded ignorance and argued that they were just following well-
established custom.  “Thos prohibatory Laws [banning their settlement] are Nevar 
sufficiently promulgated and have never hitherto been put in Execution,” one group of 
French Broad settlers complained.  “[W]e did not transgress your laws from a refractory 
disposition, but only followed the practice of the different states who had unapropriated 
lands to settled, who from time immemorial confirmed the actual settlers in their 
settlements upon their paying the price settled by Law.”  Every petition the French Broad 
settlers sent concluded by appealing for the opening of a land office and honoring the 
settlers’ preemption rights “at a moderate price.”  Other times they appealed to officials’ 
mercy, using moral suasion to make quasi-legal claims.  They had placed their lives and 
property at risk and suffered the brunt of Indian attacks, rhetorically parading widowed 
mothers and fatherless children before the legislators.  They were desperate and had 
nowhere else to go: if expelled, we “must take up with hunger for [a] companion and 
familiarly shake hands with the cold hand of poverty,” as a group of North Carolinian 
petitioners stated.89   
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And they asked, always, for more time—to bring in their crops, to appeal to yet 
another official or legislature who might offer relief.  The settlers “generally promise 
compliance” with orders for removal, one federal officer along the Ohio wrote, “but I 
observe it is with a degree of reluctance, and that they are fond of construing every 
indulgence, in the most favorable and extensive manner for themselves.”  Unless forced 
off, “there will be no end to their craveing for future indulgence.”90 
 When these appeals to officials were unavailing, as they were both along the Ohio 
and the French Broad, the intruders opted for another approach.  Employing the rhetoric 
of the American Revolution, they would assert rights to what historians have termed self-
sovereignty—the right of the people to form their own governments.  If the state would 
not honor their claims, they would constitute a new state.91   
 This language of self-governance and autonomy appeared in both the Northwest 
and Southwest Territories.  In nearly every settlement north of the Ohio, federal officials 
discovered an advertisement penned by a settler named John Emerson.  Emerson 
proposed meetings to frame a constitution for the settlements.  “I do certify that all 
mankind,” Emerson wrote, “agreeable to every constitution formed in America, have an 
undoubted right to pass into every vacant country, and there to form their constitution.”  
The settlers manifested these rights to self-sovereignty by electing their own justices of 
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the peace who issued writs and decided cases without any sanction from state or federal 
governments.92 
Paired with this claim to self-governance was a rejection of federal authority over 
their lands.  An anonymous writer echoed Emerson’s assertions about the right to create 
new settlements; unlike Emerson, he cited authorities—the pursuit of happiness in the 
Declaration of Independence, the guarantees of possessing property in the Massachusetts 
and Pennsylvania Declarations of Rights, and, in particular, the fifteenth article of the 
Pennsylvania Bill of Rights, which promised, in the author’s paraphrase, that all men had 
a “right to form a new State in Vacant Countrys.”  This author went further, however, by 
carefully scrutinizing the Articles of Confederation for any provision that might grant the 
federal government the power to “determine on the destruction of any Man or his 
property.”  Congress had a right to conclude treaties with the Indians, he argued, but not 
to prevent immigration; the right to levy war, but not against its own loyal citizens; the 
authority to resolve disputes involving “territory, Jurisdiction, or Boundary lines,” but not 
to determine the right of property.  In short, this author concluded, federal officials who 
attempted to deprive the settlers of their lands could be held jointly and severally liable 
for their actions.93 
South of the French Broad, settlers proved equally defiant of North Carolinian 
authority.  North Carolina’s hold on its western possessions had always been tenuous, the 
region’s inhabitants dissatisfied with a government they believed favored coastal 
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interests.  In the mid-1780s, these disgruntled settlers seceded to form what hostile 
observers decried as the “pretend State of Franklin.”  The Franklinites, as they were 
called, enacted their own constitution, elected their own legislature and governor—a 
prominent frontiersman named John Sevier—and created their own court system.94  
They also crafted their own land policy.  Under their own authority, the 
Franklinites entered a dubious agreement known as the Treaty of Dumplin Creek with the 
Cherokees.  As reported by the Cherokee leader Old Tassel, only a handful of young 
Cherokee men had attended the treaty session, all the while insisting to the Franklinites 
that they lacked the authority to negotiate a land sale.  The Cherokees had promised only 
to consult with the nation’s leaders. Nonetheless, on the basis of the purported treaty, the 
Franklinites now “call[ed]” the disputed territory “their Ground.”  Flouting North 
Carolina’s restrictions, the Franklin legislature opened a land office for all the territory 
between the French Broad and Tennessee Rivers. Whites began to settle throughout 
Cherokee country, even within a few miles of Chota, a “Belovd Town” and one of the 
most important locations within the Cherokee Nation.  The panicked Cherokees appealed 
to state and federal officials for help.  “[W]e look upon the white people that Lives in the 
new State very deceitfull,” a group of Cherokees told a federal representative. “[W]e 
have Experienced them, and are much affraid of them.”  North Carolina’s Indian agent 
predicted a war. 95    
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For their part, the Franklinites promised to “Hold [the land] in Defiance of Every 
power.” Indeed, both North Carolinian and federal proclamations ordering the 
Franklinites off the Cherokee land proved fruitless, as the settlers refused to acknowledge 
either state or federal authority.  “[T]hey Had Knowledge Enough to Judge for 
themselves,” one group of settlers informed a North Carolinian official trying to expel 
them from the land, “that they should not ask North Carolina Nor no other person how 
they ware to B. Governd.”96 
  In 1788, after intense factionalism and a brief battle, Franklin imploded, and 
North Carolina resumed control over the region.  But the defiance of the French Broad 
settlers persisted.  Excluded from civil government because their settlement remained 
illegal under North Carolina law, they, like the settlers north of the Ohio, established their 
own “social compact,” drafting articles of association that adopted the laws and 
constitution of North Carolina but kept the civil and military officers appointed by 
Franklin in office.  And they insisted on the continued validity of the Treaty of Dumplin 
Creek, arguing that it was authorized by North Carolina’s governor as well as the state of 
Franklin.97 
 In sum, the supposedly lawless banditti who defied statutes and executive 
proclamations were, in their minds, neither. Though divided by hundreds of miles, 
settlers violating state and federal law by settling north of the Ohio and south of the 
French Broad adopted similar arguments and rhetoric.  They did not wish to live under 
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“no government”; what they wanted was a government that would honor the claims to 
land they asserted.  They sought to achieve this through petitions that cast them, and not 
distant political elites, as the lawful actors.  Failing that, they sought to build their own 
states that would validate their claims.  
  
Officials who sought to prevent occupancy claims faced limited options.  Law, a 
possibility in theory, proved deeply inadequate in practice.  “[A]s to the intruders [on 
Native and public lands],” wrote Arthur St. Clair, governor of the Northwest Territory, in 
response to a suggestion to use the courts to constrain them, “the United States had best 
at once throw open this Country to every person who pleases to take possession of it, and 
give up all hopes of their Land ever being of use in discharging the public debt, for not 
one of them, I am certain, will ever be removed of civil process.”  Instead of courts, 
federal officials seeking to protect federal as well as Native title could select between two 
options: harshly punitive measures on the one hand, or negotiation and accommodation 
on the other. 98 
North of the Ohio, officials largely adopted force.  The federal Commissioners of 
Indian Affairs authorized the commander of the few hundred federal soldiers along the 
river, Colonel Josiah Harmar, to evict illegal settlers forcibly.  Secretary at War Henry 
Knox reiterated to Harmar that the removal of “all intruders” from federal lands was “the 
first object” for his forces: “the payment of the public debt . . . dictate[s] that you make 
use of the force under your command, to expel from the public lands, those lawless men 
who have acted in defiance of the orders and interest of the United States.”  Harmar was 
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only too pleased to “give . . . federal Law” at gunpoint.  Throughout 1785 and 1786, 
detachments of federal soldiers ranged the Ohio, ordering settlers to leave their cabins 
and burning the homes and crops they left behind.99 
Given the settlers’ unwillingness to acknowledge federal authority, the contest 
over the Ohio lands threatened violence.  As Major John Armstrong traveled up and 
down the river, ordering settlers to leave, he frequently encountered defiance. Some 
gatherings of men simply “laugh[ed]” when Armstrong read them his orders.  One man 
named Ross, after “cast[ing] many reflections on the Honorable the Congress the [Indian] 
Commissioners & the commanding Officer,” stated that he “was determined to hold his 
possession” no matter where the instructions came from.  If Armstrong destroyed his 
house, “he would build six more in the course of a week.”  Armstrong arrested Ross and 
sent him off in chains.    Others armed themselves and promised to resist violently, 
backing down only when Armstrong proclaimed that he would fire on any armed party.  
When Armstrong entered their homes, he discovered loopholes and barricades.100 
 North Carolina officials dealing with settlers south of the French Broad dearly 
wished to follow a similar course.  The state’s Indian agent, Joseph Martin, was certain 
that only “an armed Force” could remove the settlers.  In fact, in 1784, North Carolina’s 
governor instructed Martin to call on local leaders and militia to “drive off those 
evelminded persons who have intruded, and still continue on the Indian Lands, beyond 
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[the] French Broad River.”  But since the local militia was far more likely to endorse 
attacking the Cherokees than removing intruders, force was largely unavailable.101 
 The experience in the Northwest Territory also suggested that force was often 
unavailing.  Despite repeated evictions, settlers returned, sometimes two or three times.  
The lure was simply too great.  “While men who wish to act orderly and under good 
Government anxiously wait for arrangements being made,” one observer presciently 
wrote in 1785, “others of speculative & interpresing genius step forward . . . A few may 
be dislodged, but they will soon become too numerous for this to be easily effected.”102 
 That left accommodation.  In North Carolina, the repeated appeals of the French 
Broad settlers had an effect.  Though a number of bills legalizing the intruders’ status 
never passed—too many legislators deemed the claims “impolitic”—the French Broad 
settlers secured a key concession in North Carolina’s 1789 cession to the federal 
government.  The cession, the law provided, “shall not prevent the people now residing 
south of French Broad . . . from entering their pre-emptions in that tract, should an office 
be opened for that purpose, under an act of the present General Assembly.”103 
 This provision complicated an already confusing situation for federal officials 
attempting to clarify ownership in the newly ceded Southwest Territory.  In a territory 
already marked by a tangle of ownership claims, the French Broad region presented an 
especially thorny challenge, beset by three distinct sets of claimants, all of whom could 
point to positive law to justify their ownership.   
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The first claimants were the settlers actually occupying the territory. The cession 
only protected their rights contingently: their right to preemption depended on North 
Carolina’s creation of a land office.  But the state’s assembly failed to open an office, in 
part because the cession complicated its own right to govern territorial lands, especially 
south of the French Broad.  The settlers remained, the status of their occupancy rights 
uncertain. 
 The second claimant came to be the federal government.  Until 1791, under both 
the Treaty of Hopewell and North Carolina law, the Cherokees legally owned the French 
Broad land.  But at the Treaty of Holston, Governor Blount purchased the Cherokee 
rights to the region.  By virtue of the government’s position as sole purchaser of Native 
title, ownership of roughly 300,000 acres passed to the federal government.  As Jefferson 
noted in his report, because North Carolina had legally barred settlement in the area, it 
was the only parcel of land that the federal government owned free of prior claims under 
North Carolina law, and so constituted “the only Lands open to [federal] Disposal” in the 
entire territory—setting aside, Jefferson noted, the large number of settlers already 
present on the land.104 
 This struggle, between intruders citing preemptive rights and the federal 
government seeking to preserve its own title, strongly resembled the contests north of the 
Ohio, though complicated by the cession’s protection of preemption rights.  But what 
muddied the situation still further was the existence of a third set of claimants, asserting 
ownership on still murkier legal grounds.  In autumn 1790, soon after he arrived in the 
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Southwest Territory, William Blount discovered a North Carolina grant for lands south of 
the French Broad, even though such grants would be, in Blount’s estimation, “directly 
against both the Words and Spirit . . . of the laws of No. Carolina.” Blount soon learned 
that settlers were using so-called supernumerary warrants—the warrants issued under 
North Carolina’s 1783 land law for duplicate land claims—to obtain title to the French 
Broad lands.  Blount duly informed Secretary of State Jefferson of the practice.105   
The claimants under the warrants were untroubled that the lands ostensibly 
belonged to the United States.  Under their interpretation of the act of cession, the federal 
government’s obligation to honor North Carolina’s law encompassed the supernumerary 
warrants, even though North Carolina foreclosed their application to the French Broad 
lands.  North Carolina Governor Alexander Martin seemed to agree. Though Martin 
issued a proclamation against the practice at Jefferson’s urging, he also observed that the 
grants that had been issued, as well as any future grants, were still legally valid, as the act 
of cession granted North Carolina “full authority” over vacant lands.106 
 The French Broad settlers, then, differed from claimants north of the Ohio in the 
diverse array of statutory law they could invoke to support their claims.  Their situation 
also differed from the struggles north of the Ohio in the remarkably solicitous response of 
federal officials. Attorney General Edmund Randolph argued for leaving the matter in 
Blount’s discretion rather than issuing indictments, and Jefferson urged Blount to require 
only a vague acknowledgment of the federal government’s title from the settlers: that 
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way, he suggested, “you will secure the right of the U.S. with as little trouble and injury 
to the intruders and grantees as you can.”107 
 This preference for accommodation, rather than confrontation, had several causes.  
Unlike Henry Knox and Col. Harmar, Jefferson and Randolph were not military men, 
accustomed to issuing orders and expecting obedience.  Echoing the settlers’ quasi-legal 
arguments, Jefferson even acknowledged that “equitable circumstances” might justify the 
settlers’ land claims.  But they may also have recognized that federal authority in the 
Southwest Territory remained tenuous, dependent on the local goodwill.  With few 
soldiers in the region, federal policy depended on William Blount and his handful of 
lieutenants—all former North Carolinians, selected by dint of their local prominence and 
influence rather than nationalist commitments. Blount was in fact even less reliable than 
Jefferson or Randolph realized. Before he wrote to his superiors warning of the French 
Broad frauds, Blount had written to his business associates to buy up supernumerary 
warrants to invest in the “scheme”—“my name never to appear,” he cautioned.108 
 Yet the shift toward accommodation also reflected a change in the political mood 
away from earlier iron-fisted approaches.  At the first U.S. Congress, western 
representatives pushed for a federal land system that would acknowledge the right of 
occupancy for unauthorized settlers on federal lands.  “Will you then raise a force to 
drive them off?” Representative Scott, from western Pennsylvania, asked on the floor of 
the House of Representatives in May 1789.  “That has been tried; troops were raised and 
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sent under Harmer [sic] to effect that purpose . . . but three hours after the troops were 
gone, these people returned again, repaired the damage, and are now settled upon the 
lands in open defiance of the authority of the Union.”  Scott argued that these settlers “be 
indulged with a pre-emption to the purchase,” and the House agreed.  The House passed a 
bill that would grant “preference” to “actual settlers,” even though dissenters grumbled 
that a speculator could simply “spend a few days on his land, and call himself an actual 
settler.” But after the House’s bill died from slow neglect in the Senate, the ambiguous 
status of preemption rights in the territories persisted.109  
 In one sense, such ambiguity served the settlers well; it suggested at least 
grudging acknowledgment of their informal claims.  With territorial officials unwilling or 
unable to evict them, the purported intruders remained on their lands, their continued 
occupation making mass removal more difficult and costly.   
But casting the unauthorized settlers as simply defending a customary legal order 
against the state—as wishing merely to be left alone—ignores how fully the settlers were 
invested in recognition of their title under formal law.  This is especially clear south of 
the French Broad, where the settlers’ rhetoric demonstrated that many still craved 
legalization, even though their occupancy had acquired quasi-legal status.  They 
continued, for instance, to petition Congress.  In 1794, assisted by a committee from the 
first sitting of the territorial legislature, they asked that their “right of pre-emption to their 
hard-earned improvements and possessions” be recognized when a federal land office 
opened.  Even more significant than the settlers’ language, however, was their actions.  
After asking Congress to honor preemption rights, they related that many had  purchased 
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North Carolina land warrants and “laid them on their lands,” in the expectation that 
Congress would confirm them.  They audaciously asked that Congress honor their 
warrants—while also preventing “stranger[s]” from using those same warrants to seize 
title “from the holder and improver of the land.”  In other words, many of the French 
Broad settlers were not content to assert preemption rights alone.  They grasped at any 
available source for ownership that would bolster their claims to the lands they lived 
on.110 
 A similar reliance on multiple sources of ownership to protect title to French 
Broad lands appears in the Superior Court case King v. Wilson. Around the time the 
settlers were petitioning Congress, Robert Wilson, who lived in the disputed region, fell 
into conversation with Robert King, a prominent land speculator.  King asked Wilson 
whether he wished to obtain a supernumerary warrant for the lands on which he lived.  
Wilson declined, though not because he thought his occupancy right sufficient.  Rather, 
he “did not wish to risque his money for a Grant because he conceived the grants 
Obtained in that tract of Country would be illegal and void.” King in response “insisted 
that grants in that manner obtained would be good and valid in law.”111 
Wilson finally reached an agreement with King that would purportedly protect his 
title against the legal uncertainty surrounding the French Broad lands.  As the parties 
orally contracted, King would obtain a warrant from North Carolina in his own name 
from Wilson’s land, but he would also provide a bond for Wilson to obtain his tract “in 
fee simple . . . derived from the United States whenever the federal Office for the sale of 
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said land should be opened (provided the title and conveyance from North Carolina . . . 
should be found insufficient).”  It would take many years before this contract in the 
alternate could finally be settled.112 
As King v. Wilson suggests, notwithstanding federal acquiescence in the presence 
of the “intruders,” the French Broad region in the early 1790s was not a squatters’ 
paradise.  It was a place where three forms of ownership—occupancy, state warrants, and 
federal grants—comingled as much as they clashed, and where “actual settlers” sought 
above all official recognition of their ownership claims.  The settlers understood that 
there were threats to ownership other than federal bayonets; they recognized that, in the 
litigious free-for-all of Southwest Territory land practice, other claimants often 
represented the greatest challenge for land ownership.   
 
At its most extreme, the confrontation between settlers asserting occupancy 
rights—“intruders”—and the federal government took the form of a physical, and 
ideological, standoff: settlers asserting natural-law claims that denied federal authority 
against soldiers evicting them at gunpoint, acting on the orders of officials who despised 
such defiance of federal directives as “lawlessness.”  Following the perspective of the 
officials themselves, most histories of the period have fixated on such dramatic 
showdowns.  But this narrative risks misunderstanding the aims of both the government 
and the settlers.  The federal government itself oscillated, sometimes tolerating intruders, 
and nearly legalizing their claims.  Even more significantly, casting the anti-statist as 
defenders of customary norms, as many histories have done, flattens their objectives.  
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The order they sought to defend—preemption rights—was grounded in statute.  And, 
although based on rights of occupancy and improvement, preemption rights were not an 
unvarnished acknowledgment of vernacular claims; they still depended on state 
recognition, recordation, and often payment, to secure legally protected title.  These 
rights were but one source of ownership that these settlers strategically, and 
pragmatically, advanced to try to protect their rights.   
In the end, what these “lawless” settlers craved above all was law—law that 
would protect their lands in the midst of the tremendous scramble for ownership 
throughout the territories.  But as the French Broad region suggests, law did not always 
provide a solution.  Just as with the state land system, preemption rights did not guarantee 
security of title.  They merely cast settlers into the territories’ litigious sea of land claims. 
* * *  
In May 1789, two months into its first sitting, the House of Representatives 
returned to the question of the federal land system in the U.S. territories.  All the 
members agreed that the issue was “deserving of the earliest attention,” in the words of 
James Madison.  When the House sidetracked to discuss the amendments that would 
become the Bill of Rights, Representative Vining of Delaware urged the congressmen to 
return to the land issue.  “[I]n point of importance,” he argued, “every candid mind would 
acknowledge its preference.”113 
This sense of urgency concerning federal title reflected both the typicality and 
uniqueness of the controversies over ownership in the Northwest and Southwest 
Territories.  Federal officials and lawmakers were not alone in grappling with the sources 
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and definition of property in the 1780s and early 1790s.  Throughout the United States, 
confusion and contention over title occurred wherever jurisdiction and ownership were 
unsettled.  In what Anglo-American maps labeled as upstate New York, the 
Haudenosaunee (Iroquois), the federal government, state officials, and land speculators 
all contended over the scope and meaning of Native title and consent.  In Kentucky—a 
Virginia county sandwiched between the two federal territories until its statehood in 
1792—Virginia’s system of indiscriminate location, which closely resembled North 
Carolina’s 1783 land law, produced notorious amounts of litigation.  “The Titles to the 
landed Estates in Kentucky are so very uncertain,” one observer wrote, that “the Chance 
is at least three to One, that a Man who purchases there must defend his Title by a 
Lawsuit.” And on Massachusetts’s eastern frontier (present-day Maine), speculators 
embracing positivist conceptions of ownership contended with settlers who used quasi-
legal arguments to assert occupancy rights to land.114 
But Congress’s hurry to create a land system stemmed from more than a sense of 
general crisis; it derived from a view that the territories held especial significance in 
recrafting ownership in early America.  In part, the territories’ distinctiveness stemmed 
from the intensity of property pluralism there: issues of Native ownership, state land law 
systems, and occupancy rights all overlapped simultaneously, creating an especially 
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complex ownership tangle.  For Congress, though, the territories’ salience came from the 
fact that they represented the future of land ownership.  Already by the early 1790s, by 
dint of the North Carolina and Virginia cessions, most western lands were under federal 
jurisdiction. Because of the federal government’s sole right to purchase Native title, this 
concentration would only increase.  At the same time, state-controlled “vacant” lands 
were quickly disappearing; in 1789, one congressman declared Kentucky “already full.”  
Congress accordingly viewed the Northwest and Southwest Territories as a laboratory for 
the creation of federal precedents that would, they anticipated, ultimately govern property 
over much of the continent.115 
Yet the congressional push to quickly define federal title in the territories, and 
thereby make land available for western settlement, failed.  It failed because the shadows 
of past land systems doubly haunted the federal government, both in the territories and in 
the halls of Congress. 
As Jefferson’s report underscored, and federal officials quickly discovered, the 
federal territories were not a blank canvas for crafting federal policy.  They were, rather, 
a crazy quilt of the ideas and laws that other people had created about ownership.  
Pluralism resulted because the territories were a place of collision: most obviously, 
between Native and Anglo-American concepts of property, but also between settlers from 
different states with their own land laws; between distant federal administrators, state 
governors and legislatures, and local officials; and between smallholders and grandees.   
These encounters concentrated and intensified the debates about ownership 
already swirling throughout early America.  Though these controversies involved broad, 
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abstract ideas—questions of land and democracy, the individual and the state, natural and 
positive law—in the territories they were the stuff of everyday legal practice, made 
manifest through formal deeds, grants, warrants, as well as quasi-legal claims that 
appeared through petitions and even violence.  This proliferation of paper also made 
concepts about property sticky: the persistence of a parcel of land, and the centrality of a 
chain of title, meant that long-vanished ideas about ownership remained relevant, and 
contentious, for decades afterward.  Ideas about how to grant land were, in this sense, 
immortal. 
 The result of all this pluralism was confusion, which even those who profited 
handsomely from the disorder claimed to abhor.  But if everyone professed agreement 
about the problem, not all agreed about the cure.  The solution proposed by the Land 
Ordinance of 1785—prior survey and the rectangular grid—was controversial in the 
territories.  For one, it was immensely expensive; many suggested it would cost more 
than it would bring in. For another, many insisted the rectangular grid made confusion 
worse, not better.  Rectangular lines would arbitrarily and unpredictably divide valuable 
natural features, while surveyors could be notoriously inaccurate.  Far better to have 
tracts “so well described with natural Bounderies as to leave no grounds or possibility of 
dispute.”  Even Arthur St. Clair, the governor of the Northwest Territory charged with 
implementing federal law, expressed doubt.  Like most at the time, he advocated for 
adopting what was most familiar and well-known to him—in his case, given his central 
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Pennsylvania roots, the Pennsylvania land system.  He often rode this favorite 
hobbyhorse in letters to cabinet officials.116    
The disagreement in the territories found its echo in the capital, where Congress 
was also arguing vehemently about which elements of the past to accept, and which to 
reject.  Though histories of the federal land system, written with the benefit of hindsight, 
often read as if the 1785 land ordinance foreordained later outcomes, the law may as well 
have never existed for all the attention Congress paid it.  Its debates in the late 1780s and 
early 1790s demonstrate, rather, how unformed and unsettled federal land policy 
remained.  The only principle that seemed to secure universal agreement was that lands 
could only be sold after they had been purchased from Native nations.   Otherwise, 
members disagreed over prior survey, the rectangular grid, the location of federal land 
offices, occupancy rights, and the price per acre; they fought over whether federal land 
policy should serve large moneyed purchasers or smallholders.117   
Though earlier land practice was the primary touchstone for this wide-ranging 
debate, the congressmen fiercely disagreed about prior systems’ merits.  When one 
congressman praised New York’s land practice, another sought to make sure it was well 
understood “in order that the United States may avoid it.”  When one congressman 
lauded indiscriminate location, others attacked the confusion and litigation the system 
produced.  For his part, North Carolina representative Hugh Williamson observed that his 
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state’s land system, as established under the 1783 land law, had allowed “persons rich in 
securities and cash” to seize the best lands.118   
After two years of debate, the House largely punted.  The bill it ultimately enacted 
contained concrete provisions guaranteeing the right of preemption (as discussed above) 
and, after much disagreement, setting a tentative low price of twenty-five cents per acre.  
But it left the hotly contested questions of the “form, time, and manner” of how lands 
would be located and patents issued entirely to the Attorney General, who would serve as 
superintendent of the general land office.  But even this nominal agreement failed in the 
Senate, which opted instead to secure more information about the land in the territories—
which produced Jefferson’s report.  The apparently overwhelmed Congress abandoned 
the land office project, not to be revived for several years.119 
 One of the bill’s strongest backers, Thomas Scott of western Pennsylvania, 
blamed its failure not on ignorance, but on well-placed opposition from federally backed 
land companies.120  These land companies were the product of a federal policy adopted a 
few years earlier in the waning days of the Continental Congress.  By sheer number of 
acres distributed, they had a far stronger claim to be the first federal land system than the 
ineffectual 1785 ordinance.  Its backers and proponents hoped they would offer a solution 
to the territories’ property muddle.  Events played out differently. 
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Chapter 2: Land Companies and the First Federal Land System 
In 1787, as the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia and the Continental 
Congress drafted the Northwest Ordinance in New York, Manasseh Cutler, a 
Massachusetts minister little known to the congressmen and delegates, visited both.  
Cutler traveled on behalf of the Ohio Company of Associates, a group of New 
Englanders, many of them veterans of the Continental Army, who had subscribed to 
shares in a proposed purchase of western lands.  The Company had charged Cutler with 
negotiating a contract for federal lands in the Northwest Territory. Ultimately, Cutler, 
aided by another company representative, Winthrop Sargent, secured an agreement for 
1.5 million acres along the Ohio River, in return for a promised payment of one million 
dollars in federal securities.  The deal Cutler struck  “far exceeded any private contract 
ever made before in the United States,” one congressional delegate opined; he told Cutler 
he had never known “so much attention” paid to a proposal, nor  “more pressing to bring 
it to a close.”1 
Cutler’s purchase represented the beginning of what, in hindsight, can be 
denominated the first federal land system—a moment in the late 1780s when the federal 
government sold large tracts of territorial land to speculative land companies.  In most 
histories of public lands, federal sales to the companies represent a brief aberration from 
the otherwise steady march from the 1785 Land Ordinance to the federal land office 
system of 1800.2  In fact, in empowering non-state actors to pursue important 
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governmental ends, the large-scale sales were far more characteristic of eighteenth-
century governance than the abortive federal surveys and sales of the 1780s.  These 
transactions resembled the state land systems in that purchasers, not the government, 
would bear the administrative costs and reap the potential profits. The land companies 
themselves harkened to prerevolutionary predecessors such as the Vandalia, Indiana, and 
(identically named) Ohio Company.3 
But the Ohio Company and its primary imitator, the Miami Company, also 
diverged from these earlier precedents.  Unlike prerevolutionary land companies, which 
often existed in uneasy tension and often outright conflict with government, the Ohio and 
Miami Companies would not be unsanctioned, autonomous efforts to craft statelets in the 
wilderness on the strength of Indian purchases.  Rather, at least in aspiration, they more 
closely resembled quasi-public corporate entities like the East India Company long used 
to subsidize and support imperial ventures.  The Companies, in fact, sold themselves 
based on their commitment to federal state-building.  Purchasing lands directly from the 
federal government itself, the companies, especially the Ohio Company, envisioned 
themselves as forerunners and participants in the national political project of extending 
federal authority and law onto the seemingly ungovernable frontier.  As historians have 
persuasively traced, the land companies represented a projection of federal power—
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through governance, demographics, finance, and military capacity—along the Ohio 
Valley.4 
Existing literature has captured less well how the land companies would achieve 
these aims.  Recent scholarship has emphasized the growth and expansion of corporations 
in the early republic, stressing their role as sources of economic and political power and 
as polities within the broader polity.  What distinguished the land companies from the 
era’s wider mushrooming of corporate governance was that they possessed and controlled 
territory through ownership.  In this sense, the Ohio and Miami Companies were less 
forward-looking, toward an age of business corporations, than backward-looking: the 
Companies were eighteenth-century municipal corporations writ large, where power and 
authority to pursue governmental goals derived precisely from title to property.  
Controlling land, and especially how it was distributed, was not only the companies’ core 
business but also their promise as an implement of policy, in the eyes of both proponents 
and federal officials.  The diverse and extravagant promises Cutler and others insisted 
settlement would accomplish underscored how central title was to ideas about 
governance during this period.5 
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One aspect of the companies’ landholding was especially important in recrafting 
the territories:  the promise of “system.”  Though historians have generally interpreted 
this commitment as symbolic of a broader Federalist embrace of order and hierarchy, the 
land companies emphasized system in a quite literal sense: lands would surveyed and 
distributed through a well-defined and explicit process that the companies crafted 
deliberately, in contrast to the unplanned and haphazard land practices that had produced 
the territories’ property chaos.  This methodical approach to selling land would facilitate 
other goals—paying down the federal debt, crafting peaceful Indian relations, and, more 
broadly, curbing and channeling the seeming anarchic impulses of land speculation. The 
companies’ landownership would allow them to regulate settlement and avoid “the 
monopoly of lands,” which, undemocratically, “placed much power in the hands of a 
few.” In other words, paradoxically, empowering a handful of private land companies 
seemed to offer a solution to private enrichment at public expense by creating a form of 
governance over much of the territories.  Title, in this sense, served as a form of 
sovereignty.6   
That, at least, was the ideology that underlay the first federal land system.  But in 
practice, the “system” that the companies promised was largely self-serving rhetoric.  
Like William Blount and other predecessors, the land companies succumbed to the 
speculative lure of title: visions of millions of acres of lands seduced them into gambling 
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on inchoate and uncertain ownership.  The clearest example of this process was a third 
land company, the Tennessee Company, a creation of Georgia’s so-called Yazoo sales 
that became deeply entangled with politics and finance in the Southwest Territory.   
Federal officials interpreted the Tennessee Company’s vision of quasi-sovereignty as a 
threat rather than a boon to national authority.  But in time, it became clear that the 
federally endorsed Ohio and Miami Companies were far more similar to the Tennessee 
Company than their supporters’ rhetoric suggested.   
In the end, corporate control of land by all three companies proved antithetical, 
rather than complementary, to federal interests.  When their speculative gambles failed 
dramatically, all parties came away disillusioned.   The companies felt that the federal 
government had opportunistically taken advantage of their hazarding of both financial 
and personal risk, without providing the support they believed implicit in the partnership.  
From the perspective of federal officials, the land companies left property messes that fell 
to Congress and the federal government to resolve, exacerbating rather than clarifying the 
tangle of title in the territories.   “System” proved illusory.  After the first federal land 
system produced results very similar to the chaotic jumble of ownership produced by the 
state land schemes, it was soon abandoned. 
* * * 
The Ohio Company began with a 1783 petition by a group of continental army 
officers for land in the Ohio country, which they already anticipated would become a 
“Colloney of the United States” and ultimately a state.  The petition’s drafter and prime 
mover was Brigadier General Rufus Putnam, an engineer from a middling family in 
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central Massachusetts who had worked as a surveyor before the Revolution.  Though the 
petition languished, three years later Putnam convened interested parties at the Bunch of 
Grapes Tavern in Boston to draft the articles of association for a land company.7  
At the core of the Ohio Company’s plan was federal debt.  “The design of this 
association,” read the articles’ first line, “is to raise a fund in Continental Certificates for 
the sole purpose . . . of purchasing Lands in the Western territory (belonging to the 
United States).”   Continental certificates were paper promises of future repayment issued 
by a cash-starved Continental Congress to pay for the creation and supply of a national 
military.  By war’s end, these certificates had been issued to soldiers, officers, 
tradesmen—anyone with outstanding financial claims against the United States.  The lack 
of confidence in the new national government’s financial security meant that these 
certificates traded at a heavy discount; in 1784, Putnam found them selling for as little as 
18-20% of their face value.8 
The Ohio Company proposed to raise $1,000,000 in Continental Specie 
Certificates, which would then be redeemed for western lands.  Rather than purchasing 
land outright, investors would purchase a “share” in the Company that would entitle them 
to a portion of the lands. There would be a thousand shares in the company, which could 
be purchased for $1,000 in certificates and $10 in gold or silver; the hard currency would 
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be used to pay the Company’s operating expenses.  Individuals were limited to a total of 
five shares; multiple purchasers could also pool their resources and obtain a share.9 
The Ohio Company met again a year later, after agents had already begun 
soliciting subscribers across New England.  At this meeting, Putnam was unanimously 
appointed as one of three directors of the Company.  The other two were Samuel Holden 
Parsons, a Connecticut native and Revolutionary War general who had served as 
congressional treaty commissioner at the 1785 Treaty of Fort Finney with the Shawnees, 
and Manasseh Cutler, former army chaplain and a clergyman in Ipswich, Massachusetts, 
with a particular interest in natural science.  A fourth man, Winthrop Sargent, was 
appointed as the Company’s Secretary.  Also from Massachusetts, Sargent had served as 
an artillerist during the war, and a surveyor in the Ohio Country for the Continental 
Congress. Later that year, they would be joined by James Varnum, a former general from 
Rhode Island, as director, and Richard Platt as treasurer. The Company charged the 
newly appointed directors to “immediately” apply to Congress to purchase lands.  “We 
are in Serious earnest,” Parsons wrote a Connecticut delegate.10   
In summer 1787, Manasseh Cutler journeyed to New York to reach an agreement 
with the Continental Congress. A political neophyte, Cutler nonetheless quickly 
insinuated himself into the nation’s political elite, dining with James Madison and 
Elbridge Gerry at the constitutional convention, and with Arthur St. Clair (then President 
of Congress), and Henry Knox, the Secretary at War, in New York.  There, Cutler found 
Congress in the midst of drafting the Northwest Ordinance for the governance of the new 
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federal territory, including the Ohio Country; he proposed a number of (unspecified) 
amendments, which, he was happy to note, “have all been made.”11 
 The actual contract proved harder to secure.  To be sure, Congress salivated at the 
prospect of retiring large chunks of the national debt, and the “mode of Sale” that Cutler 
proposed would also “exempt the United States from the greatest part of the expence” of 
surveying and selling the land under the 1785 Land Ordinance.   But, as one 
congressional delegate complained, Congress found it impossible “to get anything done,” 
even the “plainest propositions” like Cutler’s proposed purchase.  The largest obstacle 
was price.  While Congress sought $1 per acre, Cutler insisted on $.33 an acre, which 
Congress refused.12 
 A breakthrough occurred on the evening of July 20, when William Duer called on 
Cutler.  Duer was the secretary of the Board of Treasury, the congressional committee 
charged with negotiating the contract with Cutler.  He was also an influential New York 
financier.  He came to Cutler on behalf of a group of the city’s “principal characters” who 
proposed expanding the Ohio Company’s proposal to “take in another Company but that 
it should be a kept a profound secret.”  Cutler, they urged, would negotiate for a much 
larger purchase than originally planned, and this new company—later dubbed the Scioto 
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Company, after its location—would pay for the additional land.  “The plan struck me 
agreeably,” Cutler recorded, and “Sargent insisted on my undertaking [it].”13 
 Encompassing Duer’s proposed purchase made Congress much more receptive, 
since they were now discussing retiring millions of the public debt.  The parties agreed 
that, although the nominal price would remain a dollar per acre, the actual price would be 
reduced to $.66 per acre on account of “bad lands.”  But another obstacle remained, due 
to intense regional horse-trading over who would fill the newly created positions in the 
territorial government created by the Northwest Ordinance.  Over dinner with some 
southern congressmen, Cutler negotiated that Parsons and Varnum would serve as 
territorial judges, while Sargent would serve as the territorial secretary.14 
 With the deals struck, “matters went on much better,” and three months later, 
Cutler signed a formal contract.  The Ohio Company would pay $1,000,000 in two 
installments:  $500,000 up front with a right of immediate entry, with an additional 
$500,000 due after the surveying of the tract within seven years, at which point the 
government would legally transfer title.   The one and a half million acres purchased 
would be located along the Ohio River, to be surveyed following the Ordinance of 1785, 
with tracts reserved for future sale and to support education and ministers.  The actual 
price in specie worked out to eight cents per acre.15 
The same day, Cutler and Sargent signed another indenture for the “Scioto” 
speculation crafted by Duer.  It encompassed what Cutler guessed to be 3.5 million acres 
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(actually roughly five million) west of the Ohio Company’s purchase to the Scioto River.  
There was no immediate payment, but the associates would pay six installments, every 
six months, at the same rate of 2/3rds of a dollar per acre.  At Putnam’s urging, Cutler 
and Sargent had separated the Ohio from the Scioto contracts, entering the second in their 
names alone to avoid the appearance of impropriety.  But despite this separation, the two 
projects remained entangled.  The Ohio Company had on hand only $356,000 in 
certificates.  The remaining $143,000 needed for its required down payment came from 
the “Scioto Tract Associates”—Duer’s cabal of financiers. “Without connecting this 
Speculation,” Cutler wrote somewhat defensively, “similar terms & advantages could not 
have been obtained for the Ohio Company.”16  
Cutler’s negotiations proved remarkably successful.  Much of the project’s appeal 
was financial: Cutler tempted congressional delegates with the promise that the sale 
would ultimately retire nearly four million dollars in federal debt.  But the purchase’s 
fiscal attractions were inseparable from its promise to channel the era’s speculative 
impulses to serve the public interest.  Rather than undermining or co-opting the state, as 
most land speculations of the time did, the Company’s boosters claimed to bolster the 
authority of the national state, by creating a “large & immediate settlement,” consisting 
of “the most robust & industrious people in Amer[ic]a” who were “strongly attached to 
the federal Government.”  In other words, the federal government would entrust the 
survey and sale of the public lands to the Ohio Company, which would also enjoy de 
facto control over the territory’s governance, thanks to the overlap between Company and 
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federal officials.  Cutler particularly stressed that the new settlement would be 
“Systematic,” an argument that found a receptive audience in Samuel Osgood, president 
of the Board of Treasury and charged with negotiating the contract.  Osgood lamented to 
Cutler that “System had never before been attempted” in settling western lands, 
notwithstanding “the advantages of System in a new Settlement.”  This vision of harmony 
between federal and corporate interests led Osgood to proclaim the Ohio Company’s  
“plan . . . the best ever formed in Amer[ic]a.”17 
   
On April 7, 1788, Rufus Putnam, elected as the superintendent of the new 
settlement, brought forty-eight selected men to the confluence of the Ohio and 
Muskingum Rivers, the center of the Company’s settlement, after struggling through the 
winter snows of Pennsylvania.   The first task that confronted Putnam and his men was 
surveying.  The Company had charged Putnam with implementing its elaborate plan for 
dividing the Company’s 1.5 million acres among its 1,000 shareholders. As crafted in the 
Company’s first meeting after the purchase agreement, the plan called for a city and 
commons centered at the rivers’ confluence, which was ultimately named Marietta.  The 
town would be carefully laid out into “oblong squares,” in which each shareholder would 
receive a houselot.   Individual plots of increasing size would then radiate outward: one 
thousand eight-acre lots surrounding the city; one thousand 116.48-acre lots along the 
Ohio; one thousand 320-acre lots along the navigable rivers stretching north into the 
purchase; and one thousand 992-acre lots in the “inland towns” away from the rivers.  
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Parcels would be assigned to individual shares by lot.  “By this mode of Division,” one 
investor wrote, “the Proprietors will be enabled to make Settlement by preveously 
forming a Sistem by which they will bind themselves to adhere to fixed Principals for 
that purpose.”18 
As Putnam toiled, “Ohio fever” struck New England, where inhabitants anxiously 
awaited reports of the new settlement.  “No property commands money like the Ohio 
Lands,” Cutler gleefully reported from Ipswich.  One man reported that his home was 
“thronged with Caracters” seeking to invest in the Company, a craze that extended to 
Nova Scotia and even to the Caribbean island of St. Croix.  Many of the subscribers were 
veterans, but they ranged widely.  Some were wealthy and influential, such as Governor 
Bowdoin of Massachusetts; others, relatively humble, put down what they could, even if 
it was only a few dollars cash.  By May 1788, all shares had been subscribed, and now 
traded at double their initial cost.  “The spark for emigrating to the Western world is 
kindled into a blaze,” Cutler told Putnam.19 
 Not all shared this enthusiasm.  Manasseh Cutler satirized the opposition as a 
“new disorder” he dubbed “Ohio-Phobia,” the symptoms of which appeared whenever 
“the excellences of the Ohio Country” were discussed. Cutler diagnosed the root of this 
ailment as venality, since the Ohiophobe bewailed that emigration caused the value of his 
New England to fall by half.  By contrast, Cutler positioned himself and his allies as 
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nationalists: the Company, he stressed, would sink the national debt, “extend the 
American Empire--increase our internal wealth--& render us more respectable abroad.”20   
 Cutler’s vision of harmony between corporate and national authority seemed to be 
playing out in Marietta.  The Company set about using the asset it had—land—to attach 
those federal officers not yet linked to it.  It donated houselots to soldiers stationed at Fort 
Harmar, the headquarters of the federal soldiers of the First American Regiment that lay 
directly across the Muskingum River from Marietta, and inveigled the Regiment’s 
commander, officers, and even Secretary of War Henry Knox to become shareholders.  
The Company was particularly anxious to attach Arthur St. Clair, the Territory’s 
governor, who became a shareholder and was also gifted a number of additional lots in 
Marietta.  As Ohio Company proprietor John May candidly acknowledged, such gestures 
were “a little selfish,” as the Company  “wish[ed] [St. Clair] to make the Muskingum the 
seat of government, and place of his residence.”  This proximity to power would, they 
anticipated, make the Company’s lands more valuable.21   
When St. Clair finally arrived in Marietta on July 9, 1788,  “[a]ll rejoiced at his 
coming,” as the governor was greeted with a fourteen-cannon salute and St. Clair gave a 
brief speech praising the leaders of the Ohio Company for their commitment to “order.”  
“This is the birth-day of this Western World,” May wrote.   May’s hyperbole expressed a 
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sense that the Territory’s origins lay in the union of the Company’s settlement with 
constituted federal authority, as represented by St. Clair.22  
 
 St. Clair’s speech to Marietta’s inhabitants particularly recommended treating the 
“Numbers of Savage and, too often, hostile Nations” that surrounded the town with 
“kindness & the strictest Regard to Justice.”   In reply, Rufus Putnam reassured St. Clair 
that “[w]e have treated [the Natives] like friends, like brothers.”23 
 This exchange emphasizes the centrality of recasting Indian affairs for the Ohio 
Company’s project—an aspect of governance that dovetailed neatly with the Washington 
Administration’s goals.  The Company fervently hoped to replace the violence that had 
previously characterized the frontier with a warmer cross-cultural relationship.  Even 
before he arrived in Marietta, Rufus Putnam had written to John Heckewelder, a 
Moravian missionary among the Delawares, to reassure him of the Ohio Company’s good 
will toward Natives.   “I want to embrace them in the arms of Friendship,” Putnam told 
the minister, “I want to be made acquainted with them, I want to have them Introduced to 
our Settlement in a friendly manner I want them to live by us and with us if they please I 
want (if I may be permited to speak it) I want that we should do them good and not 
evil.”24 
 The key to cross-cultural peace was land.  Putnam and other Ohio Company 
leaders diagnosed the violence that plagued the Ohio Valley as, at base, a land use 
problem.  The “Big Knives”—the Natives’ term for the refractory Virginians who had 
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settled along the Ohio River—had ranged all over Indian lands, competing with tribes for 
game and illegally settling Native land.  The “New England Mode of Settlement” was 
different. “Being Farmers or Mecannicks and not Hunters,” the settlers had little interest 
in overrunning Native lands.  Putnam also embraced the language of consent only 
recently adopted by Henry Knox and other federal leaders.  “I wish the land may be 
purchased from them [the Indians] on the principle of Bargain and Sale,” he wrote, 
repudiating the doctrine of conquest, “and not wrested from them as a condition of 
giveing them Peace.”25 
Indian relations and Company land were intertwined in another sense, as well.  
Bloodstained lands had little value.  Company officials well understood how specters of 
Indian attacks, exaggerated by a constant torrent of newspaper reports of Native 
atrocities, haunted the minds of New Englanders.  “The greatest present discouragement 
[to the Company] is the fear of Indians,” Cutler wrote; he urged Putnam to censor the 
first letters back to New England to ensure that the “first impressions” of Indians were 
positive. Rumors proliferated anyway.  “Terreble Stories” circulated that Putnam’s entire 
party had been killed en route to the Ohio. Recently arrived Marietta settlers had to 
reassure their families that they had been spared from the “savages.”  Samuel Parsons 
reported that more than one hundred settlers had halted in Pennsylvania, and some turned 
back, on account of “unfounded Reports of Danger industriously spread to alarm the fears 
of people.”  New Englanders’ hazy grasp of western geography exacerbated the problem.  
Reports of attacks anywhere along the frontier—Illinois, Kentucky, or even Georgia—
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occasioned alarms, since in the minds of New England readers “all goes for Western 
Country.”  Such vague reports of Indians, “magnified . . . a thousand fold,” constituted 
“our Principal Obstruction to Settlement.”26  
For the Company, then, perceived amity with Natives was a critical business 
decision vital to its economic success in attracting settlers and investors.  In countering 
rumors of Indian terrors, the Ohio Company settlers deployed the alternate trope—that of 
“friendly” Indians, a term settlers repeatedly used to describe the Delawares and 
Wyandots they encountered around Marietta to correspondents back home.  In a letter 
sent back to Massachusetts for publication, Putnam reported on his very first meal at 
Marietta, a banquet at Fort Harmar with the Delaware chief Captain Pipe and twenty 
other Natives who had come to the fort to trade.  When Putnam told Pipe of the 
Company’s “business,” Pipe reportedly proclaimed that the Natives “should be happy to 
live by us.”   Samuel Parsons similarly reported that the Delawares “profess a great 
Friendship for the Yankees who they distinguish from the Settlers on the Virginia 
Shore.”27   
Such tidy correspondence between Native views and the New Englanders’ self-
conceptions suggests a certain amount of ventriloquism, but the strong relations between 
the two groups were not just propaganda.  The Delawares and Wyandots who lived in the 
area had long experience with Anglo-Americans, and “Pipe”—the Delaware chief 
Konieschquanoheel, the most important local Native leader—had pursued a close 
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relationship with the United States for the past several years.  Winthrop Sargent had 
befriended Pipe during previous visits, while Fort Harmar’s commander described him as 
a “manly old fellow” and “Gentleman.”  Such alliances served Native purposes.  Given 
the blurred lines between the Company and federal authority, there were good reasons for 
the Delawares to embrace the Ohio Company settlers; these links furthered their 
connections to the United States and secured access to trade goods.28     
 This seeming harmony between Native and Ohio Company goals made early 
Marietta something of a mixed settlement characterized by cross-cultural curiosity, 
exchange, and even seeming friendship.  After their initial “acquaintance” with the New 
Englanders, Wyandots and Delawares—“our Indian friends,” as Putnam dubbed them—
came to Marietta “almost every day.”  Manasseh Cutler, who traveled to Marietta in the 
summer of 1788 (ultimately his only trip to the Ohio Country), dined with Natives nearly 
every night of his visit. A particularly strong bond formed around Marietta’s public 
celebrations, as the New Englanders’ love of ceremony and performance found its analog 
in Native diplomatic culture, where feasting and ritual served to forge ties.  Thus, when 
General Varnum died in January 1789, local Native leaders marched in his funeral 
cortege.  Other Native leaders picnicked in Marietta, where they listened to the 
declaiming of verse and then competed against the New Englanders in a foot race. Local 
Delawares also attended Marietta’s first July 4 celebration, where toasts were raised to 
Captain Pipe as well as Governor St. Clair and the new constitution.  Ohio Company 
proprietor John May, heading one of the tables, was bemused when one of the Delaware 
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chiefs greeted him, “How do you do, brother Yankee.”  He seated the Delaware next to 
him and watched as he ate freely and tried to join in the toasts.  “He labored with all his 
might to speak them,” May recorded, “but made very poor work of it.”  May noted that 
he had shaken hands with most of the local Delawares since his arrival.29 
 Underneath these avowals of good will, however, ran an undercurrent of 
suspicion.  Despite his amusement with the Indians, John May thought them “a set of 
creatures not to be trusted.”  “[N]ot withstanding [the Indians’] professed friendship,” one 
Marietta settler wrote, “there is a guard placed every night.”  The Ohio Company settlers 
knew that the situation further down the Ohio was very different, as bands of Natives 
ambushed barges travelling down the river.  Governor St. Clair thought war with these 
western tribes “inevitable.”  Local Natives had their own misgivings about the 
Company’s settlement.  Captain Pipe, for one, told Putnam that he “did not expect any 
people would come on to settle before the treaty [of Fort Harmar],” suggesting discontent 
about the federal government’s presumptuous appropriation of Delaware lands.30  
The New Englanders displayed little anxiety about living in what threatened to 
become a war zone, however, because they believed their land policies mitigated the 
Indian threat.  In particular, by creating well-organized towns rather than isolated huts in 
the woods, the Company’s centralized regulation of land practices had ensured the 
settlers’ “safety and wellbeing,” which “depend[ed] upon their establishing themselves in 
the most compact possible manner.”  This approach, they argued, also improved the value 
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of lands, which the Indian threat would otherwise make worthless.  Repeatedly, Ohio 
Company settlers praised the virtue of “compact” settlement, which they were confident 
guarded them well against attack.  “[T]he Indians themselves remark in their Towns, that 
we settle compactly & not in the scatterd manner in which the Frontiers have been 
generally Settled,” wrote Samuel Parsons, “& no Attempt [to attack] can be made without 
meeting the whole force in the Settlement.”31        
  
Just as the Company’s land policy promised to remake Indian affairs, its elaborate 
system of land distribution would, its backers hoped, tamp down on the excesses of land 
speculation.  All shareholders would receive the same number of acres and kinds of 
parcels.  And because assignments were made by lot, no investors could engross the 
particularly valuable large tracts next to the town, nor would in-the-know speculators be 
able to select the best tracts or gerrymander their lots.  Theirs was a structured and 
egalitarian vision of land distribution, in opposition to the frantic grab for riches that 
generally characterized land speculation of the era.   
That, at least, was the plan.  As Captain Jonathan Heart of the American 
Regiment observed, it soon suffered the fate of many designs crafted in the abstract. “The 
Division of the land into Cities Towns . . . was a well digested System to read within the 
Town of Boston,” he reported, “but . . . on putting the System into execution there were 
innumerable embarrassments.”  In particular, system proved inadequate to restrain the 
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greed that seemed to afflict anyone involved in western lands.  As one investor 
complained of the Company, “Speculation was ushered in to their System at an early 
period.”32 
The first struggle was over the eight-acre lots that were to surround Marietta.  
When Putnam arrived, he discovered the land around Marietta hilly and wooded; the land 
would be poor and require expensive roads.  He opted to lay the lots along the Ohio and 
Muskingum instead.  The lots were then distributed by a lottery held in New England, 
but, when many of the proprietors—particularly the agents and directors—arrived, they 
discovered their lots were too far from Marietta to be safely farmed, given the Indian 
threat.  Putnam’s innovations became the target of their ire.  “I am told my opinion was 
not to govern me,” Putnam complained, “but the Vote of the Company.”  Disgruntled 
claimants, led by Varnum, “very much disturbed the peace of the Society.”  Finally, a 
compromise was reached in which the commons would be divided up into three-acre lots, 
though, Putnam later recorded, most fared no better in this second lottery either.  A 
particularly angry contingent of Rhode Islanders was unmollified—Putnam saw “flying 
Clouds which indicate another Storm gathering.”33    
Concern over the Native threat prompted another significant shift from the 
original plan.  Anxious for settlers capable of bearing arms, the Company created so-
called “donation lands,” withdrawing 100 acres from each share to be granted to actual 
settlers gratis as long as they met the Company’s stringent requirements: constructing a 
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house (“at least 24 feet by 18 . . . with a Chimney of Stone or Brick”), planting fruit trees, 
clearing fifteen acres of pasture.  Most importantly, the settlers had to carry arms and 
ammunition, obey the militia law, and construct proper defenses.  These stipulations 
ensured these donations would “protect the inhabitants on the Lands to be allotted to 
proprietors.”34  
 Despite the effort to maintain order and system, the new policy “opened such 
doors for  
. . . speculation on speculation,” in Captain Heart’s words.  Few claimants actually 
settled; most, “more anxious to fill their purses than increase the Settlement,” resold the 
lands to “real settlers” for $50-$100.  Meanwhile, the donation committees created to 
enforce the system became, in the eyes of some, arbitrary and self-dealing.  Proprietor 
Ichabod Nye bitterly recalled being stripped of his lot when a self-interested party lied to 
the local donation committee.  In his small settlement of Bellpre, the committee’s 
“tyraney became so notorious that they ware Called the Damnation Committee.”   As for 
those who actually settled on the lots, most arrived entirely destitute, without animals, 
farm tools, or furniture; “not one half . . . had a pot or a Cattle [Kettle]” to cook their 
food.35 
 Even surveying provided a source for controversy.  The first lines, hastily drawn, 
contained “gross” and “scandalous errors.”  Many lots were located on lands reserved for 
Congress, and so had to be voided, laying the groundwork for future litigation.   One 
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investor read this as confirmation of the Company’s ineptitude. “The business . . .  
perfectly coincides with most of the transactions of the Ohio Company,” he complained, 
which “has generally been conducted in a mode that reflects little Credit on the abilities 
or intentions of the various Managers.”36    
 In fact, the challenges that confronted the Ohio Company were structural as well 
personal; they stemmed from its hybrid status as both a company intended to produce 
value for investors and an actual settlement.  The interests of the Marietta settlers and the 
so-called “non-resident proprietors”—shareholders who remained in New England—
fundamentally diverged.  Those in New England sought returns, not stability or 
flexibility.  Fearful of being short-changed, they were “monstriously suspicious” of any 
land proposals emanating from Marietta.37   
Structural tensions also appeared in the Company’s linkage between land and 
debt, by virtue of a deep irony at the heart of the Company’s finances.  Though the 
Company was both reliant on, and an investment in, federal state-building, its financial 
success depended on public perception of federal fiscal weakness, as manifested by the 
low price of federal certificates. The ratification of the Constitution—an event the Ohio 
Company settlers celebrated—undermined their financial stability: as public confidence 
in the nation’s financial health rose, federal certificates’ value also rose.  With this shift, 
“people . . . began to look upon securities better than western Land.”  The value of the 
Ohio Company shares accordingly fell.  By early 1789, they were selling for “much less 
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than the first cost”; many would-be sellers could not find buyers.  Some shareholders 
wrote demanding back their certificates that had not yet been paid to Congress.38 
  
The small-scale speculations that dominated Marietta’s land divisions found their 
echo in the much grander dealings of the Ohio Company’s directors.  In the eyes of many 
shareholders, Cutler and Sargent, for all their talk of public-spiritedness and 
disinterestedness, were the largest and riskiest speculators of all, having conjoined the 
Ohio Company with the Scioto Company.  The “very great impropriety” of Cutler and 
Sargent’s gamble was the “daily . . . subject of Conversation” back in New England.  
Seen as a “dirty speculation,” the Scioto investment caused “general . . . dissatisfaction” 
among the shareholders.  “I cannot allow myself to suppose,” one incredulous 
shareholder wrote Sargent, that the Company’s directors “would be concerned in so 
disreputable a Thing as speculating upon [the Company’s] Property and at their Expence 
for the Benefit of a few Individuals.”  Rumors spread that both Cutler and the Ohio 
Company’s treasurer had spent “every farthing” of the Company’s money on the Scioto 
Company instead.  When Cutler visited Ohio, he was much “injured” by the constant 
criticism he encountered on the subject.39 
Much of this criticism was well-founded: the grasping and unstable Scioto 
Company represented precisely the sort of risky and ill-conceived land speculation that 
the Ohio Company had sought to displace, one reliant on boosterism, questionable title, 
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and paper promises to create overnight wealth from hoodwinked investors.  The Scioto 
Company owned nothing; it held only a contract to purchase lands from the federal 
government in the future at a fixed price, “the naked preemption.”  To secure the money 
for these future payments, the Company’s investors had to sell this contingent promise of 
title for immediate cash.  The Company’s proprietors opted to market the lands in 
Europe, hoping to profit from the disorder of the early days of the French Revolution.  
"Now is our Time,” Winthrop Sargent proclaimed as word of chaos reached him, “& the 
peaceful Acres of the West, are worth their Weight in Gold.”  Apart from this initial burst 
of starry-eyed enthusiasm, though, Cutler and Sargent contributed little to the venture, 
which quickly escaped their control even as it entangled them in a complicated web of 
debt and land companies created by William Duer and his agents. The Company’s agent 
in France, Joel Barlow, decided on his own accord that the promise of future title was 
“too light and dangerous a ground to attempt retailing upon,” and so created a shell 
company that contracted with the Scioto Company for lands, which Barlow then began 
selling in 100-acre fee simple parcels.    As with the Ohio Company in New England, the 
promise of western lands caused something of a cultural sensation, and the would-be 
French settlers drafted a constitution for the “Society of the 24 Associates” for their 
proposed city along the Ohio.40 
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Cutler and Sargent, “totally ignorant” of all these machinations in Europe, were in 
over their heads.  As the same rise in securities that challenged the Ohio Company made 
the Scioto Company’s planned purchase entirely unaffordable—Cutler estimated it would 
cost nearly one million in specie—Cutler and Sargent sought to cut their losses. “I would 
be very glad to find a person that would take what I hold,” Cutler wrote, “& free me from 
my obligation.”  But the plan proceeded, notwithstanding its organizers’ doubts.  In late 
1790, 400 French settlers arrived to a settlement, grandly named “Gallipolis in their 
honor, along the Ohio downriver from Marietta.  The “town” in fact consisted of a few 
crude huts that Rufus Putnam had hastily constructed. 
But the French settlers’ greatest shock was the discovery that “all the apparently legal 
Documents” shewn to “Seduc[e]” them with the “Solidity of the Titles”of their lands 
were frauds.  Though the settlers had purchased land in fee simple, the Scioto Company 
held only the “preemption right”—the option to purchase the federal lands.  And, even 
had Scioto owned land outright, it turned out that Gallipolis was located within the tract 
owned by the Ohio, not the Scioto, Company.   When Governor St. Clair passed through 
Gallipolis shortly after the settlers’ arrival, he found the residents “very discontented and 
mutinous.”  Without catching the irony in the face of Cutler’s repeated assertions of 
serving the national interest, St. Clair lamented how the quest for private gain had 
undermined the position of the United States.  The “interested speculation of a few men, 
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pursued with too great avidity,” he feared, had placed the French settlers “in absolute 
ruin” and “would destroy American character abroad.”41 
In February 1791, William Duer met with Manasseh Cutler and Winthrop Sargent 
in New York to resolve the Gallipolis mess.  With it clear that the Company would fail, 
the Scioto proprietors now vied to shed themselves of any responsibility for the French 
settlers.  They finally agreed that Duer would pay for 148 Ohio Company shares that had 
been forfeited for lack of payment and that the French would be granted lands from the 
Ohio Company’s purchase.  Though Cutler and Sargent’s risky gamble had failed to pay 
off, they would manage, it seemed, to extricate themselves with little loss to themselves 
or the Ohio Company.42   
  
 A month before the New York meeting, at sunset on Sunday, January 2, 1791, a 
group of Wyandots and Delawares stopped in at Big Bottom, a collection of a little over 
twenty settlers up Muskingum Creek from Marietta.  Friendly with the local Company 
settlers, the Natives conversed and dined with two of them, Francis and Isaac Choate. In 
the midst of talking, the Choates heard gunfire.  The Natives told the alarmed Choates 
they were now their prisoners.  Three other men from the settlement were also taken 
prisoner; two escaped to seek help.43 
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When a relief party of Ohio Company settlers arrived the next day, it discovered a 
grisly scene.  The settlement’s other twelve settlers, confined in the blockhouse, had all 
been killed and the building burnt.  Only charred, unidentifiable bodies remained, which 
the horrified settlers buried in the blockhouse.44  
 “Our prospects are much changed,” wrote an alarmed Rufus Putnam on learning 
of the attack, which became known as the “Big Bottom Massacre.”  “[I]n stead of peace 
and friendship with our Indian neighbours a horid Savage war Stairs us in the face.”  In 
attempting to understand this sudden reversal, the Ohio Company settlers viewed 
themselves as the victims of others’ misdeeds.  One placed responsibility on the “Big 
Knife Virginians,” who had roamed across the river committing a litany of attacks and 
violations against the Indians, who, he argued, were “perfectley contented with their new 
allies,” the Ohio settlers.  For his part, Putnam, consistent with his earlier diagnosis, 
blamed a failure of land policy.  He had been told by federal officials that the Ohio 
Company’s land had been “fairly obtained from the natives.”  But when Putnam 
examined federal treaties, he discovered that the lands “were rather wrested then fairly 
purchased.”  Even at the Treaty of Fort Harmar, when the government had agreed to pay 
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for Native lands rather than claim by conquest, the tribal representation was “very 
partial” and many tribes “never consented to what was don.”  In Putnam’s view, the Ohio 
Company settlers were sacrifices to this failure to follow the land policy of “fair dealing,” 
and secure true Native consent.45 
 The panicked Putnam was certain that the attack presaged more assaults.  He had 
heard reports that the Indians, “[m]uch elated with there success,” had “threatened there 
should not a remain a Smoak [Smoke] on the ohio by the time the Leaves put out.”  
Rumors abounded that an Indian army of two or three thousand would soon attack 
Marietta.  But, with nearly all the federal soldiers stationed downriver, the Ohio 
Company’s settlement was “defenceless.”  Putnam appealed to Henry Knox and even 
President Washington for assistance.  He insisted that, not only was the federal 
government responsible for the conflict, but the interests of  “united States in General” as 
well as the Ohio Company were at stake.  If the federal government effectively protected 
settlements established “under [its] authority,” then the public lands would “rapid[ly]” 
sell, “Sink[ing] many millions of . . . National Debt.”  But if the protection was not 
forthcoming, “the consequence” was clear.  Instead of orderly purchases, the lands would 
be “Seized on by privit adventurers who will pay little or no reguard to the laws of the 
United States or the rights of the natives.”46 
 Putnam’s appeals for federal support based on the Ohio Company’s commitment 
to and investment in the national interest were unavailing.  Concentrating their forces 
downriver for an expedition, federal officers lamely offered Putnam a single cannon for 
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defense.  The message was clear: the Ohio Company would have to rely on its own 
resources to survive the war.  Meeting days after the attack at Big Bottom, the Company 
agreed to call out the militia on its authority.  It would pay all expenses from its own 
pocket, with the “highest confidence” that Congress would later “reimburse the necessary 
expense we shall be at in defending ourselves against the Common Enemy.”  Abandoning 
their remote settlements, Ohio Company settlers retreated to defensible stockades, while 
Native war parties destroyed their houses and stole their cattle.  Many began abandoning 
the settlement in droves, even the settlers on the donation lands, who had promised to 
defend the Ohio Company.  Nearly half of the original forty-eight settlers fled.   Those 
who remained saw the value of their investments plummet, as shares’ value fell even 
lower.  "Our Settlement does not encrease,” one Marietta resident complained, “we are 
circumscribed within narrow Limits & are heartily tired of the Indian War, & with its 
present Management see no End to it."47 
 War also destroyed the apparent trust that had existed between the local Natives 
and the Ohio Company settlers.  Familiarity led to a particularly brutal and personal 
warfare.  When a Native killed a “mulatto” boy in the middle of the Ohio River, in plain 
view of Marietta, one of the Ohio Company settlers thought he “recognize[d] the Indian, 
as one whom he had known aforetime.”  Later in 1791, a scouting party—led by a man 
whose father had been killed by the Indians—shot a Native man.  The party decapitated 
the Native and mounted his head on a pole, which was displayed in front of the garrison, 
while the body was brought to the river, “where it was literalley Cutt up, & Boiled.”  
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News of this brutality spread through Indian country; one Native remarked, “Oh white 
Man boil Indian.—No. Good.”48 
 With Big Bottom and the ensuing war, the supposed harmony of interests between 
the federal government and the Ohio Company proved illusory.  Earlier confident that 
Marietta would be the headquarters for federal soldiers, Putnam was dismayed to 
discover that the rival downriver settlement of Cincinnati was selected instead.  Thus, 
even though the Company was, in Putnam’s view, acting as the federal government’s 
land agent, the War Department’s neglect meant that the Company had to fulfill the 
fundamental governmental responsibility of protection from its own revenues.  Moreover, 
the horrors of a war the Company blamed on federal mismanagement and Virginian 
Indian hatred destroyed the hopes for an alternative Native diplomacy founded on 
friendship.  The consequences were financially as well as morally disastrous; few wanted 
to buy land in a war zone.  From the vantage of Marietta in 1792, the Company’s 
investment in federal authority seemed a poor one.49       
 
 The Big Bottom Massacre could not have occurred at a worse time for the Ohio 
Company.  The second installment of $500,000 for its lands, due in 1792, loomed, but the 
Company entirely lacked the funds to comply.  Under the contract terms, if the Company 
failed to pay, it would forfeit the entire tract.  “In a High Flame,” the Connecticut and 
Rhode Island proprietors sought to cut their losses. The Company, they insisted, should 
negotiate with Congress to purchase whatever lands their earlier payment would secure, 
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disburse the remainder of the Company’s funds as a dividend, and then issue deeds.  If 
need be, they urged giving up the entire contract.  Cutler initially resisted—arguing he 
would rather “suffer death” than turn over the books to the proprietors—but finally 
relented.50   
In spring 1792, Cutler and Rufus Putnam traveled to Philadelphia to petition 
Congress.  The claim they advanced rested on the service they had performed the nation.  
The war, they insisted, had heavily taxed the Company’s funds—$9,000 out of pocket in 
the previous year alone—as well as requiring the creation of the donation lands.  Surely 
Congress’s goal could not have been “to raise the value of their Land at the expence 
exertions and risk of others but to make an actual Settlement.”  Yet, under the current 
contract, they lacked “a clear title”: if they failed to pay, all their lands and improvements 
would “be liable to forfeiture.”   They concluded with a threat: unless Congress relieved 
settlers “from that state of suspence and uncertainty respecting their title,” they would no 
longer defend their lands but “immediately retreat to some place of greater security.”51 
 The Ohio Company’s request passed through Congress nearly unopposed, an act 
Putnam attributed to “Providence” but that likely owed much to the federal government’s 
desperate need for settlers in the midst of the Indian War.  Congress granted 750,000 
acres based on the payment already made, as well as an additional tract of 215,285 acres 
based on military bounty warrants the Company collected (the original contract had 
significantly limited the number of warrants that could be redeemed).  The only 
controversial provision was a grant of an additional 100,000 acres as compensation for 
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the donation lands, provided that the lands would be conveyed in fee simple to the lands’ 
actual settlers.  The Senate evenly split in a vote that divided almost entirely along 
regional lines, pitting the New Englanders against others; John Adams broke the tie in the 
Company’s favor.52 
 At the very moment of this triumph, however, came news of further disaster.  
Throughout 1791, William Duer and the Scioto Company had failed to pay for 148 shares 
he had agreed to purchase, and Richard Platt, the Ohio Company’s treasurer, finally 
moved toward legal action.  But even as Putnam and Cutler were negotiating in 
Philadelphia, Duer’s financial web of credit collapsed in spectacular fashion, destroying 
private fortunes “from Georgia to New Hampshire inclusive” and depressing “even the 
public Debt & Credit of the United States” as securities’ value tumbled.  Duer was 
imprisoned, where he largely remained until his death seven years’ later, his debts 
unsatisfied.53   
Duer’s collapse suddenly constricted the ties of debt that bound together the Ohio 
and Scioto Companies.  In Philadelphia, Putnam was arrested, and had to pay off over 
$2,000 in Scioto debts to obtain release.  The crash was even worse for Richard Platt, 
who had extensive dealings with Duer.  “I am ruined my dear friend,” Platt wrote 
Winthrop Sargent, “& know not how soon, I shall exchange a palace which I now live in, 
for a Jail.”  When the Ohio Company’s directors came to demand that Platt turn over all 
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cash on hand, they found his accounts at least $80,000 short.  As he had predicted, Platt 
soon followed Duer into debtors’ prison.54 
 Duer’s collapse also left the Gallipolis settlers abandoned. Appeals to territorial 
authorities produced a vague promise of “justice” from Governor St. Clair; Winthrop 
Sargent expressed sympathy with the settlers’ “very embarrassed situation” but a denial 
of being  “in any degree accessary to your misfortunes” either as a territorial official or a 
Scioto investor.  The settlers appealed, in the final instance, to Congress.  Their 
accusations against the Ohio Company were particularly blistering, as they pointed out 
the clear overlap in leadership.55     
Referred to his consideration, the Attorney General suggested that, although the 
settlers might have an equitable claim against the Ohio Company, the jurisdictional and 
practical hurdles to filing suit made recovery unlikely.  An angry Senate instead passed a 
bill demanding that the Ohio Company directors appear before it, threatening to rescind 
portions of the Company’s grant; the directors ignored the directive.  Finally, in 1795, 
Congress resolved the mess by granting the Gallipolis settlers 24,000 acres of federal 
land elsewhere in the Northwest Territory.  Though the law did not impair suit against the 
Ohio Company, in the end the Gallipolis settlers were forced to purchase their town site 
from the Ohio Company for $1.25 per acre—nearly twice what the Ohio Company had 
paid Congress for the land.56 
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  With its title secured by Congress, the business affairs of the Ohio Company 
wound to a slow conclusion.  After four years of surveying, the final division was made 
in 1796: each settler received 1173 acres dispersed in six lots.  Shareholders even 
received a modest dividend of the funds the Company managed to rescue from the 
bankrupt Platt, and Putnam’s pressing of the Company’s debtors secured another in 1800.  
With that, the Ohio Company largely dissolved.57    
Measured against other land speculations, and compared with earlier abortive 
federal efforts to distribute land, the Ohio Company was a success.  Marietta, of course, 
never became the booming center its boasters had anticipated.  By the middle of the 
nineteenth century, it was a small country town sustained by antiquarian recollections of 
its glorious beginnings.  But the Company had purchased and conveyed clear title, 
secured a modest return for its investors, and created a stable settlement—a notable 
achievement in a landscape littered with failed land schemes.58 
 For those at the time, however, the Ohio Company felt like a failure.  The 
Company was more than yet another land company; it was an experiment in a federal 
land system that could channel the rampant land speculation of the late eighteenth 
century to productive ends.  The Company had promised much.  In the mind of Putnam, 
Cutler, and others, title was a critical tool of governance and sovereignty that they could 
leverage to simultaneously bolster federal authority, repay the federal debt, recraft Indian 
affairs, and establish egalitarian land ownership in the Northwest Territory, all while 
securing returns for investors.   
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Measured against these goals, the Company came up short, as all the participants 
came away disillusioned.  Putnam never forgave the federal government’s abandonment 
of the settlement at its moment of crisis, when the repercussions of earlier federal Indian 
policy, especially the coerced treaties, had undermined the Company’s successes in 
recrafting Indian affairs.  It was the Company that had ultimately paid for federal failure: 
Putnam would later recall, embittered, that, although the Ohio Company had expended 
nearly $15,000 on the Indian war, Congress only repaid about $2,600.  For its part, the 
federal government felt the same way about the Ohio Company, especially in the 
disastrous aftermath of the Scioto speculation. Scioto’s failure meant that the promised 
enormous payments on the federal debt never arrived.  Instead, resentful federal officials 
found themselves giving land away for free as they had to resolve, at public expense, the 
tangled knot created by private avarice.  “[P]rejudices . . . against the Ohio Company” 
were felt “very strongly,” one visitor to Congress reported, because the Company was so 
“deeply implicated” in the betrayal of the Gallipolis settlers.  As for the investors, even 
those who never left New England and had even secured dividends were still angry.  
They had bargained away valuable securities, and they were frustrated by the endless 
complications and machinations of Company governance.  “I should be glad to have done 
with the business,” one wrote,  “And if wishing was not vanity; I should wish I had not 
never heard of the Ohio Company.”59 
* * * 
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In 1787, all this disillusionment and recrimination surrounding the Ohio Company 
lay in the future.  By the end of that year, buoyed by the promise of cheap federal land, 
three more companies proposed purchasing enormous tracts of land in the Northwest 
Territory; all three proposals were explicitly modeled on the Scioto Company’s contract.  
For its part, Congress eagerly pursued these deals, enthusiastic at the prospect of 
distributing federal land systematically at private expense.  In the end, though, only one 
of the schemes ultimately came to fruition, a purchase by an entity known as the Miami 
Company.60 
 Unlike the Ohio Company, with its elaborate governance structure, the Miami 
Company was largely the project of one man, John Cleves Symmes.  A prominent New 
Jersey politician, Symmes was elected to the Continental Congress in 1786, a position 
that piqued his interest in western lands.  After reconnoitering the Northwest Territory in 
spring 1787, Symmes asked Congress on August 29, 1787 to permit him to purchase one 
million acres between the Great Miami and Little Miami Rivers, just west of the Virginia 
Military District, on the same terms Congress had granted Cutler and Sargent in the 
Scioto Purchase.  Agreement was finally reached in the summer of 1788; like the Ohio 
Company directors, Symmes also received a territorial office, in his case as a territorial 
judge.61 
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Symmes began marketing his lands to purchasers from New Jersey through 
pamphlets and newspapers even before the agreement was reached.  Symmes’s plan bore 
some similarities to that of the Ohio Company.  The surveying would be based even more 
strictly on the rectangular grid of the 1785 Land Ordinance, and payment would also be 
in liquidated federal securities.  But Symmes did not issue shares nor assign lands.  
Instead, purchasers could select quarter sections (160 acres), full sections (640 acres), or 
even entire townships (six square miles; over 19,000 acres), from anywhere within the 
Company’s purchase.  An initial price of 2/3 of a dollar per acre would, Symmes warned 
his readers, rise to a dollar per acre by May 1, 1788, and would later increase above a 
dollar per acre.  Symmes’s own profit would come largely from his ownership of a 
“reserved township” he anticipated becoming the site of a town.  In essence, Symmes was 
betting on the rise of land values to increase the worth of his own holdings.62 
From the outset, Symmes never claimed quite the same public-mindedness 
constantly invoked by the Ohio Company settlers.  He focused unabashedly on the land’s 
promise for his settlers—and for himself.  But Symmes’s commitment to self-interest did 
not make him equivalent to the reckless land speculators who blithely ignored the good of 
the public.  In its own way, the Miami Company represented an even bolder experiment 
than the Ohio Company: the promise that even a businessman prioritizing profit would, 
for reasons of enlightened business practice, still pursue policies that would channel land 
speculation toward order and system. 
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This approach was clear from how Symmes advertised his lands.  To attract 
settlers, he sought to differentiate his settlement from other lands, particular those in 
Kentucky, which lay across the Ohio River from his purchase.  System, and its promise 
of clarity, proved one powerful selling point.  Symmes reassured potential purchasers 
that, unlike in Kentucky, where “titles of land are not easily ascertained [and] frequently 
very doubtful[,] . . . title to the Miami lands will be clear and certain, and no possible 
doubt thereto can arise.”   Symmes similarly crafted rules to avoid absentee landholders, 
who had proved “greatly detrimental” in Kentucky. Purchasers of his lands must have 
actual settlers and improvements on their parcels within two years, Symmes decreed.   
The ostensible motivation of this policy was security: “[I]t is reasonable,” Symmes 
argued, “that all who become purchasers should in some way contribute to the defence of 
the country.”  But Symmes’s rule was egalitarian in effect, if not in purpose.  Symmes 
would seize one-sixth of the land of purchasers who failed to meet this obligation and 
then redistribute it, free of charge, to “volunteer settlers,” who could obtain title after 
seven years by making actual improvements.  In short, for reasons of pragmatism rather 
than principle, Symmes adopted concepts of order and democracy at odds with the 
chaotic scramble for riches that marked earlier land grabs.63 
This was especially true with respect to relations with local tribes.  Like the Ohio 
Company, the Miami Company discovered that responsibility over federal lands carried 
the burden of serving as a quasi-official representative of the United States to Native 
nations. And like the Ohio settlers, Symmes came to conclude that his land business 
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would benefit from a new model of Indian affairs.  Events in Symmes’s town of “North 
Bend” consequently echoed Marietta’s experience.   
Established in a half-hearted manner in 1788, North Bend—named for its location 
along a curve in the Ohio River—was an Anglo-American island in a Native sea; the 
initial settlement consisted only of “one family . . . and a few stragling hunters.”  The 
isolation troubled the town’s settlers, steeped as they were in stories of Indian terror.  In 
spring 1789, three surveyors marking boundaries of Symmes’s lands encountered a group 
of local Shawnees.  The terrified surveyors tried to flee, but, unable to escape, prepared to 
fight.  One of the surveyors was training his rifle on a Shawnee when he was startled to 
see the Native lift his hat, put down his gun, and raised his right hand in greeting.  The 
surveyors were even more shocked to hear one of the Shawnees call out, in English, that 
they were friends.  The surveyors led the Shawnees to a nearby blockhouse.  This 
“unexpected . . . visit” initially panicked the settlers, but assurances of friendship soon 
calmed the matter.64 
Shawnee efforts at establishing solid relations with the Miami Company settlers 
were calculated and deliberate.  The Shawnees in the area had long experience with 
Anglo-Americans, particularly the fractious settlers from Kentucky.  When they learned 
that  “new white brother’s” were “coming live to live in the Miami country,” the 
Shawnees would later inform Symmes, they had held a council and resolved to 
“introduce themselves to our acquaintance rather as friends than as enemies.”  They 
specifically selected George, an Anglo-American they had taken prisoner a decade 
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earlier, to lead the party to meet the new settlers.  It was George who had called out to the 
surveyors; even after years in captivity, he still “spoke the english tongue very well.”65 
As in Marietta, this initial meeting, with reassurances of friendly intentions on 
both sides, created space for cultural mixing and exchange.   “[T]he white and red people 
began to form a sociable neighborhood,” Symmes reported after this initial encounter, 
“our hunters frequently taking shelter for the night at the Indians camps; and the Indians 
with their squaws spending whole days and nights at the blockhouse regaling themselves 
with whisky.”  Symmes found thereafter that the Indians “frequently make me visits from 
their towns.”66 
The Shawnees were quite explicit in their goals for their relationship with the new 
settlers: they sought access to trade as well as federal authority.  When Symmes formally 
met a Shawnee chief he called “Capt. Blackbeard,” the Native leader “signif[ied] that it 
would be very much to their advantage to have free intercourse with us, and exchange 
their peltrys for the articles which they much wanted.”  After Symmes agreed, the 
Shawnee pressed him on “how far I was supported by the United States, and whether the 
thirteen fires had sent me hither.”  “I answered them in the affirmative,” Symmes 
reported, “and spread before them the thirteen stripes which I had in a flag then in my 
camps”; Symmes also pointed to the federal troops on parade and the seal of his 
commission, which Blackbeard examined with great interest.  These symbols, paired with 
Symmes’s proclamations, evidently persuaded Blackbeard of Symmes’s authority and 
intentions; the chief “appeared entirely sattisfied of the friendship of Congelis (for so 
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they pronounce Congress) towards the red people.” The Shawnees then took advantage of 
the trade goods promised by their new alliance.  For the next four weeks, Blackbeard and 
his fellow Shawnees “lived chiefly at [Symmes’s] expense (nor was it a very small one, 
as they had whisky at their pleasure gratis),” before departing “in a most friendly 
manner.”67 
Symmes understood this hospitable approach to Indian relations as a sharp 
contrast to the practices of the Kentuckians across the river.  “Our living hitherto in the 
friendly manner we have with the Indians,” he reported, “has excited the jealousy & ill 
will of many of our neighbours on the Kentucky side of the Ohio: and some even threaten 
to cross the river and put every Indian to death which they find on the Miami purchase.”  
But “perhaps,” he slyly suggested, if the Kentuckians “would act as moderately towards 
[the Natives], they might live in as much safety as the people of this purchase.”68 
Yet, like the Ohio Company settlers, Symmes similarly confronted the challenge 
of recasting Indian relations in an atmosphere of suspicion and ill-defined fear.  Symmes 
himself did not trust the Natives.  “They are a subtil enemy,” he wrote, “& all their 
boasted friendship may be only to learn our numbers, and what state of defence we are 
in.”  (In fact, it was Symmes who sent envoys to Native towns so that, in the event of 
war, the army would have a guide into Indian country).  This mistrust made both actual 
and would-be settlers uneasy, easily frightened by the vague rumors that proliferated on 
the frontier.  Symmes alleged that the Kentuckians spread false accounts that all his 
settlers had been tomahawked.  The handful of federal troops in the settlement—whom 
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Symmes fed from his own pocket, only to have them trade his food for liquor—were 
insufficient. "I have indeed lost sight of any succour from the United States,” he 
complained. The settlers felt that the federal government “abandoned [them] to 
destruction, and whether the danger they apprehend is real or imaginary tis the same 
thing to them.”  Symmes wrote to Jonathan Dayton, “I fear I shall be nearly stripped of 
settlers and left with one dozen soldiers only.”69 
Focused on selling land rather than remaking Indian affairs, Symmes had 
discovered that the two could not be separated.  Due to federal weakness, his settlement 
had become a privatized Indian agency, as Symmes fed and clothed Indians and soldiers 
alike from his own pocket.  And, like the Ohio Company, Symmes quickly learned that 
land sales hinged on Native actions (or rumors about them) as much as his own efforts. 
 
Symmes’s embrace of system and actual settlement also struggled to tame more 
speculative approaches to land.  When he first arrived, Symmes had been thronged by 
Kentuckians eager to settle.  Yet, not only were these would-be settlers “very 
ungovernable and seditious,” they lacked both the means and the intent to pay.  They 
“had no other views than speculation,” Symmes complained, and quickly returned to 
Kentucky to resell their (still unpurchased) land rights to their neighbors.   When they 
inevitably defaulted, the Kentuckians “vented their spleen in abuses & calumnies” of 
Symmes.  The Kentuckians were only some of the would-be purchasers whose appetites 
exceeded their means.  Speculators constantly contracted with Symmes for hundreds of 
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thousands of acres, yet rarely paid.  Large or smallholders, few viewed land as a source 
of steady and reliable gains; the possibility of reselling bare promises of future title at a 
tidy profit excited far more interest.70   
Symmes’s questionable management exacerbated the problem.  “[W]ith 
reluctance,” Symmes’s agent Jonathan Dayton passed along the “injurious and unpleasant 
reports” circulating about Symmes in New Jersey. “[T]here is scarcely a single one of all 
the Jerseymen who have as yet returned from the Miamis, who does not complain of you 
or speak of you with disapprobation.”   They accused Symmes of promising lands to one 
person one day, then selling them to another the next.  With so many defaulting on their 
payments, and so much calumny surrounding the settlement, Dayton and Symmes grew 
anxious.  Their first payment of  $80,000 was due once the survey was complete, yet they 
lacked the required funds.71 
There was one bright spot in Symmes’s general gloom.  The town of Losantiville, 
which soon changed its name to Cincinnati (or Cincinnata—the spelling was contested) 
in honor of the fraternal society of revolutionary military officers, was thriving.  Located 
around the U.S. military post of Fort Washington at the confluence of the Ohio and Little 
Miami Rivers, the town became the seat of the newly created county of Hamilton (a name 
selected in honor of the Secretary of the Treasury).  Moreover, when full-fledged war 
broke out against the Northwest Native nations in 1790, Cincinnati ended up prospering, 
as Fort Washington became the center of federal military operations, and Governor 
Arthur St. Clair moved his residence there.  “Judge Sims's Settlement it is apprehend by 
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many is building up at our expense,” complained one Marietta resident. “[T]he principal 
part of the Troops are withdrawn from this place & sent to that . . . . & we have 
discovered that some of our Great Men are going to move down.”72 
Yet the apparent harmony between federal interests and Symmes’s land 
investments unraveled in controversy in spring 1791.  Symmes, it turned out, was as 
grasping and heedless in his land sales as his would-be purchasers: though he had happily 
sold the land under Cincinnati on the ground that his application to Congress included all 
the land between the Great and Little Miami Rivers, his formal contract with the Board of 
Treasury in fact stopped twenty miles west of the Little Miami—thereby excluding 
Cincinnati.  All of Symmes’s purported sales in the town rested on invalid title.   
 The clash between Symmes and St. Clair laid bare the challenge that the land 
companies’ independent power over ownership posed to federal authority and 
governance. The discovery of the illegitimacy of Symmes’s sales deeply angered 
Territorial Governor Arthur St. Clair, who responded, Symmes complained, “as though 
he had lately made a notable discovery of a conspiracy against the United States.”  But 
from St. Clair’s perspective, Symmes’s actions threatened the fragile efforts to predicate 
ownership on proper purchase from constituted authorities.  The federal government, St. 
Clair wrote angrily, permitted settlement based only on  “a regular and proper authority . . 
. founded on an actual purchase or previous contract.”  In this regard, Symmes and his 
settlers were identical to the intruders whom federal “Troops have repeatedly been 
employed in dispossessing . . . and destroying [the intruders’] Habitations.”  As St. Clair 
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observed, if a hope or proposal for a contract were enough to claim federal land, “who is 
that would not be justified?”  Yet Symmes, as Miami Company proprietor and federal 
official, was markedly different from the impoverished intruders who defied federal law 
to settle public lands.  This only shocked St. Clair the more.  “I could not conceive,” the 
incredulous St. Clair wrote, that “considerable Settlements . . . had been made, not only 
without authority, but directly in the face of it, and by a Person invested with high Office 
of a Judge of the Territory.”73 
 Symmes proceeded to demonstrate just how different he was from the intruders, 
by dint of both his position and the rights he claimed based on his self-proclamed 
ownership of the disputed lands.  Much of the power struggle that followed encompassed 
federal Fort Washington, the center of the war effort, which lay on land that Symmes 
purportedly owned.  Attempting to shield “innocent” and “unwary” purchasers but also 
guard federal title, St. Clair issued an official proclamation warning against further 
settlement and subjecting the settlers around Fort Washington to martial law.  Symmes’s 
response, as “proprietor of the purchase,” was to observe that he had purchased the land 
before the fort was built, and to insist that he would accept only the “justice of the 
supreme authority of the United States”—Congress—in determining the question of the 
boundary.  “[U]njustly wounded” by St. Clair’s “harsh sentences,” Symmes further 
questioned whether St. Clair in fact enjoyed the authority he asserting, alleging that 
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governor’s actions “border[ed] hard” on “acts of tyranny.”  The proclamations, Symmes 
told Jonathan Dayton, “have convulsed these settlements beyond your conception.”74 
Unlike the petitions of intruders claiming preemption rights, Symmes’s petition, 
which came just as Congress was resolving the Ohio Company’s financial implosion, did 
not languish. Citing Congress’s generous treatment of the Ohioans as they appealed for 
expanded boundaries and a grant of the land he already paid for, Symmes’s agents 
managed to secure what they sought.  In early 1792, Congress, with no discussion or 
apparent opposition, enacted two statutes that granted Symmes relief for both his 
boundaries and his finances.  The first redrew the borders of Symmes’s purchase to 
include Cincinnati; the second authorized the President to grant Symmes as much land as 
he had paid for, as well as an additional 106,857 acres, to be paid for with army bounty 
warrants.  In September 1794 President Washington issued Symmes a patent for 311,682 
acres within this survey, including Cincinnati but specifically excluding the land around 
Fort Washington.  Symmes’s success likely owed to the impossible position that his land 
sales had forced upon the federal government. Willing to defend federal title by expelling 
intruders who knowingly flouted federal authority, the federal government was 
apparently less anxious to dispossess an entire town of innocent purchasers.  Symmes’s 
ability to create an entire town of intruders forced Congress to ratify his actions 
retroactively.75 
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That might have been that.  Yet Symmes’s tangle with federal law, rather than 
dissuading him, evidently encouraged him to undertake still riskier speculation on bare 
promises of federal land.  The 1792 statute had established clear boundaries for 
Symmes’s tract; when surveyed the following year, it turned out these borders contained 
a little over 500,000 acres, much less than the one million Symmes had contracted for 
back in 1788.  Symmes nonetheless self-servingly interpreted the statute to entitle him to 
still purchase the promised one million acres, notwithstanding that most of that land fell 
outside the statutory boundaries of his tract.  Moreover, apart from the 300,000 acres 
already granted, none of the land had been paid for.76 
In Symmes’s view, all he had to do to obtain these lands was comply with the 
terms of the original agreement.  He accordingly set out to amass $82,000 to make 
another payment.  “[T]here are many who envy the lands to us, and [who] will attempt by 
means not the Most honorable to induce Congress to withhold them,” Symmes wrote his 
son-in-law Peyton Short, appealing to him for funds, “but justice and contract are on our 
Side.”  Everything hinged on making payment.  “Money will be the best argument that 
can be r[a]ised,” Symmes stated, “though I had the logic and oratory of a Cicero, and the 
right of Adam to the soil.”  Yet the same rise in securities that had doomed the Ohio 
Company hamstrung Symmes.  As 1796 stretched into 1797, there was still no prospect 
of payment. Yet Symmes remained convinced that if he could just gather the money, he 
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could force Congress’s acquiescence.  “I have read so many cases in point,” Symmes 
stated, that “if we tender the Money, it is not in the power of Congress, constitutionally to 
take [the land] from us.” Desperate for capital and confident of ultimate success, Symmes 
continued selling title outside of his bounds of his patent—lands, in other words, he did 
not own, and could not reasonably claim—based only on the expectation that he would 
eventually receive them from Congress once he made payment.77  
Seemingly overwhelmed by the complicated tangle of documents, representatives 
in Congress reacted only slowly against Symmes’s freewheeling gambling with the 
public domain.  Albert Gallatin, a representative from western Pennsylvania with 
growing expertise on the public lands, took on the responsibility of mastering and 
explaining Symmes’s contract to Congress.    He headed committees that in 1796 and 
again in 1797 investigated Symmes’s contract and concluded that he had no right to the 
lands he claimed.  In 1798 Symmes watched in horror as Gallatin proposed declaring the 
lands outside Symmes’s patent forfeit; the bill became law the next year.78  
As his house of cards began to collapse around him, Symmes became increasingly 
desperate.  To obtain influence, he took “infinite pains” to secure the election of his son-
in-law, William Henry Harrison, as the Northwest Territory’s delegate to Congress.  He 
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also turned to another source of authority—his position as a judge on the General Court, 
the Northwest Territory’s highest tribunal.79   
The overlap between corporate and federal authority in the territory had long 
made Governor St. Clair uneasy.  Years earlier, he had pointed out that main settlements 
in the Territory lay on Miami and Ohio Company lands, and that the Companies’ 
management had “laid the foundation of endless disputes.”  Yet Symmes as well as Rufus 
Putnam, while serving as heads of these companies, were also General Court judges.  
“Every land dispute will be traced to some transaction of one or other of those Gentlemen 
in those capacities,” St. Clair observed, “and they are to sit in Judgement upon them.”  St. 
Clair feared the risk of “Biass.”80   
Now, St. Clair’s fears were seemingly being realized, as Symmes used his judicial 
authority to try to stop the proliferating lawsuits based on his dubious land sales.  In one 
case, Symmes supposedly told some of the purchasers of his lands that they should go 
ahead and litigate a suit challenging their title’s validity.  If, as was likely, they lost in the 
lower county court, “they should remove it into his Court, where they might be sure, he 
would not give Judgment against himself.”  In Ludlow v. White, an ejectment action 
before the General Court, the plaintiff argued that Symmes should recuse himself because 
he was “directly interested” in the outcome: the defendant had purchased the disputed 
land from Symmes, who had warranted the title (meaning he was legally liable if the title 
proved defective).  Symmes refused, insisting he had “no interest” in the suit and 
presiding over much of the trial.  Yet in the middle of the proceedings, Symmes suddenly 
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reversed himself.   Reportedly, he “openly acknowledged that he was the person most 
interested in the event of the suit” and stepped down from the bench.  He then walked 
across the courtroom to the bar, from which he “advocated [the case] for the 
defendant.”81  
Symmes’s erratic behavior was not confined to the courtroom; he was reportedly 
also advocating extrajudicial means to protect his title.  In one deposition, a man named 
McCashen reported going to Symmes to demand back the money he had paid for his 
land.  Symmes refused.  He instead urged McCashen to go home and “shoot or drown 
any person who might molest him.”  This approach had worked for the squatters in 
Pennsylvania, so,  “if the purchasers under [Symmes] would follow th[is] example . . . 
their attempt would prove successful.”  Symmes had similarly urged others to “hold[] 
their possessions by force of arms,” St. Clair reported to the Secretary of State.  St. Clair 
wondered whether Symmes could be prosecuted under the Sedition Act for these 
actions.82 
These extreme efforts notwithstanding, the Miami Company crumbled around 
Symmes.  Besieged by lawsuits stripping him of tens of thousands of acres of land—he 
was arrested three times for debt in 1802 alone —Symmes slid toward penury.  In a final 
appeal to Congress, Symmes stated that its statutes voiding the contract were causing him 
“very great hardships, tending to the utter destruction . . . of his whole property.”  
Referred Symmes’s petition, the Attorney General presented a lengthy report that 
determined that Symmes had no legal rights based on the contract.  In fact, the Attorney 
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General concluded it was Symmes who had violated a provision in his patent and so 
owed the U.S. over $15,000 in compensation.  Symmes never paid this debt.  He died 
penniless in North Bend, Ohio—the town he had created—in 1814.83 
 
Both the federal government and Symmes entered the Miami Purchase expecting 
mutual benefits; both came away feeling used.  In particular, both Congress and Symmes 
felt that they had been burdened with all the risk while other party had sought to profit. 
Congress’s disappointment was understandable.   Instead of producing the reliable 
and orderly settlement Congress had anticipated, Symmes had used implicit 
congressional backing to spin an elaborate scheme of debt and dubious title.  And just as 
in the case of the Scioto Company, the costs of these reckless speculations with the public 
domain fell on innocent purchasers, and ultimately the federal government, to resolve.  
Bombarded with petitions asserting that roughly 2,000 settlers with questionable title 
would lose “their only support & means of subsistence, ” the federal government felt 
constrained to offer the right of preemption to Symmes’s claimants.  But, while these 
gestures were more generous than Congress’s treatment of other unauthorized settlers, 
federal policy, rather than assuaging the settlers, produced “very great alarm.”  
Congress’s beneficence, after all, only granted the settlers the right to repurchase, at two 
dollars per acre, lands for which they had already paid one dollar per acre.  Many could 
not exercise their preemptive rights because they had only verbal contracts with Symmes; 
others had no money to make the purchase.  Of the roughly 100,000 acres ultimately 
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purchased under the preemption statute, 30,000 were ultimately forfeit because the 
claimants lacked the downpayment necessary; much of the rest fell to speculators rather 
than individual holders.84 
Symmes emphasized a different sort of risk.  Part of the risk was financial.  
Symmes had created a “respectable settlement” at his own expense, spending four 
thousand dollars supporting “starving emigrants” and paying “presents” to the Indians.  
And by removing Anglo-Americans’ “horrid impressions” of the Indian threat, he had, in 
his estimate, doubled the value of the unsold federal lands.    Yet all these services to the 
nation, Symmes lamented, had “no weight with Government.”85  
But Symmes also stressed the broader risk he had taken—a gamble on the process 
of colonization and the success of the federal government itself.  Symmes saw himself as 
a “patriotically bold and adventurous” man who had hazarded his fortune and his life “at 
an early day in aid of Government . . . to extend the empire of the United States and 
reclaim from savage men and beasts a country that may one day prove the brightest jewel 
in the regalia of the nation.”  But federal policy favored the timid men who “grip[p]ed 
hard their certificates” and “s[a]t quietly by their own firesides,” waiting while Symmes 
took on the financial and physical dangers needed to subjugate the country, and only then 
swooping in to reap the rewards.  “[I]s this what you call fair, sir?” Symmes appealed.86   
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Symmes’s self-pitying and self-serving rationalizations ignored the extent to 
which his failure was self-created.  Nonetheless, others found Symmes’s feeling of 
grievance justified.  The Attorney General, for one, though he emphasized that Symmes 
had no legal claim to relief, nonetheless viewed him as a “pathetic” figure whose 
“misfortune” had been “productive of particular benefits” for the nation.87 
In fact, both Symmes and federal officials had used each other, by design.  
Western land was supposed to unite them: Symmes would secure access to formal, 
legitimate title, while the federal government could transform its landed holdings into 
revenue without an elaborate and costly bureaucracy, all while creating orderly and 
unambiguous ownership.  This would-be symbiosis was the heart of the first federal land 
system, which envisioned that this alignment of interests between speculators and federal 
officials would produce both private gains and public benefits. 
Symmes’s failure ultimately spoke as much to the flaws of this vision as to his 
personal shortcomings. As it turned out, private and public interests ran in opposite 
directions.  As Symmes’s experience demonstrated, everyone involved in land in the 
early republic—from the small Kentucky claimants to grand investors—was out to secure 
a quick return by selling things that they did not yet own.  Land speculation was built on 
contingencies and future promises of title: Congress itself sold the future right to public 
lands based on the promise of future payment, the better to secure higher revenues.  But 
these features, which made land such a potentially lucrative investment, were 
fundamentally at odds with certainty and order; land speculation thrived on confusion.  In 
the end, though, someone had to resolve the mess, a role that usually fell to the 
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government.  In short, the knot of confusing claims and contradictory title Symmes left in 
his wake—yet another source of ownership to be hashed out in lengthy nineteenth-
century litigation—proved the predictable legacy of this failed experiment in distributing 
the public lands.      
* * *  
The situation in the Southwest Territory was different from that north of the Ohio.  
North Carolina’s extensive land grants meant that the federal government had little title 
with which to entice land companies.  Yet just to the south, Georgia had millions of acres 
to offer, and in the early 1790s, it entered into a series of contracts known as the Yazoo 
sales that were larger and even more poorly defined than the Scioto or Miami 
speculations.  Though most histories of Yazoo have focused on the sales’ political and 
financial consequences, few have examined what happened in the vast and nebulous 
spaces that Georgia purported to sell.  Like their competitors to the north, the Yazoo 
companies represented an effort to use title to extend governance and state power into 
these uncertain regions.  But unlike the Ohio and Miami Companies, these companies 
existed in tension with, and often in outright defiance of, federal authority.  For much of 
the 1790s, then, federal officials struggled to suppress these state-backed land companies 
by asserting federal law.  And though their lands ostensibly lay just over the border 
within Georgian territory, much of this struggle between federal and corporate authority 
centered in the Southwest Territory.88 
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 The most significant effort at actual settlement of the Yazoo lands was undertaken 
by the Tennessee Company, headed by Zachariah Cox, who would later gain the Creek 
title of “leader of the Ecunnaunuxulgee,” which was translated as “those greedily 
grasping after land regardless of governmental disapproval.”  Like many speculators, Cox 
started as a surveyor, working in Wilkes County on the Georgia frontier.  Cox first 
became interested in western lands in 1785, when he sought to lead a group of Georgia 
settlers to the area known as Muscle Shoals.89   
Located in present-day Alabama, Muscle Shoals was one of the most strategically 
significant locations in the Southeast.  The Shoals was located at the “Bent” of the 
Tennessee River, the region’s most important waterway, which traced a U-shaped path 
between its origin in the Smoky Mountains (present-day eastern Tennessee) and its end at 
the Ohio River, linking the Tennessee Country to the Mississippi watershed.  The “Bent” 
was the Tennessee’s southernmost point, from which a short portage connected to rivers 
that ran south to the Gulf of Mexico: one Tennessean described this “small . . . neck of 
land” as key to the region’s “intercourse and commerce” with “every quarter of the 
globe.”  The Shoals also lay at the junction of Cherokee, Creek, and Chickasaw territory, 
and so had long served as a center of trade and diplomacy among the three nations.  In 
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the 1786 Treaty of Hopewell with the Chickasaws, the United States had promised to 
establish a trading post at the Shoals, on the site of an earlier French fort.90 
 These prospects for Indian and riverine commerce early attracted would-be 
speculators. Formally within Georgia, the Shoals’ location tied it to the Tennessee 
Country and excited the interest of North Carolinians.  In 1783, the ubiquitous William 
Blount, with several other prominent North Carolinians, finagled the Georgia legislature 
into a complicated land deal for the Shoals.  The project failed, though, when the 
speculation became entangled with the short-lived secessionist state of Franklin.91 
 After Cox’s 1785 scheme similarly came to naught, he seized a new opportunity 
in 1789.  Though the federal government urged states to cede their western lands, cash-
strapped Georgia proved particularly resistant.  Instead of cession, Georgia followed the 
federal government’s lead and in 1789 sold off enormous tracts of its western territory to 
land companies.  One of three newly created speculative organizations, Zachariah Cox’s 
Tennessee Company received 3.5 million acres centered at the Shoals, at a heavily 
discounted price of 1.3 cents per acre, to be paid within two years.92   
Georgia’s model of corporate state-building, however, differed from the federal 
government’s.  Georgia had little interest in the issues of system, clarity, or governmental 
authority that preoccupied federal officials.  Its model echoed more closely the 
unregulated land schemes of North Carolina and Virginia, except that, while those states 
focused on availability to smallholders, Georgia fixated almost solely on profiting as 
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quickly as possible from millions of acres formally included within the state but in 
practice entirely outside state jurisdiction.  The state’s own title to the Yazoo lands was 
questionable: nearly all the land was still legally owned by Native nations, a right 
guaranteed under federal treaty.  This uncertainty of the title was reflected in the bargain 
purchase price—1.3 cents per acre, to be paid within two years, far below the sixty-six 
cents per acre paid by the Ohio and Miami Companies. Legally, Georgia resolved the 
dilemma of title by requiring the land companies to extinguish Indian claims and keep the 
state “free from all charge and expences” from Indian affairs.93 
 Georgia’s plans deeply troubled federal officials, who viewed the purported sale 
of federally guaranteed Native lands as a flagrant violation of federal law.  Secretary of 
War Henry Knox and Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson both concluded that the sale 
was unconstitutional.  Since the United States held the “only constitutional right” of 
negotiating with Indians, Knox reasoned, “the state of Georgia could not delegate to the 
companies . . . a right which they do not possess.”   Jefferson agreed with this legal 
conclusion, but urged suasion rather than coercion to resolve the conflict, at least 
initially.94  
As federal officials debated, Cox began preparations for settlement.  Throughout 
1790, he distributed advertisements throughout Kentucky and the Southwest Territory, 
promising free land to would-be settlers who raised a crop at the Bent.  Over the winter, 
Cox and his would-be settlers gathered on the Tennessee River in the Southwest Territory 
and built boats.  In late March of 1791, Cox and thirty-one armed men traveled downriver 
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to the Shoals.  In a letter widely reprinted in eastern newspapers, Cox reported meeting 
with Piamingo, leader of the Chickasaws, as well as representatives of the Cherokees.  
Both supposedly assured Cox of their friendship, though other reports suggested that Cox 
had told the Natives only of plans to trade and kept silent about his planned settlement.95   
 In Philadelphia, federal officials, including President Washington, read the 
newspaper accounts of Cox with alarm.  “Notwithstanding the existing laws [and] solemn 
Treaties” protecting Indian lands, an angry Washington wrote, “the agents for the 
Tennessee company are at this moment by public advertisements under the signature of 
a Zachariah Cox encouraging by offers of land, & other inducements, a settlement at the 
Mussle-Shoals.” Jefferson forwarded Cox’s advertisements to William Blount, now 
governor of the Southwest Territory, with instructions to halt the plan; Knox supposedly 
gave Blount orders to prevent the settlement “at all events.”96 
 Cox’s settlement came at a tricky time for Blount, who was in the midst of 
negotiating what would become the Treaty of Holston with the Cherokees.  When word 
of Cox’s planned settlement reached the gathered Cherokees, they were “exasperated” 
and “Indigna[n]t.”  The Natives complained to Blount that he was only “amus[ing] them 
with friendly Talk” of a treaty while the United States was committing an “open 
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Violation” of their earlier agreements by permitting a settlement “on their usual hunting 
grounds.”  When Bloody Fellow and other Cherokee leaders visited Philadelphia early 
the next year, the Cherokees specifically demanded that the federal government prevent 
the Tennessee Company’s planned settlement.97     
Cox’s plans similarly angered the Creeks.  The influential Creek leader Alexander 
McGillivray found himself pursued by a man named Gordon, whom Cox had apparently 
sent to “Cajole” Creek support “by the most profuse and wild promises he could invent.”   
But McGillivray wanted nothing to do with “these wild Speculators.”  “These fellows 
must think me as mercenary, base & unprincipled as themselves,” wrote the incredulous 
McGillivray.  Cox may have won over a few “Infatuated Indians,” but McGillivray 
recognized the danger.  “The Tennesee Companies Grant,” he observed, “includes every 
foot of our, the Cherokees & Chickasaw Hunting Grounds.”98 
Trying, and failing, to halt Cox in the Southwest Territory, Governor Blount 
sought to assuage Natives by distancing the federal government from Cox’s actions and 
relying on Native jurisdiction to enforce federal law.  “[T]he Tennessee Company,” 
Blount told the Cherokees, “was acting without any Permission or Authority of the 
Supreme Government, & contrary to the Views of the Same.”   Blount’s statement 
implicitly granted the Cherokees the right to attack Cox under the Treaty of Hopewell; 
Blount even allegedly encouraged Natives to “intercept” Cox’s party.99   
                                                
97 Holstonian to Mr. Claypoole, August 16, 1791; “Report of the Secretary of War to the President,” January 17, 1792, in TP: Vol. IV, 
111-15. 
98 Alexander McGillivray to William Panton, May 8, 1790, in John Walton Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks (Columbia: Univ of 
South Carolina Press, 2007), 259-63. 
99 Holstonian to Mr. Claypoole, August 16, 1791; “New-York, Monday, July 18,” Daily Advertiser, July 18, 1791. 
  175 
McGillivray also concluded that federal law—in his case, the recently ratified 
Treaty of New York with the Creek Nation—authorized resistance to Cox’s settlement.  
“This Measure of Messr. Cox I conceivd to be a flagrant Violation of the treaty, because 
Congress had pledgd themselves not to Countenance the Georgia Grants to the Yasou & 
Tennessee Companys,” McGillivray wrote, which “left me at liberty to act hostilely 
against them if they should presume to Settle the Countrys in question.”   Accordingly, 
when McGillivray learned that Cox’s men had begun their attempt, he sent a Creek force 
to destroy Cox’s settlement.  But when they arrived at the Shoals, the Creeks found the 
site abandoned.  Likely learning of the dangers, Cox and his men had stayed only briefly 
to trade with local Chickasaws before heading back upriver.  McGillivray posted guards 
in case Cox returned.100   
  Cox and his men retreated to the Southwest Territory.  There, Blount ordered 
them bound to appear before the Superior Court of the Washington District on charges of 
violating the federal Trade and Intercourse Act, which prohibited private purchases of 
Native land.  But the result was not what Blount wished: “[t]he Grand Jury would [not] 
find the bill against Cox and others,” he complained.  In the eyes of the territory’s 
settlers, federal officials feared, seizure of Native land was no crime; many of the jurors 
themselves were supposedly illegally settled on Cherokee land.  But Attorney General 
Randolph also questioned whether would-be private purchasers like Cox had committed 
any crime, because the statute, seemingly through inartful drafting, merely voided private 
purchases without attaching any criminal penalties.  Cox’s actions led President 
Washington to propose a new version of the statute, ultimately enacted in 1793, that 
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contained a provision urged by James Madison that specifically criminalized settlement 
and surveying on Indian lands.101 
In the interim, the controversy over Cox roiled the Southwest Territory.  Blount’s 
defenders praised his resistance to Cox, since it saved the Territory’s citizens from 
entanglement in a scheme “unwarrantable by the Laws of the Union & in Violation of 
Subsisting Treaties, which are the Laws of the Land.”   For his part, Cox claimed that 
Blount’s opposition to his plan had turned many residents against the governor; Blount 
himself lamented that the grand jury’s decision “has given the Company a sort of triumph 
in the Eyes of ignorant People over Government.”   Blount’s deputy Daniel Smith told 
Jefferson that Cox’s “acquittal by the Jury at the last Superior Court” led many there “to 
believe the laws cannot punish them for settling at the shoals.”  The defiant Cox 
announced plans to continue his open violation of federal law by returning to the Shoals 
the following year.102 
In the end, Cox’s proposed 1792 expedition never happened.  In part, this was due 
to continued federal resistance.  Refusing to accept the grand jury’s verdict as the final 
word, Blount promised that the federal government held “other means in store” to stop 
Cox’s settlement.  A gubernatorial proclamation forbade Cox from passing through the 
Southwest Territory and threatened that any citizens “so injudicious” as to join him 
would be hauled “before the federal court.”  In spring 1792, territorial judge David 
Campbell issued a lengthy charge to a grand jury reiterating the constitutional provision 
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that all treaties made by the United States were the “supreme Law of the Land,” urging 
their strict observance by the territory’s citizens.  Printed and distributed throughout the 
territory, Campbell’s charge “operated much to the disgrace of those Adventurers,” 
according to one observer.103 
But ultimately, it was Indian power and financial worries, not federal law, that 
doomed Cox’s 1792 plans.  The Cherokee and Creek threat remained very real: Cox and 
his men would be “mad . . . to attempt another Settlement,” one newspaper correspondent 
wrote, “unless they can embody a force sufficient to act in opposition to all the Southern 
Indian Tribes.”  Meanwhile, at the same moment that the Ohio and Miami Companies 
were struggling to meet their obligations to the federal government, Cox found himself 
unable to scrounge together the money needed to pay Georgia, which (unlike the federal 
government) insisted that payment be made in hard currency rather than near-worthless 
state currency.  “Your good friends the Muscle shoal Compy. have faild to make 
pay[men]t,” a gleeful and sarcastic correspondent informed William Blount, “& I am told 
have Squandered the[ir] Certificates in such manner as not to be able to settle with their 
Associates.”104    
      
Notwithstanding this initial failure, neither Georgia nor Cox was ready to 
foreswear such a lucrative scheme because of a few setbacks.  Several years later, Cox 
and a number of associates revived their plans, liberally plying the Georgia legislature 
with bribes. In 1795, Georgia sold the lands once again to several companies, including 
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nearly three million acres around the Shoals to the Tennessee Company for $60,000.  
Unlike the earlier sales, however, this land grab caused tremendous ferment.  Outrage 
over the legislation, which became known as the “Yazoo fraud,” led to the election of a 
new legislature the following year, which not only repealed the earlier legislation as 
unconstitutional but literally burned the earlier statute.105 
 Neither repeal nor controversy daunted Cox, who, following the precedent of 
other land companies, constructed a complicated charter for his new settlement.  He 
would begin by building trading posts for the Chickasaws, making it all the easier to 
obtain their lands “under the authority of the United States.”  Like the Ohio Company, 
the Tennessee Company would then subdivide its lands into various lots.  Each settler 
would receive 1,001 acres: a single acre houselot in the town of “Ockochappo” and then 
one 50-, one 200-, and three 250-acre lots.  Rather than paying for their lands, would-be 
settlers would obtain deeds by working for the Company for twelve months.  But Cox 
was adamant that no settlement would occur until he had obtained the “apporbation of 
Congress” for his actions.106  
As Cox set about his plan, rumors about his intentions reached government 
officials.  In 1797, Cox returned to Knoxville—now the capital of the new state of 
Tennessee, created from the former Southwest Territory the previous year—where he 
opened a store.  There, Cox reportedly began buying up weapons and ammunition, 
including $1200 in cavalry swords, and gathering a private army.107 
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  Cox reassured every official curious about his mysterious behavior that his 
purposes were lawful.  He told both John Sevier, the new governor of Tennessee, and the 
state assembly, where he spoke briefly, that he “should not proceed until authorized by 
the laws of his country.”   As for the arms, he would use them only “defensively” to 
guard against Indian attacks.  Sevier gave Cox his blessing to pass through Tennessee.  
Cox also called on Benjamin Hawkins, the federal Indian agent for the Southeast, to 
reiterate his obedience to federal law.  Cox supplied Hawkins a copy of his plan and 
asked for a license to trade with the Chickasaws.108  
These proclamations of lawfulness, however, relied on an expansive and self-
serving interpretation of the law, as Hawkins recognized.  Cox believed himself entitled 
to construct a trading post at Muscle Shoals on the basis of an earlier Chickasaw cession 
to the federal government at the Treaty of Hopewell, notwithstanding that he himself 
lacked federal authority or sanction. The supposed lawfulness of Cox’s plan also 
depended on the sympathy and influence of “well wisher[s]” like Tennessee’s newly 
elected congressman Andrew Jackson, who, Cox believed, would ensure that the 
extension of the Indian boundary to encompass Cox’s lands would “shortly take place.”  
“Government will find it a better policy to people a country with their own citizens,” Cox 
wrote the sympathetic Jackson, “than to reserve it as an asylum for savages.”  Many 
Tennesseans strongly supported Cox in this goal.  Governor Sevier, for one, regarded the 
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federal government’s “prevention of a settlement at or near the muscle shoals . . . a 
manifest injury done the whole western country.”109   
For their part, Native nations strongly contested Cox’s claims of legality.  As 
reported by Benjamin Hawkins, the Cherokees and Chickasaws had received remarkably 
accurate accounts of the Georgia sales, and intended to resist.  The Chickasaws, having 
already given Cox “notis” not to “make Attempt to Settel,” threatened to immediately 
“strike” any settlement.  Nor, they warned, should Cox rely on the agreement of a few 
Chickasaws, “for such permision is not By the consent of the Chickasaw Nation.”  As for 
the Cherokees, a national council wrote to the President appealing for him to “fulfill his 
promises” by preventing Cox’s settlement. If that failed, Hawkins reported that the 
Cherokee warriors “have their moccasins ready” to resist.110  
Federal officials in the Adams Administration, fearful of the consequences of 
Cox’s plans, sided with the Native nations.  “Tennesee and Cox have a good deal 
disturbed me,” Secretary of War James McHenry confided.  McHenry believed that 
Cox’s plans, if carried out, would “menace[] the United States in an extensive Indian 
war.”  Insisting on upholding federal guarantees of Native lands, McHenry gave explicit 
orders not to allow Cox and his men to pass by U.S. forts, even if they presented state 
passports.111 
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Federal officials grew anxious when Cox seemed to take the first steps toward 
settlement.  In 1798, he created a town called Smithland at the confluence of the 
Tennessee and Ohio.  His somewhat opaque motives seem to have been to use this 
location as an eventual springboard for travel up the Tennessee to the Shoals, over two 
hundred miles to the south.  Smithland itself was in the narrow strip of far western 
Kentucky between Tennessee to the south and the Northwest Territory (present-day 
Illinois) to the north, where, across the river, federal Fort Massac controlled the Ohio 
River.  But, despite some confusion over whether Cox’s settlement was on Indian land, 
the federal government was largely powerless to halt the settlement.  After meeting Cox, 
Kentucky’s governor sanctioned the plan, and Cox involved the local militia commander 
in the scheme.  If the federal government did invoke the Trade and Intercourse Act to 
forcibly expel Smithland, word had it that Cox intended to “defend the place as long as 
he had a man able to fire a gun.”112  
Federal officials were also troubled by reports that Cox was experimenting in 
private government, turning Smithland into his own personal fiefdom by establishing his 
own courts—“tribunals . . . unknown to the nation,” in the words of one federal official.  
Martin Wickliff, a passing trader, reported that Cox had arrested him for violating “the 
laws of Smithland” when he got into a fight with one of Cox’s men. When Wickliff told 
Cox he “did not think Smithland had any right to make laws,” Cox insisted, “every man 
has a right to make himself laws of his own house, and that the houses there were his.”  
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Wickliff particularly hit a nerve when he stated he intended to inform the local army 
commander.  “By God we are not to be threatened with the Federal Officers,” Cox 
thundered, before expelling Wickliff from the settlement. Yet, as egregious as Cox’s 
“usurpation . . . of the rights of sovereignty” was, it did not violate federal law, since 
Smithland lay within Kentucky, not the federal territories.113   
The stalemate persisted until July 1798, when Cox and a number of his men 
attempted to pass Fort Massac to continue down the Ohio.  Their destination was 
unknown.  Cox proclaimed that he intended only to go to New Orleans for supplies, but 
federal officials believed, and later adduced depositions asserting, that Cox actually 
intended to travel up the Tennessee and “force a Settlement” at Muscle Shoals.  Though 
Cox had a pass signed by the supportive Kentucky militia commander, the fort’s 
commander, Major Kingsberry, refused to allow Cox and his men to proceed, citing 
orders that barred the passage of all armed parties by the fort.  If Cox attempted to pass, 
Kingsberry warned, he would be constrained to fire on him.  Cox ranted against this 
exercise of “military prerogative,” a violation of the free navigation of the Ohio 
“guaranteed to every citizen by the constitution and laws of the United States.”   Finally, 
Kingsberry agreed to allow Cox and a few of his men to pass, as long as he could inspect 
the boats and no more than a third of the men were armed.  Cox complied, but he also 
evaded Kingsberry’s orders by sending the rest of his men overland to rejoin him further 
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downriver.  He then continued, not up the Tennessee to the Shoals, but down the 
Mississippi to Natchez, capital of the newly created Mississippi Territory.114   
When they learned of Cox’s apparent deception, furious federal officials pursued 
him.  Cox awoke in his room in Natchez surrounded by what he described as a “battalion 
of federal troops, with fixed bayonets.”  On the orders of Winthrop Sargent—the former 
Ohio Company official and Secretary of the Northwest Territory had just been appointed 
as Mississippi’s territorial governor—Cox was arrested and held in federal Fort Panmure. 
Allegedly held in “close confinement” and denied letters and visitors, Cox appealed to 
Sargent for a hearing, and, subsequently, the writ of habeas corpus, guaranteed to him “as 
well as every other citizen of the United States, by the federal constitution.”  He received 
no answer; his pleas to territorial judges were similarly unavailing.115  
Finally, despairing of his situation, Cox climbed over the fort wall and escaped.  
Fleeing first to New Orleans, where the Spanish governor refused American demands for 
extradition, Cox proceeded through Choctaw Country back to Tennessee, supposedly 
pursued by Indians offered a federal reward for his capture.  (This measure especially 
angered Cox, smacking of “savage or military prerogative” in contrast to the “impartial 
laws” that he claimed existed in the states.).  Arriving in Nashville, Cox was arrested on a 
federal warrant and brought before a federal judge.  Attorney General Charles Lee told 
the Secretary of State he thought that Cox’s actions “come under the description of 
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Treason in levying war against the United States.”  But after being detained for an 
additional three months, Cox was released, evidently for lack of evidence.116 
Despite his ultimate vindication, Cox’s arrest represented the “end to this 
troublesome man’s career,” in one newspaper’s words.  Cox lost control over the 
Tennessee Company, and Muscle Shoals remained Indian country until after the War of 
1812.  In 1803, Cox petitioned Congress, alleging that he had lost $9,000 in goods—
merchandise, a boat, and a slave—from his arrest.  Though it conceded the evidence of 
his transgressions was thin, Congress referred him to the courts for relief.  Cox moved to 
Virginia, where died in the 1830s.117   
But even after Cox’s settlement schemes faded, the controversy over the sales to 
the Tennessee Company and other Yazoo companies persisted.  Zachariah Cox’s deeds 
still floated around the Southwest Territory, regarded as “of little Value” by territorial 
citizens but ultimately snapped up by investors, who spawned a generation of litigation 
over these paper empires. With Georgia’s 1802 cession of its western lands, the federal 
government inherited responsibility for Georgia’s dubious land dealings. In the 1810 case 
of Fletcher v. Peck, in a decision that intertwined federalism, Indian affairs, and land 
policy, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Georgia’s 1796 repeal of the Yazoo land sale 
violated the Constitution’s Contract Clause. In 1814, a compelled Congress compensated 
purchasers, including the latest shareholders of the Tennessee Company, with the 
promise of $5 million in proceeds from future land sales.118 
                                                
116 Cox, An Estimate of Commercial Advantages, 49-51, 62-70; Charles Lee to Timothy Pickering, September 11, 1798, Reel 4, WSP. 
117 “Zachariah Cox,” Philadelphia Gazette, January 11, 1799;  “#167: Arrest of Zachariah Cox by the Governor of the Mississippi 
Territory,” November 28, 1803, American State Papers: Miscellaneous, 361-62. 
118 Stockly Donelson v. Etheldred Williams (Hamilton District Court of Equity 1801), in Historical Records Survey, Works Progress 
Administration, Records of Knox County, Superior Court Record Book “B”, 1797-1804 (Nashville: Historical Records Survey, 1939). 
  185 
  
It is easy to follow Alexander McGillivray and read the Tennessee Company as a  
“wild speculation.”  The colorful Zachariah Cox presented a sharp difference from the 
respectable New Englanders who established the Ohio Company, who saw themselves as 
advancing federal authority and interest.  By contrast, Cox—notwithstanding his constant 
protestations of obedience to “any constituted authority derived from our government”—
demonstrated a loose and permissive approach to federal law, skirting outright defiance.  
Cox’s opportunistic machinations represented precisely the kind of land speculation that 
Congress had hoped to forestall.   
Part of the difference for Cox was federalism.  The state he was bolstering was 
Georgia, not the United States, and he readily hopscotched across jurisdictions, securing 
support from Kentucky and Tennessee, even as his enterprises took him into domains 
governed by tribes or the federal government, often represented by the army: the 
“savage” and “military” authority Cox so despised. 
Cox’s scheme also underscored the interrelationship between land companies and 
Indian affairs.  Unlike Putnam and Symmes, Cox had little sense that recasting Indian 
affairs to correspond with the federal government’s newly solicitous approach would 
yield dividends.  For Cox, as for an earlier generation of land speculators, Native nations 
only represented an obstacle; their leaders were to be cajoled or bribed into providing a 
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fig leaf of legality to settlement, with the ultimate aim of removal and dispossession.  
Natives actually were a barrier for Cox, as Native jurisdiction proved far more effective 
than federal justice at forestalling his settlement.  It was Creek, Cherokee, and Chickasaw 
resistance, not Blount’s ineffectual legal efforts, that ultimately prevented Cox from 
controlling Muscle Shoals.  But as Cox understood, the boundaries between Native and 
federal authority proved blurry. In contrast to the Delawares’ and Shawnees’ studied 
cultivation of the Ohio and Miami Companies as federal proxies, Native leaders south of 
the Ohio recognized that Cox lacked federal support and so could be punished with 
impunity. In fact, thanks to treaty provisions as well as the encouragements of Blount and 
Pickering, Creeks, Cherokees, and Chickasaws were implicitly enforcing federal as well 
as Native law when they threatened to expel Cox. 
Yet Cox’s efforts were not as different from the Ohio and Miami Companies as 
federal officials imagined.  Land in the early republic was powerful and disruptive.  
Cox’s settlement in Smithland demonstrated, just as Marietta and Cincinnati had, that 
ownership often bled into jurisdiction.  The difference was that schemes in the Northwest 
Territory had ostensibly sought to harness land’s power to bolster federal authority, while 
Cox’s self-aggrandizing efforts were seemingly freed from all restraint, and thus 
“inimical to our government.”  The extreme reaction to Cox underscored the perceived 
seriousness of his threat: without settling a foot of land at Muscle Shoals, Cox’s plans 
convulsed the Creek, Cherokee, and Chickasaw Nations, the Southwest Territory, and the 
Washington and Adams Administrations.119 
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The final result, however, was strikingly similar.  The Miami and Ohio schemes 
had ultimately ended with speculators struggling to use their authority and control 
against, rather than on behalf of, the federal government.   The Tennessee Company 
merely laid bare the tension between corporate and federal sovereignty that the Ohio and 
Miami Companies had attempted, largely unsuccessfully, to paper over.  Ultimately, 
Cox’s would-be enrichment at public expense was merely more obvious and flamboyant.  
Ironically, thanks to the Supreme Court’s intervention requiring that the Yazoo 
Companies’ shareholders be compensated, it also proved the most remunerative.  
* * * 
 In 1790, as the second session of the first Congress began, Abraham Baldwin, 
congressman from Georgia, wrote to Joel Barlow, overseas in France selling land on 
behalf of the Scioto Company.  Predictably, land matters dominated the letter: Baldwin 
discussed plans to purchase federal lands in the Illinois Country, Georgia’s sale of the 
Yazoo lands, the Scioto Company’s dealings, and a visit from Rufus Putnam and 
Manasseh Cutler.  But above all, Baldwin wrote to reassure Barlow, who, despite his 
foreign posting, had managed to get hold of the congressional journal and read about 
Congress’s debates over opening a land office.  “From the whole you conclude that there 
is nearly an end to the plan of selling in large tracts, and say we are impolitic &c,” 
Baldwin stated.  “There is no such thing . . . Everybody is in favour of selling in large 
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tracts, rough & smooth, if we can.”  Baldwin pointed toward two favorable congressional 
reports on recent petitions to purchase still more lands.120 
 As Baldwin’s letter demonstrates, the lure of the first federal land system—large-
scale sales to speculative land companies—remained strong into the 1790s.  The appeal 
for Congress was undeniable. Distributing title through the companies offered a potent 
tool to pursue orderly title and restrain speculation, or so federal officials believed.  And 
land companies promised to achieve these goals without requiring the creation of 
expensive bureaucracies or systems of office-holders.  In fact, throughout much of the 
Northwest Territory, the Ohio and Miami Companies provided both the framework and 
the personnel on which federal territorial governance was built. 
 In ways difficult to appreciate now, title provided a form of governance that the 
companies were to use to pursue policy aims that dovetailed with federal goals.  To 
borrow Arthur St. Clair’s phrase, owning and selling property implicated “rights of 
sovereignty,” including fiscal state-building, diplomacy and war with Native nations, and 
dispute resolution.  In the early American west, this corporate sovereignty existed 
alongside, and intersected with, Native, state, and federal sovereignty, in ways that 
suggest continuities with both the colonial past and broader global imperialism. The irony 
was that the federal government empowered the Ohio and Miami Companies to act at the 
same moment that it was asserting its sole authority to govern in these areas against rival 
claimants such as states, foreign nations, and private purchasers from Natives.  It came, 
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too, as the long-standing link between property and governance was dissolving in the 
wake of the American Revolution.121 
 Perhaps for these reasons, the late-eighteenth century land companies were a far 
cry from the East India Company; in practice, the power that they enjoyed was thin and 
highly dependent on the federal government.  Ohio and Miami Company officials 
adjudicated disputes, but they did so as federal officers, even if Symmes heavily blurred 
the boundaries.  They conducted their own diplomacy with Native nations, but, at the first 
sign of trouble, insisted on their entitlement to federal military protection.  And the 
companies’ financial success and failure, it turned out, rested not only on the state of 
federal finance but also on Congress’s willingness to rescue them from their own 
excesses. 
 Similarly, although some of the companies’ proponents may have dearly believed 
in the “system” they promised, in the end they were selling a bill of goods.  In this sense, 
the Ohio and Miami Companies were no different from Cox’s scheme.  Lured by the 
promise of paper fortunes, Symmes, Sargent, and Cutler happily built settlements, like 
Cincinnati and Gallipolis, that rested on the same (dubious) legal footing as the intruders 
that the federal government evicted at gunpoint.  But it was in failure, rather than success, 
that the companies demonstrated just how much authority they really enjoyed.  As the 
federal government’s panicked response to Zachariah Cox suggests, the entanglement 
between title and jurisdiction gave the companies considerable power to disrupt as well 
as further federal aims.  The companies used their quasi-governmental role to force the 
national government to bear the costs of their avarice, a reality Congress discovered when 
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it felt morally (or, in the case of the Tennessee Company, legally) obligated to relieve the 
unwitting victims of the land companies’ speculative schemes.   
 As a result, it was Barlow’s prediction, not Baldwin’s, that proved more accurate. 
Congress did not continue selling large tracts to speculators. The era of the great land 
companies proved brief, and the Ohio, Scioto, and Miami Purchases were, in the end, the 
only direct sales of federal land to companies. Similarly, after Georgia transferred its 
domain to the federal government in 1802, states no longer had vast tracts of land to sell.  
The result was that, going forward, the federal government, and its officials, would 
dispense and determine the validity of title directly.  “[S]elling lands,” one congressman 
argued as Congress debated a land office in 1796, “should always be kept in the hands of 
Government, and not in those of speculators.”  The experiment of the middlemen was 
over, at least for the time being.122 
 The deeper legacies, however, remained.  As landholder, the federal government 
still used its power over title to try to shape policy, reserving lots for education and 
religion, subsidizing internal improvements, and paying its soldiers in public lands.  
Much later, far larger corporate quasi-sovereigns fueled by the federal domain returned, 
in the form of the transcontinental railroads.  And the states subsidized a new generation 
of speculators who proved just as adept at holding out the prospect of public goods while 
using government support to underwrite their own risky ventures.  In this sense, the 
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tension between corporate and governmental sovereignty remained deep within American 
legal and political thought and practice.123 
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Chapter 3: Rise of Federal Title 
 
 In October 1789, the recently inaugurated President Washington wrote to Arthur 
St. Clair, newly appointed as governor of the Northwest Territory.  Among other 
directives, Washington urged St. Clair to head to the town of Vincennes “as soon as 
possible,” telling St. Clair it was a “circumstance of some importance” that the 
inhabitants be guaranteed their lands “by some known and fixed principles.”  The 
President later received a lengthy and highly detailed report from St. Clair about 
Vincennes lands, as well as three separate petitions from the town’s inhabitants on the 
subject, which he forwarded to Congress.1 
 Addressing the minutiae of land practice in a small and distant village—
Vincennes was a settlement of several hundred French settlers along the Wabash River in 
present-day Indiana—is likely not what the Constitution’s drafters had had in mind when 
they created the Presidency two years earlier; nor does it comport with present-day 
visions of the weighty matters that occupied the first president.  Yet Washington was not 
alone.  Resolving the land claims in Vincennes and other French settlements in the 
Illinois Country produced voluminous reports from Governor St. Clair and territorial 
secretary Winthrop Sargent, lengthy correspondence involving cabinet officers, 
especially Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, and two separate acts of Congress, along 
with numerous petitions and congressional reports.  As for the issues that occasioned 
these deliberations—the validity of villagers’ claims to title to small town lots or 
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neighboring vacant farmland based on decades-old grants —they were more typical of a 
local county court docket than the national legislature and executive.2 
 But, as surprising and unfamiliar as this federal attention to these small-bore 
disputes may seem in the present, it was characteristic of federal land practice in the 
1790s.  To call this a system or policy would suggest a level of planning and forethought 
that was absent.  Rather, as in the case of Vincennes, the federal government was dragged 
into one parochial, fact-intensive property controversy after another.  Like the Illinois 
settlers, Native nations arguing over their borders with one another and military bounty 
holders alleging fraud and theft all advanced claims to territorial lands, thrusting the 
federal government into complicated tangles of competing ownership.  Often, their 
asserted property rights rested on unfamiliar and foreign bodies of law that nonetheless 
required acknowledgment, even if implicitly, within Anglo-American law. 
Considered in parallel, a certain pattern emerges from these seemingly disparate 
and disconnected disputes.  Most saliently, in all these conflicts, it was the federal 
government—sometimes Congress, but more frequently federal officials and 
administrators—who became the arbiter of property rights.   This was not wholly 
accidental.  The federal government’s authority to resolve property conflicts served its 
own ends, even when it had no material interest in their outcome.  As Washington’s letter 
suggested, merely creating property based on “known and fixed principles” made 
property rights more legible, and their administration simpler, for the federal government. 
There is another sense, though, in which federal officials became the arbiters of 
these disputes almost by default.  As the only “constituted authorities” within the U.S. 
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territories, federal officials became saddled with the responsibility to resolve property 
disputes, even when they would rather not have done so.  Sometimes, this charge came 
from above, as when Congress and the President burdened St. Clair and Sargent with the 
thankless job of adjudicating French titles.  Just as often, the pressure came from 
claimants themselves.  When charged with buying Indian land and granting military 
bounty land, most federal officials had little interest in determining the intricacies of 
Native property under Native law or in resolving fact-bound allegations of fraud in 
conveyances.  But Native leaders and military veterans pressed their claims and insisted 
on federal intervention; federal officials, with varying degrees of eagerness, were 
constrained by their sense of obligation and duty to give these contentions at least some 
consideration. 
An alternative would have been to rely on courts, especially local courts, which 
were well versed in small-scale property disputes of this nature.  In fact, some federal 
officials sought to devolve responsibility to the judiciary, particularly in the contentions 
involving military bounty lands.  But, though courts intervened in these controversies in 
the long run, they rarely did so in the 1790s.  As slow and individualized institutions, 
courts could not create an entire property scheme from hundreds of existing claims, as 
territorial officials did in Vincennes; nor did Anglo-American courts enjoy authority over 
the diplomatic arenas in which negotiations over Native property rights played out.  
Federal officials confronted a jurisdictional and competence gap that they were often 
forced to fill. 
  195 
By circumstance as much as by design, then, the federal government found itself 
repeatedly serving as arbiter in territorial property controversies. Contemporaries, as well 
as later historians, paid little attention to this process: they were fixated on the lengthy 
and fruitless debates over the creation of the federal land offices and public sales.  But as 
Congress dithered, throughout the 1790s the federal government was already engaged in 
real property work, out in the territories.  Unlike the land offices, this work focused on 
adjudication, not distribution; rather than creating new property rights, officials sought to 
weigh existing claims and translate them into an authoritative title.  And, because this 
process was improvised, this had little of the routinized feel of the later land office.  
Nonetheless, by the end of the period, this ad hoc solution to the challenge of the 
multiplicity of title had crystallized into precedent, providing the template for the 
property adjudications that followed.  
 As they sifted through these conflicting claims, federal officials were also shifting 
the meaning of property in the territories.  In all these disputes, the final outcome of the 
federal government’s deliberations was a piece of paper from the federal government 
conferring title: a federal land grant, in the case of the French settlers and the military 
veterans; a formal treaty with written guarantees of territory, in the case of Native 
nations.  As a result of these adjudications, then, ownership came to derive from the 
authority of the United States, rather than from the plural sources that had previously 
undergirded property rights.  This transformation toward a more positivist conception of 
ownership, centered in the national state, provided the necessary support for the land 
offices and the century of expansion that followed. 
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* * * 
Title in the federal territories always began with Native nations, as we have seen.  
Even within the blinkered legal conceptions of Anglo-Americans, Natives could only 
alienate what they owned.  This seemingly straightforward requirement paradoxically 
meant that federal officials had to decipher Native land claims at the same moment they 
sought to “extinguish” and erase them.  But as officials discovered to their dismay, the 
only basis for assessing the validity of competing Native claims to title were Native 
ownership concepts themselves.  This structural feature of early American land required 
federal officials to become the often reluctant arbiters of Native property law as they 
dimly understood it.  In one sense, this constraint reflected Native power and federal 
weakness, in the sense that Native legal systems could not be ignored or disregarded.  Yet 
at the same time, adjudicating Native title aggrandized federal authority and made Native 
ownership rest on the questionable interpretations of Native legal concepts made by 
federal officials who were far from disinterested.3 
 
In the late eighteenth century, Natives and most Anglo-Americans agreed that 
Native nations owned most of the Southwest and Northwest Territories, even if the 
precise nature of that ownership was unsettled.    The Southwest Territory encompassed 
the heart of what historians now call the Native Southeast.  The Smoky Mountains and 
                                                
3 This attentiveness to the boundaries of Native territory by federal officials—grudging and partial though it was—has largely escaped 
the notice of historians of Native North America, who describe federal officials as committed to a process of erasing Native 
ownership.  For instance, in her path-breaking article on Native territory and its boundaries, Juliana Barr argues that “[s]ilencing an 
Indian presence became requisite in [U.S.] attempts to solidify national borders.”  Juliana Barr, “Geographies of Power: Mapping 
Indian Borders in the ‘Borderlands’ of the Early Southwest,” The William and Mary Quarterly 68, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 8.  But as 
the history here suggests, Natives were more successful than Barr acknowledges in forcing federal officials to consider their territorial 
claims, even though this process arguably, and ironically, furthered the federal project of “extinguishing” Native property rights that 
Barr describes. 
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their foothills, where the Anglo-drawn borders of the Southwest Territory, North 
Carolina, and Georgia converged, were Cherokee territory, while to the south, largely 
within Georgia’s purported borders, were the lands of the Creek confederacy.   The 
territory of the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations lay further west and south, between 
present-day Nashville and the Mississippi River.  North of the Ohio River, in the 
Northwest Territory, the United States confronted diverse tribes that Anglo-Americans 
struggled to distinguish.  Some, such as the Miamis, Weas, and other tribes of what 
federal officials dubbed the Wabash Confederacy, had long lived along the Miami and 
Wabash Rivers.  Others, such as the Delawares and Shawnees, were more recent arrivals, 
pushed from ancestral homelands along the eastern seaboard by Anglo-American 
dispossession.4 
Despite differing concepts of ownership, these diverse nations shared overlapping 
understandings of personal and national property and territory that they articulated in 
negotiations with Anglo-Americans.  Most fundamentally, life in these nations centered 
on villages surrounded by cornfields.  Long-standing occupation of these lands conferred 
ownership.  The Miami chief Little Turtle told federal commissioners that his nation 
owned its lands because they were “enjoyed by my forefathers time immemorial”; 
throughout the territory,“[t]he print of my ancestors’ houses are every where to be seen.”5   
Beyond these Native hubs were the broad territories that Anglo-Americans 
denominated as the nations’ “hunting grounds.”  Natives measured these lands and their 
                                                
4 For a discussion of the Native peoples of the Ohio, Illinois, and Tennessee Countries, see the Prologue. 
5 “Minutes of a Treaty with the tribes of Indians called the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanese, Ottawas, Chippewas, Pattawatamies, 
Miamies, Eel River, Kickapoos, Piankeshaws, and Kaskaskias, begun at Greenville, on the 16th day of June, and ended on the 10th 
day of August, 1795,” in Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, eds., American State Papers: Indian Affairs, vol. 1 
(Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832) [hereinafter ASP:IA]. 
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boundaries less through formal markers than through a sense of distance and their 
relational position.  One Delaware informed missionaries that even though he “did not 
rank with the for[e]most . . . he possest as much Land as a man could walk over in the 
best part of a day.”  This Delaware’s statement exemplifies the complicated coexistence 
of individual, clan-based, and national claims to property.  Many Native rights to 
property consisted of use rights in a commons shared among multiple tribal members, 
and even multiple nations.  The Cherokees, for instance, repeatedly rejected U.S. efforts 
to obtain the land around Muscle Shoals by informing federal officials that they could not 
sell them “as they were not clearly our property” alone, since they were held as “a sort of 
common property” for hunting among the Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Creeks, as well as 
the Cherokees.6    
Migration further complicated Native property claims.  Particularly in the Ohio 
country, as tribes arrived from the eastward to settle among other nations that had been 
long resident, they worked out arrangements whereby the newcomers acknowledged 
prior occupants’ title.  One Anglo-American discussed Ohio country tribes’ appropriation 
of lands as a “new District” to recently arrived Shawnees. When an emissary bearing an 
invitation to an Anglo-American treaty arrived at a Kickapoo village north of Vincennes, 
                                                
6 John Parrish, “Journal, #4,” 30 June 1793, John Parrish Journals, Clements Library, University of Michigan; “Conference of the 
Chiefs of the Cherokee Nation with the Secretary of War,” ASP:IA,1:204; Benjamin Hawkins to William Blount, March 10, 1791, 
Folder 3: 1791, WBP:LC.  For a similar statement, see Extract of Leonard Shaw to [Secretary of War], June 20, 1792, in “Extracts of 
Correspondence on Indian Affairs,” October 1792, in PGW:PS, 11:291-315.   
Work on Native property rights has grown considerably over the last several decades.  For an early consideration, see William 
Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England, 1st ed (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983).  
Important recent works include Barr, 6-45; Angela Pulley Hudson, Creek Paths and Federal Roads: Indians, Settlers, and Slaves and 
the Making of the American South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 17–20; Nancy Shoemaker, A Strange 
Likeness: Becoming Red and White in Eighteenth-Century North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 13–34; Allan 
Greer, “Commons and Enclosure in the Colonization of North America,” The American Historical Review 117, no. 2 (April 1, 2012): 
365–86.  
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the Kickapoos informed him that they could give no answer “without consulting the 
Ouiatonons [Weas], being the owners of their [the Kickapoos’] lands.”7 
Encounter with Euro-American law also transformed Native conceptions of 
property.  By the late eighteenth century, years of experience had schooled Natives on 
Euro-American conceptions of ownership, and they worked to translate their long-
standing views on property into forms that their Anglo-American interlocutors would 
understand.  This was particularly true with respect to Native methods of recording 
property claims.  To supplement methods of preserving territorial claims such as oral 
testimony, marks on the landscape, and wampum belts, Natives began to use written 
records of land transactions.  So Native leaders carefully preserved copies of the treaties 
and other papers given them by Europeans, presenting them to later Euroamerican 
negotiators as proof of their land claims.  At one treaty negotiation, “the Indians produced 
a bundle of papers as records & ratifications of former treaties.” Native access to written 
texts often caused alarm among federal officials as producing claims that were too legible 
in Anglo-American law.  In 1797, U.S. Army General James Wilkinson was highly 
“embarrass[ed]” when a group of Natives in the Northwest Territory presented him with 
a document “asserted to be the original counterpart of the Treaty of Greenville left with 
the Indians” by the federal commissioners.  This copy, Wilkinson noted with anxiety, 
outlined borders that differed from the version ratified by the President and Senate.8 
                                                
7Arthur Camp[bell] to Arthur St. Clair, January 8, 1791, Reel 3, ASCP;  “Report of Antoine Gamelin,” 17 May 1790, in SCP, 155–60. 
8 John Parrish, “Book Relative to Indian Affairs Journals to Treaties,” June 12, 1791, Ayer MS 3146, Newberry Library, Chicago, Ill.; 
James McHenry to Maj. H. LeButts, December 15, 1797, Box 2, James McHenry Papers, Clements Library, University of Michigan.  
On the role of writing among Native communities during this period, see Shoemaker, Strange Likeness, 61-81; Phillip H. Round, 
Removable Type: Histories of the Book in Indian Country, 1663-1880 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010). 
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As these instances suggest, though Native concepts of property diverged from fee-
simple ownership, they were neither unfamiliar nor illegible to Anglo-Americans.  
Community-held commons, as well as parcels subdivided into various interests, had deep 
roots in the Euroamerican legal tradition. And unclear and uncertain boundaries were 
characteristic not just of Native property rights, but of property practice of the era more 
generally. The worn copies of treaties that Natives presented federal negotiators were 
simply yet more documents asserting ownership amidst the maelstrom of warrants, deeds, 
and grants engulfing the early American borderlands.9    
 
This similarity between Native and Anglo-American concepts of ownership in the 
borderlands provided cold comfort to federal officials.  For them, it merely meant that, 
like other property claims in the borderlands, Native property and territorial divisions 
were “extremely vague,” as one federal official complained, requiring those officials to 
extract order from a complicated and ill-documented history.  The diverse forms of 
communal and shared ownership made parsing out chains of title, as well as obtaining the 
consent of all the owners, highly challenging.   But, as in other instances of line-drawing, 
the stakes for the federal government were high.  Constructing explicit lines of Native 
property and territory served national interests, bolstered federal authority, and created a 
clear basis for ownership.  As congressional commissioner Samuel Parsons observed, 
                                                
9 On the congruence, rather than divergence, between European and Native property concepts, particularly concerning common 
ownership, see Greer, 365–86; Shoemaker, 13-34. 
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“the security of the Title to those [western] lands is much concerned in procuring the 
confirmation . . . of the Indian Title.” 10 
Creating unambiguous delineations of property was even more salient in the 
context of Indian affairs because of the risk of conflict. Many federal officials blamed 
violence between Natives and whites on ill-defined borders.  President Washington 
insisted that Indian boundaries be “very distinctly marked,” so that “ignorance may no 
longer be offered as a plea for transgressions on either side.”  Thomas Jefferson proposed 
giving Natives letters protecting their lands with “marks of solemnity”—printed on 
parchment with seals and in tin cases—to guard against intrusions. Natives, too, often 
sought explicit borders in an effort to curb Anglo-Americans: the Shawnees and 
Delawares of the Ohio Country demanded that one treaty line be marked by a “great 
road” cut by axemen to “prevent the White people from settling on their hunting 
grounds.” For differing reasons, then, both Natives and Anglo-Americans saw the 
formalization of informal land practices as essential to cross-cultural harmony.11 
Boundaries between Native and U.S. territory were one thing, boundaries among 
Native nations another.  Many federal officials attempted to steer clear of these disputes.  
Secretary of War Timothy Pickering found these “altercations among [the Indians] about 
their boundaries” to be “tedious and . . . inconvenient,” and urged federal commissioners 
at the Treaty of Greenville to enter a single treaty with all the tribes at once to obviate the 
need to adjudicate Native boundaries: “one instrument,” he wrote, “will save much time 
                                                
10 Timothy Pickering to Anthony Wayne, April 8, 1795, NWTC.; Samuel Holden Parsons and James Davenport to His Excellency 
Governor [Samuel] Huntington, April 6, 1789, Ayer MS 687, Newberry Library. 
11 George Washington to Secretary of War [James McHenry], July 18, 1796, George Washington Collection, MS-1033, Rauner 
Special Collections Library, Dartmouth University; Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, March 13, 1793, in PGW:PS, 12:314-
15; Rufus Putnam to Oliver Wolcott, March  15,1799,  Reel 1, Letters Sent by the General Land Office to the Surveyors General 
(microfilm), M27, U.S. National Archives, Washington D.C. 
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and trouble.”   At the earlier Treaty of Hopewell, federal commissioners merely guessed 
at borders between southeastern nations by marking them on the map with a dotted line 
and describing tribal territories only by referring to neighboring tribes rather than 
establishing clear boundaries.  They told the Chickasaws that they left the question of 
intertribal boundaries to “the respective tribes.”12   
Yet the federal government found that it could not extract itself from adjudicating 
property among tribes.  The question of which Native nations were “true owners” of 
disputed lands, for instance, recurred at the Greenville negotiations, despite Pickering’s 
instructions.  The commissioners at Hopewell ended up promising the Chickasaws that, 
once they had “agree[d] with the neighbouring tribes respecting their boundary,” the 
United States “would send a white man to [be] present with the Indians and see them 
mark it.”  (This promise went unfulfilled.)  Even Pickering himself sometimes violated 
his own prescription to avoid intertribal property disputes.  When the Chickasaws 
proposed creating a trading post along the Tennessee River, Pickering authorized it only 
“if the Chickasaws indisputably own the land, and the Cherokees do not claim it or also 
consent to the measure.”   Pickering even implicitly conceded the role of the United 
States in resolving intertribal property disputes in yet another controversy about 
Chickasaw territory, this time about the proper interpretation of a presidential 
proclamation protecting the Chickasaws. President Washington, Pickering insisted, had 
clearly not intended “to decide the boundaries between the lands of different Indian 
nations.”—“at least on the mere representation of only one of the parties,” Pickering 
                                                
12 Timothy Pickering to Anthony Wayne, April 4, 1795; Henry Knox to George Washington, July 21, 1794, in PGW:PS, 16:402; 
Timothy Pickering to David Campbell, August 28, 1795, Folder 2, Timothy Pickering Letters, Ayers 926, Newberry Library; 
Hopewell Commissioners to John Hancock, January 14, 1786, Item No. 138, Henry Knox Papers (microfilm), Reel/Vol. 47, 
Massachusetts Historical Society. 
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quickly continued.  As this caveat demonstrated, even Pickering acknowledged that the 
federal government would intervene to arbitrate property disputes among tribes.13 
One reason federal officials could not avoid intertribal property claims was that 
Natives themselves insisted on federal involvement.  At the Treaty of Hopewell, for 
instance, the question of the Chickasaw boundary with the Creeks only arose when an 
unnamed Chickasaw chief demanded of the commissioners to show him his nation’s 
boundaries on the map:  “he wished,” the commissioners reported, that “Congress would 
point out his lands to him, he wanted to know his own.”14   
Subsequent incidents help illuminate why a Native leader would ask United States 
officials to clarify his own nation’s territory.  Natives were not ignorant of their own 
boundaries, but they were eager to learn—and codify—which property rights Congress 
would protect.  At the Treaty of Fort Harmar, for instance, the Wyandots “strongly 
insisted” on their claim to the lands that the treaty acknowledged as belonging to the 
Shawnees, even going so far as to demand an explicit treaty provision to recognize their 
claim.  The Wyandots told Arthur St. Clair, serving as treaty negotiator, that they “so 
much insisted” on this claim because they were certain that the Shawnees would continue 
their attacks on the United States.  As a result, unless the Wyandots’ separate property 
claim was protected under Anglo-American law, the Wyandots would forfeit their rights 
alongside the Shawnees when the United States punished the recalcitrant Shawnees.  The 
Chickasaws offered similar logic at a negotiation several years later.   There, the 
Chickasaws reportedly told the Cherokees, “Your nation . . . must look upon our lands 
                                                
13 “Minutes of a Treaty . . . Begun at Greenville,” 570; Hopewell Commissioners to Hancock, January 14, 1786; Timothy Pickering to 
David Henley, March 23, 1795, Folder 4, Timothy Pickering Letters, Ayers 926, Newberry Library; Henry Knox to George 
Washington, 21 July 1794, in PGW:PS, 16:402; Pickering to Campbell, August 28, 1795. 
14 Hopewell Commissioners to John Hancock, 14 Jan. 1786. 
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apart from yours. . . . We want ours separate.”  The Chickasaw fear was that the 
Cherokees were so “stained with the blood of the white men” that it must “end in [the 
United States] driving you from your lands.”15    
As these instances exemplify, there were good reasons why Native nations sought 
federal confirmation of intertribal boundaries.  Because the effectiveness of Native title 
increasingly hinged on U.S. acknowledgment, there were strategic benefits for Natives to 
write their ownership of disputed territories into federal treaties, thereby enshrining those 
claims in future disputes with the United States.  In the process, Natives forced federal 
officials to adjudicate property disputes they would have gladly avoided. 
 
Defining Native territory—whether to purchase it or to assuage Native 
demands—required some basis for determining Native property rights.  Anglo-American 
property law provided little help: interested in taking, not defining, Indian lands, even the 
most ardent expansionists did not assert that these doctrines, rooted in British common 
law and state statutes, extended into territory still acknowledged as Indian country.  
Expansionism did, of course, lead many Anglo-Americans to argue that Natives held few 
legally protected property rights.  Yet, not only had the federal government rejected this 
position, assessing whether Native title was equivalent to that enjoyed by whites was 
irrelevant when resolving property disputes among Native nations.   
Only one form of property law, then, seemed to exist in Indian country: Native 
property concepts themselves.   In the absence of any other basis, adjudicating tribal 
                                                
15 Arthur St. Clair to President [Washington], May 2, 1789, in TP: Vol. II, 191–93; James White to James Monroe, August 9, 1792, in 
The Papers of James Monroe, eds. Daniel Preston and Marlena C. DeLong (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2003), 2:555-57. 
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property involved determining which tribes were proper owners under Native law.  This 
requirement thrust federal officials into the unlikely role of trying to understand, 
interpret, and apply Native concepts of ownership.16   
To gain this information, federal officials came to rely on both Native and non-
Native informants.  When Knox met with Native leaders, he engaged them in long 
conversations about the histories and origins of their nations; he also copied ethnographic 
tracts by travelers in Indian country like William Bartram.  For their information, St. 
Clair and especially Blount turned to a network of official and quasi-official Indian 
agents, many of whom were intermarried with Native women, knew Native languages, 
and had long lived in Indian country.  Blount praised temporary agent John McKee, 
previously a trader among the Cherokees, as possessing a deep “knowledge of Indians, 
their habits & dispositions”; he similarly commended interpreter James Carey, whose 
“long and intimate” relationship with the Cherokees, “understanding [of] their language 
and connexion with them,” made him a reliable source on Cherokee country.17 
In particular, to find out Native ownership rights, federal officials were often 
instructed simply to ask Natives directly.  As Henry Knox instructed a federal negotiator 
to the Ohio Country, one of the “first objects” of the treaty was “to ascertain from the 
Indians what tribes are the allowed proprietors” of the lands under discussion.  Echoing 
this view, President Washington instructed the Attorney General to determine which 
                                                
16 In the sense that federal governance came to rely on the power conferred by knowledge of the colonized, the early United States 
represents an early manifestation of what Nicholas Dirks has termed the “ethnographic state.” Nicholas Dirks, Castes of Mind: 
Colonialism and the Making of Modern India. (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2001).  This link between quasi-
ethnographic knowledge of Native peoples and administration had parallels in early Spanish colonialism: see Jeremy Ravi Mumford, 
Vertical Empire: The General Resettlement of Indians in the Colonial Andes (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012).  It would 
also later become more institutionalized, and elaborated, in federal governance of Native peoples.  Frederick E Hoxie, A Final 
Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920 (Lincoln, Neb: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 116-45. 
17 William Blount to Secretary of War, November 10, 1794, in TP: Vol. IV, 364-70; William Blount to Secretary of War, March 20, 
1793, in TP: Vol. IV, 244-47.  
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Native nations were the “acknowledged proprietors” of disputed land in the Ohio country 
based on which nations’ claims were “conceded generally by other Indians bordering” 
those lands. Washington continued: at least “as far as the information shall be 
attainable.”18  
As Washington’s caveat reflected, parsing Native ownership often confounded 
federal officials, who disagreed in their interpretations of Native property law.  In the 
Southwest Territory, U.S. representatives struggled to distinguish the overlapping 
territories of the Cherokees, Creeks, Chickasaws, and Choctaws.  One particularly 
contentious issue proved to be Native ownership of the Cumberland district around 
Nashville.  Both the Creeks and Cherokees objected to Anglo-American settlement, 
repeatedly informing federal officials that the Cumberland lands were hunting grounds 
communally owned by them as well as the Chickasaws and Choctaws.  They acted on 
their property rights through near-constant raids: one Cumberland resident complained to 
congressman James Monroe that the “incessant . . . indian depredations & murders” 
experienced in the region could “hardly [] be conceived at a distance.”19 
William Blount, the Southwest Territory’s governor, waded deep into what he 
understood as Native law to dismiss Cherokee and Creek property claims as mere 
pretence.  Based on “the greatest contiguity to hunting grounds, and the prior use of 
them”—which, he argued, provided “the best claim Indians can establish” for 
ownership—the lands properly belonged to the Chickasaws (who had, conveniently, 
already ceded their claim).  Indeed, he argued, in various discussions with federal 
                                                
18 Henry Knox, “Instructions to Major General Anthony Wayne Relatively to a Proposed Treaty with the Indians North West of the 
Ohio,” 4 April 1794, NWTC (emphasis added); President [Washington] to Attorney General, February 12, 1793, in TP:, Vol. II, 435. 
19 White to Monroe, August 9, 1792. 
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representatives that the Cherokees themselves had “admitted the Chickasaw claim was 
just.”  Nor did the Cherokees have a sound basis to establish their own property right.  
“[B]y the best information I can collect,” Blount told the Secretary of War, “the Claim of 
the Cherokees to the lands lying on Cumberland is a recent thing,” undermining any basis 
in long-standing usage.  As he pointed out, the Cherokee homelands lay considerably 
further east, along the Smoky Mountains.  It was only as the Cherokees had drifted down 
the Tennessee in the wake of the Revolution, Blount noted, after ceding their eastern 
lands, that they showed any interest in the Cumberland territory.20 
 Blount found the Creek claim even more unfathomable.  Blount’s Cherokee and 
Chickasaw informants told him that the Creek hunting grounds traditionally stopped well 
south of the Tennessee River, and that the Creeks had hunted along the Atlantic coast 
until the Georgians forced them inland.  Moreover, he observed, the nearest Creek village 
was two hundred miles away from Cumberland, while McGillivray, the Creek leader, 
lived over three hundred miles away.  Blount obtained confirmation of these views at 
Tellico in 1794, where he grilled Cherokee leaders.  “[I]s it not a fact,” Blount leadingly 
asked Cherokee John Watts about Creek lands, “that in the division of the Lands among 
them red people . . . . [the] Tennessee bounds them on the North?”  “What you say about 
the Boundary of the Creek Land is right,” Watts reportedly replied.  Thus, “from 
anything I have ever heard,” Blount concluded that the Creeks had not even the “colour 
of claim” to “a foot of land” north of the Tennessee River.21 
                                                
20 William Blount to Secretary of War [Henry Knox], January 14, 1793, in TP: Vol. IV, 226-34; William Blount to Secretary of War 
[Henry Knox], Nov. 8, 1792, in TP: Vol. IV, 114.  
21 William Blount to Secretary of War [Henry Knox], Nov. 8, 1792; “Conference at Tellico Blockhouse,” November 7, 1794, in “The 
Correspondence of Gen. James Robertson,” The American Historical Magazine 3, no. 4 (October 1, 1898), 367-72. 
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 Blount’s interpretations reflected more than self-dealing and arrogance, though 
they contained a healthy dose of both.  As blinkered and ethnocentric as Blount was, he 
nonetheless keenly felt the need to explain and justify his views based not on Anglo-
American law but on Native law as he constructed it, legitimated by Native statements 
themselves.  Yet his interpretation differed sharply from that of the Natives themselves, 
for two reasons.  First, he deprecated Native nations’ own statements of their property as 
opportunistic, favoring the views of neighboring (though hardly disinterested) tribes.  
Second, he insisted on Native national territory as fixed and unchanging and was 
unwilling to acknowledge the migrations resulting from Anglo-American colonialism.  
This position was especially ironic for a man whose political career stemmed from the 
territorial expansion of the United States and whose personal wealth derived from 
rampant speculation in western lands.  
 Not everyone in the Washington Administration agreed with Blount’s approach to 
Native property in the Southwest Territory.  Secretary of War Timothy Pickering, for 
instance—who had a fraught relationship with Blount—found Blount’s rejection of 
Native testimony, and their own actions, unaccountable.  “The inveteracy with which the 
Creeks committed depredations on Cumberland,” Pickering wrote Blount, “satisfied me 
that they had some latent claim to the lands,” implicitly rebuking the governor.  
Consulting with James Seagrove, the U.S. agent to the Creeks, Pickering found “his 
answer justifies my suspicion.  The Creeks said their claims on those lands had never 
been extinguished.”  As further proof that the Creeks had a legitimate claim to 
Cumberland, Pickering pointed to the recent treaty of Colerain, in which the Creeks had 
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relinquished their claim to the area.  Since then, incessant Creek violence against the 
Southwest Territory had ceased.  For Pickering, these actions, rather than the testimony 
of neighboring tribes or immemorial usage, constituted the strongest evidence of Native 
property rights.22 
 A similar conflict played out in the Ohio Country, where federal officials 
confronted an even more complicated set of overlapping claims produced by an even 
longer history of Native mobility.  The Wyandots, Shawnees, Delawares, Ottawas, 
Chippewas, and Senecas, for instance, all claimed ownership over the lands between 
Ohio River and Lake Erie, present-day eastern Ohio.  Some of these tribes, such as the 
Wyandots, had been long resident, but most, particularly the Shawnees and Delawares, 
had arrived from elsewhere.  Following Blount’s emphasis on immemorial usage, some 
federal officials concluded that, under Native law, these newcomers lacked any 
ownership rights.  Congress, for instance, opined that the Shawnees “are not considered 
by the Indians as a Nation having any Claim of Territory.”  Or, as treaty commissioner 
Samuel Parsons put it more bluntly, the Shawnees “do not own a Foot of Land in the 
World”; an Indian country trader told a federal military commander that the same 
principle applied to the Wyandots and Delawares as well.23  
Other officials followed the course charted by Pickering and credited nations’ 
ownership claims based on occupancy, regardless of earlier history.  Secretary of War 
Henry Knox, for instance, instructed negotiators to acknowledge title in the tribes “who 
were the actual occupants of the lands as the proper Owners thereof.”  This argument 
                                                
22 Pickering to Campbell, August 28, 1795. 
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1904-37). 34:95-101 (emphasis added); Samuel Holden Parsons to Samuel Johnson, December 3, 1785, Folder 5, Samuel Holden 
Parsons Papers, Connecticut Historical Society; David Duncan to Josiah Harmar,  March 28, 1786, Vol. 3, JHP. 
  210 
rested in part on analogy to Euroamerican legal concepts.  In the eyes of one army 
officer, the Delawares were the  “actual proprietors” of the lands in the eastern Ohio 
Country.  But because other nations “now reside and hunt on those Grounds,” they “by 
possession have attended a kind of claim.”  As these statements suggest, Anglo-
Americans believed that under Native law, as in Anglo-American law, occupancy itself 
could yield title.  Occupancy as the basis for ownership had the added benefit of clarity in 
the midst of an often confusing muddle.24 
Occupancy became a particularly salient legal concept as federal officials waded 
into the question of Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) ownership of the Ohio Country.  Decades 
earlier, at the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix with the British, the Six Nations had ceded 
land south of the Ohio that they purportedly owned through conquest, much to the anger 
of Shawnees and other tribes who actually inhabited that territory.  In the 1784 Treaty of 
Fort Stanwix, this time held with federal commissioners of the United States, the Six 
Nations now ceded the United States lands north of the Ohio, claimed “by virtue of [the 
Six Nations’] former conquests,” a cession reconfirmed at the 1789 Treaty of Fort 
Harmar.25 
Federal officials now came to question the validity of these claims to ownership 
under Native law.  When Timothy Pickering asked the Six Nations about the Ohio 
Country, for instance, the chiefs declared “their title to the lands . . . was acknowledged 
by all the Western Indians.”  But when Pickering pressed the Six Nations to cede these 
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lands to the United States for a third time, the chiefs “confessed that the four most hostile 
tribes denied their right to it.”  Pickering concluded that, “whatever claim the Six Nations 
might formerly have to the lands Westward of the Allegany, they long relinquished the 
same to the Delawares and others of the present Western Indians.”  All the earlier 
cessions of the Six Nations, then, “I consider as affording us but the Shadow of a title” to 
the Ohio Country; the federal government would have to negotiate with the lands’ actual 
inhabitants to extinguish their claims.26 
In the end, whether they happily made supposedly authoritative pronouncements 
on the validity of Native property, like Blount or Parsons, or waded into the morass of 
competing assertions only grudgingly, as with Pickering and Knox, federal officials all 
became interpreters of Native property law.  In determining which property rights the 
federal government would honor, Pickering and Knox’s broader approach, favoring 
occupancy and tribes’ own statements of ownership, prevailed over the more crabbed and 
static vision of Blount, in which tribes’ property rights derived from immemorial usage 
alone.  In part, this was a matter of expediency.  As Pickering’s instructions at Greenville 
suggested, it was easier to simply compensate tribes than to haggle over property rights 
or risk conflict.  But it was also a matter of the legibility of Native property law.  The 
ubiquity of occupancy as a source of ownership in Anglo-American law made it difficult 
to deny Native rights grounded in the same principle. Occupancy was also more 
workable: ironically, given its stinginess, Blount’s approach required wading into history 
to uncover the “true” owners, while occupancy afforded a bright-line rule for 
adjudicating Native disputes like that over the Ohio country.  In working through these 
                                                
26 Pickering to Wayne, April 8, 1795. 
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disputes, federal officials created their own federalized version of Native property law, as 
they wished to understand it.      
 
The history of federal adjudication of Native property rights presents a 
paradoxical view of the rise of federal authority over title.  On the one hand, as eager as 
federal officials were to seize Native land, most had little desire to determine questions of 
Native property law.  It was the structure of early American land law that made federal 
adjudication of Native ownership inescapable.  Natives could only alienate what they 
owned, and, with the federal government the only legitimate purchaser, federal officials 
had to decide thorny questions of Native law as they interpreted it, for they had no other 
basis to determine the legitimacy of Native property rights.  The role of arbiter of Native 
property law was also thrust on reluctant federal officials by Native peoples themselves.  
For all that westward expansion involved the denial and erasure of Native governance 
and property, then, the requirement of valid title entailed federal officials’ implicit 
recognition and attempt, however half-hearted, to understand Native law.  
But on the other hand, the consequence of this constrained choice by federal 
officials was the aggrandizement and expansion of federal power over property.  This 
outcome reflected the constrained choices that Native peoples confronted: federal 
acknowledgment of Native title, especially in formal Anglo-American legal documents, 
presented one of the only viable avenues to attempt to preserve Native lands against 
Anglo-American encroachments.  But the effect was that property disputes under Native 
law came to be adjudicated within a federal forum, relying on incomplete federal 
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understandings of indigenous legal orders.  This pattern, which held throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, had pernicious consequences for Native peoples.  It 
made Native title appear as if it existed merely at the sufferance and whim of federal 
officials, and transformed Native property rights into “claims” whose validity hinged on 
legibility within highly formalized Anglo-American law.  In this sense, even though 
federal officials embraced a vision of Native property more sympathetic than most 
Anglo-Americans of the time, the rise of federal title came at the expense of Native 
ownership.27   
* * * 
At the same time that federal officials were struggling to make sense of Native 
property law, some of those same officials were working to interpret another body of 
foreign law to codify customary property practice within the U.S. territories.  The law in 
question was that of the French inhabitants of villages stretching along the Mississippi 
and Wabash Rivers in the Northwest Territory.  Both the law of nations and the 
Northwest Ordinance guaranteed the property rights of these settlers.  Yet implementing 
this promise by determining the title of these few hundred settlers proved daunting.  
Beginning in the late 1780s and lasting for over a decade, adjudicating these French 
property claims occupied inordinate amounts of federal administrative attention.  The 
governor and secretary of the Northwest Territory spent years untangling the settlers’ 
rights  As in the case with Native title, though, the result of this process was more than 
                                                
27 For histories that consider Native land claims advanced before federal officials in the twentieth century, see Christian W. McMillen, 
Making Indian Law: The Hualapai Land Case and the Birth of Ethnohistory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); David E. 
Wilkins, Hollow Justice: A History of Indigenous Claims in the United States (Yale University Press, 2013).  The history presented 
here suggests that the more explicit role for ethnohistorical sources in Native land claims that McMillen traces has important 
precursors in the more informal ethnography forced on federal officials in the late eighteenth century. 
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the sum of its parts.  In working through these seemingly penny ante disputes, federal 
officials established precedent for resolving what came to be known as private land 
claims, and entrenched the principle that land claimants looked to the national 
government for secure title. 
 
 French settlers arrived in what was then known as the Illinois country in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.  They built villages along the rivers linking 
French Canada and Louisiana: Vincennes, along the Wabash River in present-day 
southern Indiana; Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and Prairie du Rocher, along the Mississippi River 
in present-day downstate Illinois.  Remote outposts whose residents were closely tied to 
surrounding Native nations through kinship and intermarriage, these towns capitalized on 
their proximity to Natives to serve as entrepots in the Indian trade between the 
continent’s vast Native interior and the Euroamerican commercial centers of Montreal 
and Detroit.28 
Despite their isolation from other European settlements, the villages’ strategic 
location along the Mississippi and Wabash made them integral in the long contest for 
control over the continent.  By the time federal officials arrived in the late 1780s, formal 
sovereignty over the territory had switched three times.  First, at the end of the Seven 
                                                
28 On the history of French settlements in the Illinois country and their relations with Natives, see Robert Michael Morrissey, Empire 
by Collaboration: Indians, Colonists, and Governments in Colonial Illinois Country (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); Carl J. 
Ekberg, French Roots in the Illinois Country: The Mississippi Frontier in Colonial Times (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998).  
On Vincennes in particular, see Andrew R. L. Cayton, Frontier Indiana (Indiana University Press, 1998), 1–97; Denise Marie Wilson, 
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Entrepôt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014); Karen Marrero, “On the Edge of the West: The Roots and Routes of Detroit’s 
Urban Eighteenth Century,” in Frontier Cities: Encounters at the Crossroads of Empire, eds. Jay Gitlin, Barbara Berglund, and Adam 
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Years’ War, the British had replaced the towns’ French government.  Then, during the 
American Revolution, the Virginians invaded, at once displacing the British and ravaging 
the towns’ economy, as the militia freely pillaged from the people they had supposedly 
liberated.  Finally, sovereignty passed again when Virginia ceded both ownership and 
jurisdiction over the region to the federal government in 1784.29 
When federal officials at last arrived at the villages beginning in the late 1780s, 
they were unimpressed by what they saw, filtering their impressions through a haze of 
class and cultural contempt.  Vincennes, the largest of the three settlements, held only 
330 families.  With its economy wrecked by war, the town’s buildings were “low, Old, 
and ugly,” many in “decay’d & even ruinous condition.”  (The situation in the other 
towns was similar: Kaskaskia was reportedly “nothing more then [sic] a heap of ruin.”)  
Anglo-American visitors had little respect for the inhabitants, whom they found “very 
Ignorant,” even though, not knowing French, many officials could not speak with them.  
Their disdain also had a racial element.  As a result of the inhabitants’ “vicinity, trade, 
and intermarriages” with neighboring tribes, Vincennes residents were “a good deal on 
the savage establishment” and “barely . . . removed from the Indians”; many wore Indian 
clothes and had “brown complextions.”  Federal officials thought these residents ill-
suited for American governance.  “The people will not relish a free government,” 
territorial judge John Cleves Symmes reported after a visit to Vincennes.  “[T]hey say our 
laws are too complex, not to be understood, and tedious in operation—the command or 
                                                
29 On the Revolutionary War in the Illinois Country, see George Rogers Clark, The Conquest of the Illinois, ed. Milo Milton Quaife 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2001); Cayton, Frontier Indiana, 70-97.  
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order of the Military commandant is better law and spedier justice for them & what they 
prefer to all the legal systems found in Littleton and Blackstone.”30   
Symmes’s sneers notwithstanding, the French settlers possessed a legal system 
that depended on more than military whim.  Their property law, based on a French legal 
code known as Coutumes de Paris, was grounded in notarial practice, with formal, 
written deeds in standardized language sworn before publically appointed notaries.  The 
settlers employed community schemes of marital property, required wives’ consent for 
sales of communally held lands, and measured lands in arpents, a standard French unit 
slightly smaller than the Anglo-American acre.  They had developed a tripartite division 
for their lands—individually held townlots, river lots divided in French fashion into long 
strips, and commons.  Individuals owned the river lots, but they were worked 
communally through an open-field system.31 
Yet, just as Littleton and Blackstone were poor guides to the property law on the 
Anglo-American frontier, the French villagers’ property practices reflected the exigencies 
and customs of the borderlands as much as they did the Coutumes.  In particular, land 
ownership did not have the salience for the habitants it held for the land-crazed Anglo-
Americans.  In the mid-eighteenth century, the Illinois Country had been the center of a 
booming flour trade, producing wheat and livestock that was transported downriver to 
                                                
30 John Cleves Symmes to Robert Morris, June 22, 1790, in CJCS, 287; William Clark, “Journal,” August 20, 1797, NWTC; John 
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University of North Carolina Press, 2006). 
31 The foremost work on land tenure in the Illinois Country is Carl J. Ekberg, French Roots in the Illinois Country: The Mississippi 
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Illinois Country was variegated and complex,” but notes that, throughout the region, nearly all the towns employed the same land use 
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Louisiana.  But thirty years of war, competition from Anglo-American farmers up the 
Ohio, and an exodus of many into Spanish-held Louisiana led the remaining habitants to 
live mostly by commerce, describing themselves as “chiefly addicted to the Indian trade”; 
Anglo-Americans ironically disdained the French they encountered as “indifferent 
Farmers.”  Moreover, communal farming and the settlements’ remote location meant that 
there was little to be gained by engrossing enormous tracts in the fashion of Anglo-
American speculators.  Land held little value as a commodity without the prospect of 
ever-increasing land values driven by constant immigration.  As a result, land practice in 
the French villages reflected the informality of life in close-knit communities where 
residents knew each other’s holdings.  Boundaries were drawn haphazardly and 
imprecisely; Vincennes was remarkable, an Anglo-American surveyor observed, for its 
“extreme irregularity.”  Written deeds spoke vaguely of lots extending “of the depth of 
one street to the next” and referenced locations based on neighboring owners.  One land 
contract contained only a promise to sell along with the assurance that, “as soon as we 
see each other again I will straighten all things out.”32 
Anglo-American law guaranteed the persistence of French property law and 
norms in the villages after the cession to the United States.  Under the law of nations, 
private property rights within transferred territory could not be invalidated.  Honoring 
this requirement, Virginia’s cession to the federal government required that the French 
settlers “shall have their possessions and titles confirmed to them.”  The Northwest 
                                                
32 “Journal Kept by George Hunter of a Tour from Philada. to Kentucky by the Illinois Country,” July 14-Oct. 15, 1796, American 
Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, Penn.; “Land Sale Contract Btw/ Dominque Burguant and Josete Poirier and Vital Bouche,” 
(typescript translation), December 24, 1782, Translation, I.164, Lasselle Family Papers, L127, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis, 
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Ordinance in turn promised that French settlers’ “laws and customs” concerning “the 
descent & conveyance of property” would remain valid.33 
In June 1788, responding to petitions from the French villages, the Continental 
Congress sought to fulfill these guarantees by legislating that “ancient settlers” who had 
lived within the villages in 1783 would have their claims confirmed; they would also 
each receive nearby tracts of 400 acres, to be laid in parallelograms.  It directed the newly 
appointed territorial governor Arthur St. Clair to adjudicate and confirm the settlers’ 
titles, “according to the laws & Usages of the Governments under which they have 
respectively settled.”  Congress even recognized that that the settlers “may have acquired 
equitable Titles to lands under some peculiar Customs established and recognized in the 
ancient French Colonies where no actual grants have passed.”  It accordingly ordered St. 
Clair to honor these “equitable or Customary rights to Lands” rather than dispossess the 
villagers.34 
St. Clair finally reached the Illinois and Wabash Countries in summer 1790.  He 
and his second-in-command, territorial secretary Winthrop Sargent, instructed the towns’ 
residents to appear before them with the papers and witnesses necessary to establish their 
claims to land, on which St. Clair and Sargent would then pass judgment. 
This task proved more daunting than either Congress or Washington anticipated 
when they charged the territorial officials with this responsibility.  Part of the problem 
was volume: St. Clair received over 4,000 land claims to adjudicate.  An even more 
                                                
33 “Cession of Western Land Claims,” March 1, 1784, in TP: Vol. II, 6-9.Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 32:334-43.  
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substantial problem was evidence.  St. Clair and Sargent were accustomed to Anglo-
American land recordation schemes, in which counties tracked parcels in official ledgers.  
The villages lacked anything comparable. “[N]o records are preserved,” one official 
lamented.  There had been written grants from French and British officials, but they had 
been scribbled on “small scrap[s] of paper,” Sargent complained, then passed to notaries 
who recorded them on “loose sheets.”  These notarial papers rarely survived.  One notary 
had reportedly run off with all the public records, while the other papers were simply 
scattered upon a notary’s death.  Notaries also passed deeds into the hands of owners, but 
these records were either later “fraudulently destroyed” by interested parties, or, entrusted 
to people Sargent thought “unacquainted with their consequence” who then lost them: 
“for, by the French usage, [these deeds] are considered as family inheritance, and often 
descend to women and children.”  Sargent thus read the difficulty as one of cultural 
difference—the failure of French law to conform to Anglo-American legal and gender 
norms.   In fact, the villages’ “usage” reflected less differences in formal law than the 
legal norms of a society where the absence of a land market among strangers created little 
need to establish clear chains of title.35 
 This informality extended beyond recordkeeping to encompass the sources of 
ownership. “The confusion of title here is a labyrinth of perplexity,” Judge Symmes 
reported from Vincennes, “which requires the utmost care nay tenderness to set right.”  
Symmes noted the “variety” of titles: “prescription, bar[e] possession—fraudulent deeds 
from those who had no right to sell.” Title to much of the land around Vincennes rested 
                                                
35 Symmes to Morris, June 22, 1790; “Report of the Proceedings of Winthrop Sargent Upon the Land Claims of the Settlers of 
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on a purchase from the local Piankeshaw Indians that had been made, the town’s 
inhabitants insisted, in “utter[]” ignorance of the “laws of America, respecting land-
affairs.”  Other portions of land were commons, which some settlers now sought to have 
distributed in individual tracts.36      
The fundamental challenge that confronted St. Clair and Sargent, then, was 
translating a customary land system suited for local needs into a formalized framework 
legible in Philadelphia and elsewhere, one in which ownership rested on legitimate 
sources of title established by written, impersonal evidence.  Overseeing this act of 
translation gave St. Clair and Sargent tremendous discretion in determining which claims 
to honor and which to reject.  The paucity of written evidence presented them—“there is 
scarcely one case in twenty where the [written] title is complete,” Sargent lamented—
meant that they had to rely on “oral Testimony” about land ownership (though, in a rare 
fit of optimism, Sargent conceded that much of this testimony was “very good”).37   
This task also thrust the Pennsylvanian St. Clair and the New Englander Sargent 
into the unlikely role of experts on French colonial land law, addressing questions for 
which, as in the case of Native title, there was no basis for adjudicating other than 
reference to validity under prior local practice.  In one case in the town of Kaskaskia, St. 
Clair rejected the claim of a man named Cruelly, who proffered testimony from a Mr. 
Bughet that he had received a land grant. St. Clair nonetheless disallowed the claim on 
the ground that, based on Bughet’s testimony, the grant appeared to be on Jesuit land.  
But if Cruelly had obtained the land from the Jesuits, it could only be a leasehold, since 
                                                
36 Symmes to Morris, June 22, 1790; “Petition of the Inhabitants of Post Vincennes,” July 26, 1787, in TP: Vol. II, 58-60. 
37 “Report of the Proceedings of Winthrop Sargent,” 323-32. 
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under French practice, as understood by St. Clair, Jesuit land “could not be alienated.”  
St. Clair also faced a question of land tenure when ruling on the titles of settlers who had 
crossed the Mississippi to Spanish territory.  Because these grants were not in fee simple 
but reverted to the king’s domain when vacated—or at least so St. Clair concluded—
these tracts “strictly” belonged to the United States as the king’s successor, though St. 
Clair hinted to the Secretary of State that he thought some temporary relief warranted.38  
 The thorniest question confronting St. Clair and Sargent, though, was not an 
“ancient” claim at all, but a hybrid issue of custom and federalism that had arisen only a 
few years earlier.  Shortly after the Virginians arrived in the Illinois Country, their 
regional commander, Lieutenant Todd, had authorized the local courts to make land 
grants, which they did right up through 1787, to the amount of 48,000 acres.  Todd 
claimed this authority based on precedent: local court officials explained to Sargent that 
“since the Establishment of this Country, the Commondants have always appeared to be 
vested with the powers to give Lands.”  Local courts then issued land grants citing both 
Todd—inflated into the “Chief Justice for the United States”—and “utmost necessity” for 
authority, while also stressing that the granted lands had not been given or owned by 
anyone.39     
St. Clair recognized none of these authorities.  In his view, Todd’s grants were 
triply invalid.  First, Todd held no authority to grant land under Virginia law; second, 
even if he had, he could not delegate this power to the courts; and, third, since most of the 
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grants had occurred after Virginia’s cession to the United States, they were “absolutely 
void.”  St. Clair accordingly “uniformly rejected” these grants as “altogether 
unauthorized” and “usurpation[s]” by “self created” officials.40 
 The irony in these assessments was how little they resembled the operation of a 
“free government” as envisioned by Judge Symmes.  St. Clair and Sargent were not law-
trained judges determining title in adversarial cases turning on the fineries of Blackstone.  
They were unelected federal administrators, appointed by a distant legislature without 
any involvement of the French villagers, passing judgment based on their own 
impoverished understandings of French land law and practice.  They became, in short, the 
latest in the line of “commandants” to rule over the villagers and their property.  Yet they 
differed from their French and British predecessors in their insistence on formalizing 
local land practices.  By the end of 1790, St. Clair, with Sargent’s assistance, had ruled 
on the myriad claims presented him.  Now, in place of the plurality of sources of 
ownership that had previously governed village life, St. Clair aspired to substitute a 
single valid title—a patent, issued by an authorized representative of the national 
sovereign, with the promise of the clear and authoritative point of origin that St. Clair and 
Sargent had found so lacking. 
  
If the United States was more autocratic than Symmes believed, the French 
settlers proved both less acquiescent and better equipped to navigate the “free” 
institutions of their new government than he anticipated.  Rather than passively accepting 
St. Clair’s judgments, petitioners from the villages importuned Congress to allow claims 
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based on Indian purchases as well as on Todd’s grants.  The French foray into the early 
American culture of petitioning proved successful.  Likely anxious to secure the 
allegiance of the French villagers in a volatile borderland, Congress granted relief to 
many of the claimants St. Clair had denied.  Under a 1791 statute, both Indian purchases 
and Todd’s grants were allowed as long as the lands had been “actually improved.”  
Congress responded to further complaints from the villagers in another statute two years 
later, promising to pay for surveying at public expense.41 
 Yet the French settlers confronted another, less appealing facet of Anglo-
American governance when they faced interminable delays in securing their title.  The 
villages’ informal land system had had little call for the elaborate boundary-drawing that 
employed so many young Anglo-American men as surveyors: unlike Cincinnati or 
Marietta, where nearly every man of property had started as a surveyor, the Illinois 
Country had only one man “who could run a single line,” in St. Clair’s estimation.  When 
this single surveyor became ill, St. Clair struggled to find a replacement to mark out the 
new tracts.  Centralizing the authority to grant lands in the federal government also held 
matters up, as administrators debated the legal niceties of authority.  St. Clair had first 
flagged the question of whether he held the authority to issue patents early in 1792; in 
1794, U.S. Attorney General William Crawford was still discussing the question.  He 
concluded that the 1791 statute only implied, but did not specifically provide, that this 
authority should be held by the territorial governor; nor did the Constitution or the laws 
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authorize the President to fill this breach.  The residents would have to wait, the Attorney 
General concluded over Winthrop Sargent’s objections, for Congress to act.42  
This delay turned the forthcoming federal grants into yet another paper promise of 
land circulating freely and widely through the early republic, luring speculators.  Anglo-
Americans had arrived in the French villages early after the American Revolution, 
attracted by word of the French charters that promised solidity of title.  Now, with the 
promise of federal patents, the French lands became commodities, casting them into the 
churning sea of early American land speculation.  The French residents—many of whom 
were part of a trading culture that held that “Merchants ought to have nothing to do with 
lands,” others of whom had already moved across the Mississippi River into Spanish 
territory—largely cashed out, transferring the promise of their grants to a “few 
speculators.”  When territorial judge George Turner came to Vincennes in 1794, he 
reported that “[b]y far the greater part [of the French settlers], having neither patience 
nor, as they say, much confidence left in the promise of Government, have sold their 
rights for little or nothing,” reducing the poorer residents to living as tenants on their 
neighbors’ lands.  Supposedly a federal grant could be purchased for a rifle or a mediocre 
horse.  When Governor St. Clair at last returned to the Illinois and Wabash Countries the 
next year to rule on expanded land rights authorized by the 1791 statute, he found the 
claims had proliferated: both the “old rights and the Court Grants had become subjects of 
traffic, and scattered in different parts of the United States.”43  
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St. Clair’s return visit to the Illinois Country in 1796 was, in many respects, a 
repeat of his first.  Once again, he faced the challenge of adjudicating claims based on a 
vague standard, although in this case the source was not French but federal law.  
Congress’s 1791 law protected the rights of settlers who had constructed an “actual 
improvement”: this, St. Clair complained, “is not a very definite term.”  St. Clair 
delegated the task to Sargent, who, in 1797 and ’98, parceled out tracts of 400, 200, or 25 
acres, based on his assessment of a parcel’s state of improvement.  After Sargent left to 
serve as governor of the Mississippi Territory, St. Clair struggled to make sense of the 
notes he had left behind.  “[I]t is not easy to discover by what rule [Sargent’s grants] were 
governed,” he lamented.  “[T]he people are extremely dissatisfied.”44 
Patents to the lands finally began to be issued in 1799.  But, as with many land 
sagas, conflict and confusion over title in the Illinois and Wabash Countries dragged 
on—past the creation of a new and separate Indiana Territory with Vincennes as its 
capital, from the Illinois and Wabash Countries, and even past the admission of Indiana 
and Illinois as states.  Congress ultimately created a board of commissioners in 1804 to 
weigh unexamined claims anew, and 1812, established another board to reassess the 
validity of the grants made by St. Clair and Harrison.  These boards demonstrated that St. 
Clair’s promise of definitive ownership, resting on a clear chain of ownership, was 
illusory.  On the contrary, they spoke of St. Clair just as the governor had dismissed the 
land practices of Todd and others.  St. Clair had managed the “business” in a “loose 
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manner,” they lamented, relying on ill-defined “bundles of papers” to determine claims, 
and sometimes exceeded his authorization from Congress.  Throughout the entire 
process, they discovered copious evidence of fraud and self-dealing, in the form of 
perjured affidavits, faked transfers, and illegal interpolations in the entry books.  And 
they hinted that St. Clair had colluded in the process, confirming tens of thousands of 
acres in dubious grants obtained by his sons as well as St. Clair’s associate, the local 
magistrate John Edgar.  They did not wish to “impeach the character of any man,” the 
commissioners observed, but if the facts made it “appear that something has indeed been 
‘rotten in Denmark,’ we cannot help it.”  The stream of petitions and congressional 
interventions did not finally end until the 1830s.  In the end, many of St. Clair’s 
seemingly questionable grants stood, receiving confirmation through congressional 
statutes that simply confirmed titles that the commissioners had questioned but not 
rejected outright.45 
The commissioners cast their struggle in moralistic terms, describing themselves 
as wading through the “very mire and filth of corruption.”  Yet, as we have seen, St. Clair 
and Edgar were hardly alone in using official positions to pursue land speculation.  In the 
territories, the ability to tilt property confusion to personal advantage was less a character 
flaw than a requirement for office—quite literally, given how many territorial officials 
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owed their appointments to their prominence as landholders.  By personalizing the 
confusion and placing the blame on St. Clair’s self-dealing, the commissioners 
overlooked the deeper roots of what happened in Vincennes and the Illinois Country.  
Fraud and deceit were the consequence of the collision between informal village land 
systems with multiple, poorly documented sources of ownership, and the rapacious early 
American land market.  Congress exacerbated the problem when it granted a single 
official expansive discretion, and confusing instructions, to parse thousands of poorly 
documented claims that he barely understood.  Clarity of title, the federal government 
discovered, could not be so easily or so cheaply bought.46 
 
The struggles to address the title of the French settlers were a harbinger of things 
to come.  Even before Sargent had finished his work in the Illinois Country, he found 
himself replicating the process in Detroit, which passed to U.S. sovereignty in 1796.  
Once again, Sargent was shocked by how “extreme loose[ly]” the inhabitants had dealt 
with land, with “scarcely a single Deed made where a Boundary was expressed”; he once 
again set about attempting to create what he saw as order from perceived chaos. There 
were more Vincennes and Detroits down the line as the United States expanded.  Even as 
the federal land system envisioned tidily surveyed rectangular tracts marching across 
vacant land, the territory the United States sought to incorporate was seldom empty or 
unclaimed by Europeans, let alone Native peoples.  Recognizing and resolving these 
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claims consumed enormous amounts of federal time and resources over the nineteenth 
century.47 
The challenges presented by prior Native and European ownership were more 
similar than the sharp dichotomies drawn between Natives and Euroamericans then and 
now—between oral and written cultures, or between customary and formal law—would 
suggest.  In both Native and French villages, land practice reflected societies in which 
ownership was informal and localized, and where title relied on a hybrid of oral and 
written remembrance for proof.  The structure of early American land law similarly 
constrained the federal government to acknowledge the property law of both sets of prior 
claimants to the land, even if the recognition of Native law, unlike the formal 
incorporation of French law, was implicit and partial at best.  As a result, in both 
instances, often reluctant federal officials found themselves mired in the details of alien 
property regimes, as they sought to use incomplete and contradictory evidence to 
translate informal ownership practices into a system where official documents granting 
well-defined and unambiguous title circulated as commodities.   
The difference lay in the purpose, not the nature, of the assessment.  Federal 
officials sought to interpret Indians’ title in order to extinguish it; they sought to 
understand the French villagers’ title to confirm it, even if they regarded the French 
settlers as barely distinguishable from Natives.  Undoubtedly racial, this distinction also 
owed much to the contrast between the quasi-foreign status of Native nations and the 
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position of the French settlers, however unwilling, as newly minted “citizens” of the 
United States.    
Another parallel between Native and Euroamerican claims concerned the role of 
the federal government.  As with Native title, arbitrating property rights within the 
French villages both constrained and expanded federal authority.  Congress’s decision to 
task federal territorial officials with this job did not result from a thoughtful deliberation 
that the territorial governor was well equipped to wade into the villagers’ land problems; 
rather, urgent petitions from the French settlers forced the federal government to fulfill 
the abstract promises extracted by Virginia in its cession, and St. Clair and Sargent were 
already there.  But making these local land decisions a federal responsibility granted a de 
facto right of appeal to Congress and the executive branch.  As a result, though neither 
the President, his cabinet, nor Congress had expertise, nor likely much interest, in 
colonial French land practice, they confronted constant petitions and appeals to recognize 
settlers’ land claims.  In this manner, the settlers and claimants claimed an unlikely and 
outsized presence on the national agenda and forced the federal government to repeatedly 
intervene in their jejune land disputes. 
The claimants, of course, were pursuing their self-interest, not trying to bolster 
federal authority.  But the consequence of their actions was the considerable 
centralization of these small-bore disputes in the federal government.  Most title disputes 
in early America were settled in local courts, a precedent Virginia happily followed in the 
Illinois Country by devolving all authority to local judges and then entirely neglecting the 
region.  Title in Vincennes and elsewhere, by contrast, became a federal question 
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adjudicated by federal administrators.  The result, though largely unintended, was the 
creation of a precedent that questions of preexisting ownership claims by Euroamericans 
would be resolved, extrajudicially, by federal administrators.  These bodies would 
evaluate claims based on earlier property systems and laws and translate these 
preexisting, often inchoate rights into definitive, federally recognized land title.  As a 
result, Congress ensured that petitions and appeals from remote borderlands villages, 
burdened with the minutiae of local property disputes, would continue to flow eastward 
to Washington throughout the coming century. 
* * * 
Throughout the 1790s, the federal government found itself entangled with 
resolving earlier claims to land.  The settlers at Vincennes were only one of a number of 
groups who pressed their land rights on Congress, resulting in an ad hoc process of 
confirmation.  Since 1785, Congress had promised land to the Moravians, a German 
religious order whose settlements of converted Delawares along the Muskingum River, in 
the Northwest Territory, had been brutally attacked by Anglo-Americans during the 
Revolution.  Their lands were finally surveyed, and title confirmed, in 1797.  A territorial 
resident named Ebenezer Zane secured a bill confirming his land rights based on his 
development of a road, while his brother Isaac, long held captive among the Wyandots 
and subsequently a federal Indian interpreter, later won a similar confirmation based on 
an old Indian grant.  In the Southwest Territory, meanwhile, federal officials were 
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occupied with resolving conflicts between the lands sold by North Carolina and Native 
land rights as guaranteed under treaties.48        
All the while, even as it worked through these claims, Congress, as well as would-
be purchasers, anticipated the opening of a land office—the symbolic moment when, pre-
existing claims resolved, the remaining vacant land could be sold to individual 
purchasers.  Much of the West, John Cleves Symmes wrote at one point from near 
Cincinnati, was “running mad with expectations of the land office opening in this 
country.”  Debated since 1789, proposed in an influential report by Secretary of Treasury 
Alexander Hamilton the following year, the opening of this office was perennially 
expected, and perennially delayed.  Part of the delay reflected the fact that, in the wake of 
Jefferson’s 1791 report and the confusions surrounding the Ohio and Miami Companies, 
it was unclear which lands the federal government could in fact sell.  But most of the 
delay seemed to stem from the ongoing war against the Northwest Indian Confederacy.49   
Congress returned to the question of the land office only at the end of 1795, after 
the Treaty of Greenville.  “There never was a bill of greater importance than that before 
the House,” stated one representative at the outset of the debate, “[T]hat House were the 
fathers of the country.”  But Congress turned out to be full of bickering parents.  For over 
two weeks, debate over the land office was the “principal business” of the House of 
Representatives.  None of the contentions from four years earlier, when Congress had last 
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debated the land office, had been resolved.  Many still strongly advocated for the system 
of indiscriminate location; others, arguing that this made it “impossible . . . to make titles 
certain,” insisted on the rectangular survey.  The congressmen disagreed about the size of 
the lots sold, the amount of land to be sold, where sales should be held, whether sales 
should be through auction or land offices, which executive department should oversee the 
sales, and whether purchasers should be required to actually settle on the purchased lots.  
The weight of earlier precedent weighed heavily in their deliberations: James Madison 
remarked that he “was not surprised to hear different opinions on this question, according 
as members felt from the usages of the States to which they belonged.”  But there were 
now also new, federal precedents to draw from: several members cited the experiences of 
the Ohio and Miami Companies in their arguments, largely as cautionary tales.50  
Overlaying all these disputes was the broader question of which claimants the 
new land system should serve.  The committee that drafted the bill had been tasked 
primarily with crafting a system that would sell as much land as possible as quickly as 
possible to extinguish the national debt.  “It is immaterial to us who buys the lands so 
[long as] we get a good price for them,” John Stanwick, a Democratic-Republican from 
Philadelphia observed, voicing this perspective. “I think it worth while to employ the 
present moment of avidity to speculate in our lands, so as to clear off our Debts.”  But 
many members, particularly from western regions, were strongly opposed to a system 
that would privilege the wealthy.  Setting out to “destroy that hydra, speculation, which 
had done the country great harm,” they argued that it was possible to “raise money and 
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invite settlers” at the same time.  “Persons of property . . . can generally accommodate 
themselves,” John Williams, a representative from upstate New York insisted. “[W]e 
ought to accommodate the lower classes of the people.”  In fact, both goals seemed to 
secure broad agreement from the congressmen; where they disagreed was over means.  
Many insisted that small lots served the interests of smallholders as well as the United 
States: Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania, outspoken during the debate, argued that this 
approach “will give to the Government all the profits of the speculator. Government 
would be, in effect, its own speculator.”  Others, however, insisted that smallholders 
would never purchase even the small lots.  There were also strong disagreements over 
whether settlement requirements would advantage poor claimants or merely depress the 
price of lands.51  
The statute that these debates produced was, unsurprisingly, a compromise.  It 
provided that lands would be auctioned, at both Philadelphia and Pittsburg, at a minimum 
price of two dollars per acre.  The lot size, determined after much contention, was settled 
at a compromise of one section of 640 acres, or one square mile.  In the end, the 
rectangular survey prevailed and was written into the statute.52  
What was arguably most significant about the 1796 law, though, was its 
existence.  After long delay, Congress had at last enacted its first forward-looking land 
statute, envisioning a system that, in design, was the antithesis of the arbitrary and post-
hoc systems that had emerged to resolve prior Native and European claims.  The statute 
created a federal officer, the surveyor general, to oversee a team of surveyors who would 
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map out vacant lands into neatly demarcated square townships.  Meanwhile, in place of 
the vague directions given St. Clair and Sargent to adjudicate private claims, the 
Secretary of the Treasury created elaborate and detailed instructions on the rules to 
govern the land sales.  The hope, as with many of the territorial land schemes of the era, 
was to create security of title at the outset.  In this sense, the 1796 statute, rather than the 
1785 Ordinance, represented the true beginning of the later federal land office system.53 
Yet even this origin story is doubly misleading.  For one, the new statutory and 
administrative scheme relied on structures in the Territory created by previous land 
efforts.  The 1796 statute placed the responsibility of overseeing auctions in the hands of 
the ubiquitous Governor St. Clair.  Meanwhile, the newly created post of Surveyor 
General fell to Rufus Putnam just as he was wrapping up his responsibilities as director 
of the Ohio Company.  Putnam neatly transitioned from overseeing the Company’s 
surveyors to supervising the federal government’s—who were often the same people; 
others had worked for Symmes and the Miami Company.54 
For another, the statute’s actual operation proved a flop.  Congress, it turned out, 
knew very little about what was actually happening in the territories, an ignorance many 
representatives freely confessed. One observed that, even though he was on the 
committee that drafted the statute, he was “very imperfectly acquainted with the subject.”  
Representative Coit of Connecticut argued that the House should delay acting until a 
survey had been done, since “they were legislating on a subject upon which they had very 
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little information.”  But Coit was shouted down on the grounds that the “present” was the 
best time to sell, “when speculation was at so high a pitch.”  But the federal government 
actually had very little land ready to sell, much of which had already been available.  
Speculators proved more interested in the cheaper, and choicer, lands already available 
through land companies or the states.  Sales at the first public auction under the law, held 
in Pittsburgh in October 1796, were so disappointingly small that it was not repeated, and 
ended up as the only auction held under the 1796 statute.  For his part, Governor St. Clair, 
after complaining about the expense and inconvenience of the travel, further moaned 
about the auction itself. “[T]he whole business” remained in “a state of disorder,” St. 
Clair grumbled, the elaborate precautions of the Secretary of the Treasury 
notwithstanding.55 
In the end, it was not the hotly debated terms of sale that were the most 
consequential legacy of the 1796 statute, but the labor-intensive work of surveying.  
Putnam and his surveyors had to first survey the Treaty of Greenville boundary, and only 
then proceeded to mark the grid established under the law over much of present-day 
Ohio.  The pace was frenetic.  In 1798, Putnam oversaw the survey of over 3 million 
acres.  Putnam claimed he and his men worked longer hours than “any Public Office 
within my Knowledge.”  This system of prior survey consumed tremendous sums—over 
$25,000 in 1799 alone, nearly three times what the government annually paid Native 
nations of the Ohio Country for the same land.56   
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 The purpose of these expansive and expensive efforts was to avoid the challenges 
that had made earlier sources of title such an abundant source of confusion.  Yet this 
elaborate solution misdiagnosed much of the problem.  The challenge with the 
preexisting claims was only partly that they were vague and confusingly marked.  The 
more fundamental issue, as the federal government’s experience with Native and 
Euroamerican claims showed, was that acknowledging land rights rooted in the past, even 
the very recent past, commodified them.  Suddenly valuable, papers and certificates 
establishing these rights proliferated, their pedigree difficult to trace.  Federal officials 
struggled to distinguish legitimate from opportunistic or fraudulent claims, a task in 
which neat grids and elaborate rules helped little.  Rather, as in Vincennes or in 
Cumberland, claimants dragged reluctant officials into the mess of adjudication, forcing 
them to address the consequences of speculation. 
 This quickly became apparent even in the newly gridded public domain.  Thanks 
to federal efforts to resolve or “extinguish” Native, state, and private rights, title to this 
land now vested in the federal government—most of it had never been legally settled by 
Anglo-Americans—but even the public domain already had existing claims. The federal 
government had already promised enormous portions of the public land being surveyed in 
the Northwest Territory to satisfy the military bounties offered to Revolutionary War 
veterans.   
Like the states, the Continental Congress had recruited soldiers with promises of 
land at war’s end.  Recruits had been pledged parcels ranging from 100 acres for privates 
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and noncommissioned officers up to 1100 acres for a major general.  Just as with public 
land sales, satisfying these warrants was long delayed.  A handful were located on land 
set aside under the 1785 Ordinance.   In 1788, Congress created a system for redeeming 
the remaining bounties, but did not assign any lands.  Eight years later, when Congress 
created the system of public land sales, it also created a framework for at last satisfying 
the warrants.  A large part of the Northwest Territory was designated as the Military 
Tract, to be surveyed by the Surveyor General, from which lands would be apportioned.  
Those holding warrants were required to submit their claims to the Secretary of Treasury, 
and then, the Secretaries of the Treasury, War, and State would gather to hold a lottery to 
determine the order in which the confirmed warrants could select their lands.  With 
repeated extensions by Congress, this lottery was not held until February 1800.57 
Federal bounty land warrants suffered the predictable consequence of federal 
promises of land early made and long delayed.  They quickly became a speculative 
investment.  When Congress discussed the warrants, one representative said that the did 
not know a “single soldier” who still held one; another observed that they could be 
purchased in New York for a “mere trifle.”  Speculation in the warrants was particularly 
intense in the Northwest Territory, where residents marketed themselves as possessing 
superior knowledge about western lands.  Stationed in the Territory, U.S. Army Captain 
John Armstrong attempted to involve his eastern acquaintances in a scheme for 17,000 
choice acres of bounty lands that, he asserted, only he knew of, including secret 
information about coal and iron deposits; he was simultaneously involved in a separate 
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plan to engross 30,000 acres that included valuable salt springs.  One of Armstrong’s 
eastern correspondents took him up on these proposals, purchasing 5,000 acres in military 
warrants until “the soldiers have quit calling on me.”  Armstrong had an advantage here, 
too.  As an army captain, he had ready access to soldiers, many of whom were 
revolutionary veterans.  Armstrong set about buying up the bounty rights from the 
soldiers under his command for a little over 1 pound a piece.58 
 This freewheeling market in bounty land certificates presented a challenge for 
speculators and the War Department alike.  Congress felt obligated to regulate the bounty 
market at least minimally, but was permissive about the legal niceties required for a 
transfer.  Because many soldiers had sold their bounties “without any formal 
Conveyance,” it required that the Secretary of War honor either written conveyances or 
the presentation of soldiers’ discharges from the army, unless “fraud in Obtaining such 
discharge shall be proved.”59 
 These seemingly nominal requirements nonetheless often foiled speculators, who 
in their zeal for purchasing had ignored even basic formalities.  Captain Armstrong, for 
instance, found many of his claims rejected because he lacked discharges, because the 
conveyances had not been “registered and acknowledged before a magistrate,” because 
the land had already been claimed, or because the soldiers were ineligible.  Another 
speculator found that 1400 acres of his 2600-acre claim were rejected—some 
conveyances lacked the proper power of attorney; others lacked a year or date; others, as 
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in Armstrong’s case, had already been claimed.  John Cleves Symmes’s associate 
Jonathan Dayton complained that the military rights Symmes had purchased caused him 
“an inconceivable amount of trouble”; despite over twenty visits to the War Office, he 
had still not received his land warrants.60 
 At the same time, these minimal bureaucratic precautions seemed to do little to 
halt actual fraud and abuse, complaints of which overwhelmed the War and Treasury 
Departments.  As under the state law system, disgruntled soldiers and claimants sought to 
file caveats that would prevent land entries from being issued.  Many alleged that the 
purported conveyances were fraudulent.  A man named Henry Hill noted that the 
conveyance of his claim was supposedly executed in New York, where he had never 
been.  Judah Alden alleged that “two swindlers” on State Street in Boston had taken his 
warrants.  Others claimed that they had lost or misplaced their warrants, including the 
executor to the estate of Baron von Steuben, the prominent general who had helped train 
the Continental Army at Valley Forge.61 
Federal administrators were conflicted on how to address these contentions.  
Secretary of War James McHenry was unwilling to allow “[e]very devise of dishonest 
cunning,” as he described these frauds and misrepresentations, to defeat the “hard earned 
dues of Offices and Soldiers.”  He attempted to forestall the proliferation of forgeries by 
distributing a printed broadside requiring that all magistrates must swear that the 
transferer was personally known to them before registering either deeds or powers of 
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attorney conveying bounty rights.  Furthermore, the magistrates would need to provide 
the War Department evidence that they were, in fact, Justices of the Peace.    And, 
lacking any “other guard for individual rights to military lands,” McHenry enjoined 
“strictness and caution . . . at the War Office,” requiring that his clerks closely scrutinize 
all the warrants presented.62   
Nonetheless, McHenry lamented, even such careful examination “must often be 
ineffectual,” due to “the great diversity of the Arts practiced to deceive.”  He urged 
Congress to adopt a more comprehensive administrative solution.  He noted that the 1796 
statute provided no relief, although the customary practice before his arrival, without any 
statutory authorization, was to permit claimants to file caveats.  Going forward, McHenry 
advocated an administrative proceeding similar to that used in Pennsylvania, where the 
Board of Property had adjudicated disputed rights to land.63 
Though he likely did not realize it, McHenry’s proposal echoed earlier calls for 
some sort of federal administrative tribunal to adjudicate disputed land rights.  In his 
1790 report proposing the creation of a public land office, Alexander Hamilton had urged 
that the land office commissioners should be empowered to “determine[]” the 
“controversies concerning rights to patents or grants of land” that arose in their district.  
A year later, Thomas Jefferson observed that he, too, had argued for “the establishment 
of a proper judicature for deciding speedily all land controversies between the public and 
individuals,” but that Congress had not acted.64   
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McHenry’s similar plan envisioned that appointed federal officials would hear 
evidence on the land warrants and rule on their validity.  For him, the important benefit of 
this approach was that it would not require defrauded claimants to file suit, where they 
would bear the burden of proof.  Rather, because the “rights appears [sic] to strongly to 
center” in the original holders, they should “stand upon the footing of Defendants,” with 
the burden of proof “on the other party to make out his own rights (as is understood to be 
legal principle) compleat.”65   
McHenry’s proposed administrative adjudication contrasted with the approach 
advocated by Oliver Wolcott, who as Secretary of Treasury was responsible for 
administering the actual distribution of lands (as opposed to the registering of bounty 
rights).  Wolcott concluded that the 1796 statute granted “no power to investigate or 
decide on the titles of the holder of military land Warrants.”  Exhausted by the constant 
filing of caveats, he directed the recorder of deeds to inform the claimants that “the merits 
of their claims can only be determined at Law”—that is, through the courts.  This 
approach reflected both a statutory textualism as well as a grounding in the practice of 
most states, where disputes were referred to courts rather than being adjudicated by the 
executive.  Wolcott adopted a similar approach for disputes that arose through the Land 
Office.66  
On paper, Congress sided with Wolcott, if only through inaction.  A committee 
was appointed to “inquire into the expediency or inexpediency of passing a law to 
                                                                                                                                            
lands, discussed at the outset of Chapter 1.  He was likely referring to his statement that a “local judge will doubtless be provided” to 
decide these disputes.  “Report on Public Lands,” November 8, 1791, in PTJ:MS, 22:274, 283-84. 
65 McHenry to [Congress], April 15, 1800. 
66 Ibid.; Oliver Wolcott, Secretary of Treasury, to Joseph Nourse, Registrar of the Treasury, January 9, 1800, Letters Received by the 
Secretary of the Treasury, 1796-1851. On the role of courts in resolving disputes that arose in the land office, see Secretary of the 
Treasury to Thomas Worthington, June 10, 1801, in TP: Vol. III, 139-44; Secretary of the Treasury to Judge of Court of Common 
Pleas of Ross County, August 7, 1802, in TP: Vol. III, 240-42. 
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regulate the manner of entering caveats to prevent the issuing of patents for land granted 
for military services,” but its report does not seem to have survived; at any rate, no 
legislation passed, and Congress later rejected a petition from claimants arguing that their 
lands had been fraudulently obtained, urging them to obtain “full and complete relief” 
from a “court of competent jurisdiction.”  Yet the War Department continued to assess 
the validity of land warrants: in the decades following 1800, it rejected nearly four claims 
for every warrant that it issued.  And in some respects, Congress itself fulfilled the role 
McHenry urged, albeit in ad hoc fashion.  It constantly extended the deadline for filing, 
and, even while paying lip service to opposing legislative resolution of individual claims, 
it passed statutes authorizing relief for individuals who had lost their bounty rights.  After 
the War of 1812, it attempted to preemptively forestall the recurrence of the problem by 
barring the transfer or sale of bounty rights; only soldiers themselves could claim them, 
though they could then sell the land warrants.  This prohibition failed, and the land office 
found itself once again confronting caveats filed by disgruntled claimants; the new 
Secretary of War ended up making policy by banning filings from attorneys altogether.  
In short, however much Congress and the executive wished to avoid getting dragged into 
determinations on individual claims, it proved difficult for the federal government to 
avoid making quasi-judicial decisions to afford claimants relief.67 
The federal government’s experience with the military bounty lands underscores 
that the earlier (and ongoing) struggles over Native and French title represented more 
than the resolution of prior claims necessary before the federal government could itself 
                                                
67 10 Annals of Cong. 519, 625; “Military Bounty Land Warrants Fraudulently Obtained,” Feb. 27, 1809, in ASP:PL, 827.  For the 
number of warrants issued versus claims rejected, see Hutchinson, Bounty Lands, 151. 
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divide and alienate the public domain.  Rather, even as the federal government sought to 
parcel out lands over which it claimed ownership, it continued a pattern in which federal 
administrators, or even Congress itself, passed judgment on the validity of individual 
titles.  Judicial involvement, when it occurred, came much later, and usually granted 
considerable weight to earlier federal pronouncements.   
As this process suggests, it was not vague boundaries or multiple sources of 
ownership alone that forced the federal government to wade into the morass of 
conflicting property rights.  Even when the federal government itself created the terms of 
ownership, disputes arose that required federal intervention, in large part because of the 
paper promises that floated freely through the early republic and made exploiting the land 
system too tempting to forego.  Federal administrators’ incessant despair over fraud and 
confusion—whether in Native, French, or veterans’ claims—was the result.  As these 
complaints demonstrate, officials were rarely anxious to adopt this role: some, like 
Wolcott, attempted to avoid it altogether, while others, like McHenry, saw it as part of a 
national commitment to the veterans.  But like earlier adjudications, the pressure to 
arbitrate these questions came from claimants themselves, who demanded resolution 
from the federal apparatus.   
Like the settlers in Vincennes, bounty rights holders were merely following the 
chain of authority.  But this process also oriented claimants toward Philadelphia, and 
later, Washington.  The most influential speculators became those who, like Captain 
Armstrong, had some sort of privileged access to federal power.  Others from the 
territories served as intermediaries, gathering claims to make the journey to the capital, 
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where they could press their case in person.  Those who could not travel wrote letters and 
sent petitions to Congress instead.  This process, of course, favored the wealthy and well-
connected over smallholders.  But it also meant that, for citizens scattered throughout the 
United States, their prospect of landed wealth rested on the determinations of the federal 
government.  Their fates rested with a distant bureaucratic office, in which beleaguered 
clerks hoped their close scrutiny could thwart the “dishonest cunning” that seemed to 
infect all early American markets in land.     
* * * 
  As they delved into local property disputes throughout the U.S. territories, federal 
officials felt, perhaps, a sense of déjà vu.  Despite dramatically different contexts, these 
officials were called on repeatedly to assess the validity of property claims, often under 
unfamiliar legal orders, and translate them into definitive federal title. 
 Unlike the land systems that preceded or followed it, this adjudicatory role of the 
federal government was not planned in any meaningful way.  It happened because Anglo-
American law made the federal government sovereign over the territories, with the 
consequence that the constant property disputes that resulted from the proliferation of 
title in territories became a federal responsibility.  Natives, French settlers, and military 
veterans all pressed their demands for the government to honor their property rights, 
rooted in ambiguous title histories, and federal officials sought to determine which claims 
were legitimate.  In the process, they distilled the complicated and plural sources of 
ownership in the territories into a single document, a federal title that issued—
eventually—under federal authority. 
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 In the long run, the rise of federal title was not a boon for most individual 
claimants.  Precisely because federal land grants were legible and purportedly 
authoritative, federal guarantees turned out, in practice, to undermine the smallholders’ 
security of title.  Natives, French settlers, military bounty holders—all were swept into 
the voracious maw of the early American land market, which alienated their federally 
recognized ownership rights through transactions sometimes coerced, and always marked 
by dramatically unequal bargaining positions.  This result occurred not because the 
claimants were naïve, but because they confronted constrained choices, of which federal 
protection seemed the least bad option.  Ironically, the real winner in this struggle was the 
federal government.  This was not just because land was a valuable asset, but because 
throughout early America land ownership was a tremendous source of power.  Just as the 
federal government discovered that sovereignty reinforced ownership, title, it turned out, 
became a potent source for exercising sovereignty in practice. 
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Chapter 4: Federal Sovereignty 
Soon after Washington’s inauguration, Secretary of War Henry Knox drafted a 
series of highly influential reports urging the transformation of federal policy toward 
Native nations.  In one of them, Knox’s the Secretary observed that, when the federal 
government gained control over the territories, it had gained authority over a world of 
violence and casual brutality.  “For some years past,” Knox informed Washington, both 
Natives and non-Natives in the borderlands had “exercis[ed] indiscriminate hostilities on 
each other.”  At that point, it would be futile to “ascertain the original aggressors”; the 
only clear fact was that the “the innocent on both sides suffer more frequently than the 
guilty.”  Knox argued against the view that this violence between Natives and U.S. 
citizens was the natural and inevitable state of the borderlands.  He believed that the 
federal government could “remedy” these evils—but only if “the administration of indian 
affairs” were “conducted by fixed principles established by Law, and which being 
published should be rigidly enforced.”1 
Knox’s report epitomized the Washington Administration’s vision for remaking 
Indian affairs, one that, to paraphrase Lisa Ford, might be called “federal sovereignty.”  
But the federal sovereignty of 1790s was very different from the settler sovereignty that 
Ford describes emerging in the Georgia borderlands in the 1820s and 1830s. Federal 
sovereignty was not primarily focused on the extension of territorial sovereignty, nor was 
it directed solely against Native peoples.  Rather, at the core of Knox’s plan was the 
concept, familiar to historians of early federal law more broadly, that the federal 
government alone could serve as a neutral arbiter in the seemingly intractable and violent 
                                                
1 “Henry Knox’s Notes on the State of the Frontier, January 1790,” January 1790, in GWP:PS, 5:76-81. 
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disputes between Natives and non-Natives.  Knox believed firmly in the majesty of a 
supreme and impartial law, forcefully applied against both Natives and citizens of the 
United States who violated it.  The federal government, Knox wrote, “must keep both 
[Indians and whites] in awe by a strong hand, and compel them to be moderate and just.”2     
These views formed the basis for the Trade and Intercourse Acts, a series of laws, 
enacted and expanded several times over the course of the 1790s, that robustly asserted 
federal criminal and regulatory jurisdiction over the borderlands. These laws applied 
anywhere in the United States that Native territory—what the statute labeled “Indian 
country”—existed, but they had particular importance in federal territories, which was 
where most Indian country, and most Indians within the United States, were.  The statutes 
sought to preempt borderland violence in two ways.  First, the federal government would 
create, police, and regulate well-delineated physical boundaries between Natives and U.S. 
citizens.  Second, the federal government would assume jurisdiction over cross-cultural 
crime, vigorously punishing both Native and white offenders.3   
As an effort to prevent violence and crime, the Acts, and federal sovereignty more 
generally, failed.  Such boundaries as there were remained permeable, and federal efforts 
to hold Natives and whites legally accountable for their crimes rarely succeeded.  In 
explaining this failure, federal officials constantly wrung their hands at federal 
powerlessness, as they found themselves unable to compel either Natives or their own 
citizens to obey the law.  Scholars have since expanded and refined this contemporaneous 
                                                
2 Report of the Secretary at War to Congress, July 10, 1787, in TP:Vol. II, 31-35. 
3 Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329; Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469; Act of 
Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743; Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139.  In his detailed study of the Trade and Intercourse Acts, 
Father Paul Prucha relied almost entirely on territorial sources, especially the printed territorial papers.  Francis Paul Prucha, American 
Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1780-1834 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1962).  Nonetheless, significant portions of Indian country also existed in New York and Georgia, particularly in Georgia’s 
unceded western lands, though these would later become part of the Mississippi Territory. 
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complaint.  One line of scholarship, drawing on work on the rise of sharp racial 
boundaries between “red” and “white” people in the late eighteenth century, has 
emphasized the dominance of a “language of exterminatory anti-Indianism,” in the words 
of Peter Silver, that undermined official efforts to secure justice for Native peoples.  Lisa 
Ford’s work, by contrast, demonstrates how governments’ necessary reliance on both 
Native diplomacy and localism entrenched long-standing customary practices of 
reciprocity, retaliation, and justifiable violence shared by both Natives and white settlers.4 
These works powerfully and compellingly elucidate many of the dynamics in the 
borderlands, but their focus risks obscuring the institutional factors that allowed popular 
practices and narratives to prevail.  In embracing the triumph of custom over formal law, 
they fail to consider the limitations of federal officials’ own vision.  In particular, Knox, 
as well as others in the Washington Administration and in territorial government, had 
little sense of law’s limits.  Many of them were military men, and so embraced an 
extreme positivist model of law as command and coercion.  But as a descriptive matter, 
this was a poor understanding of early American law, in which courts and other legal 
institutions were arenas for contest far more than they were institutions for enacting the 
sovereign will.  Knox and others failed to appreciate how the formal limits within federal 
                                                
4 An older view on the failure of the Trade and Intercourse Acts, which reflects the complaints of federal officials, appears in Prucha, 
American Indian Policy, 189-210.  For an overview of the large and growing literature on the rise of conceptions of Natives and non-
Natives as separate “races” in the late eighteenth century, see Joshua Piker, “Indians and Race in Early America: A Review Essay,” 
History Compass 3, no. 1 (2005): 1–17; David J. Silverman, Red Brethren: The Brothertown and Stockbridge Indians and the 
Problem of Race in Early America, First (Cornell University Press, 2010); Daniel K Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A 
Native History of Early America (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001), 190-236; Nancy Shoemaker, “How Indians Got 
to Be Red,” The American Historical Review 102, no. 3 (June 1997): 625–44..  For works that emphasize the role of racial hostility in 
forestalling the punishment of crimes against Natives, see Patrick Griffin, American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary 
Frontier (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 198–208; Peter Rhoads Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed 
Early America (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008), 127–60. 
Lisa Ford’s study focuses on Georgia during this period, although the history she traces is entangled with the Southwest Territory and 
Tennessee.  Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788-1836 (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010).  Kathleen Duval similarly emphasizes the role of other sources of law—in her case, Osage 
law—in limiting the reach of federal jurisdiction.  Kathleen DuVal, “Cross-Cultural Crime and Osage Justice in the Western 
Mississippi Valley, 1700-1826,” Ethnohistory 54, no. 4 (October 1, 2007): 697–722. 
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law, including the explicit acknowledgment of other jurisdictions, the conflict of laws, 
and local autonomy, worked to cabin federal power. 
The net effect of the Trade and Intercourse Acts, then, was not to end centuries of 
violence and discord; it was to channel these fierce contentions over Indian affairs into 
legal language and legal forums.  But it would be a mistake to regard this outcome as a 
simple story of failure.  Those resisting the federal government—to some extent Natives, 
but even more territorial citizens—came to rely on the tools of federal law to craft their 
argument, which, paradoxically, worked to legitimate and enhance federal authority.  In 
this sense, the early effort to establish federal sovereignty created the parameters of legal 
debates over Indian affairs for the century that followed. 
* * * 
To the untutored eye, frontier violence seemed to stem from lawlessness.  But 
although federal officials sometimes slipped into this language, they generally thought 
they knew better. The problem was not law’s absence, but that the wrong kind of law 
dominated the frontier.  They dubbed this law “the Savage principle of retaliation,” 
described elsewhere as the “Indian Construction and Operation of the Law of Blood for 
Blood.”5     
As Anglo-Americans understood it, retaliation was the foundation of the Native 
legal order.  When applied to murder, Native law required that deaths be avenged by 
killing those from the same clan, nation, or ethnic group as the killers, even if those so 
                                                
5 William Blount and Andrew Pickens to Secretary of War, August 6, 1793, in TP: Vol. IV, 296; Edward Telfair to Henry Knox, 
December 5, 1792, Reel 2: The Territory Southwest of the River Ohio, Senate Territorial Papers (microfilm), M200, U.S. National 
Archives.   I refer to crime between Natives and non-Natives as “cross-cultural” for lack of a better term.  “Interracial” adopts too 
readily the racial frame that I argue elsewhere in the paper was often problematic for understanding crimes between Natives and non-
Natives; and “cross-national,” while perhaps more accurate for how many federal officials and Natives interpreted these incidents, is 
too distant from current usage.  “Cross-cultural,” though imperfect, has the benefit of capturing the blurry boundaries between Native 
identity as both race and nationality during this period. 
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executed bore no personal responsibility.  This form of collective guilt based on ethnic 
and national affiliations was termed “taking satisfaction.” Anglo-Americans believed that 
the commitment to this principle was deeply rooted in Native character and law. “The 
passion for revenge implanted in the earliest infancy of a Savage mind, and cherished by 
the force of habit,” Henry Knox reported, “is almost uncontroulable.”  Knox may have 
derived this understanding from William Blount, governor of the Southwest Territory, 
who took great pains to explain Cherokee legal principles to Knox.  Blount attributed 
retaliation to the Cherokees’ “Clanish Law,” which required that “each clan shall protect 
and take satisfaction for all injuries offered to person of each individual of it.”  To bolster 
this argument, Blount recounted a story of how the Cherokee leader Bloody Fellow had 
executed another Cherokee who had turned over Bloody Fellow’s brother to the British 
for killing a white man.6 
In casting retaliation as a Native legal principle, federal officials sought to 
differentiate it from Anglo-American law, in which the society at large adjudicated the 
guilt and innocence of individuals, not groups. “[W]hatever friend, Father, brother, or any 
other relation are lost in War, revenge is never sought for by the Whites,” army officer 
Henry Burbeck told gathered Anishinaabe at Michilimackinac.  “[T]hey are buried with 
the Hatchet.”  Henry Knox conveyed similar information to the Cherokee leader Hanging 
                                                
6 Henry Knox to Edward Telfair, March 14, 1791, NWTC; William Blount to Secretary of War, November 8, 1792, in TP: Vol. IV, 
208-16.  Scholars of Cherokee law echoed Blount’s emphasis on retaliation.  John Phillip Reid, A Law of Blood; the Primitive Law of 
the Cherokee Nation (New York: New York University Press, 1970); Rennard Strickland, Fire and the Spirits: Cherokee Law from 
Clan to Court (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1975). 
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Maw.  “We do not permit an individual who has been wronged to be his own avenger,” 
he wrote.  “This is never allowed among the whites, when the society is well regulated.”7 
But even as he mouthed these pieties to Native leaders, Henry Knox well knew 
that Anglo-American society in the territories was far from “well regulated,” at least as 
Knox envisioned it.  On the contrary, territorial citizens explicitly adopted both the legal 
logic and the very language of their Native neighbors, based largely on the insistence that 
this was the appropriate body of law to govern cross-cultural conflicts. “Let the laws of 
retaliation be enforced,” one inhabitant of the Southwest Territory insisted in response to 
Cherokee and Creek attacks.  William Blount had frequently informed Henry Knox that 
Anglo-American relatives of those killed by Natives in the Southwest Territory 
“thirst[ed] for revenge, or, what is here termed, satisfaction.” Like the Native satisfaction 
it aped, Anglo-American retaliation was indiscriminate, based on collective, not 
individual, responsibility: those whose relatives died at Native hands sought to “fall[] on 
the Indians and tak[e] satisfaction, without regard to age or sex.”  White residents north 
of the Ohio felt similarly.  As Arthur St. Clair complained to President Washington, “they 
are in the habits of retaliation perhaps, without attending precisely to the nations from 
which the injuries are received.”8 
But, although retaliation had deep roots in both Native and American legal 
thought in the borderlands, by the 1780s and ‘90s it was the subject of vigorous challenge 
by both Native and American leaders.  The critique was twofold.  The first was it was 
                                                
7 Henry Burbeck, “Speeches to Indians,” August 1797, Ayer 121, Newberry Library; “Message from the Secretary of War to the 
Hanging Maw, Sent by Governor Blount,” August 27, 1793, in ASP:IA, 431. 
8 William Cocke, “For the Gazette,” Knoxville Gazette, December 29, 1792; Blount to Secretary of War, November 8, 1792; “The 
Address of Governor Blount to the Chiefs and Others of the Cherokees…,” May 23, 1792, in ASP:IA, 268-69; Gov. Arthur St. Clair to 
President, September 14, 1789, in TP: Vol. II, 216-17.  Ford draws attention to this shared culture of retaliation, though she gives 
shorter shrift to the critiques that emerged in the late eighteenth century.  Ford, Settler Sovereignty, 35-42, 85-97. 
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indiscriminate, entirely disconnected from personal responsibility.  “Let men die for their 
own crimes, when they commit such as are worthy of death,” the prominent Virginian 
Arthur Campbell urged the Cherokee leader Hanging Maw in a letter reprinted in the 
Knoxville Gazette.  John Sevier, former governor of “Franklin” and the first governor of 
Tennessee, proclaimed that he held “the principle of retaliation . . . in the utmost 
detestation”; he sought “not the blood of the innocent, but that of the guilty.”  Some 
Native leaders reportedly espoused the same view.  The Chickasaw John Morris, on his 
deathbed after being shot by an anonymous white settler, urged that punishment be meted 
out only to the guilty.  In another story, relayed by federal Indian agent Silas Dinsmoor to 
his children, a group of Cherokees plotted to kill Dinsmoor in revenge for the senseless 
murder of an old Cherokee man by two white hunters; the Cherokees demanded “pay, 
and good pay” for the murder.  Discovering the plot, the Cherokee leader Bloody Knife 
berated the conspirators: “[S]uppose a mad dog should bite one of your children, would 
you kill all the dogs?”  In Dinsmoor’s telling, the “logic was convincing and [the 
Cherokees] left, looking very sheepish.”9 
But there was a second critique that was even more pressing for Anglo-American 
leaders, whose primary goal was to preserve a lasting peace.  They lamented that 
retaliation’s demand that no death go unavenged required an endless and self-
perpetuating cycle of violence.  “[A]s the thirst of war is the dearest inheritance an Indian 
                                                
9 “Copy of a Letter from Colonel Arthur Campbell to Captain John Watts,” Knoxville Gazette, January 28, 1792; John Sevier to 
Benjamin Hawkins and Andrew Pickens, April 19, 1797, in Samuel Cole Williams, ed., “Executive Journal of Gov. John Sevier,” Pts. 
1-7, East Tennessee Historical Society’s Publications 1 (1929): 95-153, 2 (1930): 135-149, 3 (1931) 154-82, 4 (1932) 138-67, 5 
(1933) 155-77, 6 (1934) 104-28, 7 (1935) 128-164 [hereinafter “Executive Journal of Gov. John Sevier”], pp. 149-51; “Knoxville, 
Saturday, June 1,” Knoxville Gazette, June 1, 1793; “Genealogies: Col. Silas Dinsmoor” n.d., Dinsmoor Alumni File, Rauner Special 
Collections, Dartmouth College. In a letter to William Blount, Hanging Maw, seemingly taking up Arthur Campbell’s urging, 
promised not to revenge the recent murder of a relative at the hands of Anglo-Americans.  “[I]t is forgotten,” he wrote, “the death of 
my relation is to me as if he had died a natural death.”  “Knoxville, Thursday, June 5,” Knoxville Gazette, June 5, 1794. 
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receives from his parents, and vengeance that of the Kentuckians,” Major Hamtramck 
wrote to Arthur St. Clair, referring to white settlers who proved most troublesome to 
federal authorities in the Northwest Territory, “hostility must then be the result on both 
sides.”  The result was that relations between Anglo-American settlers and Natives were 
perhaps irrevocably poisoned.  “An immortal hatred subsists in the breast of one against 
the other,” one frontier inhabitant reported.  Whenever “a backwoods man meets an 
Indian he will kill or be killed, being possessed by this fury, no distinction of friendly or 
unfriendly Indians will be made.”  The result was that all Indians would very quickly 
become unfriendly, and “every Nation will join against us.”10  
The costs of retaliation were especially troubling to Secretary of War Henry 
Knox.  Under the doctrine of retaliation, “the slightest offence occasions death—revenge 
occasions.”  The result would be a “merciless war” which destroyed “the innocent and 
helpless with the guilty.”  He specifically castigated the frontier settlers for “exercise[ing] 
indiscriminate revenge against all persons bearing the name of indians, under the 
specious pretext of retaliation.”11 
Native leaders, too, were increasingly moving to abandon retaliation for the sake 
of peace.  When two Cherokees were killed stealing horses in 1795, federal Indian agent 
Silas Dinsmore reported that the tribe’s “headmen,” who were “firmly disposed for 
peace,” had convinced the victims’ relations to “not take satisfaction.”  By the late 1790s, 
both the Creek and Cherokee councils had voted to abolish aspects of retaliation; in 1797, 
Dinsmore’s superior, Indian agent Benjamin Hawkins, reported that the Creeks had 
                                                
10 John Francis Hamtramck to Gov. Arthur St. Clair, December 2, 1790, in SCP, 197-98; W. North to Unknown, August 7, 1786, 
NWTC. 
11 “Report of the Secretary at War to Congress,” July 10, 1787, in TP: Vol. II, 31-35. 
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publicly executed six men, including one white man, for murder, which he stated “gives a 
hope that the right of revenge might be transfered from private hands to a public 
jurisdiction.”  Though Creek and Cherokee leaders were responding to pressure from 
federal representatives, they were also trying to remake their societies to abandon a legal 
principle that proved so costly.12  
Like the Creeks and Cherokees, Knox was also attempting to shift legal authority 
to a “public jurisdiction.”  He particularly emphasized the need for some impartial arbiter 
to resolve disputes.  “There can be neither Justice or observance of treaties,” Knox wrote, 
“where every man claims to be the sole Judge in his own cause, and the avenger of his 
own supposed wrongs.”  In both federal Indian treaties and the Trade and Intercourse 
Acts, drafted largely by Knox and enacted first in 1790, Knox advocated a new law to 
govern cross-cultural relations—federal law—and a new judge—the federal 
government.13 
As described earlier, the Acts codified three distinct legal principles that Knox 
and other federal officials believed would secure cross-cultural peace.  The first was 
physical separation.  “[D]eep rooted prejudices,” Knox argued, held both “by the Whites 
and Savages,” would “ever prevent their being good neighbours.”  Other federal officials 
echoed this view: William Blount argued that the United States should prevent Natives 
and whites from “a too frequent promiscuous Intercourse with each other.”  Some way to 
                                                
12 Silas Dinsmore to David Henley, July 8, 1795, Folder 3, Silas Disnmore Papers, Ayer MS 241, Newberry Library; Benjamin 
Hawkins to James McHenry, March 1, 1797, in C. L Grant, ed., Letters, Journals, and Writings of Benjamin Hawkins (Savannah, Ga.: 
Beehive Press, 1980). 1:85-87.  For discussions of the Cherokee and Creek modifications of retaliation, see William Gerald 
McLoughlin, Cherokee Renascence in the New Republic (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1986), 43–46; Strickland, Fire 
and the Spirits, 57-72.  
13 “Henry Knox’s Notes on the State of the Frontier,” January 1790.  The Trade and Intercourse Act was reenacted, with expansions, 
in 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802, and then finally in 1834.  Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329; 
Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469; Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743. 
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sharply divide Natives and whites was necessary.  President Washington and members of 
Congress spoke wishfully of a “Chinese wall” to divide the two groups.  Blount, for his 
part, was besotted with the idea of a river, rather than an easily transgressed “immaginary 
line,” keeping Natives and whites apart.14 
The Trade and Intercourse Act adopted more pragmatic approach.  It drew a sharp 
legal boundary between “the Indian country,” a phrase the statute used to describe the 
territory under Native jurisdiction and ownership, and what was sometimes called the 
“ordinary jurisdiction” of the states and territories.  From 1796 on, this boundary was 
written into the text of the statute itself.  Crossing the boundary was increasingly 
regulated.  At first, the Acts focused on requiring licenses and bonds from Indian traders, 
the most frequent non-Natives within Indian country.  But subsequent versions expanded 
to require that any person who travelled into Indian country, at least south of the Ohio, 
would have to obtain a passport.  Crossing into Indian country to hunt, settle, or survey 
Native lands were all criminalized, prohibitions enforceable by the federal military.  
Though shy of a wall, Henry Knox did set about creating a “chain of [federal] posts” to 
regulate the border.15 
The second was federal jurisdiction over cross-cultural conflicts. “The right that 
each party assumes of being judges and prompt executioners in their own cause prevents 
all effectual interference,” Knox observed, “excepting by a legal coercive power, which 
shall make the necessary sacrifices to Justice, let them belong to which side they may.” 
                                                
14 Ibid.; William Blount to James White, December 14, 1795, in TP: Vol. IV, 411-14; 4 Annals of Cong. 775-76; George Washington 
to Secretary of State, July 1, 1796, , in The Writings of George Washington, ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford (New York; London: 
G.P. Putnam’ Sons, 1889), 13:112. 
15 Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329; Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469; Act of 
Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743. 
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Justice, impartially administered by the federal government, was a leitmotif for Knox; he 
insisted that both Natives and whites be judged and held accountable by the national 
government.16 
At first blush, the Trade and Intercourse Acts seem a patchy and tepid expression 
of Knox’s view. They asserted authority only over crimes committed by U.S. citizens 
against Natives, and only within “Indian territory.”  They did not displace Native 
jurisdiction over Indian country or claim jurisdiction over Natives.  From this 
perspective, the Acts were, as Lisa Ford rightly notes, examples of legal pluralism, 
suggestive of how jurisdiction could quickly collapse into diplomacy, in which law 
enforcement required negotiations among sovereigns.17 
But the Acts did not exist in isolation.  Territory outside Indian country was 
already under federal sovereignty: “[A]ll the laws of Congress,” Attorney General 
William Bradford wrote, “are, in their operation coextensive with the Territory of the 
United States, and obligatory upon every person therein, except independent Nations & 
Tribes of Indians residing on Indian lands.”  If a crime by or against Natives were 
committed outside Indian lands, it would already fall within either state or, even more 
likely, territorial jurisdiction.  Extending federal jurisdiction over U.S. citizens within 
Indian country thus closed a jurisdictional gap.  It was also a bold assertion of federal 
sovereignty, though this is less apparent in hindsight, given that the Trade and Intercourse 
Acts presaged further, more aggressive assertions of federal jurisdiction over Indian 
lands.  But in the late eighteenth century, when most of the Anglo-American political 
                                                
16 “Report of the Secretary at War to Congress,” July 10, 1787; Henry Knox to George Washington, July 7, 1789, in PGW:PS, 3:134-
40.   
17 Ford, Settler Sovereignty, 32-46. 
  258 
elite still regarded tribes as “nation[s] of independent government,” exercising U.S. 
jurisdiction within Indian country, even over U.S. citizens, was a power grab, not a show 
of restraint; the United States was intruding into territory controlled by a quasi-foreign 
sovereign.18 
As for Native people, treaties of the era all contained jurisdictional provisions 
requiring that signatory Native nations “deliver up” Indians who committed murder or 
robbery against a U.S. citizen, “to be punished according to the laws of the United 
States.”  Knox made clear that his vision of federal supremacy embraced both Natives 
and white settlers: Indians as well as U.S. citizens, he argued, had to be shown “the 
absolute necessity of submitting to the justice and mercy of the United States.”19     
Viewed in this frame, the Acts represented a muscular assertion of federal 
criminal jurisdiction with few parallels in the early republic.  Not only did they create a 
category of crimes punishable by fines, imprisonment, or even death, but they also 
provided that offenders could be tried in federal courts anywhere in the United States.  
And, if a U.S. citizen committed a crime in Indian country prohibited by the act, he or she 
could be arrested under military authority anywhere in the United States, even within 
state borders.  Given these provisions, the statutes were read at the time as aggressive, 
and controversial, projection of federal power.  Erstwhile Franklin governor John Sevier 
                                                
18 Attorney General to Secretary of the Treasury, June 9, 1795, in TP: Vol. II, 520-21; Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael and 
William Short, June 30, 1793, in PTJ:MS, 26:405-17. 
19 Treaty of Fort Harmar, U.S.-Wyandots et al., January 9, 1789, 7 Stat. 33; Treaty of Peace and Friendship, U.S.-Creeks, Aug. 7, 
1790, 7 Stat. 35; Treaty of Holston, U.S.-Cherokees, July 2, 1791, 7 Stat. 39; Henry Knox to George Washington, February 22, 1791, 
in PGW:PS, 7:402-15. 
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denounced the law as “an infamous act” that “had given more umbrage” to the citizens of 
the Tennessee Country “than any act ever passed since the independency of America.”20 
 
The original Trade and Intercourse Act was brief: seven sections, barely two 
printed pages long.  But for the federal officials who crafted it, especially Henry Knox, it 
represented a foundational charter for asserting federal supremacy over Indian affairs.  
Federal officials distributed embossed parchment copies, in tin containers, to Native 
nations; Washington cited it to Native leaders as evidence of the “fatherly care the United 
States intend to take of the Indians.”  Copies of the statute were freely distributed 
throughout the territories, reprinted in territorial newspapers, and read verbatim by 
territorial judges to grand juries.  Despite its brevity, the Act authorized an expansive 
“legal coercive power” that reflected Knox’s vision for how federal law would replace 
the law of retaliation, as the federal government would separate Natives from U.S. 
citizens and arbitrate the crimes each committed against the other.  Over the ensuing 
decade, federal officials—territorial governors, judges, and military officers—would 
struggle to implement these provisions.21  
* * * 
                                                
20 Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329; Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469; Act of 
Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743.  The Trade and Intercourse Act created one of only a handful of federal crimes in the early republic.  
The other major criminal statute was the Crimes Act, which created statutory provisions for the punishment of treason, for crimes 
committed within exclusive federal jurisdictions, and for crimes that obstructed the federal judiciary.  Crimes Act, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 
(1790).  The most analogous provisions of the Crimes Act extended jurisdiction over the high seas, which, like Indian country, lay 
outside state jurisdiction.  Ibid., §§ 9-13.  For the limited literature on early federal crimes, which omits discussion of the Trade and 
Intercourse Act entirely, see Kathryn Preyer, “Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the Common Law of Crimes 
in the Early Republic,” Law and History Review 4, no. 2 (1986): 223–65; Adam H. Kurland, “First Principles of American Federalism 
and the Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction,” Emory Law Journal 45 (1996): 94. 
21 George Washington to the Seneca Chiefs, December 29, 1790, in PGW:PS, 7:146-50; Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, 
March 13, 1793, in PGW:PS, 12:314-15; “Extract from ’an Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, Passed by 
the Congress of the United States, March 1, 1793,” Knoxville Gazette, November 1, 1794; Rufus Putnam, “Charge to the Grand Jury” 
[N.D.], Box 2, Folder 6, Local Government Records, Marietta College Library. 
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Knox’s principle of separation never gained much traction in the territories.  Part 
of the problem was simply that Native and whites were too entangled to be so easily 
divided; the clear lines that Knox and others envisioned had no basis in reality.  Just as 
significantly, accounts of mutual hostility and implacable hatred fundamentally 
misunderstood, and even exacerbated, the problem.  Much of the violence between 
Natives and whites did not consist of skulking, vengeful attacks.  It began, rather, in 
taverns and houses, often in the heart of towns like Vincennes and Knoxville, and usually 
started with sociability, not hatred.  But when these everyday encounters rapidly shifted 
from camaraderie to bloodshed, the ensuing violence was interpreted, especially by those 
outside the borderlands, in light of the fraught diplomatic and racial overtones that 
colored cross-cultural interactions.22   
Throughout the territories, Natives and Euro-Americans had lived alongside one 
another for centuries before the United States arrived.  Living in small isolated 
communities surrounded by Natives, Euro-Americans had forged extensive and 
intertwined ties of trade, debt, and sociability with their Native neighbors.  The advent of 
U.S. sovereignty sometimes strained, but did not sever those relationships.   
 The French settlement of Vincennes in the Wabash Country in the Northwest 
Territory, for instance, remained a hub where Natives and non-Natives continued to 
intermingle throughout the 1780s and ‘90s.  Because the town was a center of the fur 
trade, surrounding Native groups were “continually coming to and going from this 
place,” trading their skins for liquors and remaining “eight or ten days.”   Court and 
                                                
22 For a consideration of the significance of “cities”—broadly construed—as sites of encounter on the frontier, see Jay Gitlin, Barbara 
Berglund, and Adam Arenson, eds., Frontier Cities: Encounters at the Crossroads of Empire (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2012). 
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church records suggest the close relationships that resulted, recording cross-cultural 
debts, Native baptisms, and Indian residents: when John Toulon passed away in 1797, he 
left behind items belonging to a Native “who used to lodge in the House.”  Anglo-
American visitors were often shocked at how freely Natives and local inhabitants mixed.  
Passing through Vincennes, the traveler George Hunter stayed with a man named Smalls.   
“Here is a considerable resort of Indians,” Hunter recorded, “they are constantly thro & 
about this house at all times, like as many pet Lambs, at present there is a Man, his Squa 
& child sitting by the kitchen fire.”23 
 Such mixing appeared in other long-standing settlements in the Northwest 
Territory.  In Michilimackinac, a federal outpost in the heart of Anishinaabe territory in 
what is today northern Michigan, the federal commandant allowed Natives “free 
intercourse” to the village, allowing them to come “either by day or night . . . at 
pleasure.”   In Detroit, Winthrop Sargent complained about the very “great Resort of 
Indians.”  Legal records there also indicate ongoing commercial relationships.24      
 But Natives and non-Natives coexisted in newly founded Anglo-American towns 
as well as long-standing French settlements.  In Cincinnati, Winthrop Sargent reported 
seeing “a number of Indians mixing with the Inhabitants of the Town.”  Knoxville, 
created from whole cloth as a federal administrative center in 1791, rivaled Vincennes in 
                                                
23 Robert Buntin to Winthrop Sargent, June 21, 1793, Reel 2, WSP; “A True and Perfect Inventory . . . of the Deceased John Toulon 
called Gamuchon,” October 26, 1795, Box 2, Knox County Probate Records, Knox County Public Library, Vincennes, Ind.; “Journal 
Kept by George Hunter of a Tour from Philada. to Kentucky by the Illinois Country” 14-10.15 1796, American Philosophical Society, 
Philadelphia, Penn.  For baptismal records in Vincennes in the 1780s and ‘90s, see St. Francis Xavier Catholic Church Records 
(Bowie, Md.: Heritage Books, Inc., 1999).  For account books, see Account of John Decker to Moses Henry, 1792,  Box 1, Knox 
County Probate Records, Knox County Public Library; Account of Lewis Chatellereault, 1797, Box 1, Knox County Probate Records, 
Knox County Public Library.  This version of Vincennes history is somewhat at odds with the account presented by Richard White, 
which presents post-war Vincennes as a place where the preceding “face-to-face world” was in decline. White, The Middle Ground, 
421-33. 
24 Speech to the Indians, October 1799, Ayer MS 121, Newberry Library.  In one suit from Detroit, a Detroit merchant sued Mrs. 
Rankin, described as an “Indian Woman” and “a sole Trader” (a woman authorized to transact business), for a substantial sum of 
money Aiken v. Rankin, September 12, 1797, No. 221, Box 2, Wayne County Court of Common Pleas Records, Michigan Supreme 
Court Records, Archives of Michigan, Lansing, Mich. 
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the intensity of relationships with neighboring Natives.  Much of this collegiality 
occurred around what one early historian described as the “court” of William Blount.   
Blount spent an inordinate amount of time socializing with Natives, especially 
Cherokees.  Entire days passed in recreation, “unalloyed with public cares”;  the governor 
reported one Knoxville meeting with the Cherokee leader John Watts nearly entirely 
“devoted to eating, drinking and jocular conversation, of which Watts is very fond.” 
During the Treaty of Holston, another Cherokee named John Taylor “lived with 
Governor Blount as one of his family . . . ate and drank at his table as one of his family, 
and slept by his side.”  Blount’s social ties to the Cherokees were especially strong, but 
such connections characterized Knoxville more generally.  Blount’s successor, Tennessee 
governor John Sevier, reported from the city that, “as the Cherokee settlements are in our 
vicinity . . . they frequently resort among our inhabitants, and particularly at this place.”25 
 As had long been the case, intercultural sex accompanied, and paralleled, such 
commercial and social connections. French men had long had sexual relationships with 
Native women, but recently arrived Anglo-Americans often followed suit.  In one 
instance, an army officer stationed at Fort Finney supplied a Wyandot woman, “Young 
Polly,” and her mother with stolen goods from the garrison; the women were to “remain 
in the neighberhood” until the officer’s enlistment expired and he could bring her to 
Pittsburgh.  There were also alleged instances when white women became involved with 
Native men.  In one case, the Knoxville Gazette reported that a Philadelphian woman had 
                                                
25 Winthrop Sargent to Abner Prior, October 25, 1792, in TP: Vol. III, 386-89; “Minutes of the Conference at Coyatee with the Chiefs 
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eloped with a Cherokee called “Young George”; the paper urged that she be taken up for 
vagrancy.  Several years later, the Gazette published an account of a Mrs. Abbott, a 
military wife, who absconded with a Cherokee after he paid her “great attention.”  The 
Cherokees, the newspaper stated, threatened to “continue to take [white settlers’] wives 
for pay” for their lands.26  
 These close ties that existed between Natives and non-Natives throughout the 
territories did not obviate questions of power.  Rather, as a generation of scholars have 
emphasized, intimacy often reinforced, rather than mitigated, inequalities.  Commercial 
ties ensnared Natives in debt, while officials like William Blount sought to use their 
relationships with Native leaders to bolster U.S. leverage.  Cross-cultural sex was 
especially fraught.  Even as white men’s relationships with Native women built on long-
standing Native practices of using sex to forge ties with, and even control, outsiders, they 
also corresponded with Anglo-American men’s exploitative views of Native women as 
sexually available.  Prior to becoming governor, for instance, William Blount wished 
travelers to the lower Cherokee towns “greate Choice and Great plenty of Cheekamagga 
Squaws.”   As for accounts of sex between Native men and white women, it is hard to 
know whether they were real or mere projections of white men’s sexual panic.27   
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But, as tense as these intimate links between Natives and whites were, they 
represented the antithesis of the “Chinese wall” that men like Washington, Knox, and, 
ironically, even Blount hoped to construct between Native and American societies.  They 
also did little to prevent conflict.  If anything, they heightened it—particularly when 
mixed with alcohol, which seemed to so easily blur the boundary between conviviality 
and violence. 
 Formally, selling alcohol to Natives was illegal, at the least in the Northwest 
Territory.  But territorial law was openly flouted.  The alcohol trade was also too 
profitable, and too engrained, to be prohibited; one of the participants in Vincennes was 
even a county official.  Ultimately, federal officials capitulated to reality.  Winthrop 
Sargent, acknowledging that Natives would get it “from some Quarter or other,” 
explicitly authorized its sale by a few trusted individuals.   To the south, the federal 
government felt constrained to sell rum and whiskey at the federally run trading posts it 
opened in Cherokee and Creek country, because the “habits of the Indians in this respect 
could not be controuled.”28     
 The availability of liquor drew Natives into territorial towns, where they would 
trade their peltry for alcohol and go on extended benders.  Vincennes residents regarded 
themselves as particularly plagued with roving bands of intoxicated Indians, who 
“destroy[ed] the peace and good order of the Village.”  One local magistrate reported 
how a party of “drunken tho friendly Indians” had accidently burned down the house of 
one of the village’s poorest residents; another house, inadvertently set ablaze three days 
                                                
28 Lt. Prior to Arthur St. Clair, October 7, 1791, Reel 3, ASCP; John Francis Hamtramck to Secretary of War, March 31, 1792, in TP: 
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later, was saved only by the federal soldiers from the fort.   “Our village is stained with 
blood every day,” Catholic missionary Jean Rivet reported to his superior from 
Vincennes.  Alcohol was an “inexhaustible source of quarrels . . . thefts, murders, and 
disorders of all kinds,” Rivet related, before offering a lengthy catalogue of violence: the 
“son of a great chief” killed by a “negro”; a white man stabbed by an Indian, who was in 
turned stabbed by another white man; a mother and choir singer shot at twice by an 
Indian; a village elder attacked by an Indian armed with a knife.  “All these horrors,” 
Rivet lamented, “are the sad consequences of the drunk[e]ness of the savages.”29 
Criminal cases from Vincennes underscore Rivet’s link between alcohol and 
violence, though they make it clear that Rivet’s attribution of blame ignored the white 
residents’ own role in drunken mayhem.  Vincennes resident Lambeir Burway, for 
instance, seemed to have a knack for finding himself in the midst of cross-cultural brawls.  
In 1796, his home was the scene of a battery against a Pottawatomie known as the brother 
of Grand Poo, for which Leno Burway (presumably a relative) was indicted before the 
county court.  A year later, Lambeir was himself indicted before the General Court of the 
Northwest Territory for a battery against a “Certain Indian Caled the Leaf.” The affair 
began as yet another drunken tavern brawl, where the Leaf, after employing “a grate dale 
of insulting Language” against a village resident named Mr. Rambout, drew his knife and 
stabbed Rambout.  Just as the Leaf was about to make a second stroke, Burway 
intervened to separate them, at which point the Leaf started attacking Burway and 
Burway “in defence of his Own Life struk the said Indian with His Knif nere about the 
                                                
29 Robert Buntin to Winthrop Sargent, June 21, 1793, Reel 3, WSP; Jean Francois Rivet to Bishop Carroll, August 8, 1797, 
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senter of his Brest.”  The Leaf collapsed to the ground and was carried to a nearby house 
by the other Indians, where he died.30 
 A similarly tangled skein of facts appeared in the prosecutions of James Cooney 
and Thomas Coulter in relation to the death of a Delaware named George Allen a couple 
years later.  The alleged crime occurred at Thomas Coulter’s inn in Vincennes, where a 
Delaware and a Frenchman were scuffling over a tomahawk.  Three or four more Indians 
rushed in to help their countrymen, prompting the “white people” to push them all out of 
the tavern.  But the Natives began to attack the windows and doors of the house, leading 
Thomas Coulter to fire a gun at them; still their attack persisted.  James Cooney then 
grabbed the gun, reloaded, and fired again, at which point “the people cried out that an 
Indian was killed.”31 
 Matters to the south were similar.  In 1792, William Blount investigated 
complaints by the Cherokee leader White Man-killer that he had been attacked by 
Knoxville residents.  Blount discovered that the Cherokee had been “drinking with some 
people, in a tavern.”  A drunken White Man-killer insulted Mr. John White, also drunk, 
who struck the Cherokee, “but not with an intention to kill.”  Blount concluded: “It was a 
drinking affair only, and I understood was so settled when the parties got sober.”32     
                                                
30 “Testimony of Antoine Marchal” July 7, 1797, Box 1, Folder 10; “Testimony of Claude Coupin” July 7, 1797, Box 1, Folder 9; 
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 Another incident, from after the Southwest Territory gained statehood as 
Tennessee, demonstrates especially clearly how alcohol-fueled camaraderie could 
quickly turn deadly.  As recounted in a lengthy letter by A.M. Hoar to federal interpreter 
James Carey, two Cherokees, one named Johny, the other Samy, passed by Hoar’s home 
on their way to return a horse to its white owner.  Sammy was well-known to Hoar and 
his neighbors, and enjoyed a good reputation, so Hoar “Got Some Whiskey and treat[ed] 
them” as a reward for “So friendly an Act to the Whites.”  Soon, Hoar’s house was full of 
people from the neighborhood, all “freely” drinking whisky; everyone was “friendly and 
in Good Humour.”33 
At this point in the impromptu party, a small white man with the odd name of 
Barefoot Runion, “Very Much Intoxicated,” began to “Rastle or Scuffle” with Johny.  
Johny asked Hoar if Barefoot was not angry and a “bad man”; Hoar told him he had 
simply had “Too Much Whiskey.”  The wrestling continued, with Johny sometimes 
flinging Runion, and sometimes vice versa; they frequently paused to go up to the table to 
drink together. Everything appeared to Hoar to be “in freen[d]ship and Diversion . . . .  
Nor Neither did I in the Least Expect Any Mischief.”34   
At some point, however, the situation turned, and the two men began to “fight in 
Earnest.”  Hoar intervened to separate the two men, grabbing Johny.  But at the same 
moment, Samy, the other Cherokee, who had been lying drunk on the floor, awoke and 
began to fight with Runion.  Runion threw Samy onto the short leg of a stool.  Samy 
complained that his belly hurt; Hoar inspected it, but could see no outward mark.  The 
                                                
33 A.M. Hoar to James Carey, July 28, 1802, Records of the Hiwasee and Tellico Trading House, RG 49, U.S. National Archives. 
34 Ibid. 
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Cherokees spent the rest of the night at Hoar’s house and began the journey back home 
the next morning.  Samy left still complaining about pain; Hoar later learned that he died 
on the journey.  Hoar was very contrite and “Much Troubled” by the affair; he 
particularly “Much Lament[ed] that Too Much Whiskey Was Amongst the people.”35 
 Such instances of drunkenness, violence, and even manslaughter did not mean 
that Natives and Anglo-Americans were not neighborly.  On the contrary, as judged by 
local court dockets, white neighbors in the territories behaved exactly the same way. 
Towns like Knoxville, Cincinnati, and Vincennes were hard-drinking, violent places 
where drunken men, and sometimes women, regularly slandered, assaulted, and even 
killed one another.  Alcohol-fueled camaraderie could turn to murder just as quickly 
when whites drank among themselves as when they drank in mixed company.36 
But if the violence that occurred between Natives and whites in territorial taverns 
was quotidian, the wider setting was not.  Unlike much of the violence among whites, 
assaults and murders committed by and against Natives occurred against a broader 
background of low-level warfare, racial tension, and diplomatic negotiation.  In this 
context, ordinary conflicts between neighbors could take on political and diplomatic 
importance.  Often it was difficult to tell whether a particular death should be regarded as 
an ordinary crime, the product of happenstance, or an act of war.  In Vincennes, for 
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instance, a local magistrate investigated the death of one Laviollette, killed “by the 
Savages.”  At first it appeared that Laviollette was the victim of an Indian attack, a 
common occurrence on a frontier in the midst of war; but it turned out that killing 
stemmed from a local Piankashaw’s “personal resentment” against Laviollete due to a 
“dispute about a Perogue” (a canoe-like boat).  In other instances, the line between a 
“drinking affair” and warfare proved blurry.  At Hays station, near Nashville, two 
Cherokees were drinking with the inhabitants when, “a little intoxicated,” they “boasted 
of their war exploits,” including killing two white men.  The two Cherokees were found 
in their camp the next morning, “both dead, and shot through their bodies.”  Officials 
regarded their death at the hands of unknown white assailants as murder, but the 
surrounding events also made it a plausible wartime killing.37 
 The situation was complicated, too, by the rise of a widespread anti-Indian 
rhetoric throughout much of the territories.  As Peter Silver has traced, years of warfare 
in places like Virginia and Pennsylvania had produced societies where the ritual appeal to 
Indian atrocities and the rhetorical parade of suffering victims made Indian-hating a 
staple of shared political culture.  As migrants from these places moved west, and faced 
more warfare, they brought these views with them.  Such rhetoric was arguably strongest 
in Kentucky, which suffered Native attacks but where few white residents encountered 
Natives in everyday contexts, but it was also widespread in both the Northwest and 
Southwest Territories, where anti-Indian language infected territorial print culture, 
especially newspapers.  Though often read in class terms, as a trait of the impoverished 
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intruders on the public domain, these views’ foremost proponents were often local elites 
vying for political prominence who supposedly sought to pander to popular prejudice—
men like Henry Hugh Breckenridge in Kentucky, or William Cocke in the Southwest 
Territory, a rival of William Blount whom the governor excluded from office.  Anti-
Indian rhetoric proved, too, to have widespread currency among the middling sort: the 
citizens of Cincinnati, for instance, who banded together to offer a scalp bounty during 
the Northwest Indian War, or army officers whose correspondents casually dismissed 
Indians as “Copper faced Sons of whores.”38 
 Yet these views never entirely dominated the territories.  The pages of the 
Knoxville Gazette, for instance, the Southwest Territory’s only newspaper, were a 
battleground where writers under adopted Indian identities such as the Cherokee Hanging 
Maw not only rebutted the arguments offered by Breckenridge and Maw but mocked 
them for not enjoying any actual political power or authority.  William Blount even 
borrowed explicitly from earlier fights when he had the Gazette reprint Franklin’s 
pamphlet condemning the Paxton Boys’ attacks on the Conestoga Indians thirty years 
earlier in Pennsylvania.  And anti-Indian views were more likely to translate into political 
fighting—or, as we shall see, mass action—than private murders.  But federal officials, 
particularly in Philadelphia, often wrote and spoke as if all territorial citizens shared these 
views and acted on them.  Those who live “remote from the seat of government,” 
                                                
38 F. Johnston to John Armstrong, July 15, 1790, Box 2, Folder 7, Armstrong Papers, M6, Indiana Historical Society; Silver, Our 
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Secretary of War Timothy Pickering wrote, “do not deem Indians entitled to the common 
rights of humanity,” and so “murder & plunder Indians whenever they can.”39 
An incident in Vincennes, from 1791, underscores especially clearly how 
outsiders, fixated on these racial and class divides, could quickly escalate local, drunken 
disputes into full-blown diplomatic and diplomatic incidents.  According to the report of 
the county magistrates, the affair began as yet another drunken argument.  A number of 
Natives in the village routinely received whiskey from a man named Simpson.  One 
night, the Natives returned to Simpson’s and became “intoxicated.” Also at Simpson’s 
was Lieutenant Dirck Schuyler, a soldier stationed at Fort Knox known to his 
commanders as a bad egg given to “continual drunkenness” and “other base conduct.”  
Schuyler was drinking with several companions, other young white men whom the 
magistrates deemed “unworthy” companions.  Simpson refused to give the Natives liquor 
without payment in furs, “whereon some disputes arose altho’ they did not understand 
each other, and Simpson struck the Indian.”  Schuyler and his companions then seized the 
Native and took him prisoner, parading him through the streets “in a riotous manner.”  
But the Indian soon escaped from the drunken men.40 
The matter might have ended here, yet another drunken fight over debts between 
Indians, a shopkeeper, and the soldiers.  But Schuyler and his companions pressed on.  
The arrival of Anglo-American newcomers such as Schuyler, many of whom could 
barely conceal their disdain for both Natives and the French settlers, had riven Vincennes 
                                                
39 “For the Gazette,” Knoxville Gazette, October 20, 1792; William Blount, “For the Gazette,” Knoxville Gazette, June 1, 1793; 
Timothy Pickering to David Campbell, August 28, 1795, Folder 2, Timothy Pickering Letters, Ayers 926, Ayer Collection, Newberry 
Library.  Silver argues that the political deployment of the “anti-Indian sublime” against opponents was its “most crucial[]” function.  
Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, xviii-xxvi. 
40 John Francis Hamtramck to Josiah Harmar, February 18, 1791, in Thornbrough, ed., Outpost on the Wabash, 277-79; Magistrates of 
Knox County to Arthur St. Clair, July 29, 1791, Reel 3, ASCP.  Simpson’s culpability, the magistrates noted, could not “be proved but 
by the Testimony of Indians.” Ibid. 
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with racial and ethnic tensions.  Schuyler and his companions used the brawl as an excuse 
to uncork these discontents.   After the unknown Indian escaped, they proceeded to attack 
the house of a Frenchman named Joseph Andre, where one of the men beat Andre’s 
pregnant wife, fired a pistol into the door, and seized Andre’s son.  Andre pleaded that 
they were Frenchmen—presumably insisting on their difference from the Indians—but, 
when asked if they had come to kill the French, Schuyler and his companions shouted, 
“Yes, kill them, kill them.”  Schuyler and company then proceeded to the neighboring 
house of Jean Baptiste Constant, a local Indian interpreter, where they seized “an Indian 
and his Wife and Children,” and conveyed all of them to the guardhouse.41   
At this point, town residents intervened.  Their primary concern was how the 
surrounding Natives would interpret the affair.  Pointing to the “extreme Weakness of the 
Village” and the need to “conciliate as much as possible the affections of the Indians, 
who . . . might in a great measure effect our ruin,” the magistrates pleaded with Schuyler 
to release the captured Native. Indeed, “alarmed” local Natives had already begun to 
mass ominously on the opposite bank.  Eventually, Schuyler released the Indian.  The 
villagers dispatched a prominent local to inform the Natives that Schuyler and his 
companions had been indicted before a special session of the general quarter court of the 
peace, and would “endeavor to prevail on them to forget the whole Affair.”  In the end, 
Schuyler was punished—but not by the civil courts.  Because of his military post, 
                                                
41 Magistrates of Knox County to St. Clair, July 29, 1791. 
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Schuyler was cashiered and threatened with court martial; he opted to resign instead.  A 
precarious peace persisted in Vincennes.42 
The Schuyler incident helps illustrate why Knox’s vision of a strictly enforced 
separation—a “Chinese Wall”—between Natives and whites could not be realized.  In 
part, this reflected the shortcomings of formal law: a neat boundary line could not undo 
the commercial, social, and sexual entanglements that bound together Natives and U.S. 
citizens.  Indian country and the U.S. territories bled imperceptibly together; ostensibly 
American towns like Vincennes, Nashville, and Knoxville were also central sites of 
Native diplomacy and trade.  Not only could the federal government not simply separate 
the groups by fiat, but, as William Blount’s close ties to the Cherokees demonstrate, 
federal officials also relied on, encouraged, and benefitted from such intermixing. 
But the Schuyler incident also underscores the flaw in Knox’s belief that only 
federal jurisdiction, untainted by the biases of both Natives and territorial citizens, could 
supply justice.  Distance had a cost as well as a benefit.  Local Natives and whites were 
not color-blind; they well understood the racial and cultural barriers that divided them, 
and did not always like one another.  But they also knew the local connections that bound 
them together, and recognized that cross-cultural violence, like violence in the territories 
more generally, often resulted from a potent mix of alcohol, personal disagreements, and 
happenstance.  Those who witnessed such crimes often argued, as A.M. Hoar insisted in 
the death of Samy, that there was no intention of killing. 43   
                                                
42Ibid; Arthur St. Clair to Lt. Prior, August 15, 1791, Reel 3, ASCP; Arthur St. Clair to Henry Knox, August 17, 1791, Arthur St. Clair 
Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library; Henry Knox to George Washington, August 28, 1792, in PGW:PS, 
11:49-50. 
43 Hoar to Carey, July 28, 1802. 
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Yet that first-hand knowledge was often lost as reports of the violence spread to 
those further removed from the territories, especially federal officials.  Preoccupied with 
broader concerns about diplomacy and Indian affairs, these men fixated on divisions 
between opposing national and racial categories, and, because they saw the world that 
way, they assumed that all borderland residents did, too.  On several occasions, St. Clair 
and Sargent quickly interpreted instances of cross-cultural violence in light of this 
narrative, only to discover that they had misread a local dispute as a racially motivated 
killing.  Yet once this narrative of borderland violence as a product of racial hostility was 
established, it was remarkably durable.  Violence became evidence of racial hatred, while 
the existence of racial hatred in turn allowed intent in any cross-cultural crime to be 
inferred.  But as a result, more and more people like Lieutenant Schuyler—strikingly, 
both an outsider and a federal officer—came into the territories.  Dividing the world into 
separate and hostile racial groups, men like Schuyler increasingly transformed the 
violence of everyday life into political violence intended to convey overt racial meaning, 
turning their narrative into a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
* * * 
 Knox’s second principle, the establishment of federal jurisdiction over crimes 
between Natives and whites, proved equally fruitless.  The problem was not lack of 
effort: territorial officials took Knox’s admonition that “justice” should govern Indian 
affairs very seriously, and intervened in dozens of instances of cross-cultural crime in the 
territories.  And like Knox, they advanced a vision of colorblind justice, under which 
both territorial citizens and Natives would be liable under federal law for the harms they 
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committed on the other.   As Winthrop Sargeant told Ottawas and Chippewas gathered at 
Michilimackinac, “[W]e are determined to obtain the same Rule and make no Difference 
between Red and White People.”44 
 In the end, however, the federal government largely failed in its efforts, both to 
punish Natives for crimes committed on U.S. citizens, and to punish citizens for crimes 
they committed against Natives.  The two circumstances were very different, yet the 
fundamental cause of failure was, in broad strokes, similar: the formal limitations built 
into the scope and reach of federal law.   
These institutional constraints checked territorial officials’ power to exercise the federal 
jurisdiction they ostensibly enjoyed. 
 
   On July 24, 1794, an unknown group of Natives killed and scalped John Ish, a 
white settler, while he was at his plow on his farm eighteenth miles below Knoxville on 
the south side of Holston River, in the Southwest Territory.  The killing, William Blount 
stated, “much exasperated the Frontier People.”  Eight days later, on August 1, a 
territorial Court of Oyer and Terminer in Knoxville tried, and a territorial jury convicted, 
a Creek Indian named Apongphohigo for Ish’s murder.  He hanged three days later, at 
four in the afternoon.  “Your Muscoga acquaintance took a civil swing,” a territorial 
resident wrote to Indian agent John McKee upon witnessing the execution.  ““[H]e died 
with firmness.”45   
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 Apongphonhigo’s trial and hanging was likely the first time the federal 
government exercised criminal adjudicatory jurisdiction over an Indian.  Federal officials 
celebrated it as “an example, worthy of imitation, of how federal criminal jurisdiction 
could replace retaliation in punishing Natives accountable for their attacks. John McKee 
argued the Creek’s conviction would “spare the innocent from the rage of the exasperated 
frontier inhabitants.”  In a grand jury charge, territorial judge Joseph Anderson insisted 
that “the late punishment of the Creek Indian, for the murder of Ish,” showed citizens that 
they must “not be your own avengers . . . but rest your hope on the due administration of 
the laws.”  And Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton praised the proceeding as “an 
example of justice and fair dealing” in urging the Governor of Georgia to adopt similar 
measures to prevent citizen attacks on Natives.46  
 Yet United States v. Apongphigo, as the case was officially captioned, was also 
the only recorded prosecution of a Native in the Southwest Territory.  The Northwest 
Territory situation was similar: records survive of a single capital prosecution, United 
States v. Wapikinomouk, that occurred just as Vincennes was transitioning from an 
outpost of the Northwest Territory to the capital of the newly created Indiana Territory.  
                                                                                                                                            
copy, 1942), pp. 12-14, Tennessee State Library and Archives. Ish left little trace in surviving archives, appearing in a single local 
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Understanding why events federal officials believed so worthy of emulation occurred so 
rarely requires digging more deeply into the circumstances of the two cases.47 
 The accounts of Apongphigo’s trial—a brief court record and a slightly fuller 
newspaper version—reveal a court that adhered scrupulously to the legal process that 
would have been afforded a non-Native defendant in a murder case.  Apongphohigo—
“an Indian of the Creek Nation late of the Town of Tookcaucaugee; or Punk Knot on 
Oakfuskry River”—was indicted by a grand jury for murdering Ish “feloniously willfully 
and with malice aforethought.” James Carey, the federal Indian interpreter, explained the 
indictment to the Creek, who reportedly “confessed the fact.”  But the court, “willing to 
afford the prisoner the benefit of trial by a jury, (permitted him to withdraw his plea) and 
plead not guilty.”  A petit jury was then sworn, and Apongphohigo had John Rhea 
assigned him as counsel by the court.  (Rhea was an “early settler” on the Cherokee lands 
south of the French Broad River.)  The jury heard the “fullest testimony” on the case, 
which does not survive, although the witness list does: it included James Carey, the 
federal interpreter, as well as four other territorial citizens, including Joseph Sevier, John 
Sevier’s son.  The jury voted to convict, and Judge Anderson, who oversaw the 
proceeding, pronounced the sentence of death in the “usual form.”48 
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 Given Apongphohigo’s confession, the most interesting legal issue in the case 
was jurisdiction.  The indictment had stated that the Creek’s crime had been “contrary to 
the laws of the United States and Treaties of peace made with the Creek Nation and 
against the peace and dignity of the United States.”  Carey further explained to 
Apongphohigo that in the Treaty of New York “it was agreed that if any Creek Indian or 
Indians should commit a murder upon any citizen of the United States, he or they should 
be given up, and tried according to the laws of the United States.”  Apongphohigo replied 
that he was “well acquainted with the talk that was held at New York, for it was well 
sung in their ears by the chiefs after their return to the nation: But that the Upper Towns 
had thrown away that talk, and taken up the hatchet.”  Apongphohigo’s reply was, 
perhaps, an implicit jurisdictional rebuke to the court; it implied that the Upper Creeks, at 
least, had never ratified the treaty, and so could not bind them.  But this jurisdictional 
wrinkle did not attract any attention.49 
Even absent the Treaty of New York, however, Apongphohigo would likely have 
been subject to federal prosecution. Apongphonhigo’s killing of Ish had happened within 
lands that the Cherokees had ceded the United States at the Treaty of Holston, and so 
within the jurisdiction of the federal territorial courts.  Here, the international-law 
principle, documented in Vattel, that a nation’s courts presumptively enjoyed jurisdiction 
over all persons within their jurisdictional limits regardless of nationality seemed to 
operate.  Two years after Apongphonhigo’s execution, section 14 of the 1796 Trade and 
Intercourse Act would specifically codify what it implied was preexisting legal authority 
                                                
49 “Knoxville, Monday, August 4,” Knoxville Gazette, August 4, 1794; United States v. Apongphigo, Minutes of Oyer and Terminer 
Court.   
  279 
by specifically reaffirming the power of “legal apprehension or arresting, within the 
limits of any state or district, of any Indian” who had “come over or across the [] 
boundary line, into any state or territory” and stolen from or killed inhabitants there.  
Section 17 of the same act, which allowed the arrest within the states or territories of 
“any person” who had violated the statute, also plausibly warranted Indians’ arrest and 
trial, as one official argued.50 
 Apongphonhigo’s trial, then, presented a pageant of the triumph of federal law 
and jurisdiction.  But this appearance was only a facade.  In fact, Apongphonhigo’s 
subjection to federal criminal jurisdiction was due almost entirely to Cherokee law. The 
most important legal issue was not what happened to Apongphohigo in the Knoxville 
courtroom, but how he got there in the first place. 
 After Ish’s death, two territorial militia leaders, Major King and Lieutenant 
Cunningham, set off to pursue the killers.  They followed the trail into the Cherokee 
Nation, but they proved incompetent woodsmen.  Arriving in the Cherokee town of 
Willstown, where the influential Cherokee leader Hanging Maw lived, they learned from 
the Indian trader William Springston that he had seen Ish’s scalp and the party of Creeks 
that had taken it.  Though the Creeks had not gotten far, Springston reported, King had 
missed his chance to capture them.51 
 Here, Hanging Maw intervened, offering assistance on how to “overtak[e] and 
punish[] the Murderers of Ish.”  Maw in fact dispatched eleven Cherokee warriors, 
including Willoe, his own son, to assist King and Cunningham in their pursuit.  Their 
                                                
50 Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book II, §§ 101-103, pp. 312-13; Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469, 472-74; John Sevier to 
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51 Samuel R. David to John McKee, August 1, 1794, Folder 5, John McKee Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 
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hunt led them south, to the Cherokee town of Hiawassee, where the residents told them 
that the killers were indeed Creeks who had recently passed through the town, and who 
would likely camp the night at the town of “Wocoee” (Ocoee, further down the Hiwassee 
River).  Continuing their pursuit, they thought they had the killers in sight, when a runner 
from Hiawassee arrived and alerted them that one of the killers had remained behind.  
The party turned around, found the Creek—Apongphonhigo—and quickly surrounded 
him.52 
 The question then became what to do with Apongphonhigo.  No one seemed to 
think of his apprehension in criminal-law terms—there was no warrant, and no civil 
officer present to arrest him.  Blount himself, in his instructions to the Cherokees, had 
been indifferent as to the murderers’ fate, as long as they were punished: either the 
Cherokees could kill the murderers “and their Hair brought in fresh,” or they could be 
“taken alive and delivered . . . to be by my order put to death at this place [Knoxville].”  
But the issue became who would take the Creek prisoner.  For their part, the Cherokees 
urged King to “kill or take him.”  The reason for this insistence was not specified, but the 
Cherokees likely considered the Creek as the enemy of the United States and so deferred 
to the Anglo-Americans.  But King refused to do so, instead arguing the “propriety of 
their doing one or the other.”53 
Although he offered no explanation for his actions, King’s hesitancy and 
deference to the Cherokees are illuminating.  In refusing to arrest Apongphohigo, King 
was following federal law as it then existed, which did not extend criminal jurisdiction 
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53 King to Blount, July 30, 1794.  On Native ideas of personal jurisdiction, see Katherine A. Hermes, “Jurisdiction in the Colonial 
Northeast: Algonquian, English and French Governance,” The American Journal of Legal History 43, no. 1 (January 1999): 62–69. 
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over Natives within Native territory.  For most purposes, the federal government regarded 
Native lands as a foreign and autonomous jurisdiction, a result that the Washington 
Administration believed derived from the customary law of nations as long practiced in 
North America.  Most of federal legal practice with respect to Native nations—the 
emphasis on diplomatic negotiation, the codification of the relationship in treaties, the 
preemption of state law—reflected this legal position.  Territorial citizens sometimes 
attempted to use Native territory’s foreign status to their own advantage.   Robert 
Slaughter, charged with the 1798 murder of Joseph Hardin, argued that the alleged crime 
had occurred “on the Indian Lands, without the jurisdiction of this Court and within the 
limits of another nation at the time the offence is charged to have been committed”; his 
success is unclear.  In 1794, when Zachariah Johnson sued Charles Raygan for an assault 
that happened in the French Broad region of the Southwest Territory before the 
Cherokees had ceded it to the United States, Raygen’s attorney argued that the lands 
where the tort occurred were “out of the protection of the United States.”54 
As Raygen discovered, there was an important exception to the lack of federal 
criminal jurisdiction within Indian country: the United States could exercise personal 
jurisdiction over its citizens even within Indian country, a power codified in the Trade 
and Intercourse Act.  Thus, in Reygan’s case, the court and the jury seemingly agreed 
with Johnson’s attorney’s argument that the assault and battery “is [a] personal action and 
                                                
54 United States v. Robert Slaughter, September 1804, Box 1, Folder 17, General Court Records, Indiana State Archives; Zachariah 
John by Joseph Johnson v. Charles Raygan, April 1794, Minutes of Oyer and Terminer Court, Hamilton District Superior Court, 28-
30.  I discuss the legal status of Native nations during this period in Gregory Ablavsky, “Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause,” Yale 
Law Journal 124, no. 4 (2015): 1012–90. 
  282 
always follows the person, is not local”—the territorial court, in other words, could 
exercise personal jurisdiction over Raygen.55   
But Apongphohigo was neither within ordinary territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States nor a U.S. citizen; King had no legal basis to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over him.  In the end, it was Willioe, Hanging Maw’s son, who bound Apongphonhigo 
and brought him to federal Indian agent John McKee at the Tellico Blockhouse, a federal 
outpost within Cherokee territory.   
What followed conformed to Native, not Anglo-American, legal norms.  McKee 
recounted that the Cherokees met the prisoner’s arrival with the firing of guns and shouts 
of the “death whoop”; “joy,” McKee asserted, “seemed to be diffused in the countenance 
of every description of the Cherokees.”  Both McKee and King recorded how Middle 
Striker, “a distinguished chief from Will’s Town,” grabbed the prisoner, lifted him up “as 
high as he could, [then] dashed him with great violence on the ground, exclaiming, ‘That 
is the way I shake hands with my enemy!’”  When McKee managed to dissuade Hanging 
Maw from scalping the prisoner alive, the Cherokees snatched Apongphonhigo’s warlock 
instead, “with which they danced the scalp-dance all night, and used all the ceremony of 
exultation commonly practiced among Indians on the death or capture of an enemy.”  The 
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next day, McKee, along with the Cherokees and local militia, escorted the prisoner to 
Knoxville.  Only then did the legal machinery of territorial law begin to operate.56 
The Cherokees had their own reasons to assist the United States. William Blount 
had adopted a preemptory tone in demanding Cherokee cooperation, giving Hanging 
Maw ten days to apprehend the killers—an action that at once acknowledged the 
Cherokees as an autonomous jurisdiction while also demeaning their independence.  But 
the Cherokees did not behave as though they were coerced; as Major King reported, they 
“appeared to breath the keenest spirit of revenge for the death of Ish.”   This eagerness 
likely reflected Cherokee, rather than American, agendas.  The upper Cherokees had little 
love for the Creeks, with whom Hanging Maw was “highly exasperated on account of the 
many injuries he has received.”  The Cherokees also recognized that they could use the 
affair to solidify their relationship with the United States. Afterwards, Hanging Maw 
repeatedly cited the case to remind officials of Cherokee service, and, equally significant, 
his own importance within the Cherokee nation.  In his next meeting with Blount, Maw 
stated, “I ordered the Creek seized . . . & I will kill my own People if they kill white 
people.”  When Blount began distribute goods to the Cherokees, Maw asked whether 
they would go to the Cherokees who killed whites or to those “who had given proof of 
their friendship to the United States by taking [a] Creek.”  Blount got the message, 
ensuring that loyal allies among the Cherokees received “the greatest share.”57 
The elaborate display of federal legal supremacy in the Knoxville courtroom 
sought to erase all this history, obscuring federal dependence on Native jurisdiction and 
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law.  But Aponphonhigo knew that the real legal work had been done on the Cherokee 
path to Ocoee, not in Knoxville.  Asked whether there was any reason the judgment of 
the court should not be pronounced upon him, the Creek replied: 
he had not any thing; that he come out with an intent of killing and stealing or 
being killed; that he had killed the man for which he had been tried; and that it 
had been his misfortune to fall into the hands of the whites; but that he should 
escaped them if it had not been for the Cherokees; and that if he was now put to 
death there was plenty of his nation remaining to revenge his death. 
 
Apongphonhigo’s comments also suggest why his trial was the last instance an Indian 
was prosecuted in the Southwest Territory.  As Apongphonhigo threatened, the 
cooperation Maw and the Cherokees offered the United States had costs as well as 
benefits; it made the Cherokees liable under Native law for his death.  Sure enough, mere 
weeks after the killing, the Creeks appeared at Willstown, demanding that Middle Striker 
and Willioe be “delivered up in satisfaction for the Creek, who they apprehended.”  The 
Cherokees had known that that their support would “draw the Creeks upon them,” and 
had asked McKee for protection from the United States.  Yet Blount and others did not 
seem to take any special efforts in response.  The evidence on this question is lacking, but 
the Cherokees, perhaps, made their own calculation that the costs of aiding the United 
States outweighed the benefits.58 
 It is tempting to read Apongphonhigo’s arrest, trial, and execution as evidence of 
how the realities of the borderlands, particularly Native power, undermined federal 
assertions of legal supremacy.  The affair certainly underscored how dependent the often 
inept and incompetent territorial government was on Native support.  But fitting the trial 
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Correspondence of Gen. James Robertson” (October 1, 1898), 356. 
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into a narrative of federal weakness ignores the fact that, as arrogant as the United States 
and its representatives could be, formal federal law disclaimed criminal jurisdiction over 
Native lands.  As King’s refusal to exercise authority within Cherokee territory suggests, 
the Southwest Territory and the Cherokee Nation formally remained separate and distinct 
jurisdictions. 
 
 The trial for United States v. Wapikinimomouk was held in Vincennes.  
Wapikinomouk, a Delaware, was accused of murdering a white man named Harrison, 
first name unknown.  As in the case of Apongphohigo, the Delaware was prosecuted 
before a specially called Court of Oyer and Terminer.  Wapikinomouk’s proceeding, 
however, was briefer and more cursory than Apongphohigo’s trial.  He was indicted by a 
grand jury on the testimony of a fellow Delaware, Johny, who had been “Sworn with an 
uplifted hand after the Custom and manner of the Indians.”  Although both 
Wapikinomouk and Johny were presumably well acquainted with Euroamerican 
society—the indictment described them as “late of Kaskaskia,” a French settlement in the 
Illinois country on the American side of the Mississippi—they spoke through Joseph 
Baron, the federal Indian interpreter.   It is unclear whether Wapikinomouk had counsel.  
His indictment charged with murder with malice aforethought in violation of territorial 
law.  Treaty law was not mentioned, although the Treaty of Greenville contained a 
provision stipulating that Delawares who killed citizens of the United States would be 
punished according to the laws of the United States.  After the indictment was translated 
to Wapikinomouk, he pleaded not guilty; a jury was empaneled and convicted him.  
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Having nothing to say, Wapikinomouk was sentenced to be hanged on Monday, 
November 23.59 
  Unlike in Apongphohigo’s prosecution, however, extensive testimony about the 
crime survives, in the form of two recorded, likely pretrial interrogations of Johny and 
Wapikinomouk, conducted by two judges of the court.  These statements likely echoed 
the testimony offered at trial, and offered a largely consistent account of the killing.60 
 In their telling, the crime, like much of the cross-cultural violence in the region, 
reflected both the close ties that could arise between Natives and whites, and the 
capriciousness and seeming irrationality of many killings.  Wapikinomouk, Johny, and a 
third Delaware named Matashikan had been traveling together from the Kentucky side of 
the Ohio River when they encountered Harrison.  Harrison asked to purchase some 
venison which Wapikinomouk had recently caught; Wapikinomouk hospitably shared the 
meat for free, at which point Harrison “gave them all a drink of Wiskey & then a Second 
& third,” until they all “got drunk.”  Around noon, the four men decided to take the ferry 
to the north side of the Ohio River; Wapikinomouk stated that Harrison wanted to join 
them on their way to “the Spanish Country,” on the other side of the Mississippi, “to see 
what kind of country it was.”  While they waited for the ferry, Harrison and 
Wapikinomouk “jumped & wrestled,” just as had been done at the gathering at A.M. 
Hoar’s house; Johny testified that it had been done “in good humour & [with] no 
                                                
59 “Presentment Against Delaware Indians” September 1801, Box 30, Folder 4, M98, William Hayden English Papers, Indiana 
Historical Society; “Court of Oyer and Terminer,” November 10, 1801, Box 30, Folder 4, William Hayden English Papers. Since 
Vincennes did not yet have a newspaper, there was no public announcement of the execution.  Vincennes would not have a newspaper 
until 1804.  Note that the Johny discussed here, a Delaware, is distinct from the Johny, a Cherokee, present at the incident at A.M. 
Hoar’s house. 
60 “Examination of Johny,” October 29, 1801, Box 30, Folder 4, William Hayden English Papers; “Examination of Wapihinomock,” 
October 29, 1801, Box 30, Folder 4, William Hayden English Papers; “[Alternate] Examination of Wapihinomock,” October 29, 1801, 
Box 30, Folder 4, William Hayden English Papers.  A brief account of the trial can also be found in James Joseph Buss, Winning the 
West with Words: Language and Conquest in the Lower Great Lakes (University of Oklahoma Press, 2013).  Buss misstates that the 
records indicate trial, rather than pre-trial, testimony.  
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Appearance of Disgust or Resentment.”  On the other side of the river, the four mounted 
men proceeded single file, with Johny in front, then Harrison, followed by the two other 
Delawares.  At some point someone shouted “Let’s kill him” in Delaware.  Johny 
whipped around to hear two rifle shots and see Harrison fall from his horse.61 
The crime was remarkable for its seeming lack of motive.  As a robbery, it offered 
a poor yield: Wapikinomouk took four silver dollars from Harrison and divided them 
among his party, though Johny refused to accept any.  The Delawares took Harrison’s 
horse, saddle, bridle, and rifle, but left his body on the ground; both Johny and 
Wapikinomouk stressed that they had neither scalped nor stripped Harrison.  Asked 
whether there had been any cause for “Quarrel or misunderstanding,” both Johny and 
Wapikinomouk insisted that there was not.  Wapikinomouk, perhaps self-interestedly, 
testified that Harrison “was killed when they were drunk and without any Cause of hatred 
or ill will.” But Johny confirmed Wapikinomouk’s account. The murder, he told the 
judges, was entirely unplanned.  Right after the shooting, he had “upraided” the other 
Delawares, noting that Harrison had “used them well and gave them to eat & drink with 
him.”62 
But it was what happened after the killing that was perhaps most relevant to how 
the two Delawares ended up in the Vincennes courtroom.  All three Delawares had 
proceeded to Cape Giradeau, which was a town on the Spanish side of the Mississippi in 
present-day Missouri.  When they arrived, Johny went to his uncle Captain Allen, a 
                                                
61 Examination of Johny,” October 29, 1801; “Examination of Wapihinomock,” October 29, 1801; “[Second] Examination of 
Wapihinomock,” October 29, 1801.  The only meaningful discrepancy between the testimony of Johny and Wapihinomock was that 
Johny testified that Harrison asked to accompany them toward Kaskaskia, while Wapihinomock testified that Harrison planned to 
accompany them toward the Spanish lands. 
62 Examination of Johny,” October 29, 1801; “Examination of Wapihinomock,” October 29, 1801; “[Second] Examination of 
Wapihinomock,” October 29, 1801. 
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Delaware chief, relaying the account and handing over Harrison’s rifle.  Allen seems to 
have informed Louis Lorimier, the town’s Spanish commandant, who demanded that 
Wapikinomouk hand over the horse and bridle.  It was the Spanish and the Delawares 
who handed over Wapikinomouk for prosecution.  But the third Delaware, Matyikan, 
remained at Cape Girardeau, in Spanish territory, “not delivered up,” in Johny’s phrase.  
The territory’s attorney general ordered that a writ be issued for his arrest, but, by its own 
terms, the writ had no force in Spanish territory, and Matayhikan never seems to have 
been captured.63 
In short, Wapikinomouk’s prosecution, just like Apongphohigo’s, demonstrated 
how much the exercise of federal criminal jurisdiction over Natives depended on the 
cooperation of other jurisdictions. Wapikinomouk faced federal law only because the 
Delawares and the Spanish decided that he should; Matayhikan, on the strength of the 
testimony equally culpable for the same crime, escaped punishment, similarly on based 
solely on Delaware actions.  Territorial officials’ scrupulous adherence to their vision of 
the rule of law—more dubious in this instance, where the lack of intent might arguably 
undermine a murder conviction—was entirely beside the point. 
The problem with Knox’s vision of forcing Natives to submit to federal law was 
not that informal law defeated the formal authorization of federal criminal jurisdiction.  
The more substantial issue was that, on its own terms, federal law did not govern foreign 
territory, including Indian country.  As long as the territories were borderlands that 
Natives and others could easily traverse, the formal as well as practical reach of federal 
                                                
63 Examination of Johny,” October 29, 1801; “Examination of Wapihinomock,” October 29, 1801; “[Second] Examination of 
Wapihinomock,” October 29, 180.; “Court of Oyer and Terminer,” November 10, 1801.  
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jurisdiction would be limited.  The consequence of this reality was that the federal 
government could only get its hands on Natives to prosecute when Natives themselves 
were willing to cooperate. 
 
If prosecutions against Natives in territorial courts were rare, prosecutions of 
territorial citizens for crimes committed against Natives were not.  Dozens of such 
prosecutions occurred, in both the Northwest and Southwest Territories.  Given that 
historians have correctly emphasized the early American state’s commitment to 
imperialism and the inability of Anglo-American courts to deliver justice to Native 
peoples, this discrepancy is unexpected.  Much of the difference, of course, reflected the 
fact that the territorial courts could get their hands on their own citizens to prosecute 
much more easily.  But many territorial officials proved just as dedicated as trying to use 
the courts to punish cross-cultural crimes as Henry Knox was. In many ways, territorial 
officials acted just as Knox had hoped they would, using federal jurisdiction to try to 
bring what they regarded as justice to Native peoples.64  
But few of these prosecutions ever produced a conviction.  Crime against Natives 
was rife in the territories: citizens of the Northwest Territory had “abused, cheated, 
                                                
64 An older debate in the historiography, centered in New England, focuses on the extent to which Anglo-American courts treated 
Indians “fairly,” with Alden Vaughan emphasizing an impartial legal system, Alden T Vaughan, New England Frontier: Puritans and 
Indians, 1620-1675, 3rd ed (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 185–210.while Yasuhide Kawashima convincingly 
argued that, even as Anglo-American judges strove to treat Indians impartially, cultural barriers prevented a neutral application of 
justice.  Yasuhide Kawashima, Puritan Justice and the Indian: White Man’s Law in Massachusetts, 1630-1763 (Middletown, Conn: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1986).  More recent work has stressed both the failures of justice as well as the imperialist aspects of the 
extension of jurisdiction over Natives.  For a focus on New England, see Jenny Hale Pulsipher, Subjects Unto the Same King: Indians, 
English, and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005); for mid-
eighteenth century imperial governance, see Gregory Evans Dowd, War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations & the British 
Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 174-211.  In several articles, Katherine Hermes adopts a middle path that 
stresses legal colonization as a “gradual process.” Katherine A. Hermes, “‘Justice Will Be Done Us’: Algonquian Demands for 
Reciprocity in the Courts of European Settlers,” in The Many Legalities of Early America (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro 
Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, by the University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Katherine 
A. Hermes, “The Law of Native Americans, to 1815,” in The Cambridge History of Law in America (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
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robbed, plundered, and murdered [Indians] at pleasure,” Arthur St. Clair fulminated.  But 
these crimes also went unpunished: “I have never heard that any person was ever brought 
to due justice and punishment,” St. Clair continued. South of the Ohio, federal Indian 
agent Silas Dinsmore was equally frustrated.  “[O]ur own people are the aggressors, & 
we suffer the guilty to pass . .  . unpunished,” Dinsmore complained.    He continued: 
“Let us no longer boast of our civilization, of an equitable government and salutary laws, 
if we cannot adduce one fact to authenticate the theory.”65 
That federal officials could not enforce federal law within a region where the 
federal government enjoyed “sole and exclusive” jurisdiction is, perhaps, surprising.  But 
federal officials had a ready explanation that historians have readily credited: bias.  “It is 
the prevailing opinion of the people in general upon the frontiers, that it is no harm to kill 
an Indian,” a federal military officer informed Henry Knox.  Knox himself complained 
that the “frontier people generally” not only “lessen the criminality” of “killing of 
peaceable Indians” but in fact “confer a degree of merit” on the crime.  George 
Washington, for his part, blamed “jealousies and prejudices” for forestalling “efficient 
measures” in redressing harms to Indians.66  
Federal officials were not wrong to place blame on territorial citizens.  But their 
pat explanation obscured how the complicated institutions and politics that characterized 
the territories had also acted to undermine federal authority. 
 
                                                
65 “Address of Governor St. Clair to the Territorial Legislature, at the Opening of the Second Session, at Chillicothe” November 5, 
1800, in SCP, 501-10; Silas Dinsmore to John Sevier, March 8, 1797, Box 2, Folder 2, John Sevier Papers, 1796-1801, First 
Administration, Governor’s Papers, Tennessee State Library and Archive. 
66 Josiah Harmar to Henry Knox, March 18, 1787, Vol. 28, Letterbook B, pp. 55-59, JHP; Henry Knox to George Washington, 
December 27, 1790, in PGW:PS, 7:121-27; Washington to Pendleton, January 22, 1795. 
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There was only a single court system within the “ordinary jurisdiction” of the 
territories: the federally created territorial courts.  In structure, the territorial courts 
resembled the two-tier systems that existed in most states: local county courts and an 
appellate court created by the Northwest Ordinance known as the “General” or 
“Supreme” Court.  (In the Southwest Territory, rather than a single General Court, there 
were three regional Superior Courts, a holdover from North Carolinian practice.)  But in 
other respects, the territorial courts were more like Article III federal courts, which did 
not exist in the territories.  The judges were all federal appointees: General Court judges 
were selected by the President and confirmed by Congress, while county judges, as well 
as local clerks, sheriffs, and other officials, were all chosen by federally appointed 
governor.  In that sense, federal authority reached deep into territorial governance.  And, 
except for the congressionally appointed appellate judges, who enjoyed lifetime tenure, 
every other federal official in the territory, from the governor on down, served at the 
pleasure of the President, and could be dismissed at will.67   
For men like Henry Knox, the federal nature of these courts was important.  As 
national institutions, the federal courts were supposed to transcend local bias, a vision 
expressed in the creation of diversity jurisdiction over suits by citizens of different states, 
and the right to remove such suits from state to federal courts, in the Constitution and 
                                                
67 Northwest Ordinance, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50 (1789).  Literature on the territorial courts is relatively sparse.  Some exceptions include 
Andrew Cayton, “Law and Authority in the Northwest Territory,” in The History of Ohio Law, ed. Michael Les Benedict and John F. 
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1789 Judiciary Act.  The Washington Administration similarly looked to the federal 
courts to secure justice to Natives free from local prejudice.  George Washington referred 
a group of Senecas from upstate New York to the federal courts for justice, just as Arthur 
St. Clair argued that Pennsylvanians who attacked some Haudenausonee traveling under 
federal protection “should be prosecuted in the Federal Court.”    From 1793 onward, the 
Trade and Intercourse Acts codified this approach.  Though the first version of the statute 
had merely required that crimes against Natives be adjudicated in the “same manner” as 
crimes against whites, the 1793 statute explicitly ceded jurisdiction over capital crimes 
under the Act to the federal circuit courts, while jurisdiction over all other offenses would 
be in federal district courts.  In an acknowledgment of the parallels between the Article 
III courts and the territorial courts, the statute provided that, in the territories, capital 
jurisdiction would lie with the General Court, while lesser offenses would be tried in the 
county courts.68 
Many territorial judges, as well as territorial officials, did prove assiduous in their 
efforts to punish crimes against Natives.  Judges like Rufus Putnam and Joseph Anderson 
in the Northwest and Southwest Territories respectively specifically called for the legal 
protection of Natives in their charges to grand juries, while Governors St. Clair and 
Blount and Secretaries Sargent and Smith constantly pressed for the prosecution of 
crimes against Indians.69  
In many ways, this result occurred precisely for the reasons Knox and others 
thought the federal courts would be more reliable in executing federal policy.  Unelected 
                                                
68 Gov. Arthur St. Clair to Secretary of War, April 19, 1791, in SCP, 203-05; Act of July 22, 1790, § 5; Act of March 1, 1793, § 10. 
69 “Charge to Grand Jury, General Court,” Box 1, Folder 1, Local Government Records, Marietta College Library (This document is 
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territorial judges and executives had little dependence on the local populace; they were 
far more oriented toward their superiors in Philadelphia.  Judge Campbell even sought to 
ingratiate himself with Secretary of State Jefferson by sending the Secretary copies of his 
grand jury charges urging prosecution of those who harmed Natives.  But officials’ 
insulation from local pressures also allowed them, at least in their view, to assess the 
situation impartially.  Prosecuting and executing Indian killers was not only “humane,” 
they stressed, but also “political,” in the eighteenth-century meaning of good policy: by 
“convinc[ing] the Indians that we mean to do justice,” federal punishment would 
“prevent retaliation upon some innocent persons.”70 
Not unrelatedly, federal officials’ commitment to protect Native peoples had a 
substantial class component.  These men were hardly egalitarians; rather, they tended to 
regard Natives through a haze of patronizing pity that the well-born felt for the weak and 
helpless.   “As we are now powerful and more enlightened than [the Indians] are,” Knox 
wrote, “there is a responsibility of national character, that we should treat them with 
kindness and even liberality.”  This feeling of noblesse oblige translated into a sense of 
official duty.  As Natives “are less capable of Seeking Legal redress for wrongs don them 
then other people,” Northwest territorial judge Rufus Putnam charged a Marietta grand 
jury, “it is the more incumbent on all officers of Government and Courts of Justice, ex 
oficio, to seek out and bring to punishment those who may have ben guilty of Trespasses 
against them.”71 
                                                
70 David Campbell to Secretary of State, February 25, 1792, in TP: Vol. IV, 121-28; David Campbell to President, November 9, 1791, 
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This same class prejudice led federal officials to distance themselves from 
virulent anti-Indian views, which they disdained as vulgar.  In contradistinction to the 
lawless white rabble they believed perpetrated crimes against Natives, these officials 
believed themselves as members of the “dispassionate and enlightened part of mankind,” 
which embraced “justice and moderation” towards the Indians; it was their peers, they 
felt, whose approval they had to secure.  This commitment made officials immune to the 
torrents of anti-Indian rhetoric spilled in territorial newspapers and political broadcasts.  
“[T]hough we hear much of the Injuries . . . committed by the Indians upon the Whites,” 
St. Clair wrote, that “equal if not grate Injuries are done to the Indians by the frontier 
settlers of which we hear very little.”  George Washington similarly noted that the 
Natives, “poor wretches, have no press through which their grievances are related.”72 
If early American law had simply been the enactment of the will of officialdom, 
then, many crimes against Natives would have received swift and decisiveness 
punishment.  But, even in a place where law ostensibly rested in the hands of a single 
sovereign, these federal officials found that the checks on governmental authority, both 
formal and practical, constantly thwarted their aims. 
One challenge was that territorial law was geographically bounded.  Like Natives, 
U.S. citizens readily took advantage of their borderland location to hop between 
jurisdictions.  Many alleged criminals either came from or fled to places outside 
territorial officials’ authority; Kentucky, sandwiched between the territories, was an 
                                                
72 Gov. Arthur St. Clair to Henry Knox, January 27, 1788, in SCP, 2:40-42; George Washington to Edmund Pendleton, January 22, 
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especially common destination.  In those instances, notwithstanding that the states were 
ostensibly part of the same polity as the territories, federal officials became just as 
dependent on the whim of another jurisdiction’s officials as when Natives fled to Indian 
country or Spanish territory. All St. Clair, Winthrop Sargent, or Blount could do was 
appeal to states’ governors to assist in apprehending criminals.  The Constitution 
ostensibly mandated extradition, but popularly elected officials in places where neither 
Natives, nor the federal government, nor Arthur St. Clair were held in high esteem 
crafted legal theories around this requirement.  So, despite formal requests, it seems that 
the sought-after criminals were rarely extradited.73   
Federal and state jurisdictions could, in fact, prove quite hostile.  In one instance 
when federal soldiers entered a Kentucky town directly to try to apprehend a criminal for 
an alleged murder of a Native, a near riot resulted, with the Kentuckians’ loud complaints 
prompting a court-martial for expedition’s commanding officer.  In another case, some 
North Carolinians killed two Cherokees peaceably trading there.  They then dispatched a 
Cherokee woman they had captured back into Cherokee country with a letter that blamed 
the killing on “the people of the territory south of Ohio,” in an avowed effort, William 
Blount believed, to bring the Cherokees’ wrath on the Territory.  But, because the 
offenders were outside the Southwest Territory, Blount could not punish them directly.74  
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 Another challenge was the legal bar on Native testimony, which restricted most 
Natives from testifying in court against non-Natives.  Neither federal nor territorial law 
mandated this prohibition; it stemmed rather from the long-standing common-law 
proscription against non-Christian testimony, which itself was shifting during the period.  
Territorial officials often complained about this restriction, particularly with respect to 
illegal sales of liquor to Indians, and occasionally resorted to official fiat to avoid its 
constraints.  And officials did not apply its strictures to Natives who could plausibly 
claim to be Christian, as in the case of the Cherokee Richard Finnelson, who was allowed 
to swear a deposition “[a]fter having the nature of an oath explained, and declaring that 
he believed in the doctrines contained in the New Testament, and its divine authority.”  
But despite these frustrations and circumventions, neither Congress nor the territorial 
legislatures abolished the restriction.  In the territories, this may have stemmed from an 
ongoing controversy over whether the Northwest Ordinance obligated the territorial 
legislature to adopt preexisting statutes from the states or whether it empowered them to 
craft wholly new laws—a position urged by the territorial judges, who pointed for the 
need for regulations that would protect “the natives.”  But it also stemmed from a deep 
and widespread veneration for the common law, which was enshrined in the Northwest 
Ordinance and described by the territorial judges as “the birth-right of the citizen.”75 
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Territorial officials were also far more focused on the consequences of another 
common-law right, one explicitly enshrined in the Northwest Ordinance: the requirement 
that territorial inhabitants “shall always be entitled” to a trial by jury.  In the territories, 
juries seemed to foil all federal officials’ efforts to punish crimes against Natives.  “A 
Jury will hardly be found” in the Southwest Territory, William Blount reported, that 
would convict for killing an Indian.   “There had never been one instance of a white man 
condemned and hanged by white men, on the frontier, for the murder of an Indian, since 
the first landing in America,” Connecticut Representative Jeremiah Wadsworth 
hyperbolically informed Congress in 1795.  “No jury would bring the criminal in 
guilty.”76 
The failure of jurors to indict and convict criminals for crimes against Natives 
was a particular bête noir for Governor Arthur St. Clair.  In one especially glaring 
instance in 1795, two Pottomattomies in federal custody were being transported to jail in 
Cahokia, in the Illinois country, escorted by a militia guard and the county sheriff, when 
they were killed “in open Day Light.”  After St. Clair issued a proclamation against the 
crime, two inhabitants of St. Clair County were arrested and brought before the grand 
jury in the local court in Kaskaskia.  But even though the “most positive testimony was 
adduced,” the jury refused to indict.  St. Clair specifically instructed the prosecutor to try 
again when the court moved to Cahokia, also in the county, where the judge made a “very 
pathetic charge” to the jury.  Still, St. Clair bemoaned, the grand jury failed to cooperate.  
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The prosecutor then tried to indict the men for manslaughter, but the jury similarly 
refused to acquiesce.  Secretary of War James McHenry sought to console St. Clair.  It 
was “deeply regretted” that such crimes were “connived at by a jury,” but, he lamented, 
juries were “only medium thro’ which the Culprits can be punished.”  St. Clair was not 
convinced.  Though he did not propose eliminating juries altogether—even for a man as 
hierarchical as St. Clair, juries were too sacred to be abolished—he did suggest that they 
be heavily controlled.  The government, he urged, should “compel jurors to do their 
duties” by prosecuting them for violating their oaths and by levying a “heavy” fine on 
counties that allowed perpetrators to go free—a proposal the higher-ups never adopted.77 
Federal officials did not deeply ponder why juries seemed to acquit these crimes 
so freely.  They found no mystery: jurors were irredeemably prejudiced against Natives 
and so incapable of doing justice.  But their insistence that juries never punished 
offenders who harmed Indians, or that the local population always sanctioned such 
violence, was overbroad.  In Nashville, for instance, even before the advent of territorial 
government, a local jury convicted David Wallace for beating the Chickasaw chief 
William Glover.  In 1793, when unknown assailants killed the “well known and 
esteemed” Chickasaw chief John Morris only six hundred paces from William Blount’s 
Knoxville home, local residents were outraged: thirty of them joined a (fruitless) posse to 
hunt for the killers.  The previous year, when Southwest Territory resident James 
Hubbard shot at four Cherokee women and a Cherokee man, the Knoxville Gazette had 
mocked Hubbard and stressed that his actions were “generally held in abhorrence.”  
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January 1796, in TP: Vol. II, 542.  For another instance when St. Clair bemoaned a jury acquittal, see St. Clair, “Address of Governor 
St. Clair.” 
  299 
Clearly targeting elite opinion, the newspaper had thought this statement “necessary,” 
“[l]est it should be supposed by such as are unacquainted with the frontier settlers, that 
such conduct meets their approbation.”  And as discussed earlier, grand jurors in 
Vincennes indicted multiple white defendants for violence against Natives even in cases 
where the testimony seemed to support credible claims for self-defense; the final verdicts 
in these cases are unknown.78 
What seemed to distinguish these incidents from the acquittals that St. Clair and 
others lamented was context.  Glover and Morris were Chickasaws, a nation widely 
known for its firm allegiance to the United States.  By contrast, the acquittal of the 
murderers of the Pottawatomies took place on a war-scarred frontier, where peace had not 
yet been officially declared and where memories of Native attacks were quite fresh.  The 
Pottawatomies, in fact, had been jailed “on suspicion of their being a war party.”  In these 
circumstances, the jurors may have interpreted the killing less as an unjustified murder 
and more as a legitimate act of war.79 
St. Clair and Sargent did not view it that way; since the Natives were in federal 
custody, they regarded the crime as an affront to government.  In a sense, St. Clair and 
Sargent were likely right.  The early American judiciary, and especially juries, had long 
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been conceived as a bulwark of resistance against governmental overreach.  Judicial 
politics were particularly intense in the territories, where the avenues to express popular 
disapproval of governmental action that existed elsewhere—elections, legislatures, town 
and county governance—were largely foreclosed.   
Jury verdicts thus became one of the only vehicles for territorial citizens to 
register their discontent with federal policy, particularly toward Indians.  Territorial 
citizens facing Native attacks felt themselves neglected and abandoned by the federal 
government, a view only reinforced when arrogant men like St. Clair and Sargent seemed 
more committed to protecting Indians than the nation’s own citizens.  William Blount, far 
more concerned about popular support than St. Clair or Sargent, interpreted jurors’ 
acquittals for crimes against Indians as a rebuke to governmental inaction. “The Indians 
have killed in the most cruel and inhuman manner our nearest and dearest Friends,” 
William Blount imagined jurors stating when asked to convict an Indian killer, “and 
Government has made no demand of Blood in Satisfaction.”  Given these facts, “why 
should we by our Verdict give Blood either to satisfy the Government or the [Indian] 
Nation[?]”80 
This conflation between federal authority and justice for Natives played out 
especially clearly in Cincinnati.  Though the town was the capital of the Northwest 
Territory, neither Arthur St. Clair nor Winthrop Sargent, with their seemingly imperious 
demands for obedience, was held in high regard there.  Sargent in particular, recollected 
by territorial residents as a “proud, haughty man” who wanted “to make every Person 
submit to his will,” had been at odds with territorial inhabitants since his arrival.  After 
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trying, and failing, to get a grand jury to indict several young men who had mocked him 
in Marietta, Sargent moved to Cincinnati, where he found himself in near open warfare 
with local residents.  Twice he confronted near-riots as residents fired off guns in reckless 
disregard, Sargent thought, of territorial law.  But his efforts to compel justice were 
ineffective. In Hamilton County, which encompassed Cincinnati, Sargent complained, 
“the great invaluable blessing of Trial by Juries . . . is perverted to a Curse.”  The 
county’s veniremen were characterized by “uncountrouled Licentiousness,” and any 
magistrate who attempted to enforce the law would “become the Object of their highest 
Displeasure.”  Sargent’s judgment was only confirmed when, several years later, a 
Hamilton County grand jury indicted him on a trumped-up charge of usurpation.81 
These preexisting tensions prompted and colored what amounted to an anti-Indian 
riot that broke out in Cincinnati in September 1794, right at the end of the Northwest 
Indian War.  The riot began, once again, as a drinking affair.  A number of Choctaws and 
Chickasaws, serving at William Blount’s behest as Native allies in the federal campaign 
against the Ohio nations, had passed through Cincinnati on their return to the Southwest 
Territory. According to subsequent testimony, the Natives were at the store of Major 
Zeigler, a former army officer, drinking whiskey “& Diverting themselves in their way,” 
when a Mr. Findley came up and demanded that the Indians go away, claiming they were 
disturbing a sick person.  As the “intoxicated” Choctaws and Chickasaws dispersed, one 
                                                
81 “Copy From a Manuscript in the Hand Writing of Major Horace Nye (son of Ichabod) of Putnam Ohio prepared about 1847 for Dr. 
Hildreth” (typescript copy), Box 2, MS 210, Marietta, Ohio Collection, Ohio Historical Society; Griffin Greene to “Peter,” c. 1791, 
Northwest Territory Collection, Clements Library, University of Michigan; Winthrop Sargent to Arthur St. Clair, February 7, 1793, 
TP, Vol. II, 432-33; John Cleves Symmes to Winthrop Sargent, January 7, 1793, Reel 3, WSP; Winthrop Sargent to Arthur St. Clair, 
January 20, 1793, Reel 4, ASCP.  For information on Sargent’s abortive efforts to prosecute residents in Marietta , see “Journal of 
Colonel Ichabod Nye (typescript),” p. 97, Folder 2, Box 3, MS 210, Marietta, Ohio Collection, Ohio Historical Society. As territorial 
secretary, Sargent was tasked with acting as governor during St. Clair’s frequent absences.  Sargent had been filling this role when, 
unbeknownst to him, St. Clair returned to another part of the territory.  The grand jury indicted Sargent for unconstitutionally 
exercising St. Clair’s duties.  See Winthrop Sargent to Secretary of State, September 30, 1796, in TP: Vol. III, 456-68. 
  302 
who spoke English told Findley, “me Major Gen’l”—presumably alluding to his military 
service.   Findley did not take this assertion of rank by a Native well.  He responded, 
“you may go to hell,” and then said it again.  A scuffle ensued—the testimony disagreed 
about who began it—but knives were drawn, and Findley and his accomplices beat 
several of the Choctaws.82 
 But in a town at war, the matter did not end there.  A rumor spread that the 
Choctaws had captured a white female child, “naked, bound, and suffering.”  The story 
was poppycock; in fact, it fit so well with the tropes of anti-Indian rhetoric, and was so 
well calculated to appeal to Cincinnatians’ racial and gender anxieties, that Sargent 
suspected it was invented solely to justify what followed—a “very general Muster of 
armed men,” including some who arrived from neighboring towns.  The men paraded 
through the streets firing guns, and approached the camp multiple times, insisting that 
they would take an Indian’s scalp.  There, they faced off against the federal soldiers that 
Sargent had hurriedly posted to protect the Choctaws, who safeguarded the Natives until 
their departure several days later.  But the Indians were not the only target of the riots’ 
wrath: unknown assailants fired two bullets into Winthrop Sargent’s house.83 
 Sargent was a whirlwind in response to the riots, marching out to demand that the 
residents disperse, dashing off orders to the fort’s commandant and local magistrates, 
issuing an official proclamation promising that “every legal exertion” would be used for 
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punishment.  But his hopes were disappointed: a grand jury indicted only two of the 
perpetrators for assault and battery, one of whom was acquitted because the principal 
witness was absent, another who, “by Delay of Process,” escaped.  Sargent wrote a 
scathing letter to the district attorney in response, accusing him of a litany of errors and 
mistakes in bringing the perpetrators to justice.  In the end, Sargent concluded in a letter 
to the Secretary of State, “the civil authority in Hamilton County is inadequate to afford 
protection to the Indians.”  The reason he ascribed was revealing. The grand jury, Sargent 
lamented, was neither “generally disposed (I believe) to do justice to the red people, or 
sufficiently sensible of their Dependence upon, and Obligation to the general 
Government.”   Hostility toward Indians, in short, twinned with contempt for federal 
authority, which were increasingly coming to be seen as the same thing.84 
 As Sargent implied, the problem of resistance to federal aims was not confined to 
jurors, but pervaded the territorial judiciary.  The power of appointment, it turned out, 
provided only limited control, especially in thinly populated places where the territorial 
governors were hard-pressed to find prominent local citizens with the requisite legal 
knowledge:  it was “impossible,” St. Clair proclaimed, to find judges who would act “in a 
strictly legal manner.”    So, particularly in the territorial county courts—many of which 
had merely shifted from North Carolinian or Virginian control to federal jurisdiction with 
a simple caption change in the minute book—the territorial governors had had little 
choice but to continue the same local notables as judges and justices of the peace.  As a 
result, St. Clair, Sargent, and Blount found themselves relying on local judges who were 
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often no more sympathetic to federal policies than local jurors.  In fact, St. Clair and 
Sargent got into a bitter struggle over federal authority with Cincinnati judges who 
refused to accept appointments at pleasure, citing the Declaration of Independence for 
support.  District attorneys were no different.  Governor Blount sent instructions to the 
federal district attorney for the Mero District—a young and rising Andrew Jackson—to 
make “Examples of the first Violators” of the Treaty of Holston by public prosecution, at 
the same moment Jackson was fulminating in his own correspondence about the useless 
of Indian treaties.85 
 High federal officials hoped for better things from the judges of the General 
Court, selected directly by Congress and the President, but here, too, they were often 
disappointed.  In the Southwest Territory, federal officials had felt constrained to appoint 
prominent locals who did not necessarily agree with Knox’s larger vision.  Even as he 
was lecturing juries on the need to prosecute criminals who harmed Indians, for instance, 
Judge Campbell of the Southwest Territory was living in what he dubbed an “intrusion 
castle” on unceded Cherokee lands in explicit violation of the Trade and Intercourse 
Act.86  
 In the Northwest Territory, the problem was less territorial judges’ dislike of 
federal policy than their distaste for its representatives, in the form of St. Clair and 
Sargent.  Judge Symmes had fought with the two executives upon first arriving in the 
Territory, when they had differed over law and land matters.  He quickly set himself up 
as the champion of the people of Cincinnati against Sargent, refusing to help the 
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Secretary reestablish order during the town’s repeated convulsions.  “The strength of 
government consists not in the will of the magistrate but in the support given him by the 
people,” Symmes didactically informed Sargent.  Sargent grumbled that Symmes was 
taking “an active part to Sedition—popularity is his Aim,” and was convinced that the 
judge would “attempt to stab me in the Back” with the President. But in the end, it was 
St. Clair whom Symmes tried to dispatch: when St. Clair’s reappointment was on the 
line, Symmes wrote to the President to inform him that St. Clair’s dismissal would elate 
“thousands” in the Territory. In his litany of complaints, Symmes singled out St. Clair’s 
Indian policy for attack.  “Outrageous, if a citizen charged with the murder of an Indian, 
be acquitted by a jury of the country,” Symmes stated in a sarcastic tone, “he [St. Clair] 
can calmly look on and see citizens Murdered by Indians, without one effort of the 
executive to bring the murderers to a trial.”  As we have seen, Symmes was no Indian-
hater, but he was happy to adopt their rhetoric—especially the assertion that St. Clair’s 
efforts were biased against territorial citizens— 
to undermine his political enemy.87 
A particularly outré case was Northwest Territorial Judge George Turner, who 
was close friends with Symmes until they fell out over lands.  Turner had had his own 
disagreements with Sargent and St. Clair, and even with a “surprized, and mortified” 
President Washington, who had had to peremptorily order Turner to his territorial post 
when the judge lingered too long in Philadelphia.  Despite his apparent dislike for the 
territories, Turner nonetheless seemed sympathetic to frontier complaints against Indians.  
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When two Pottawomaties were killed in the Illinois country while in federal custody, 
rumor had it that the “the most Excellent Judge approved of the Deed, and took no 
measures to apprehend the murders.”88   
But Turner was willing to enforce the Trade and Intercourse Act, bringing one of 
the few recorded prosecutions under the law in the Northwest Territory.  Yet his motives 
did not seem to include upholding federal policy, and the suit did little to convince 
territorial citizens of federal goodwill.  Turner traveled to Vincennes in summer 1794 to 
hold a special session of the General Court, even though a single judge likely lacked the 
authority to convene such a session.  From the moment he arrived on the dock on the 
Wabash—allegedly “so drunk he could not ascend without assistance”—Turner stirred 
controversy.  Based on slim testimony, he charged the operators of a barge with trading 
with the Indians without a license in violation of the Trade and Intercourse Act.  As 
provided under the Act, the sheriff seized the men’s goods—which Turner then kept for 
his own use, reportedly using an oil cloth for a tent cover, and transferring the silver, red 
blankets, knives, and other items on his own boat in the Wabash.  Turner’s actions caused 
a tremendous uproar in Vincennes, and led to an indictment by the grand jury in St. Clair 
County, as well as complaints to Congress of his “tyranny and oppressions,” including 
the “forfeitures” of “property of citizens quietly travelling on the Ohio.”  Because of the 
distance, the Attorney General recommended that Turner be indicted before the General 
Court of the Northwest Territory rather than be impeached.  Ultimately, Turner resigned.  
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A jury, meanwhile, acquitted the defendants of the charges under the Trade and 
Intercourse Act.89   
 Like many of the struggles over justice in the territories, the controversy provoked 
by Turner, with nary a Native involved, makes it easy to forget that actual Native peoples 
were the original cause for these disputes.  But this absence is revealing.  Even for would-
be humanitarians like Knox, the abstract insistence on justice for Natives was as much 
about these officials’ own self-conceptions as about real Natives.  And in the territories, 
aligning justice for Natives with federal authority almost completely subsumed Native 
issues within contentious struggles over federal power, even as the testimonial rules 
literally silenced Native voices from court proceedings.  Legal wranglings ensued: 
despite its formal reliance on a single federal sovereign, the territorial legal system 
allowed judges, governors, juries, and even other jurisdictions to all jockey for power.  
But this was what early American courts did.  In many ways, it was this proliferation of 
institutional checks and independence from direct governmental control that conferred 
legitimacy on the courts.  But precisely because early Americans courts were envisioned 
as institutions to limit executive power, tying justice for Natives to a model of law as the 
command of the President, his cabinet, and power-hungry territorial officials ensured that 
lengthy and protracted court battles would ensue. 
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   Knox’s vision that the federal government would intervene as impartial arbiter in 
disputes between Natives and white settlers presaged later efforts both to subjugate 
Natives to federal criminal jurisdiction and to use federal judicial power to protect the 
rights of unpopular local minorities—processes that would reach their zenith nearly a 
century later.  In the late eighteenth century, however, efforts to hold Natives and 
territorial citizens legally accountable for crimes against each other failed, and for similar 
reasons.  The law proved a poor implement to achieve Knox’s goals.  In part, the 
challenge was jurisdictional: territorially bounded legal spheres proved ineffectual at 
policing a fluid borderland, where people could easily pass across boundaries that laws 
could not.  But it was also because formal law and territorial institutions severely limited 
what territorial officials could accomplish.  Knox’s vision of Olympian justice delivered 
from on high simply did not acknowledge the realities of the early republic, in which 
decentralized institutions--treaties, juries, and local judges—limited the reach of federal 
authority even in places ostensibly under the federal government’s sole control.   
* * * 
Failure is in the eye of the beholder.  Knox’s efforts did not stop violence between 
Natives and white settlers.  But in the long term, Knox’s three principles arguably 
succeeded, albeit in tragic ways distant from Knox’s brand of imperialist benevolence. 
Federal law did not restrain both Natives and white settlers, as Knox had envisioned.  
Rather, the quest for separating Natives from whites helped produce the ethnic cleansings 
of the nineteenth century, as the United States forcibly removed Natives behind what 
seemed like the most unambiguous boundary of all, the Mississippi River.  The desire to 
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punish cross-cultural violence as crime resulted in increasingly aggressive assertions of 
Anglo-American, and ultimately federal, jurisdiction over Natives, including within 
Indian country, where federal and Native jurisdiction became ever more entangled.   
But in the 1790s, all this lay in the future.  At the time, the federal government 
lacked the power to exercise the jurisdiction it ostensibly enjoyed, unable to compel 
either Natives or its own citizens to obey federal laws.  As we have seen, this resulted as 
much from the tensions within federal law and governance—their failure to understand 
the roots of cross-cultural violence, their institutional structures, and their own internal 
ambiguities—as from the long-standing entrenchment of contrary laws and practices.  
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Chapter 5: Laws of War or Peace 
In 1794, territorial judge Joseph Anderson lectured the grand jury of the Hamilton 
District, Southwest Territory on the civic duty.  “Confidence in the general government—
an adherence to the principles of the constitution—a due observance of its laws, are the 
true characteristics of a good citizen.”  These, for Anderson, were not simply abstract 
principles, but pointed remarks directed toward a crisis in the Territory.  “Should any 
citizen be so hardy, as to overleap the bounds of duty, and in defiance of the laws, 
unwarrantably attack the friendly Cherokees,” Anderson instructed, “this Territory will 
not only be involved in war with them, but the whole frontier will be again exposed to the 
wanton depredations of the perfidious and barbarous Creeks.”  Anderson summed up: 
“Upon ourselves, it now depends, whether to choose peace or war."1 
War and peace were ubiquitous terms in the early American borderlands.  All 
parties professed to desire peace, and yet war seemed to be the perpetual condition west 
of the Appalachians: one commentator observed that frontiers had not “had six years of 
peace since the first settlement of the country, or shall have for fifty years to come.”  
Natives and Anglo-Americans seemed trapped in endless cycles of raids and counter-
raids.  Henry Knox believed federal supremacy offered a solution here as well.  As 
enshrined in the Constitution’s provision granting Congress the power to declare war, the 
federal government would now possess the sole authority to legitimate and authorize 
organized violence against Natives.2 
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The effect of this federal assertion in the territories was neither acquiescence nor 
defiance, but a roiling debate over the scope and authority of federal law.  Everyone in 
the territories—federal officials, Natives, territorial citizens—had a view about the 
meaning and legitimacy of the federal efforts.  The discussion quickly became a legal 
controversy—a fight over the meaning and application of the very categories of war and 
peace.  In one sense, the struggle seemed yet another conflict between custom and formal 
law.  On one side were the long-standing borderland practices of violence that blurred the 
boundaries between conflict and its absence, and between state and non-state violence.  
On the other side were the new, centralized, formal definitions that would be decided in 
Philadelphia and imposed on the territories.  But this sharp contrast is misleading.  At the 
core of the debate, as Anderson’s charge to the jury suggested, loomed the U.S. 
Constitution; even Native peoples learned about, and discussed, the Constitution’s 
implications for borderland violence.  But the Constitution was ambiguous; it did not 
define war and peace.  The debates over violence in the territories took place in that gap, 
which officials, citizens, and Natives all sought to fill; it also became a hotly contested 
struggle over who, exactly, was empowered to make this judgment between war and 
peace. 
 For all that borderland violence and, recently, the laws of war have fascinated 
historians, this early debate over definitions has largely passed unnoticed, with such 
arcana left to the pages of law reviews, which treat the subject as a question that never 
left the confines of Congress or the President’s House.  But if anything, the controversy 
flowed the other way: the contentions in the borderlands came to infect Congress, which 
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seemed equally unable to resolve who was authorized to exercise violence, and when.  
But the resulting confusion was consequential.  It helped ensure that, Knox’s hopes 
notwithstanding, the lines between war and peace, between authorized violence on behalf 
of the national state and what early Americans labeled “unauthorized expeditions,” 
remained vague and unsettled on the borderlands well into the nineteenth century.3 
* * * 
As we have seen, the threat of war—of organized violence between the United 
States and Natives as nations—lurked behind all violence in the borderlands, which was 
one reason federal officials struggled so hard to prevent it.  But beyond the secretive or 
impromptu murders that fell under the purview of the criminal law, there was another, 
more organized form of violence in territories explicitly cast as a form of warfare.  This 
consisted of what government officials termed “irregular and unauthorized 
expeditions”—self-organized military campaigns of territorial citizens into Indian 
country.  For federal officials like Knox, such expeditions arrogated to citizens the right 
to decide questions of war and peace that legally rested with the federal government, and 
so had to be suppressed.4 
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These expeditions institutionalized the doctrine of retaliation.  In the wake of 
Native attacks, frontier settlers would gather and march into Indian country, seeking 
revenge against the tribes they believed responsible.  Though rarely formally sanctioned 
by the government, these expeditions often claimed quasi-official status--the participants 
were frequently mustered as militiamen, and they were usually led by a prominent local 
leader who assumed the title of “colonel” or “general.”  Such self-organized operations 
had a long pedigree on both the southwestern and northwestern frontiers.  During the 
Revolution, when many Natives allied with the British, North Carolinian and Kentuckian 
militia had destroyed Cherokee and Shawnee villages with little outside aid or oversight.  
In the context of brutal, disorganized violence of the borderlands, these expeditions 
represented a potent way for decentralized and cash-strapped governments to wage war.5 
But with the Treaty of Paris in 1783, such violence outside governmental control 
became a threat to the tenuous peace that officials sought to create in the territories.  
Despite their military trappings, the expeditions more closely resembled the era’s urban 
mobs than a military campaign.  Their participants were gangs of ill-disciplined and 
refractory armed men, over whom their purported leaders enjoyed only nominal control.  
And like rioters, they enforced their own norms of justice and legality, which held 
Natives collectively responsible for frontier violence.  As a result, their attacks were often 
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indiscriminate in selecting their victims, falling on whichever Native village they found 
heedless of culpability.6 
Two attacks in the 1780s epitomize these expeditions’ weak structures of 
authority and their brutal willingness to seek revenge against all Indians.  In 1786, in 
response to Native attacks, roughly two thousand Kentucky militia crossed into the 
Northwest Territory in two columns under the commands of General George Rogers 
Clark, a Revolutionary War hero, and Colonel Benjamin Logan.  Clark’s men mutinied, 
returning to Kentucky “in vile Disorder.”  But while the Shawnee warriors were away 
defending against Clark, Logan’s men marched into Shawnee territory largely 
unopposed, where they proceeded to burn seven Shawnee towns.  At one town, Logan 
was met by Melonthy, a Shawnee chief who attended the Treaty of Fort Finney.  Well 
known as a “Friend to the United States,” Melonthy raised the American flag on the 
column’s approach and came out bearing a copy of the treaty.  Taken prisoner, Melonthy 
was then shot down in defiance of orders by an officer named McGeery.  Having killed a 
half-dozen other Shawnees and taken several dozen women and children prisoner, Logan 
and his men returned to Kentucky, where they displayed Melonthy’s flag as a trophy at 
the Lexington court house.7 
 Logan’s campaign had its echo in an attack led by John Sevier, the erstwhile 
governor of abortive secessionist state of Franklin in the Tennessee Country, against the 
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Upper Cherokees in 1788.  Receiving word that Cherokees from the town of Chilhowee 
were responsible for the recent killing of the Kirk family, Sevier led his men deep into 
Cherokee territory, destroying several Cherokee towns and killing nearly thirty 
Cherokees.  According to depositions from participants, when they arrived in Chilhowee, 
the Cherokee leader Old Tassel, well known to the North Carolinians, raised a white flag.  
Some of the militia pushed to kill Tassel anyway, leading Sevier to intervene: “Shurly 
Not,” he reportedly exclaimed, “Would you be so Cruel as to Kill Any person that 
Submitted to our Mercy?”  Sevier then posted a guard and ordered the prisoners not to be 
hurt “by any means.”  But as Sevier walked away, a party of the militia swarmed the 
guard.  One of them pointed a cocked gun at him, demanding that either the guard move 
“or he would make daylight shine through him.”  When the guard gave way, John Kirk, 
whose mother, brother, and sisters had all been killed in Indian attacks, rushed in and 
killed the prisoners, including Tassel.8   
On Sevier’s return several minutes later, he was outraged, declaring how 
“disgracefull And inhuman it Was to put prisoners to death.”  But Sevier then had to 
intervene to prevent his men from killing a Cherokee woman as well as a “half breed 
indian” named Charles Murphy, “beg[ging]” his men, “for god Sake they would not kill 
him.”  Murphy was spared, but only after much grumbling: Sevier’s plea for mercy gave 
“great umbridge to the whole Army and some said it would be Well done to kill any Man 
that would Save an Indian.”   If leaders like Sevier were not willing to enforce these 
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norms, other men would.  Mere days after Sevier’s attack, another expedition led by a 
man named Alexander Outlaw destroyed the Cherokee town of Citio, “where he found a 
few helpless women and children, which he inhumanely murdered, exposing their private 
parts in the most shameful manner, leaving a young child, with both its arms broke, alive, 
at the breast of its dead mother.”9 
 Such expeditions horrified both state and federal governments, who sought to 
hold the participants legally accountable.  Successive governors of Virginia sent 
instructions to Kentucky to institute “all proper legal inquiries” for punishing such 
“unjust violences.”   In response to Sevier’s “most cruel and unjustifiable” attack, North 
Carolina’s governor issued a proclamation that “strictly enjoin[ed]” all state citizens from 
entering Cherokee territory; the Continental Congress similarly issued a proclamation 
condemning the attacks and contemplating using federal forces to expel intruders on 
Cherokee lands.  But these efforts were ineffectual: reports soon reached North 
Carolina’s governor that two more attacks on Cherokees had occurred in defiance of his 
proclamation.  The norms sanctioning such expeditions were too powerful to be 
counteracted by distant state and federal governments.10 
 Preventing expeditions unsanctioned by government was a principal goal for 
Henry Knox as he recrafted Indian affairs.   “If so direct and manifest contempt of the 
authority of the United States be suffered with impunity, it will be vain to attempt to 
extend the arm of Government to the frontiers,” Knox wrote President Washington in 
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response to Sevier’s “disgraceful violation” of federal Indian treaties.  “The Indian tribes 
can have no faith in such imbecile promises, and the lawless whites will ridicule a 
government which shall, on paper only, make Indian treaties, and regulate Indian 
boundaries.”11    
The Constitution was central to this project.  Knox and the Washington 
Administration interpreted the document, especially the provisions vesting the power to 
declare war in Congress and explicitly barring states from levying war, as placing all 
power over organized violence in federal hands.  “[T]he paragraphs of the Constitution, 
declaring that the general government shall have, and that the particular ones shall not 
have, the rights of war,” Thomas Jefferson reported to Washington, “are so explicit that 
no commentary can explain them further, nor can any explain them away.”  Many others 
shared this view.  When a citizen appealed to Governor Pinckney of South Carolina for 
the state’s support of an expedition against the southeastern nations, the Governor 
declined. “[H]aving always determined to make the federal Constitution my guide,” he 
wrote to President Washington, “I should not feel myself by any means justified in 
sanctioning a measure of that kind, even from its necessity.”  Pinckney feared that such 
an action would ripen into “precedent.” 12 
These restrictions mattered because, as Pinckney’s experience suggests, the 
“unauthorized expeditions” often claimed the authority of state law by virtue of their 
militia commissions.  A band of Kentuckians seeking to attack Natives near Vincennes 
tried this gambit in 1788, citing a state law that they claimed warranted their actions in 
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federal territory.  A federal military officer informed them, “I did not know any authority 
but that of Congress who could order a war with the Indians.”  But federal law went even 
further.  Fearing that citizens claiming the right to levy war would “involve the United 
States in an unjust war,” Henry Knox urged a law subjecting the expeditions’ participants 
to a federal court martial.  Instead, the anxiety over unauthorized expeditions provided a 
major impetus for the extension of federal criminal jurisdiction over U.S. citizens in 
Indian country in the Trade and Intercourse Act, which made it possible to prosecute the 
perpetrators in federal court.  Knox followed with explicit instructions to Governors St. 
Clair and Blount to both prevent such attacks and, if that failed, to prosecute the 
violators.13 
Taken together, the Constitution and the Trade and Intercourse Act reflected a 
vision in which the federal government alone held the power to legitimate violence by 
deeming it war. The federal government would seek to deny that title to long-standing 
practices of violence in the borderlands, the practices of military self-help with dubious 
official sanction.  Such unauthorized acts would now be considered crimes. 
This restriction extended beyond territorial citizens to encompass Native nations, 
as well, whose ambiguous status under federal law made it unclear whether they enjoyed 
the power held by other sovereign nations to engage in war rather than simply to commit 
“attacks.”  This was because the brutal, isolated, and intensely personal nature of 
borderlands violence diverged from elite expectations of the legal norms that supposedly 
governed war.  This was especially true with respect to non-combatants.  Though the 
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Declaration of Independence castigated the “undistinguished destruction of all ages, 
sexes and conditions” as the “known rule of warfare” only of Indians, federal officials 
recognized and acknowledged that borderlands violence involved both whites and 
Natives in indiscriminate slaughter.14   
But federal officials did not argue that borderland customs freed the United States 
from the obligation to follow the laws of war that applied in conflicts among Europeans 
in its struggles against Indians.  On the contrary, even though they recognized that 
Natives would not obey these legal norms, federal officials in the territories repeatedly 
ordered their own military and militia to adhere to the “rules of war” and the “custom and 
usage of civilized nations” in their fights against Indians.  They embraced this one-sided 
adherence to legal rules because they believed vigorous restraint of the wanton violence 
of territorial citizens would serve to inculcate the same values of humanity in Natives.  
Sparing women and children and treating prisoners “with humanity,” as the laws of war 
required, “must teach even savages to follow them” and lead the Indians to “spare the 
citizens of the United States, under similar circumstances.”  At another point, William 
Blount demanded that the Cherokees inform him and explain the causes before they 
“went out for war”: he instructed them, “such is the custom among nations.”  In short, 
federal officials embraced a vision of tutelary warfare, in which their “examples” would 
remake borderland violence, both white and Indian.15 
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But until that point was reached, the violence of both territorial citizens and 
Natives was too haphazard to deserve the formal status of “war.”  “I presume we are not 
to be deemed in a state of war whenever any Indian hostilities are committed on our 
frontiers,” one Federalist author wrote during the debate over the ratification of the 
Constitution, when the question of the legitimacy of a standing army in peace was 
debated.  “A distinction between peace and war would be idle indeed, if it can be frittered 
away by such pretences as those.”  After ratification, the casual dismissal of Indian 
violence became the preserve of the opponents of the Washington Administration and its 
seeming militarism.  Bemoaning the army raised to serve in the Northwest Territory, 
Thomas Jefferson complained that “[e]very rag of an Indian depredation” could be 
exploited “as a ground to raise troops with those who think a standing army and a public 
debt necessary for the happiness of the U.S.”  What united these views was the insistence 
that Indian attacks diverged too far from legitimated and accepted forms of violence to 
constitute actual war, whatever that meant.  In this view, only the federal government—
not Native nations and not territorial citizens—possessed the authority to sanction 
violence by declaring it “war.”16                 
* * * 
 Native peoples, of course, had their own views on authority over war and peace, 
which they, too, were debating alongside the Anglo-American neighbors.  Just as 
Congress ostensibly possessed sole authority over the war power, Natives had long 
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resolved these issues through lengthy deliberations: one set of commissioners informed 
Henry Knox of how the Creeks had an annual meeting to resolve such issues in “a great 
council,” where they could “deliberate with freedom.”  In theory, these lengthy sessions, 
with much discussion, would slowly move toward consensus.  If the decision were for 
war, the council would then dispatch symbols—often black wampum or a hatchet—to 
convey their decisions both to potential allies and to their adversaries.17 
 In their negotiations with the United States, Native leaders, like their federal 
counterparts, portrayed themselves as possessing the power over war and peace.  “I Love 
peace, I Formerly Loved War,” proclaimed the Cherokee leader Tuskegetchee, who 
stated that he “Command[ed] Seven Towns, thirteen others Listen to my talk.”  For six 
years, Tuskegetchee noted, he worked with the Indian agent Joseph Martin, “Assist[ing] 
him in keeping peace,” turning back both hostile Creeks and the lower Cherokee towns 
known as the Chickamauagas.  “I stand up Like a Wall between Bad people and my 
Brothers the Virginians.”  At another diplomatic meeting, the Cherokee leader Hanging 
Maw had made explicit the analogy between Anglo-American and Native authority in 
emphasizing his power over war and peace.  “I am the Head man of my Nation,” he 
asserted, “as Governor Blount is of the white people.”18 
 Anglo-Americans negotiating with these Native representatives relied on these 
claims of authority.  They needed men like Hanging Maw and Tuskegetchee to enforce 
the treaties and agreements reached with the Cherokees and other nations.  But many 
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Anglo-Americans also suspected that Natives leaders possessed far less power than they 
asserted.  The problem, many Anglo-Americans believed, was that the Natives existed 
“[w]ithout government,” as Thomas Jefferson described it, where “public opinion is in 
the place of law.”  Jefferson romanticized this condition, believing that the people who 
lived under it likely possessed “an infinitely greater degree of happiness” than “under 
European governments.”  But for those charged with governing Indian affairs, this 
decentralized and seemingly anarchic method of rule made maintaining the peace with 
Natives through negotiations with their leaders an endless chore.  It was “vain,” Patrick 
Henry wrote to his state’s congressional delegates, to hope that “great number of Nations 
among whom the Restraints of Law & order are unknown” could keep the peace.  Since 
“[e]very Individual amongst them claims a right of gratifying his revenge, his avarice, or 
ambition in the time & manner he pleases,” even the “most vigilant agency” could not 
prevent violence.19 
 In part, what Anglo-Americans attributed to lawlessness reflected the complicated 
organization of Native polities.  The idea of Native nationhood had always masked a 
more involved politics in which authority centered in villages, which then combined in 
complicated and decentralized ways to exercise control on a regional and national basis. 
Many observers also noted a general sense of Native leaders’ waning power: “the chiefs, 
once absolute among them, did not have any more authority over their minds,” reported a 
Catholic missionary among the Illinois Country tribes.  When, in 1792, a group of 
Cherokees, agitating for war, began dancing and shooting through a flag of the United 
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States raised by the Cherokee leader Bloody Fellow, he tried to “order them to desist,” 
even threatening to ”kill some of them.”  But the Cherokees continued to war anyway.20 
This seeming disruption in Native governance was a consequence of colonial 
encounter: it resulted largely from the increasing intrusion of Euro-American authority 
into Indian country, in the form of talks, goods, agents, and traders, which produced 
complicated webs of influence and power within Native politics.   The 1792 journey of 
Anthony Forster into Chickasaw and Choctaw territory on behalf of William Blount is 
illustrative.  When Forster arrived at a Chickasaw “convention,” he discovered that the 
Chickasaw leader the Hair-lipped King was “disgusted and chagrined” because Blount’s 
letter had not mentioned his name and seemed to favored the King’s rival, Piamingo; 
Blount, the King complained, did not know “his power and authority within the nation.” 
When Forster continued to the Choctaws bearing a white wampum belt and an invitation 
to a meeting in Nashville, a Choctaw council deliberated for over three hours.  Just as 
they were nearing “one uniform point of decision,” what Forster described as a “mob of 
drunken Indians” stormed the council and “tore the peace belt in pieces.”  It turned out, at 
least according to Blount, that an Indian trader named Brassheart, purportedly in the 
“Spanish interest,” had plied the dissenting Choctaws with rum to spur them on.  As a 
result, Blount argued, what seemed to be an “insult . . . to the United States” should not 
“be attributed . . . to the Nation.”  But the incident underscored how increasing 
factionalism within Indian Country, and Euroamerican influence, worked to undermine 
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traditional deliberations over war and peace, and made it hard to interpret what a nation’s 
true intentions were.21 
For federal and state officials, perhaps the direst consequence of this crisis of 
authority was that, through the 1780s and into the 1790s, Native raids continued unabated 
against Anglo-American settlements in the borderlands.  Kentucky, Cumberland, the 
Washington District in eastern Tennessee Country—all became the sites of constant 
attacks.  According to “respectable evidence,” between 1783 and 1790 Natives killed, 
wounded, or took prisoner 1500 U.S. citizens along the Ohio, as well as stealing $50,000 
worth of property.  South of the Ohio was similar: William Blount asserted the nearly all 
the land around Nashville “has been stained with the blood of the Inhabitants since my 
arrival in this Country.”  Few of these attacks were the sort of massed pitched battles 
Anglo-Americans associated with warfare.  They were, rather, incursions by “small 
parties of Savages” on remote settlements that Henry Knox deemed as “difficult to be 
guarded against, as a single wolf.”  Brutal, swift, and isolated, these attacks, which 
Anglo-Americans termed “depredations,” usually left behind only victims.22 
Worst of all, from the perspective of federal officials, these attacks seemed to 
continue unabated notwithstanding promises of peace and restraint on the part of Native 
leaders, and even regardless of the formal treaties of friendship that Native nations had 
entered with the United States.  Territorial citizens began to mock these broken 
agreements as a “paper Peace.”  Federal Indian agent John McKee lectured the 
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Cherokees: “Peace does not consist in writing or Beads, but in one and all your people 
leaving off to kill the Citizens of the United States and steal their property.”23 
In explaining these ongoing attacks, Anglo-Americans offered two interrelated 
accounts, one generational, the other anthropological.  The generational explanation 
focused on the divide between Native leaders and their “young fellows,” whom Native 
leaders complained were “always wanting war.”  “It is well known how strong the 
passion for war exists in the mind of a young savage, and how easily it may be inflamed, 
so to disregard every precept of the older and wiser part of the tribes who may have a 
more just opinion of the force of a treaty,” Henry Knox reported to President 
Washington.  Elsewhere Knox described young Native warriors as “headlong” and 
“impetuous,” incapable of being “retrained by the feeble advice of their Chiefs.”  Knox 
sought to send a representative to the tribes responsible for the attacks to insist that they 
“must devise some mode for the punishment of their guilty young men.”  The United 
States, he told William Blount, “cannot and will not suffer the depredations of any part of 
the Indian tribes, with whom we have treaties.”24 
The anthropological explanation, tinged with a good deal of racialist disdain, was 
that Natives were simply too enamored of violence and bloodshed for them to cease.  
Anglo-Americans who claimed expertise on Indian matters pointed out the role that the 
“shedding of blood” played in propelling Natives to honor and authority within their 
nations.  As long as the “scalp of an innocent white man,” or “of a woman, or child,” 
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would grant Natives “honor,” Indian agent John McKee wrote, “so long there would be 
war.”  The Knoxville Gazette put it more bluntly:  “Rapacity, infidelity, and love of war, 
are prominent features in the character of uncivilized nations.”25 
What united both these explanations was their attribution of the causes of war to 
something inherent in Native “character,” rather than viewing them as a response to 
events on the ground.  When Natives proffered explanations for their violence—most 
frequently the Anglo-Americans’ rapacity for Native lands, as well as retaliation for 
Anglo-American attacks against them—many Anglo-Americans dismissed these 
complaints as mere pretext.  “It is little matter with them, what the pretense for going to 
war may be,” an Anglo-American emissary observed in an ethnographic report on the 
Creeks.  “They think that force constitutes right, and victory is an infallable proof of 
justice on their side.”  Anglo-Americans even sought to produce evidence, as in a 
spurious letter reprinted in the Knoxville Gazette from the Creek Alexander McGillivray 
disclaiming any right of revenge against Cumberland, that purported to undermine the 
legitimacy of Native complaints.26   
By contrast, Native leaders, though they sought to control the unruly young men, 
acknowledged that the warriors were acting in response to legitimate grievances.  For 
Natives, negotiations with the federal government often represented the triumph of hope 
over experience.  At the Treaty of Holston, for instance, the Cherokee leaders pointed out 
that at the earlier Treaty of Hopewell, federal representatives had come claiming “full 
power and authority” to treat, only for the treaty to be freely “violated.”  “[S]hould we 
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now make another it may still be the case,” the leaders argued, “it may still be the case 
until they take all our towns from us.”   In their statements to federal representatives, 
Native leaders pleaded with them to fulfill promises and affirm the faith the Natives had 
placed in them, if only to avoid giving further support and encouragement to the war-
mongers who insisted that diplomacy was pointless.  “We shall look to you to see it 
done,” the Cherokee leader Bold Hunter wrote to Secretary Daniel Smith of the 
Southwest Territory in response to a promise to punish an attack on the Cherokees, “and 
not to our young warriors to say that you told them lies.”  But for Natives, lies, it seemed 
to them, was often all they got.27 
The debates over war and peace in Indian Country thus paralleled in important 
ways the controversies in the territories. As other scholars have suggested, both Natives 
and the federal government confronted crises of authority that created similarly 
“unauthorized expeditions.”  But the challenge ran even deeper.  To maintain the peace, 
both sides relied on negotiations and the promises enshrined in treaties.  But when neither 
side could uphold the promises made there, it obviated their agreements and cast them 
toward violence, as both Natives and Anglo-Americans interpreted these failures as 
demonstrations of the other side’s fundamental untrustworthiness.  Their respective 
weakness cast them into mutual cycles of blame and recrimination:  even as Kentuckian 
Henry Innes told Henry Knox that the “Indians have always been the aggressors,” Bloody 
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Fellow argued it was “more the White People’s fault than theirs that these disturbances 
happen.”28  
In their more candid moments, both Native and Anglo-American officials 
acknowledged these parallel barriers to peace.   “I was convinced it was not the wish of 
them [the government officials] or my self to go to War,” the Cherokee leader John Watts 
wrote, “but was afraid that the Lawless Men living on our lands & the frontiers, Would 
be the occation of all Mischief.”  Watts’s interlocutor, the Tennessean John Sevier, 
voiced similar sentiments when he acknowledged that it “would be as difficult for the 
chiefs to prevent those disorders in every instance, as it would be for the rulers in 
Philadelphia to restrain murders and roberies often committed within that and 
neighboring cities."  George Washington, too, argued the United States could not achieve 
frontier peace “[u]ntil we can restrain the turbulence and disorderly conduct of our own 
borderers.”  The United States, he concluded, could not expect from the Indians “that 
they will govern their own people better than we do our’s.” 29 
 The parallel failures of governance and control also produced a similar challenge 
of interpretation.  Because of the question of authority, whenever an attack happened, or 
a talk arrived, or rumors trickled in, it was never quite certain whether these actions were 
the voice of the entire nation or merely spoke for isolated and discontented individuals.  
In this circumstance, neither side could discern the true motives and intent of the other.  
“From all quarters, we receive speeches from the Americans, and not one is alike,” the 
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Shawnee leader Blue Jacket informed a federal emissary in 1790.  “We suppose that they 
intend to deceive us.”  Several years later, when James Robertson of Nashville sent a 
threatening talk to the Cherokees, they were understandably alarmed.  William Blount 
claimed they should disregard it as coming from an unauthorized source, and yet Natives 
had good reason to wonder whether Blount could actually exercise the authority over 
Robertson that he claimed.30 
 If anything, it was even harder for Anglo-Americans to discern the meanings 
behind Native attacks, both because of the political divisions within Indian country and 
because of the ignorance of most federal officials.  “Truth in all enquiries is hard to 
obtain, and in none in which I have been engaged, so much so as in what respects 
Indians,” William Blount grumbled.  The information that filtered to Blount from Indian 
country, derived from a network of both Native and non-Native informants, was 
“imperfect and contradictory.”  Much of it was little more than rumor: vague reports that 
the Cherokee leader Hanging Maw opposed war while the leader Double-Head supported 
it; tales of the “bloody club”—a call to war—being offered the Creeks by the Cherokees, 
or vice versa, and being accepted, or maybe refused; whispers of warriors from one town, 
or perhaps another, setting out for an attack, or third-hand tales of traders spying white 
scalps in the town’s square.31   
Affixing responsibility for Indian attacks was equally difficult.  Territorial 
citizens had only a vague sense of Native identities, pleading inability to “distinguish 
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between Cherokees & Creeks,” let alone among the nations’ myriad subdivisions.  To 
determine the identity of the perpetrators of some of the attacks, William Blount took to 
scouring the scene of frontier killings for clues like a detective.    When pressed, Native 
leaders usually disclaimed responsibility for the attacks, attributing them to other nations, 
other towns within the same nation, or “what the chiefs are apt to call a few bad men.”32 
A stock phrase began to be used to describe this confusing and ambiguous state of 
affairs: “half peace & half war.”  William Blount observed that such a war had raged in 
the region since the Revolution and described it as the “worst of all wars.”  The people 
“would prefer an open war to such a situation,” a correspondent reported to Blount.  “The 
reason is obvious; a man would then know, when he saw an Indian he saw an enemy, and 
be prepared and act accordingly.”   Instead, with neither Native nations nor the United 
States able to restrain their own citizens, the territories existed in a vague neverworld 
between war and peace marked by ambiguous, secretive, and yet organized violence 
outside of governmental control. 33 
* * * 
In both the Northwest and Southwest Territories, the federal government sought 
to end such self-justified, extralegal violence by decisively asserting its constitutional 
supremacy over war and peace.  But the process played out very differently in the two 
territories. 
North of the Ohio, the federal government ultimately co-opted frontier violence to 
serve its own ends.  Though the United States had entered peace treaties with many of the 
                                                
32 Silas Dinsmore to David Henley, March 18, 1795, Folder 3, Silas Disnmore Papers, Ayer MS 241, Newberry Library; William 
Blount to Secretary of War, May 28, 1793, in TP: Vol. IV, 262-64; Daniel Smith to Timothy Pickering, October 1, 1795, in Letter 
from the Secretary at War, 6-8. 
33 Blount to Kelley and Sims, December 1, 1795; William Blount to Secretary of War, May 16, 1792, in ASP:IA, 267. 
  331 
nations of the Ohio and Illinois Countries, depredations continued.  Knox attributed to 
these attacks to “banditti” consisting of renegades from the what Knox termed the 
“regular tribes,” as well as the Miamis and Wabash Confederacy, who, Knox complained, 
had “refus[ed] to treat with the United States when invited thereto” because of their 
“inveterate and incurable habits of enmity” toward the U.S.  In the end, the Washington 
Administration reluctantly turned toward force as the solution, securing congressional 
authorization for a targeted expedition.  “[T]he vengeance of the Union is to be pointed 
only against the perpetrators of the mischief,” Knox stressed, “and not against the 
friendly nor even neutral tribes.”  The Administration cast the action as consistent with its 
vision of the federal government as the impartial arbiter of justice on the frontier, 
depicting the attack as a police action.  “The aggressors should be made sensible that the 
Government of the Union is not less capable of punishing their crimes,” President 
Washington informed Congress, “than it is disposed to respect their rights and reward 
their attachments.”  As the conflict escalated, Knox and President Washington published 
a widely reprinted and self-justifying statement of the war’s causes that emphasized how 
the federal government had been “compelled to resort” to force and cited the treaties with 
the Cherokees and Creeks as evidence of the “pacific and humane disposition of the 
General Government toward the Indian tribes.”34 
What was supposed to be simple exercise that would demonstrate to the Indians 
“the absolute necessity of submitting to the justice and mercy of the United States,” in 
Knox’s words, transformed into a bitter, costly, five-year-long war against the united 
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force of thousands of Natives from throughout the Ohio and Illinois Countries and up into 
the Great Lakes.  Ultimately, there were three campaigns into Indian country: one 
expedition led by Josiah Harmar in 1790, one by Arthur St. Clair in 1791, and one by 
Anthony Wayne in 1794.  Though commanded by federal officers and built around a core 
of federal soldiers, the federal army was far too small to conduct the war on its own.  All 
three relied heavily on assistance from the militia of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and 
especially Kentucky to conduct their campaigns.35      
In essence, this action granted unauthorized expeditions the sanction of law.  
Many of the Kentucky militia who marched under Josiah Harmar and Arthur St. Clair in 
1790 and 1791 were the same men who had earlier served Logan and Clarke.  And, to the 
dismay of federal officers, the militia proved just as fractious and disdainful of federal 
authority as they had of their commanding officers on the unauthorized expeditions.  
They were, one investigation subsequently found, “totally ungovernable, and regardless 
of military duty or subordination.”  When both the 1790 and 1791 expeditions 
subsequently suffered catastrophic defeats at the hands of the Ohio country nations, many 
federal military officers attributed the losses to the disorder caused by the militia.36 
Anthony Wayne’s 1794 victory at the Battle of Fallen Timbers—with a much 
expanded and better trained regular force, though still extensively supplemented by 
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militia—and the 1795 Treaty of Greenville ending the conflict largely put an end to the 
problem of unauthorized expeditions in the Northwest Territory.  Ironically, the 
Washington Administration had accomplished this goal by aligning itself with many of 
the expeditions’ aims.  The Northwest Indian War, it turned out, was highly 
controversial, for the same reason that the Washington Administration had sought to 
quell the unauthorized expeditions.  Some turned Knox’s favorite word on its head, 
observing the war’s “justice . . . is at least doubtful in my mind.”  These qualms were 
strongest in the Northeast, especially in New England.  When Washington’s secretary 
Tobias Lear traveled there in 1792, he was “surprised to find that the Indian War is 
extremely unpopular.”  As Lear informed Washington, “I have not heard it mentioned by 
a single person who did not consider it as arising rather from a wish on the part of the 
United States to obtain lands to which they have no just claim, than as a war of necessity, 
as it really is.”  In the end, the New Englanders proved arguably more right about the 
war’s aims than the self-deluding Washington Administration.  Though the 
Administration had disclaimed to all that would listen, both Native and non-Native, that it 
had no interest in Native lands, it ended up purchasing most of present-day Ohio from the 
defeated nations.  With the Natives dispossessed and removed far from the scenes of their 
depredations along the Ohio River, it is hard to imagine a result more pleasing to Logan 
and his disorganized militia.37 
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The legacy of the Northwest Indian War cast a long shadow over the Southwest 
Territory.  By 1792, it was apparent that the Treaties of New York and of Holston had not 
brought peace to the southwestern borderlands.  Reports of the “murder of some of our 
fellow-citizens” at Cherokee and Creek hands filled a biweekly column in the Knoxville 
Gazette, the Territory’s only newspaper.  Yet the Washington Administration viewed 
“the extension of the Northern Indian War to the Southern Tribes” with “extreme 
reluctance.”  Many of their hesitations were practical.  Knox knew well that the Creeks 
and Cherokees were even more numerous and powerful than the Ohio Country nations.  
Moreover, with public support for the Northwest Indian War at a nadir in the wake of St. 
Clair’s defeat, a call to broaden the conflict would be viewed “by the mass of the citizens 
of the middle and eastern States as an insupportable evil.”  The Northwest Indian War 
had also taught the Administration that what was conceived as limited and targeted 
expedition could expand into a much broader conflict.  The President, Henry Knox 
reported, was “exceedingly apprehensive that the flame of War once kindled in that 
[southern] region upon the smallest scale, will extend itself, and become general.”  And, 
because the federal government had no soldiers in the region, it would be forced to rely 
on the fractious and insubordinate local militia to achieve its ends.38 
But the Washington Administration, especially Henry Knox, also had moral 
qualms about the possibility of a southwestern war.  In contrast with the situation north of 
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the Ohio, the United States had entered solemn treaties with the southern nations, which 
Henry Knox was loathe to abandon simply because these tribes, like the United States, 
could not govern their own people.   “[I]t is very questionable, while we are unable, in 
many cases, to execute our own laws,” Knox argued, “whether we ought, in justice, to 
levy a general war upon the Creeks, for the criminality of an individual.”  Knox was also 
extremely concerned about the nation’s “general reputation in the judgement of the 
world,” and felt anxious to ensure that the justice of the war was so obvious as to 
preclude any interpretation of the United States as the aggressor.  “[I]f a war must 
inevitably ensue,” he argued, it had to be under circumstances that would demonstrate “to 
all the world that the government or citizens of the United States have not been the cause 
of bringing it on.”39 
The citizens and government of the Southwest Territory did not share the 
Administration’s reservations.  By the middle of 1792, public and elite opinion in the 
territory had reached consensus in favor of war.  “DELENDA EST CARTHAGO,” the 
Knoxville Gazette started to taking to printing incessantly in its columns, repeating the 
famous Roman cry to destroy Carthage. Unlike the Administration, the territorial citizens 
placed no faith in further diplomacy.  “Experience teach[es] us that Treaties answer no 
other Purpose,” a young Andrew Jackson wrote, “than opening an Easy door for the 
Indians to pass through to Butcher our Citizens.”  Unlike Knox, Jackson was also 
untroubled by the prospect of punishing an entire nation for the acts of a few.  If the 
nations failed to deliver up the murderers who attacked the Territory, he argued, “it is an 
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infringement of the Treaty and a cause of war.”  In fact, by condoning these acts, Jackson 
argued, the nations were accomplices: they were giving “Tacit acknowledgement of their 
Consent to the Commission of the Crime therefore all consenting are Equally guilty.”  
Much of the first sitting of the territorial legislature in 1794 was devoted to drafting a 
memorial conveying these views to Congress and urging it to punish the “faithless and 
bloodthirsty nations, the Creeks and Cherokees, according to the usage and custom of 
nations.”  In their view, war was the only path to peace.  “Fear, not love, is the only 
means by which Indians can be governed.”  Until Natives “are made to feel the horrors of 
war,” it insisted, “they will not know the value of peace, nor observe the treaties they 
may form with the United States.”40 
The territorial leadership agreed with this call to war.  “I know how earnestly the 
United States wish for peace, no man can be more sincere in that wish than I am,” 
Secretary Smith wrote to Henry Knox. But Smith had come to conclude “peace is not to 
be had without a war to convince them of the strength and dignity of our government--
that they are not to be violators of treaties with impunity.”  Viewed in this light, Smith 
argued, a targeted war would constitute a  “mercy,” as “it would check the evil before it 
becomes too general.”  Blount, too, had become an ardent proponent for war.  “The 
Creeks must be scourged and well too and the Cherokees deserve it,” he wrote to a 
congressman.  Moreover, against Knox’s concerns, Blount argued that the war would not 
be “such a bitter Pill as the War NorthWest of the Ohio.”  With the widespread support of 
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the Virginia, the two Carolinas, Georgia, and the territorial citizens, “the total Destruction 
of the two Nations” would merely be a “a Party of Pleasure.”41  
In August 1793, Blount traveled to Philadelphia to press the case for war to 
Washington and Knox.  He did so “with great earnestness,” apparently pushing war with 
such “ardor” that observers believed that the governor was “interested for that 
Purpose”—that is, biased in favor of war, perhaps to profit from it.  But despite Blount’s 
heartfelt pleadings, the Washington Administration ultimately punted on the question.  
Blount was authorized to call out the militia to protect the territory, but they were to be 
strictly limited to defensive operations, which did not encompass retaliatory attacks 
against the Indians.  The more aggressive campaign that Blount sought was, the 
President, proclaimed out of his power:  after lengthy discussion, Knox, Washington, 
Hamilton, and Jefferson had “unanimous[ly]” concluded that “measures of an offensive 
nature” could be sanctioned only by Congress, “who solely are vested with the powers of 
War” under the Constitution.  In part, this was a dodge for the Administration to avoid a 
politically tricky issue.  But the Administration also seemed highly conscious of the 
precedent it was setting for the separation of powers.  If, “by sad necessity,” so grave a 
measure as war with the southern nations were to become inescapable, Knox thought it of 
“the highest importance” that it be “a constitutional and legislative act.”42 
This outcome hugely disappointed Blount, who now had to wait while a 
contentious Congress slowly deliberated on the proposal.  Congress, a frustrated Blount 
argued at one point, should be “gullatined if they do not declare war.”  But, perhaps 
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because he was so dependent on the Administration, he largely accepted its verdict and 
rationale.  “It is Congress not the President have the power of declaring war,” he told 
James Robertson, the Nashville militia commander. “Those who are bound must obey. 
Patience is a virtue which must yet be exercised.”43 
With their neighbors and friends dying around them, territorial citizens did not 
feel patient.  The defensive measures urged on them by the Administration were totally 
inadequate, they insisted.  It was impossible to carry on a “defensive war with Indians,” 
who were “so wolfish in their manner.”  The only way to end the attacks would be invade 
Indian country directly and destroy the Cherokee and Creek towns.  With no federal aid 
forthcoming, they began to pursue self-help.  Throughout 1792 and into 1793, small 
claques would gather after Native raids.  Incensed by the attacks, sometimes spurred on 
by the relatives of the deceased, they proposed marching on the nearest Cherokee towns 
to obtain “satisfaction.”  One planned expedition of roughly fifty was thwarted after John 
Sevier ordered them to disperse.  William Blount managed to forestall another planned 
campaign of nearly one hundred men by dispatching an officer to read a proclamation.  In 
a third instance, Blount had a warrant issued against John Tipton and his conspirators 
when they plotted an attack.  But despite these successes, Blount told Knox he was 
“hourly in fear that [the people’s] thirst for revenge . . . will lead them to break through 
the Bounds of good order and government, notwithstanding what can be said or done to 
prevent it.” 44 
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The “break” that Blount and others feared happened in the summer of 1793—at 
the same moment, ironically, that Blount was in Philadelphia pleading the case for an 
offensive campaign.  Before he left, Blount had ordered Captain John Beard and fifty-six 
militia to pursue the Cherokees reportedly responsible for the death of a man named 
Gilham and his son outside Nashville.  Blount had emphatically instructed Beard not to 
cross the Tennessee River, the most unambiguous boundary between the Southwest 
Territory and the Cherokee Nation.  But, claiming to be following the track of the 
murderers, Beard defied the orders and continued south of the river, to Hanging Maw’s 
town.45   
Hanging Maw was among the most prominent Cherokee leaders, and Blount had 
assiduously cultivated a relationship with him.  In fact, Blount had recently invited 
Hanging Maw and a number of other Cherokee leaders to visit Philadelphia, and the 
chiefs had gathered in Maw’s village with two of Blount’s representatives to consider the 
invitation.  None of this dissuaded Beard and his men.  At dawn on June 12, 1793, the 
militia attacked, reportedly targeting Blount’s white representatives and the Cherokees 
indiscriminately.  They killed eight or nine people, including Hanging Maw’s wife and a 
white man named William Rosebury, and shot Hanging Maw in the arm.  Running 
through the hail of bullets, Blount’s representatives convinced the attackers, “by hard 
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pleading,” to spare the rest of Hanging Maw’s family and abstain from burning his 
house.46 
 Beard’s expedition was followed the subsequent summer by a much larger 
expedition under the command of Major James Ore, a man with extensive trading ties to 
Indian country.  Ore’s expedition of somewhere between 550 and 600 militia was 
authorized by militia commander James Robertson in Nashville, who had received word 
from a Chickasaw whom he trusted that the Cherokees were attacking Cumberland in 
three columns. Robertson ordered Ore and his men to intercept the invasion, and, if they 
did not encounter the invaders, to cross the Tennessee and “destroy the Lower Cherokee 
towns”—an order that exceeded his directives from Blount.47   
On September 14, 1794, Ore and his men snuck up on the Cherokee town of 
Nickajack and surprised its residents while they were eating breakfast.  After briefly 
resisting, the Cherokees made a “precipitate retreat” to the river.  Ore and his men then 
attacked the largely abandoned neighboring town of Running Water and returned to 
Nashville.  Ore suffered only a couple casualties, one when a militiaman fell out of a tree.  
By contrast, fifty Cherokees were reported killed, many of them slaughtered in the 
Tennessee River as they fled for safety; Ore also took nineteen prisoners.  Robertson’s 
explicit orders to the contrary notwithstanding, reports indicated that the “greatest portion 
                                                
46 Ibid.; “Knoxville, Saturday, June 15,” Knoxville Gazette, June 15, 1793; “Major King and Daniel Carmichael’s Report to Secretary 
Smith, Referred to in the Foregoing Letter.,” June 12, 1793, in ASP:IA, 459, ; James Davis and The War Club to John McKee, January 
10, 1794, Folder 5, John McKee Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. 
47 “General Robertson’s Order to Major Ore,” September 6, 1794, in ASP:IA, 530; James Robertson to William Blount, October 1, 
1794, in “The Correspondence of Gen. James Robertson” (October 1, 1898), 360-62; James Robertson to William Blount, October 8, 
1794, in TP: Vol. IV, 358-59. 
  341 
of the victims were women and children”; an eyewitness reported that the first person 
killed in the attack was a Cherokee woman.48 
Beard’s and Ore’s indiscriminate attacks convulsed the Southwest Territory.  
“[I]n no period of my life have I seen the public mind more agitated,” one observer 
reported after Beard’s attack.  There was a sharp divide between disapproval and support.  
Those most outraged were, of course, the Cherokees themselves, whose letters to federal 
officials in the attacks’ aftermath conveyed only a hint of their deep grief and despair.  “I 
am still among my people, living in gores of blood,” the Cherokee leader Doublehead 
wrote after Beard’s attack.  But, in Philadelphia, President Washington and Henry Knox 
also responded to the attacks with alarm.  Washington expressed “extreme concern” at 
such “violent and lawless inroads.”  Knox saw Beard’s attack as an assault on the most 
basic foundation of his vision for the federal government as arbiter between Natives and 
frontier settlers.  “Unless such crimes shall be punished in an exemplary manner,” he told 
William Blount, “it will be in vain for the government to make further attempts to 
establish any plan or system for the administration of Indian Affairs founded on the 
principles of moderation and justice.”  He continued: “Treaties will be at an end and 
violence and injustice will be the Arbiters of all future disputes between the whites and 
the neighbouring tribes of indians; and of consequence much innocent blood will be shed, 
and the frontiers depopulated.”49 
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Unsurprisingly, territorial citizens did not share Knox’s views.  Most strongly 
supported such measures, especially in the face of seeming federal passivity. Ore’s 
expedition “is spoken of by all ranks as the most brilliant thing that has happened or 
could have happened for this Country,” one resident reported.  Already, this observer 
claimed, the Cherokees were pleading for peace, and attacks on the Territory had 
abated.50 
Mediating between these conflicting views of the Cherokees and high federal 
officials on the one hand and territorial citizens on the other fell to territorial officials—
men like William Blount, Territorial Secretary Daniel Smith, and Nashville militia 
commander and federal Indian agent James Robertson.  Though they attempted to fulfill 
Knox’s demands to bring the perpetrators to “immediate tryal,” their efforts to enforce 
federal law in the Territory were fruitless.  Smith, in charge of the Territory while Blount 
was in Philadelphia, had ordered that Beard be court-martialed for his role and prosecuted 
under the Treaty of Holston.  But Smith discovered, “to my great pain,” that “to punish 
Beard by law just now is out of the question.”  Despite explicit orders, Smith could not 
even prevent Beard from organizing another attack while the court martial was pending.51 
In the eyes of many, the unauthorized expeditions demonstrated just how 
powerless territorial officers were over the people they ostensibly governed. “[F]rom the 
prejudice against Indians on the frontiers,” Henry Knox lamented, “it is but too probable 
that the perpetrators of these violences will escape unpunished.”  The strongest critiques 
came from the Cherokees, who were understandably skeptical of federal promises that 
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the President would secure them justice.   “Why do you talk of sending to the President to 
ask advice?”  Doublehead asked Secretary Smith. “These people did not ask any advice 
when they came and killed our people.” Hanging Maw mocked Secretary Smith for his 
impotence.  “Surely you are no head-man nor warrior,” he wrote,  “I think you are afraid 
of these bad men . . . I think they are making fun of you, and won't listen to your talks.”52 
Much of the challenge facing territorial officials was that, unlike Knox or 
Washington, they had to confront the political unpopularity of federal policy in the 
Southwest Territory.  “[W]hoever should attempt to preserve peace with Indians,” Blount 
complained, “was instantly denounced as an Indian Friend and the Cry accordingly raised 
against him.”  Robertson, for one, received hostile anonymous letters when he attempted 
to bar unauthorized expeditions; one letter writer wished Robertson “gone hence and a 
better in your room.”  Such opposition made capitulating to popular sentiment, as 
Robertson later seemed to do in authorizing Ore’s attack, politically advantageous.  
Though their political position temporarily rested solely with the federal government, 
these officials knew that both their current influence and their political prospects after 
statehood, which loomed not too far on the horizon, depended on popular support.  
Secretary Smith observed that, for these reasons, many territorial officers had actively 
supported the expeditions, and others remained silent, “countenancing disorder.”  One 
newspaper account observed that Captain Beard himself had previously been a staunch 
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opponent of unauthorized expeditions but alleged that he had abandoned this position 
once he “perceive[ed] that that was not the [path] to popularity.” 53  
Governor Blount engaged in an especially complicated political calculus around 
the expeditions.  As we have seen, though Blount’s support for invading the Creek and 
Cherokee Territory was unwavering, he felt obligated to follow and enforce federal law.  
But he sought to fulfill his duties in ways that minimized the political cost to him.  He 
deliberately delayed his return trip from Philadelphia after Beard’s expedition and 
allowed Smith to flounder, which served, Blount reported, to “highten my Character.”  “I 
left and returned . . . in good Time,” he observed.   And, though Blount did not sanction 
either Beard’s or Ore’s expeditions, he did secretly authorize to John Sevier to carry out a 
more targeted expedition in his absence, but with orders to make it seem as if it happened 
“on the Spur of the Occasion.” 54   
Blount’s complicated triangulation between his official duties and his desire to 
maintain popularity in the Territory led some to believe that, in his heart of hearts, Blount 
supported the actions taken by Ore and Beard.  “[T]he Governor is restricted to defensive 
measures, & therefore as Governor is bound to disapprove it,” one observer wrote after 
Ore’s expedition, “[but] as W.B. [William Blount] I dare believe that he is highly 
gratified.”  In fact, Blount seemed genuinely and sincerely outraged when he learned of 
the expeditions.  After receiving word of Ore’s attack, Blount dashed off a blunt and 
harsh secret letter to Robertson expressing “surprise and mortification” that the general 
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had “countenanced” such “lawless” actions, and forced Robertson to resign his federal 
positions.  “No good consequences can arise from such unauthorized expeditions,” 
Blount informed Robertson.55 
* * * 
  Why, given Blount’s explicit support for war, did he condemn Ore and Beard’s 
expeditions, both publicly and privately?  The answer lay in a roiling debate over federal 
law and the unauthorized expeditions that sharply divided territorial citizens. 
Unlike Knox or Washington, few in the Southwest Territory felt much 
humanitarian concern for the expeditions’ victims; particularly with respect to Nickajack, 
territorial citizens tended to believe that the Natives had gotten what was coming.  Blount 
himself proclaimed that the fate of the Cherokees killed in Ore’s attack was “a score so 
far as it affects the hostile part that I am quite easy on.”  But Blount was part of a small 
coterie in the Territory, many of whom were also territorial officials, who loudly and 
publicly denounced the unauthorized attacks even as they advocated war.56   
These men’s principal objection to the attacks seemed to be that they violated the 
“laws of God, of nature, and of man.”  Displaying an ostentatious commitment to the rule 
of law, these critics of the expeditions spent most of their time spinning out positivist 
arguments for the third category of human law. Reverence for the Constitution loomed 
especially large in these legal arguments.  “[R]ead it by day, read it by night,” Judge 
Campbell charged a grand jury in the Hamilton District shortly after Ore’s expedition, “it 
is the supreme law of the land—it is the guardian of your liberties.”  It was, Campbell 
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reminded them, a “solemn compact” that they and their representatives had ratified, and 
could not be retracted individually other than by leaving the country. Invocations of the 
Constitution were especially pertinent in this context because, like the Washington 
Administration, these men regarded the Constitution as clear and unambiguous on the 
issue of authority over war.  The Constitution “vests Congress, with a right of making 
peace and war,” Judge Anderson instructed a grand jury shortly after Ore’s expedition. 
“[W]e are bound as good citizens to act in conformity with their determination.” 57 
This invocation of lawful obedience fused legal and pragmatic considerations.  As 
Blount and others understood, the Southwest Territory was precariously reliant on the 
federal government.  The act of cession, one newspaper columnist observed, granted 
Congress, and Congress alone, “the right of governing this territory; also to protect.  It 
made them the judges of when, how, and where respecting protection.”  One line of 
argument framed this dependence in legal terms.  The “grand machine, our laws,” was 
the only method through which society could defend itself, the pseudonymous “P.Q.” 
observed in the Knoxville Gazette, and, by violating the laws, the Territory’s citizens 
were throwing themselves back “into a state of nature,” in which they forfeited any claim 
to governmental protection. “The man who attempts to trample on your laws, is as great 
an enemy to you as Indians,” P.Q. warned, “because he is endeavouring to deprive you of 
the means of defence,”  P.Q. urged territorial citizens to pursue “redress” through 
“constitutional channels” instead.   
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But there was also a practical edge to this argument, an issue of political strategy.  
Blount and others knew well how Knox and other high-level federal officials viewed the 
citizens of the Southwest Territory.  When Blount had sought to persuade Washington 
and others on the necessity of a campaign into Indian country, he had discovered how 
“Beard and others foolish uninformed people have done the cause of the suffering 
frontier people so much injury in the Eyes of the people of the Atlantic States.”  And 
when Blount expressed “pain” over Robertson’s orders to Ore, it was because of the 
repercussions to “the Reputation of the People I have the honor to be appointed to 
govern.”  Picking up this strain, several newspaper writers argued that, had the people of 
the Southwest Territory been more obedient, they would have already obtained 
congressional support.  Judge Anderson informed jurors that lawful conduct would secure 
the “affection of the general government, and induce them to extend . . . her kind 
protection.”58 
Implicit in this argument was an acceptance of the legal categories urged by Knox 
and others.  At root there was a fused issue of both the laws of war and constitutional 
law: when was the United States at war?  Whether from principle or pragmatism, 
Southwest Territory’s officials adopted the view urged on them by Washington’s cabinet: 
the United States could not be at war with the Indians until Congress decided that it was. 
  
Natives had a very different understanding of war and peace.  For many 
Natives—particularly those outside the class of Native leaders—the conduct of the 
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United States in failing to respond to their attacks was baffling, since it diverged with the 
legal frame they expected to govern frontier violence. In one story that reached Blount 
from the Cherokee territory, eight young Creeks had stopped at the house of federal 
Indian interpreter James Carey, where they “boasted” that “the Creeks did all they could 
to provoke the United States to war with them.”  A lengthy catalog of their alleged deeds 
followed:  “they killed and scalped men, women, and children; that they took them 
prisoners, and made them slaves like negroes; that they debauched their women, they 
took their property.  But even though “they had done it for many years, yet they could not 
make them mad.”   The Creeks’ swaggering braggadocio finished with a particularly 
pointed jibe: “Shall we take some man and bouger him, and send him back to tell his 
people, and try if that will not rouse them to war?” 59     
This highly gendered and likely embellished insult—Native instances of rape on 
the early American frontier were very rare—fit within long-standing Native patterns.  
Young Native men in particular were part of a boastful, masculine military culture 
accustomed to “lying and exageration” about war exploits.  Attacks denigrating the 
manhood of enemies were particularly common: one visitor to Creek country observed 
that those lacking prowess in war were “stiled old women, which is the greatest term of 
reproach that can be used to them.”  The Cherokees reportedly employed similarly 
insulting metaphorical language to convey their disdain for how readily the United States 
permitted them to kill its citizens.  “[T]he Cherokees had eat a great quantity of the 
white's flesh which they were very fond of at first, but they had had so much of it, had got 
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tired and thought it too salt.”  James Robertson, who relayed this tale, added, perhaps 
unnecessarily: “this they spoke in way of derision.”60 
Statements like those of the Cherokees and Creeks demonstrate how much the 
restraint of the United States surprised and upended Native expectations, and subjected 
the nation to mockery. Anglo-American failure to act equally befuddled the Chickasaw 
leader Piamingo, a staunch ally who had close ties with Blount and James Robertson.  
Piamingo—who was hardly disinterested, given his own desire to negate Creek and 
Cherokee power in the region—thought himself as a Cassandra whose warnings the 
United States had mysteriously disregarded.  “[B]ecause you never went against them,” 
Piamingo wrote in early 1793, “the Creeks Boast that your people are not men.”  A 
couple months later, he wrote again, expressing his mystification at the continued non-
action of the U.S.    “Did I not tell you how the Creeks and Cherokees would behave 
when they treated?” Piamingo wrote to James Robertson. “I said they would pay no 
regard to what they did; so you found it.”  Yet, inexplicably, the federal government 
seemed to continue to negotiate:  “I hardly know what you mean by treating with tribes 
that are always at war with you, and will be, until you whip them.”  As a result, the 
Natives now held the United States in contempt.  “If you knew how lightly and 
despisingly they speak of you and your friends, you could not bear it as you do[.]  If we 
did not know you to be warriors, we should not know what to think of you.”61 
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Both the Native enemies and allies of the United States looked to find some 
explanation for the nation’s unaccountable behavior.  Unfortunately for the United States, 
one credible answer came the country’s imperial rivals, Britain and Spain.  In particular, 
the Cherokees, Creeks, and Chickasaws maintained strong diplomatic and commercial 
ties to Spanish Louisiana, frequently traveling to New Orleans and Pensacola to meet 
with Spanish representatives.  The Cherokees reported that the Spanish, happy to 
undermine the influence of the United States, informed them “that United States had not 
money to carry on a war, and that we not fear to them injuries.”  In the eyes of the 
Cherokees, the fact that “the United States so patiently and tamely bore the injuries they 
[the Indians] had done them, without retaliation” served to “convince[] us of the truth of 
what the Spaniards have told us.”   Federal Indian interpreter James Carey, a man with 
close ties to the Cherokees, told William Blount had “often” heard them discuss the 
reasons for the passivity of the United States.  “[T]hey suppose that the United States 
must be so situated with foreign Powers, that they dare not enter into a war with them, or 
they certainly would not be offering and begging peace, in return for murders, bloodshed, 
and robbery, daily committed on their citizens.”62 
 The Spanish were not the only source for Native intelligence about the United 
States; they also turned to the U.S. citizens they found in Indian country, who offered a 
version of the Washington Administration’s constitutional argument that only Congress 
could authorize a war.  But, just as the intelligence that reached Blount was rarely an 
accurate account of the intricate politics of Indian country, the translation of federal 
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constitutional law that reached the Creeks and Cherokees was very different from how 
Knox or Washington would have explained it it.   In particular, the information arrived 
via what Knox and Washington would have considered among the least reliable sources: 
an Indian trader from Charleston named Mr. Grunter.   As John McKee recounted the tale 
to William Blount, Grunter “with apparent exultation informed the people present that the 
Indians were safe; that no State could declare war against the Indians; that, let them do 
what they would, your Excellency could not do them any injury in return; that the people 
of the territory were very anxious to have a war, and that they were the cause of the past 
disturbances.”  Other traders were evidently bearing more extreme versions of the same 
account to the Creeks: a Mr. Hull had informed “the Indians [that] the Congress have 
thrown away the people of Cumberland, 'tis w[e]ll, to kill, plunder, and commit 
devastations there, for Congress will not be angry at them for it.”63 
 Both the Creeks and Cherokees found these suggestions persuasive enough to 
bring them up with federal representatives.  In 1793, the Creeks asked to know “as quick 
as possible” whether “Governor Blount, and these Cumberland people . . . are under the 
Government of General Washington.”  The following year, the Cherokee Hanging Maw 
observed to William Blount that “[f]or many years” the Creeks “had been Killing the 
People of this Country.”  Maw enquired, “is it that this Country is not under the 
Protection of the U.S., or is it that the President is uninformed of the many murders & 
Thefts committed by the Creeks?”  These suggestions horrified federal officials:  Indian 
agent John McKee thought that the traders’ statements would “tend to impress on the 
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minds of the Indians a belief, (which l was of opinion they already began to conceive) 
that the only business of Congress was to bind the hands of her citizens, whilst the 
Indians butchered them.”  And so those officials sought to emphasize to the Natives that, 
not only were the Cumberland residents “citizens of the United States,” but that the 
federal government was also highly solicitous of their welfare.  The Cumberland people 
were “as much under the care of the President as the people of Philadelphia are, and he is 
equally desirous that your people should treat them well,” Blount told the Cherokee 
Bloody Fellow; the Governor told Hanging Maw that the United States had been given 
“full information of their [the Cumberland residents’] many sufferings.”64 
 From the perspective of the Cherokees or Creeks, who had watched Anglo-
American polities constantly break apart or recombine in the previous decade, the idea 
that Cumberland was not part of the United States was hardly absurd.  Arguably, it made 
a good deal of sense.  It helped explain why the United States seemed so indifferent to the 
fate of its own citizens, when, as Piamingo explained, even the less powerful Chickasaws 
“could not bear to throw away, and let the blood of one man pass without retaliation.”  
But it also made understandable why the territorial citizens seemed to enjoy such 
freedom to violate what federal representatives had constantly held out as the binding 
laws of the United States.  Natives, of course, could have readily understood the true 
reason—the complicated politics and imperfect authority that existed in a partly 
centralized polity—but federal officials admitted this reality only among themselves.  On 
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the treaty ground and in their talks, they stuck to the unconvincing platitudes of federal 
control.65   
 
 These platitudes did not fool territorial citizens any more than they persuaded 
Natives.  Those in the Southwest Territory knew very well how Natives were talking 
about them: the Gazette printed both Piamingo’s judgments about the baffling tendency 
of the federal government to embrace its enemies as well as the reports that the Indian 
traders had proclaimed Cumberland outside federal protection, a move the newspaper 
interpreted as a cynical ploy to get cheap stolen horses.  They also insisted they 
understood Natives far better than the distant politicians in Philadelphia, quoting with 
approval Breckenridge’s gendered statement: "I consider men who are unacquainted with 
the savages like young women who have read romances, and have as improper an idea of 
the Indian character in the one case, as the female mind has of real life in the other.”  The 
point was that those who lived in the territories, unlike the distant politicians, understood 
the practices and expectations of the Natives.  They knew the legal norms governing 
violence on the borderlands, and believed that passivity would produce neither respect 
nor peace.66 
   The challenge was to translate this argument, couched in the customary law of the 
borderlands, into a more legible legal form that would rebut the assertions of Knox, 
Blount, and others and legitimate their right to make expeditions against the Cherokees 
and Creeks.  To do so, they sought to insert their legal practices into formal law, pressing 
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particularly hard on the rigid dichotomy between war and peace that the Washington 
Administration insisted on.  This question was not decided in Philadelphia, they argued, 
but dictated by the reality in the Southwest Territory.  The Territory’s inhabitants were 
“in an actual state of war, and daily feel the effects, whatever may be said of peace 
elsewhere.”67   
At the heart of this argument was an insistence that Native actions spoke more 
loudly than any set of magic words, especially given the difficulty of determining who 
represented and spoke for the Indian nations.  One way to establish Native hostility was 
to adduce proof that the Natives had been involved in attacks against whites, which 
leaders of expeditions into Indian country took great pains to do. James Ore, for instance, 
claimed to have discovered fresh scalps of Nashville inhabitants hanging from Cherokee 
doorposts in Nickajack, as well as horses stolen from territorial citizens. Another way 
was to cite evidence that the Native attacks were more than the actions of a few isolated 
“banditti.” Here, the expeditions’ defenders pointed to attacks by large and well-
organized Cherokee and Creek armies, led by “the most distinguished of their warriors.”  
These “act[s],” they insisted, could be viewed “in no other light than as positive a 
declaration of war as ever was or can be denounced by one nation against another.”68 
Once it was clear that the “actual, repeated, and continued hostilities” by the 
Cherokees and Creeks constituted a state of war, important legal consequences followed.  
Here, the authors looked particularly to the “law of nature and nations,” which governed 
warfare among nations.  For one, the United States would no longer be obligated by its 
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treaties with Creeks and Cherokees, under the well-established principle of international 
law, oft-cited in the Southwest Territory, that war dissolves all treaties.  For another, it 
would no longer be necessary to distinguish among friendly and hostile factions of 
different tribes; the “whole nation,” Andrew Jackson wrote, could be “Scurged” for their 
attacks against the whites.  And, perhaps most importantly, it would legitimate attacks 
carried out by the territorial militia.  “The law of nations not only allows, but 
commands,” one author observed, “when we are attacked, either by a public or private 
enemy, to repel force by force.”  James Robertson responded to William Blount’s pointed 
rebuff of his authorization of Ore’s expedition by insisting on its lawfulness.  “[T]o be a 
good citizen, obedient to the Law is my greatest pride,” Robertson argued, but he could 
not have imagined that pursuing the Cherokees who had attacked the people of Nashville 
would be regarded as an “offensive measure unauthorized by the usage of Nations in such 
cases.”69 
The existence of a state of war also had important consequences under statutory 
and constitutional law that undermined the suggestion that Congress alone held the power 
to determine on war.  In making this claim, the expeditions’ legal defenders were 
promiscuous in the sources of law they relied on: in arguing that the Territory’s citizens 
had the right to “seek satisfaction” against Natives, one author, “A Fellow Citizen,” 
freely cited the right to assembly, the right to bear arms to defend the state, Blackstone’s 
discussion of the right of personal security, and the preamble of the Constitution.  But 
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taken together, these authors constructed a pointed argument that flowed from the legal 
existence of a war.  At the base was a right to self-defense, which the expeditions’ 
defenders emphasized as “the first principle in natural or social law,” the primary object 
of constituting government, and the “inherent right” of all peoples.   “We . . . are afraid of 
war in all shape,” the territorial legislature wrote Congress, “except that which the first 
law of nature, self-preservation, may enforce upon us, unauthorized by your declaration.”  
But the argument from self-defense was not grounded solely in natural law.  It translated 
into statutory terms in Congress’s acceptance of North Carolina’s cession of the 
Southwest Territory, which had explicitly promised to provide an adequate defense.  
“Have we experienced a fulfilment of that promise?” one writer asked rhetorically.  The 
right of self-defense against a state of war also had constitutional implications.  
Proponents of expeditions closely examined Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, 
which, as described by William Cocke, “expressly declares, that no state shall engage in 
war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as not to admit of delay.”  
Unsurprisingly, those who argued for attack seized on this provision’s qualifying 
language.  Cocke interpreted this language to mean, “[W]hen an enemy invades any 
particular state, such state may engage in war, and Congress is bound to support her.”70 
The arguments advanced by Cocke and other defenders of the expeditions would 
probably not have swayed Knox or Washington, had they deigned to read them.  Rather 
than abolishing the customary law that governed borderland violence, as Knox and others 
sought, these men used the diverse intellectual tools of early American law to recraft in a 
                                                
70 A Fellow Citizen, “For the Knoxville Gazette,” Knoxville Gazette, April 6, 1793; “To the Congress of the United States in Session 
at Philadelphia,” Knoxville Gazette, March 27, 1794; “Mr. Roulstone,” Knoxville Gazette, August 13, 1793; William Cocke, “For the 
Gazette,” Knoxville Gazette, December 29, 1792. 
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compelling frame the legal principles seemingly acknowledged by both Natives and non-
Natives.  But in the process, the proponents of the campaigns into Indian country did not 
present their arguments as a claim for the primacy of local and customary law against 
federal supremacy.  Rather, they did battle largely on the terrain defined by their 
opponents, fixating by way of critique on what seemed to them an unrealistic and 
unjustifiable formalism.  In the process, they claimed to reverence and honor the 
Constitution just as much as Judge Campbell and Blount did. 
* * * 
As territorial citizens well knew, the same issues that convulsed them were also 
the subject of “long and warm” debates in Congress, transcripts of which were reprinted 
in full in the Knoxville Gazette.  There were two interrelated legislative proposals.  The 
first would authorize the President to call up ten thousand militia for “offensive 
operations.”  But when the Senate proposed substituting regular soldiers for the militia, 
fierce disagreements arose when the bill returned to the House.  With ongoing heavy 
financial burdens and seeming injustice of the Northwest Indian War in mind, 
representatives from the east, particularly New England, were skeptical of the entire 
enterprise. “We have one Indian war already, which is enough at a time,” Fisher Ames of 
Massachusetts stated.  Ames was similarly dubious about employing the “exasperated 
militia,” which, he asserted, would seize and shoot “the first man, with a red skin, whom 
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they met.”  Only then would they discover  “that you have been shooting an Indian of the 
wrong nation, while in the mean time, this whole nation rise and attacks you.”71   
Joseph McDowell of North Carolina, by contrast, insisted that the “militia of the 
frontiers” consisted “the only proper forces to oppose the Indians with success.”  Unlike 
the regulars, the militia “knew the country,” but more importantly, their “habits of life 
made them perfectly acquainted with the character of the enemy.”  The most extreme 
comments came from Representative Carnes of Georgia, who veered off into a screed 
against the Administration’s Indian policy more generally.  He alleged that there were 
“improper leanings in favor of the Indians” among the federal officials that made his 
“heart boil,” and asserted that he would “not give the life of one white man for those of 
fifty Indians.”    As for protection, he threatened Congress that if they did not authorize a 
campaign, “the Georgians would take measures for themselves.”  In the end, voting 
largely along these regional lines, the House rejected the Senate’s amendment, and the 
measure died.  The Knoxville Gazette lamented that both houses wished to protect the 
Territory but “did not agree in the mode of doing it.”72 
The other provision—long sought by Henry Knox, and specifically urged on 
Congress by President Washington—would make U.S. citizens found in arms within 
Indian country liable to court martial.  Complaining that this “subject[ed] people to 
martial law,” the House of Representatives modified the bill to permit the military to 
arrest the offenders and bring them to trial pursuant to the Trade and Intercourse Act.  
                                                
71 4 Annals of Cong. 123-26, 774-79 (1794).  A draft of the bill appears in “An Act For the More Effectual Protection of the 
SouthWestern Settlers” June 4, 1794, Reel 2: Territory Southwest of the Ohio River, Senate Territorial Papers (microfilm), M200, 
U.S. National Archives. 
72 “Congress of the United States, House of Representatives, Friday, June 6,” Knoxville Gazette, September 6, 1794; 4 Annals of 
Cong. 123-26, 774-79 (1794);  “From a Philadelphia Paper,” Knoxville Gazette, May 8, 1794; “Knoxville, Monday, August 25,” 
Knoxville Gazette, August 25, 1794. 
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But the strongest disagreements focused on a proposed amendment that would exempt 
from these strictures citizens “in pursuit of Indians that had committed actual hostilities 
on the frontier.”73   
This proposal, too, split Congress along the same regional lines as before.  The 
New England representatives argued that the proposed change would blur the sharp line 
between sanctioned and unsanctioned violence urged by Knox.  The amendment would 
“destroy” the statute’s purpose, which was to achieve “one of the great objects of frontier 
policy”—namely, to “restrain the right of private war, by placing the power of vengeance 
out of the reach of individuals, and in the hands of Government.”  The amendment 
“actually arms all the passions of revenge with the rights of law”; it made the victim of an 
Indian attack “both judge and executioner in his own case”; it “legalize[d] all those acts 
of violence and revenge, that, for a century past, have deluged the frontier with blood.”.  
The amendment, in short, was the exception that would swallow the rule.  “It went to 
invert all the laws that had been made for the protection of the Indians,” James Hillhouse 
of Connecticut insisted.  “[I]nstead of being a bill to protect them from the whites, the 
resolutions would produce a bill to protect the whites from them.”74 
Representatives from the South and West, including James White, the Southwest 
Territory’s recently seated non-voting representative, reiterated the arguments advanced 
by the expeditions’ territorial defenders when they insisted that this approach was bad 
law and bad policy.  The amendment’s backers insisted that “a settler was, by the law of 
nations, authorized to pursue the [Indians] across the line and to retaliate.”  Restraining 
                                                
73 George Washington to the United States Senate and House of Representatives, January 30, 1794, in PGW:PS, 15:157-58; 4 Annals 
of Cong. 1253-70 (1795). 
74 4 Annals of Cong. 1253-70 (1795). 
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this right of retaliation, they insisted, would merely encourage “the savages to come over 
the line and murder with impunity.”  But mostly, these representatives offered emotive 
appeals and outrage over what they interpreted as affronts to their constituents.  If the law 
passed unamended, they threatened, “houses will soon be smoking and blood running.”  
Thomas Blount from North Carolina, brother of William, complained that instead of 
Congress protecting territorial citizens, “their characters are abused on this floor.”  The 
most pointed attacks came from White, who proclaimed himself “much affected” and 
used his remarks to lash out against the congressmen who he believed had impugned the 
“frontier people.”  Unsurprisingly, the Knoxville Gazette sided with White.  In its only 
editorial comment on the debates, it observed that the arguments of the New Englanders 
“let the cat out of the bag” by confirming settlers’ suspicions that “many members of 
Congress prefer the protection of the savages to that of their suffering frontier fellow 
citizens.”75 
This hard-fought debate was close; the committee of the whole initially endorsed 
the amendment, only for it to be rejected by the House.  In the end, rather than create a 
separate bill governing the unauthorized expeditions, Congress simply amended the next 
version of the Trade and Intercourse Act to include a provision that granted the army the 
power to arrest offenders within Indian country.  But there do not seem to have been any 
prosecutions under the Act’s new provisions, either.  
* * * 
One congressman who stood largely aside from the debate was James Madison, 
who seemed to regard the entire matter as an exercise in futility.  “[N]o law of any kind,” 
                                                
75 Ibid; “Congress of the United States, House of Representatives, Wednesday, February 25,” Knoxville Gazette, April 10, 1795. 
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he remarked, “would be able to hinder people from crossing the line.”  The frustrated 
Knox likely sympathized with this perspective, having seen his efforts to punish violators 
of the peace repeatedly come to naught.  He, like Madison, had come to see local 
prejudices as too stubborn to be overcome by federal law. 
But this narrative of legal impotence only captured part of the story.  Equally 
problematic was the insistence by high federal officials that Congress alone had the 
authority to divide peace from war. This constraining legal straightjacket failed to fit the 
territories, where both Natives and non-Natives regarded war not as a clearly delineated 
status between nations but as part of a spectrum of violence between cultures.  From the 
perspective of territorial citizens, the results were arbitrary: Congress seemingly 
acknowledged raids and counterraids as “war” in the Northwest Territory while refusing 
to do so in the Southwest.  Moreover, as the residents of the Southwest Territory insisted, 
once their understanding of war was acknowledged, constitutional and statutory as well 
as natural law required the federal government’s intervention and support.  For the people 
who crossed the line in defiance of government’s commands, federal law authorized, 
rather than hindered, their actions. 
Congress, it turned out, was also slow.  By the time it finally half-addressed the 
issue in 1795, the immediate crisis had passed.  In October 1795, William Blount was 
writing that the Creeks and Cherokees had demonstrated “pacific conduct” for nearly six 
months.  “Peace with the Indians exists now not only in name, or upon paper in form of 
treaty, but in fact,” Blount exulted, observing that this was the first cessation in hostilities 
in eighteen years.  This sudden reversal had several causes: the defeat of the Ohio 
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nations, which demoralized the southeastern tribes; the Jay and Pinckney Treaties with 
Britain and Spain, which mitigated some of the intense factionalism produced by 
European influences; the shifts within Native nations toward a more centralized form of 
governance.  But it also owed something to a change in federal policy, a move away from 
law toward finance.   
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Chapter 6: The Expenses of Sovereignty 
As part of his reports to George Washington on Indian affairs and the western 
territories, Henry Knox spent considerable attention on finance—a frequent topic for him, 
since, under the Articles of Confederation, he had long had to operate the War 
Department on a pittance.  Knox particularly bemoaned that many of the troubles that 
confronted the United States in both Indian affairs and the territories seemed to stem from 
an unwillingness to spend money.  “The United States having come into the possession of 
sovereignty, and an extensive territory,” he wrote, “[it] must unavoidably be subject to 
the expenses of such a condition.”1 
 As recent scholarship has demonstrated, the new federal government came into 
existence fixated on its finances. The Constitution and the new financial system granted 
the federal government financial resources that far exceeded what the states could muster.  
Over the following decade, as Knox had foreseen, a great deal of federal money flowed 
westward into the territories, as the “expenses” of sovereignty that Knox anticipated 
mounted.  Yet national finance, long seen as the paradigmatic example of state capacity, 
played a paradoxical role in the territories.  Rather than an unqualified source of strength, 
the national treasury served federal officials as a crutch to create policy when, as we have 
seen, law and authority proved inadequate.  Often, federal officials barely seemed able to 
control or resist the claims made on federal funds. 2  
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University Press, 2003); Max M. Edling, “‘So Immense a Power in the Affairs of War’: Alexander Hamilton and the Restoration of 
  364 
One role for money was to patch over federal failures.  Unable to restrain or 
punish either Natives or Anglo-American settlers for crimes, the national government 
sought to forestall violence by compensating both groups for the harms the other had 
committed.  The effect was that the federal government became financially responsible 
for the actions of people it could not control and, in the case of Natives, who were 
ostensibly not part of the American polity at all. 
Federal officials also used federal funds to try shore up the tenuous and flexible 
loyalties of borderland inhabitants, both Native and non-Native.  Throughout the 1790s, 
the federal government engaged in an extensive, and expensive, program to supply 
Native nations with so-called “Indian presents.”  Intended to placate Native demands, not 
purchase Native lands, these gifts were justified through rhetorical invocations of 
Natives’ (often real) poverty.  But in their more candid moments, federal officials 
acknowledged that they were trying to buy Native allegiance, in competition with British 
and French patrons.  In this sense, the presents reflected federal limitations in the face of 
Native power.  
 Federal officials proved even more constrained in the face of constant demands 
by territorial citizens for “protection.”  Federal money poured into the territories for 
defense.  Some this came through spending on the army, but much of it involved paying 
territorial citizens directly for their service in the militia.  In the process, federal money 
underwrote the territories’ economic development and enriched (some of) the inhabitants.  
Though territorial citizens, like Natives, often regarded this largesse as nothing more than 
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their due, federal officials, and some citizens themselves, understood this money as an 
effort to secure the questionable allegiances of ostensible U.S. citizens. 
 These expenditures reflected a national state that fit poorly into present-day 
scholarly dichotomies between “weak” and “strong.”  On the one hand, there were only a 
handful of federal officials in the territories, and they rarely wrote or spoke as if they 
acted from positions of authority.  On the contrary, tasked with governing vast spaces, 
these officials felt battered by a constant stream of events over which they had little 
control, confronted by Native and local leaders who seemed to have much more ability to 
dictate events.  Federal officials could not even always control how federal funds were 
spent: over officials’ vociferous objections, the national treasury paid the perpetrators of 
violence that federal law deemed illegal and unwarranted.  But on the other hand, 
national finance did a remarkable job of extending the influence and reach of this 
seemingly ineffectual government.  The federal government in the territories was 
ubiquitous, not out of sight.  In the form of medals and blankets, federal authority 
insinuated itself into Cherokee councils, even without the presence of a single federal 
officer.  Muster rolls and payment vouchers—other forms of federal finance—implicated 
the lives of nearly all male territorial citizens.  The prospect of federal payment caused 
Natives and non-Natives alike to take their complaints to territorial officials, and even to 
Philadelphia, for redress.  In short, federal finance allowed a handful of constrained 
officials to orient the territories around federal policy. 
* * * 
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As recounted in the previous chapters, the failure of federal law left Natives and 
white settlers free to continue long-standing practices of retaliating against each other.  
Treaty law even seemed condone such actions by barring retaliation until “satisfaction 
shall have been demanded of the party of which the aggressor is,” as stipulated in the 
Treaty of Holston.  Though these provisions were intended to forestall retaliation, the 
federal failure to fulfill the promises it made gave Native acts of revenge legal sanction.3 
In an effort to forestall such violence, federal officials quickly hit on an ersatz 
substitute for justice through the criminal law: compensation.  Unable to punish its own 
citizens for the crimes they committed against Natives, the federal government began to 
repay Native victims for both lives and property lost.  As historians have traced, such 
payments corresponded with Natives’ own customary legal practice of “covering the 
grave”—that is, rectifying wrongs, including murder, through payment.  “It has been 
understood, that, among the Indian nations, when one Indian kills another, the offence is 
not considered so much a public as a private evil, for which the family of the deceased is 
bound to obtain satisfaction . . . .sometimes by blood, and at others, by pecuniary 
considerations.” Henry Knox wrote to the Creek leader Alexander McGillivray.  Knox 
proposed, “[i]f this idea is just,” that McGillivray compensate the family of a Creek 
Indian murdered by whites, “to prevent the personal and national evils arising from 
indiscriminate retaliation.”  Knox would make “immediate” repayment to McGillivray 
from the national treasury.4 
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For all that these payments corresponded with Native expectations, though, they 
rarely arose directly from Native demands.  Rather, as in the case of Knox, they began 
with federal officials grasping for any available tool to assuage Native grievances.  Most 
often, given the failure of the courts, the readiest method available was money, over 
which federal officials had much more discretion.  Federal officials began to respond to 
every crime by doling out goods.  In early 1791, for instance, unknown whites killed a 
number of Senecas and plundered their goods on the border between the Northwest 
Territory and Pennsylvania. Since “legal process will be both slow and uncertain,” Knox 
instructed St. Clair that the governor should write to the friends and relatives of the 
deceased to demonstrate the federal government’s “abhorrence” of the act: “you will 
convince them of your sincerity by making liberal compensation to the relations for the 
loss of property.”  Knox later asked St. Clair to compile lists of stolen goods, to ensure 
“complete indemnification for every article lost.”   A similar process unfolded near 
Knoxville in 1793, when unknown whites fired on a Cherokee and two Chickasaws, 
including a Chickasaw named John Morris, who later died from his wounds.  Blount 
published a reward for the recovery of the murderers, but the men he suspected of the 
crime, he learned, all had alibis.  In the interim, Blount arranged for Morris to be buried 
with full military honors “at the usual burial-ground of the white people,” and marched 
alongside the Chickasaw’s brother in the funeral cortege.  After the funeral, Blount gave 
goods to Morris’s Chickasaw family, as well as to the Cherokees and Morris’s 
                                                                                                                                            
1815,” in Chris Tomlins et al., The Cambridge History of Law in America (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 1:32; 
John Phillip Reid, A Law of Blood; the Primitive Law of the Cherokee Nation (New York: New York University Press, 1970), 93–112. 
  368 
grandfather, who was white. “I considered it political nay essential that pretty liberal 
presents should be given,” Blount reported, “the more effectually to bury their sorrows.”5  
Federal officials did not believe that compensation bought a permanent peace: 
Blount himself acknowledged that the relatives of the victims “are not to be permanently 
satisfied by Presents,” and would likely retaliate eventually.  They recognized that these 
payments did not fully represent the justice they had promised.  But as long as “justice” 
proved elusive, compensation would have to do.  When a number of American settlers 
murdered a group of peaceful Cherokees, Henry Knox wrote to the Cherokee leader 
Hanging Maw and assured him that the President, “deeply afflicted,” would ensure that 
the Natives received the “same humanity and justice as his white children.”  But, Henry 
Knox continued, “sometimes, the bad escape unpunished.”  In that instance, Henry Knox 
enquired, “if the laws should not condemn the murderers of your friends, is there no other 
mode by which you could be satisfied?”  He directed the Cherokees to William Blount, 
whom he had already directed to provide goods to “pacify the relations of the murdered 
Indians and thereby prevent future hostilities.”6 
As a way of papering over law’s failure, compensation was not limited to 
murders, nor to payments to Natives.  Rather, federal officials came to rely on payments 
whenever authority and coercion were inadequate to preempt the long-standing practices 
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that prompted frontier violence.  Nowhere was this clearer than federal efforts to stanch 
the endemic practice of horse theft in the territories.7 
After land, horses were among the most valuable property in the borderlands.  
Residents of the Southwest Territory were particularly horse-mad; prominent 
advertisements for studs appeared regularly in the territory’s only newspaper. Unlike 
land, horses were mobile, which made them a tempting target for thieves.  Nearly every 
traveler in the territories recounted losing a horse at some point in the journey.8 
 Both Natives and non-Natives were horse thieves.  The territorial citizens stole 
horses from each other, and many stole from Natives as well: there were frequent reports 
of whites sneaking into Indian camps and coming away with three or four horses.  But 
territorial citizens fixated on Natives as horse thieves.  In the Southwest Territory, the 
inhabitants complained, that Natives had stolen 2,000 horses in the early 1790s, valued at 
a total of $100,000.  Natives would then resell the stolen horses to white traders happy to 
look the other way.  Horses stolen in the Southwest Territory soon made their way to 
outposts in Georgia and North and South Carolina, where, after resale, they were spirited 
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to Savannah or Charleston. Horses taken in the Illinois Country usually ended up in 
Kentucky.9   
Horse theft and cross-cultural violence were closely intertwined.  Many murders, 
including that of the Chickasaw John Morris, began as horse thefts.  Natives who 
plundered horses from Tennessee settlers often found themselves pursued and so “kill[ed] 
in their own defence.”  For their part, white victims of Native horse thefts could barely 
refrain “from taking what they call Satisfaction that is from killing Some of the Indians.”  
Both Indians and whites resorted to self-help to recover their losses, which, when coupled 
with mutual senses of collective responsibility, prompted further violence.  One incident 
in the Northwest Territory in 1799 was especially telling.  While traveling along a road, 
two Wyandots encountered a party of Americans, who grabbed the horse, saddle, and 
bridle of one of the Natives.  The Americans justified such bald-faced theft by insisting 
that they were only seeking compensation from the Wyanodots: “the Indians had stole 
horses enough,” they told them, “and that they would take that one in place.”  After the 
theft, the Wynadots soon encountered two other American travelers on horseback.  The 
Wyandots employed the same logic of collective guilt as the Americans: they insisted on 
taking one of the Americans’ horses, “thinking it also proper having lost one of their 
horses.”  When the man refused to yield the horse, a fight ensued that ended in the death 
of the two white travelers.10    
                                                
9 Numbers derive from “To the Congress of the United States in Session at Philadelphia,” Knoxville Gazette, March 27, 1794.  
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As such incidents underscored, horse theft presented a major threat to whatever 
tenuous peace prevailed in the territories.  “Horse Stealing is the grand Source of 
Hostility between the white and red people in this district,” William Blount opined, the 
cause for “almost continual” complaints to him; if unchecked, he feared, it would end in 
open warfare.  North of the Ohio, Arthur St. Clair similarly believed that Native horse 
theft was a prelude to full-fledged hostilities.11 
 Territorial officials tried different approaches to stanch the practice.  Law was one 
route.  The 1793 version of the Trade and Intercourse Act established a complicated 
licensing scheme for purchasing horses from Natives.  In a couple rare instances, 
purchasers who knowingly bought stolen horses, or who stole horses from Indians, were 
prosecuted.  In one exceptional case, a Vincennes resident brought suit against a 
Pottawattamie known as “Grand Blue” for holding a black mare the white settler claimed 
as his own; the two men reported “amicably settled the dispute.”  Federal agents would 
sometimes intervene to recover horses that Natives asserted were theirs, as James 
Robertson did in Nashville in the early 1790s, thereby incurring the wrath, and a lawsuit, 
from the disgruntled white owner.12 
The most frequent approach, however, was to send complainants or federal 
representatives into Indian country equipped with letters to Native leaders. Federal 
treaties with Native nations required that tribes restore stolen horses upon application for 
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recovery.  Native leaders were often cooperative, especially as they rarely profited from 
the stolen horses personally.  One Cherokee leader even promised to appoint men to go 
through the nation, and “procure by force or otherwise” all stolen horses.  But William 
Blount was skeptical that the Cherokees would be successful: “I am very sure that the[y] 
[the chiefs] have not power nor influence sufficient to have [the horses] restored.”  In one 
instance, after a territorial inhabitant reported horses stolen by the Cherokees, William 
Blount dispatched John Chisholm into the nation to recover them.  Chisholm got the 
horses, but they were stolen as he headed out of Cherokee territory. Applying to the 
chiefs again, Chisholm recovered the horses a second time, only to have them stolen yet 
again, for a third and final time.  “[T]herefore [I] think it is scarcely worth while to make 
application to the Indians for the recovery of our horses,” the victim of the original theft 
concluded.  Another problem was that horses were easily and quickly traded among 
Indians.  One horse owner in the Northwest Territory learned where his horses had gone 
third-hand: a local Delaware Indian told the owner that he had learned from a Shawnee 
that another Shawnee had taken the horse to the little Miami.  The owner diligently 
traveled to the Shawnee village along the river and learned that that his horse had been 
there, but it was already gone; the owner abandoned his efforts.13   
To avoid such complicated trips, some owners had success in hiring other Indians 
to recover the horses, which became a frequent source of Indian employment.  This posed 
its own problems, however.  “I had heard the savages frequently stole horses with a view 
to be hired to search for them,” one traveller in the Illinois Country reported.  This 
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traveler had recovered his own horse after he offering a local Delaware a two-dollar 
reward.14  
With both law and applications to tribes largely fruitless in recovering stolen 
horses, the federal government adopted a different tack: compensation.  At first, this was 
an ad hoc solution.  For those tasked with implementing federal policy, the benefits far 
outweighed the costs.  Military commanders, threatened with the prospect of violence, 
informed their subordinates to have white victims “record their losses upon good 
testimony, and I am certain the Government will indemnify them sooner than have a drop 
of bloodshed.” When Chickasaws came to Indian agent James Robertson complaining 
that Kentuckians had stolen several horses, Governor Blount ordered Robertson to 
compensate the Chickasaws from the public treasury at a price of no more than fifty 
dollars per horse.  “The dilemma at present is either for the United States to pay for these 
horses, or for the Indians to take pay (as they express it) by stealing as many other horses 
from some frontier people.”  As Blount observed, “One way or the other they [the 
Indians] will have pay.”15   
In 1796, Congress codified this approach when it renewed the Trade and 
Intercourse Act.   Under the law, Natives who had goods stolen by whites would be 
compensated from the federal treasury.  The law also provided that whites who had been 
                                                
14 “Journal Kept by George Hunter.”  Other instances of whites hiring Natives to recover lost horses can be found in Account of Lewis 
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the victims of Indian theft would be repaid for their losses by the federal government, 
which would then deduct the amount from the tribe’s annuity payments.16   
Formally, compensation for Natives required the conviction of the U.S. citizens 
who had committed the crime.  In practice, federal officials continued their earlier custom 
of paying the claims of Natives who demanded payment for stolen horses, even when 
they felt that those claims were dubious.  William Blount strongly suspected that the 
Cherokee chief White Man-killer’s horses simply wandered off during the Cherokee’s 
1792 visit to Knoxville, but the governor paid the Cherokee anyway.  Several years later, 
Arthur St. Clair compensated a Delaware who demanded payment for a stolen horse, 
even absent any criminal proceeding; the Secretary of War subsequently endorsed this 
approach and promised to repay St. Clair.  U.S. citizens even demanded repayment from 
the federal government when they helped pay for Natives to recover their horses.17   
For the most part, though, compensation under the Trade and Intercourse Act 
went to U.S. citizens, not Indians.  The number of Native claims presented to federal 
officers was dwarfed by the complaints of the territories’ white inhabitants, who penned 
lengthy lists of stolen horses, expecting compensation under the statute.  In 1799, 
inhabitants of the Northwest Territory gave Arthur St. Clair a list of horses that totaled 
$1700—as much as many of the nations’ yearly annuity.  It is unclear how many of these 
claims ever received payment, especially in the 1790s.  St. Clair and others forwarded 
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claims to the President; the resulting bureaucratic delays—along with the dilatory 
behavior of many of the claimants themselves—meant that many claims were not 
adjudicated until well into the nineteenth century.  Sometimes the payments were in fact 
deducted from the tribes’ annuities, though the evidence seems to suggest that the federal 
government more frequently just paid the claims from the treasury.  Deducting from the 
annuities, one federal official concluded, would be “inexpedient.”18 
One reason for delays in payment was that the creation of this system of ad-hoc 
administrative adjudication offered little guidance on how to evaluate claims, particularly 
with regard to supporting evidence.  The statute provided only that claimants provide the 
“necessary proofs,” a term that flummoxed federal officials.  Winthrop Sargent regarded 
compensation as the only barrier that stood between territorial inhabitants and “Lex 
Talonis”—the law of retaliation.  He accordingly made the “most liberal Construction” of 
the statute, offering “lavish  
. . . promises and assurances” of compensation.  Sargent hoped that the evidence required 
to support the claims would not be “legal”—evidence, in other words, that would hold up 
in a court of law.  What Sargent saw as an advantage—the looseness of proof—Arthur St. 
Clair saw as a liability.  Given the hazy information surrounding most purported thefts, 
the evidence for these claims could rarely be “satisfactory, or such as would entitle the 
claimants recover in a Court of Justice had the thefts been committed by fellow Citizens.”  
But such a generous standard would only encourage the territory’s inhabitants to abuse 
the system.  “[N]ot a horse will be either lost or stolen, by whomsoever it may be done,” 
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St. Clair bemoaned, “but the Indians . . . will be charged with it, and some person or other 
will be found to swear that they believe the Indians were guilty of it, and the United 
States will be called upon for all of them.”  St. Clair accordingly advocated abolishing the 
provision altogether.19 
The uncertainty around this question long outlasted St. Clair and Sargent’s terms 
in office, as the War Department struggled to create clearer standards.  But even by end 
of the eighteenth century, it was clear that the system would be neither wholly generous 
nor restrictive; it would be capricious.  As St. Clair predicted, claimants—many of whom 
who petitioned Congress directly —sought to push the federal promise of compensation 
as far as possible.  Many, including Daniel Smith, the Southwest Territory’s secretary, 
and James Ore, leader of the 1794 unauthorized expedition against Nickajack, submitted 
claims for harms that occurred within Indian country, which the statute did not authorize, 
or that predated the statute and federal treaties, sometimes tracing back to the Revolution.  
In some cases, Congress drew a sharp line, fearful of opening the floodgates to endless 
claims; yet in other instances, it granted requests that seemed to have no legal basis.20 
 
 Alongside the vigorous and largely illegal trade in horses was a parallel trade in 
people, particularly enslaved African-Americans.  “Negroes and Horses,” Anglo-
                                                
19 Sargent to Secretary of State, May 23, 1797; Arthur St. Clair to Samuel Dexter, Sec’y of War, November 29, 1800, Box 30, Folder 
3, William Hayden English Papers, Indiana Historical Society. 
20 For the subsequent history of claims under the Trade and Intercourse Acts, much later codified into federal law, see the exploration 
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State Papers: Claims (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834), 193, 222, 309, 379, 445.   
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Americans repeatedly complained, were the “property” that Natives constantly stole from 
their settlements.21   
 There were many African slaves in the borderlands, where they often toiled 
alongside enslaved Natives.  In both Tennessee and Kentucky, slavery was both legal and 
increasingly common: by 1797, William Blount was writing from Nashville that 
“Negroes are the most valuable Property in this Country.”  Enslaved Africans obtained 
under French and British rule also lived in the Illinois Country, where their legal status 
was nebulous because of the unclear retroactive scope of the Northwest Ordinance’s 
prohibition on slavery.22   
Just as proximity entangled whites and Natives together, Natives and Africans 
also forged relationships, though the sources only hint at these links. Like Native-white 
ties, these connections were often violent.  In Vincennes in 1794, local Delawares 
allegedly helped a white man abduct a slave claiming his freedom into Kentucky.  In 
1797, a “free Negro” was arrested in Detroit for the murder of an Indian; he broke his 
shackles and escaped.  And in an intriguing incident northwest of Nashville in 1799, an 
African-American slave that James Robertson had hired from Abraham Martin to work at 
Robertson’s iron works refused to accompany his master to the Mississippi Territory, 
instead “lay[ing] out Around and About the Iron Works.”  John Jones, a white man who 
lived in the area, later reported that a group of Cherokee hunters who had been in 
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neighborhood for “some Considerable Time” came by Jones’s house one afternoon “all 
very much frightened.”   The Cherokees, Jones stated, “intemated they had had a dispute 
with a negro fellow belonging to Genl. Robertsons Iron Works and that they had killed 
him.”  The absence of any discussion or testimony about the nature of the “dispute” 
suggests the hidden nature of many of these relationships, which took place out of sight 
of most Anglo-Americans.23 
But the predominant way that the surrounding Native nations came to understand 
enslaved Africans was as akin to horses: as valuable and mobile property that could 
easily be taken.  Because Indian country was a foreign jurisdiction so close to territorial 
settlements, some slaves fled there to escape bondage.  But Natives also seized dozens of 
slaves against their will—in ambushes on boats traveling down the Ohio or Tennessee, 
for instance, or in raids on Anglo-American settlements; the Cherokees reported taking 
twenty-seven slaves in a single summer.  In Native attacks, one army officer observed, 
“the Negroes are the only ones who have a Chance of their lifes (I suppose because they 
sell well).”  The Native nations of the Southeast and the Ohio and Illinois Countries had 
long traditions of taking captives and incorporating them into their societies, which 
sometimes happened with Africans.  But slaves’ value as property distinguished them 
from other captives.  Joseph Brown, a white child captured by the Cherokees in 1788, 
reported that the Cherokees were on the point of executing him when they realized that 
his captor would then insist on taking revenge on a “Negro woman” they had also 
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captured.  In Brown’s telling, the prospect of losing the “service of the negro” was too 
painful; the Cherokees’ “avarice,” he reported, spared him.24 
In one ironic moment, Tennesseean John Sevier even reprimanded the Cherokees 
for being too quick to disregard slaves’ humanity.  “You know it is wrong to swop people 
for horses,” Sevier stated, “for negroes is not horses tho they are black.” Sevier’s highly 
hypocritical remarks—he lived, after all, in a society in which horses, slaves, and land all 
served as routine and interchangeable mediums of exchange—also ignored the source of 
Native knowledge of Africans’ values as commodities: their white neighbors.  Arthur St. 
Clair reported that the Natives discovered that white Indian traders offered “a ready sale 
for every Thing plundered from the Inhabitants of the United States, but particularly 
Horses and Negroes.”  William Blount supplemented his negotiations with Chickasaw 
leaders by selling them slaves on the side.25 
Moreover, in taking slaves that legally did not belong to them, Natives were also 
just aping their white neighbors. If territorial court proceedings are any indication, 
territorial citizens frequently filched each others’ slaves.  William Blount himself, along 
with his Indian agent John Chisholm, brought a criminal suit alleging that a man named 
George Mitchell had unlawfully taken “a certain Woman Slave named Amey the property 
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of William Blount.”  In one instance, white thieves reportedly abducted two slaves 
belonging to a Cherokee woman and carried them into Kentucky.26 
As with the traffic in horses, the trade in slaves thrust on federal officials the 
obligation to try to recover Anglo-American property from Indian country.  White 
victims badgered federal representatives like Rufus Putnam, William Blount, and Indian 
agent James Seagrove to retrieve their enslaved property, even providing detailed 
descriptions of the stolen or runaway Africans.  The treaties that the United States drafted 
specifically included provisions explicitly promising that “the practice of Stealing 
Negroes and Horses” from Anglo-Americans “shall forever hereafter cease” and 
requiring the restoration of stolen property.  But Native leaders found it as difficult to 
return stolen slaves as stolen horses.  When William Blount met with the Cherokees in 
1794 and “repeatedly mentioned about the delivery of Negroes,” Bloody Fellow was able 
to recall the location and owner of nearly every slave taken from the Southwest Territory.  
Some, he knew, had been sold to the Creeks or to the Spanish.  Many, though, remained 
within the Cherokee Nation, but Bloody Fellow lamented that he was powerless to 
recover them: “We are but a poor People and have no goods to purchase the Negroes 
from the Persons who have Possession of them, if we attempt to take them by force 
perhaps they might put them to death or injure them.”27 
Once again, federal finance provided the solution.  Bloody Fellow noted that they 
would be likely be able to deliver the slaves “when we receive our annual allowance from 
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the U.S. then we can with those goods pay the Possessor for them & deliver them to 
you.”  Even before the enactment of the Trade and Intercourse Act, William Blount had 
sought to obtain federal compensation for slaves that Natives had taken, advising that one 
disgruntled resident should drawn up a petition “respecting their Negroes” in “good hand 
writing” and with the facts plainly stated, so that Blount could forward the claim to the 
President.  After the Act, many of the petitions seeking reimbursement pleaded for 
compensation for stolen slaves as well as horses.28 
In one case, the federal government became entangled in a dispute over slave 
property that did not even involve the citizens of the United States.  By some unknown 
method, the Cherokees obtained “a negro man, a negro woman and child” that belonged 
to the Chickasaw leader George Colbert.  Colbert came to Knoxville with a retinue of 
twenty Chickasaws to ask William Blount’s assistance in recovering the slaves.  Blount 
pledged his help but was apparently unsuccessful, as a year later John Sevier sent a letter 
to the Cherokees.  Sevier, indicating that he was “requested to write to you” by the 
Chickasaws, lectured the Cherokees that they could not expect to be “brothers and good 
neighbours” with the Chickasaws “if you keep their people from them.”  A year later, 
with still no relief, Colbert evidently applied to Benjamin Hawkins, the new federal 
Indian agent.  Colbert sought relief from the only ready source of property the Cherokee 
Nation had—the federal government’s “annual present made the nation.”  Hawkins 
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agreed to this arrangement as long as the Cherokees consented; after that, the issue 
vanished from the record.29     
Even absent clear resolution, the dispute over Colbert’s slaves reveals how much 
federal finance and authority had insinuated themselves into Indian country.  Colbert 
expected federal officials to resolve his dispute with the Cherokees, and Blount, Sevier, 
and Hawkins all agreed to intervene.  Moreover, federal annuities and other funds had 
become Indian Country’s readiest and most fungible source of compensation, even in 
disagreements among Natives. 
 
In short, throughout the 1790s, federal officials paid out compensation to both 
Natives and non-Natives, for crimes committed by the other.  Though this had the ironic 
effect of conforming to Native customary practice, the underlying motivation for those 
who crafted the policy was the precise opposite: to replace what officials regarded as the 
customary legal order of retaliation with a new legal order of peace and security.  Federal 
officials had tried, and failed, to accomplish this goal through law; they turned instead to 
money.  They were trying to buy their way to peace. 
The strange and perverse consequence of this seeming federal weakness was to 
reorient both Natives and non-Natives toward the national government.  Instead of 
raiding Knoxville, Nashville, or Vincennes, Native leaders arrived in these towns as 
supplicants seeking payment.  Instead of traveling into Indian country—either to “take 
satisfaction” or to pursue their horses—white claimants now traveled to Philadelphia, or 
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forwarded their petitions there, to obtain relief.  Through compensation, the federal 
government became financially responsible for the acts of people it could not control.  
The result was that relations between Natives and non-Natives in the territories were now 
triangulated through a distant national government.30         
* * * 
Compensation for the harms committed by U.S. citizens was only a small portion 
of the federal funds that flowed into Indian country.  A much larger proportion were so-
called “Indian presents” that the federal government gave to Native nations throughout 
the territories.  Some of these presents were symbolic: silver medals especially designed 
to be doled out to Native leaders and elaborate military uniforms bedecked with frills.  
But most were practical: food, alcohol, gunpowder, guns, bullets, clothing, blankets, 
cloth, tobacco, mirrors, pots, and other household items.  Native demands for these 
goods, and the federal willingness to satisfy them, reflected a complicated mixture of 
strength and weakness on both sides. 
Federal officials arriving in the territories quickly discovered that, whenever they 
encountered Natives, they also confronted outstretched hands.  Indians demanded goods 
as concrete proof of federal professions of goodwill.  When Antoine Gamelin traveled up 
the Wabash River into the lands of the Miami confederacy on a diplomatic mission, the 
Native leaders asked for a “draught of milk” (alcohol), “some good broth,” and powder 
and ball.  “[A] bearer of speeches should never be with empty hands,” the Miamis 
informed Gamelin.  An Anishinaabe emissary who met with federal representatives in the 
early 1790s spent most of his speech bemoaning how his nation was “very poor,” 
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appealing for guns, clothes, liquor, and provisions “to cover me and my peoples.”   Such 
demands seemed to mark all interactions between Natives and the federal government.  
“It is a fact that whomsoever has to see the Indians is obliged to give them [goods],” one 
federal officer complained. “[I]t is unavoidable.”31 
Because of these interactions, “beggar” became the standard epithet federal 
officials applied to any Native they encountered.  “They are the greatest beggars and the 
most indolent creatures we ever saw,” the commissioners to the Treaty of Hopewell 
reported of the Choctaws they met in 1786.  Governor Arthur St. Clair described Baptiste 
DuCoigne, the leader of the Kaskaskias around Vincennes, as “the greatest beggar I have 
met with among nations who are all beggars.” His second-in-command, Winthrop 
Sargent, recounted how “very glad” he was whenever Indians left.  When Indians came 
on what they called “friendly Visits,” Sargent complained, “they generally eke out [these 
visits] while you have any thing to give them, & this may be applied to their whole 
Colour, who are beggarly past Description.”  A federal military officer stationed at Fort 
Finney along the Ohio reported that Natives visited “almost every day to eat and drink 
with us, by way of brightning the chain of friendship curse them.”32 
 As historians have demonstrated, federal officials’ contempt for Natives and their 
demands fundamentally misunderstood Native culture.  For both the varied Native 
peoples of the Ohio Country and the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws of 
the Southeast, gift-giving served a critical diplomatic role in cementing relationships in 
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cultures oriented around exchange.  Natives showed up to diplomatic meetings with 
federal officials with gifts of their own, frequently maple sugar and wampum.  But 
federal officials had little use for sugar or “beads,” as they dubbed wampum.  By 
contrast, Natives needed, often quite urgently, the presents the federal government 
bestowed.  Centuries of trade had profoundly reoriented Native societies around 
European trade goods.  The blankets, pots, and especially guns and gunpowder that 
Natives demanded were essentials that Native nations could not readily produce for 
themselves.  The result was a situation of deep economic inequality.  When U.S. army 
general James Wilkinson sought to intimidate the warring nations of the Northwest 
Indian Confederacy, he reminded them that the “warriors of the United States” could 
raise their own meat and bread “& they make arms & ammunition for their own use.”  
Implicit in Wilkinson’s bluster was the implication that Natives lacked the same know-
how.  As the Cherokee leader Little Turkey said of arms and ammunition, “we could not 
make it ourselves.”33      
 Natives understood very well how federal officials viewed them, and attempted to 
counter their claims.  “We did not come here with an expectation of getting presents from 
you,” an Ottawa delegation informed federal army officials in 1786.  “I am no beggar,” 
the Chickasaw leader Piamingo similarly insisted as he asked that the President provide 
powder and bullets for his people; he would pay for them with furs, skins, or horses.  But 
exchange was often not enough, in part because Natives were shut out of aspects of the 
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Anglo-American market economy—“We Red People have no money,” Piamingo 
lamented—but also because Native claims of poverty were not mere rhetoric.  By the 
1790s, much Indian country was a war-ravaged land.  For thirty years, Anglo-Americans 
had destroyed Native villages, leveled cornfields, and pillaged Native goods.  Bloodshed 
and destruction continued after the end of the Revolution: a quasi-war raged south of the 
Ohio, while the federal government’s expeditions against the Northwest Indian 
Confederacy dislocated entire populations, turning whole nations into refugees.  Anglo-
Americans understood this relationship between warfare and Native poverty, and they 
sought to use it as a form of power against Native peoples.  “[W]hen your Houses [and] 
Cornfields are destroyed you have no provisions made to replace them, but are thrown 
into the greatest distress and Missary,” U.S. army commander Henry Burbeck told the 
Anishinaabe assembled at Fort Mackinac in the Northwest Territory in 1799: “[I]n short 
it’s the W[hite] people that you have to depend on and to apply too [sic] for all your 
wants.”34  
 These accounts of Native poverty and suffering were often structured by gender 
and age. “The white People cloath their women and children,” a leader of the Wabash 
Confederacy told a federal representative at a treaty session in Vincennes in 1792.  
“[O]urs are running naked. Take pity on them & send something every spring to make 
them glad.” Elsewhere, the Wabash and Illinois told Anglo-Americans that they 
“commend our women & children to your care.”  Federal officials attempted to satisfy 
these demands by routinely including goods intended for Indian “queens” and “squaws” 
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at diplomatic gatherings, and promising to supply Natives with goods for “your women 
and children.”  Many military officers found themselves feeding “old men, Women, and 
Children, who seem to have no relations to afford them support.”  Since both Native and 
American cultures associated masculinity with autonomy and independence, couching 
Native reliance on federal goods in such explicitly gendered terms served similar, yet 
antithetical, goals.  For (male) Native leaders, pleading for goods on behalf of women 
and children diminished their own sense of dependence on the Americans.  For federal 
officials, by contrast, associating Natives with women and children heightened the 
association between Natives and the era’s well-worn gendered tropes of dependency.35 
 Metaphors based on familial relationships also governed the meaning of federal 
“presents.”  By providing for Indian nations, the United States was stepping into a well-
established role as the metaphorical “father” of Native peoples.  “All white People who 
have hitherto spoken to Us, have always called Us Children,” a Wabash leader informed 
Rufus Putnam during treaty negotiations.  “I shall therefore call You Father.”  In one 
dramatic moment at the negotiations of the Treaty of Greenville, the assembled Ohio 
country nations ceased calling the federal representatives brothers and instead 
“acknowledged” the United States “to be our father.”  Federal representatives embraced 
this language, and role, when speaking to Natives.  When William Blount doled out gifts 
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to the Cherokees, for instance, he spoke of “the good things which our father, the 
President, ha[s] done for you, and what be yet intended to do.” 36    
As with gender dynamics, scholars have traced how this language of kinship and 
paternalism was susceptible to differing interpretations by Natives, who saw fathers as 
benevolent figures who protected and doted on their children, and federal officials, who 
viewed fathers as authority figures.  But by the late eighteenth century, Natives 
understood pretty well the meanings that the Anglo-Americans assigned to these familial 
metaphors.  In one striking moment at the Treaty of Holston, the assembled Cherokees 
observed that calling the United States eldest brother and father was “only a Title of 
Friendship we being the oldest people on this ground.”  The Cherokees then proceeded to 
invert the metaphor.  “Look [on] me as a mother more than any thing else,” Hanging 
Maw told William Blount and the assembled federal representatives, employing the 
maternalism more comfortable for the matriarchal Cherokees.  “[M]y land raised & 
produced you.” Other Cherokees stressed how much “it hurts our hearts” to hear the 
Anglo-Americans demand land: “[Y]ou have grown up on our land now taking it away 
from us it is just like an ungrateful child robbing his father."  Other Native groups 
stubbornly insisted on calling the United States “brothers,” or rejected familial 
relationships altogether in favor of the less hierarchical “friend.”37  
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  In short, though they contained elements of truth, narratives of Native weakness 
and reliance on American goods could often reflected expediency, for both sides.  For 
Americans, these narratives bolstered aspirations of national power, while Natives played 
up their poverty to extract trade goods.  But, as the Cherokees’ reversal of federal 
paternalism suggests, the rhetoric of a benevolent federal government dispensing its 
largesse to an impoverished people was often just that: empty words that glossed over 
how federal officials and Native peoples actually behaved when they met on the frontier.  
  
In particular, federal self-representation as liberal and generous obscured an 
important reality: the early federal government had little desire to be a conduit for food, 
weapons, and goods to Indians.  Burdened by an enormous war debt, the new nation 
sought to spend as little public money as possible on Indian affairs.  Behind the scenes, 
Henry Knox and other federal officials were urging “the most rigid oeconomy” on Indian 
agents and others at every juncture, particularly with respect to Indian “presents.”38 
Yet despite these admonitions, presents flowed out anyway, accompanied by a 
stream of excuses from federal officers to justify their seeming disregard of official 
instructions.  In this correspondence among themselves and their superiors, government 
officials painted a very different picture than the one they offered for Native 
consumption.  In their own accounts, these officials described themselves as the 
constrained supplicants, confronting Natives confident of their own strength.  Officers 
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spoke of “the impossibility of resisting the applications of Indians for rations, and 
presents.” Such language suggests that federal compliance with Native demands for 
material support reflected, not federal authority and Native weakness, but the reverse: a 
recognition that Native power in the borderlands obliged the federal government to send 
goods westward.39    
 Native power and federal acquiescence had several sources.  From a financial 
standpoint alone, the federal government desperately wanted to maintain friendly 
relations with Native peoples.  Henry Knox frequently wrote of how the United States 
could ill-afford a war with the Natives.  Events proved Knox’s predictions right.  When, 
despite what Knox regarded as the nation’s best efforts, the United States engaged in the 
four-year Northwest Inidan War, the conflict drained federal coffers, consuming over five 
million dollars—over eighty percent of federal revenues during this period. Knox’s back-
of-the-envelope calculations made clear that, whatever the price of purchasing Native 
loyalty was, it would be far less than the expense of a “system of coercion and 
oppression.”40 
Providing goods promised to be a much cheaper way to ensure peace: “[O]ne 
grate mean of securing the allegience of the natives,” Rufus Putnam wrote, “I take to be 
the furnishing them with such necessaries as they want.”  Thomas Jefferson similarly 
concluded, “The most economical as well as the most humane conduct towards them [the 
Indians] is to bribe them into peace, and to retain them in peace by eternal bribes.”  The 
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cost of a single expedition, Jefferson argued, would supply Natives with “presents on the 
most liberal scale” for a century.41 
Moreover, in providing Natives with goods, the federal government was not 
crafting policy on a blank slate, but conforming to decades of diplomatic tradition in the 
formerly British and French regions that now comprised the Northwest and Southwest 
Territories.  These precedents conditioned expectations for how a Euro-American power 
seeking Native support should behave.42   
Vincennes, long a hub for French and then British diplomacy with the Native 
nations of the Illinois country, provides an excellent illustration of how earlier practice 
constrained federal officials.  Granting presents to “friendly” Indians was the “Practice of 
all European People,” Winthrop Sargent wrote to Major John Hamtramck, the 
commanding officer of Fort Knox, the town’s army outpost.  Sargent lamented his lack of 
funds to support such gifts, but Hamtramck was undeterred.  Sargent’s letter crossed one 
from Hamtramck to him that contained virtually identical language.  Hamtramck noted 
that, financial limitations notwithstanding, he had been forced to make assurances of 
presents to the Natives who came in.  “It was necessary in order to secure their [the 
Indians] friendship to promise them some trifling recompense,” he reported.  “[I]t is an 
old Custom and they all expect it, which obliged me to promise it to them and if they get 
nothing I shall appear in a very ridiculous point of view.”  Several years later, 
Hamtramck justified supplying Natives alcohol to a different superior by insisting that 
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during diplomatic meetings the Indians “expect a keg from their father, they have been 
accustomed to it, by both French and British Governments.”43 
Hamtramck felt particularly obliged to satisfy Native expectations because, as he 
and every other federal official in the territories was well aware, the British and Spanish, 
with whom the United States fiercely competed for Native loyalties, continued to dole out 
goods from Detroit and New Orleans.  “[I]f our Government does not make [the Natives] 
presents,” Hamtramck wrote Henry Knox, “they will go to the British, who will be glad 
to see them and who will, supply them amply.”  The Wabash chiefs told Hamtramck that 
the British presented them with “Goods . . . in large heaps like stacks of Hay”; Arthur St. 
Clair similarly pressed for more federal goods by noting that the British had given 
Natives six thousand pounds in cash and an equal amount in goods.  In the Southwest 
Territory, Leonard Shaw, federal agent to the Cherokees, attempted to obtain the loyalty 
of an influential Cherokee chief, White Owl’s Son, by presenting him a laced scarlet coat, 
a ruffled shirt, a handkerchief, and some feathers.  But rather than expressing gratitude, 
White Owl’s Son merely told Shaw “what valuable presents had been given to him . . . by 
the British in Detroit,” including four coats and two shirts, boats, arm bands, gorgets, and 
as much gunpowder and lead as he wanted.  Other reports indicated that the Spanish in 
New Orleans had entire warehouses full of items intended for the Cherokees, 
Chickasaws, and Choctaws.  British and Spanish officials heightened the sense of 
competition by telling the Indians that the “Americans were poor,” since the United 
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States was distributing goods to the Natives that the Americans had purchased from 
Europe.44   
The result was an escalating and expensive arms—or rather presents—race, as 
federal officials sought to outgift the British and Spanish.  Governor Blount doled out 
goods liberally to try to wean the Chickasaws and Choctaws from foreign influence—
“ten beaves [cattle] a day and what Rum thay wanted and tobaco to smoak after thay get 
home and every other thay could say,” the Natives bragged.  Their agent told Blount the 
strategy was working: “[T]hay have bosted they never met with so good treatment from 
the british as from your Exelncy.”  The Chickasaw leader Ugulayacabe complained that 
the “delusory presents of the Americans [] unhappily blinds too many of my color.”  
Bloody Fellow similarly praised American liberality, asking his fellow Cherokees when 
they had ever gone to the British and “brought home the like of this?”45 
Federal officials justified the mounting costs by repeatedly insisting that it would 
“impolitic”—in the eighteenth-century sense of poor policy—to “break thro’ the Custom” 
and disappoint Native expectations. Implicitly, this acknowledged that tenuous federal 
authority in the territories, which Sargent euphemistically referred to as “our present 
Situation,” required such liberality.  Others admitted this relationship more explicitly: the 
magistrates of Vincennes strongly approved of Hamtramck’s “constant Practice” of 
                                                
44 John Francis Hamtramck to Secretary of War, March 31, 1792, TP: Vol. II, 380-83; Arthur St. Clair to Henry Knox, January 27, 
1788, TP: Vol. II, 89-91; “Minutes of Information given Governor Blount by James Carey, One of the Interpreters of the United 
States, in the Nation,” November 3, 1792, in ASP:IA, 1:327-29; “Tile Following Information Delivered on Oath, by James Leonard, a 
Citizen of the United States, to James Seagrove, Agent of Indian Affairs, Southern Department Rock Landing, on the Oconee. in 
Georgia,” July 24, 1792, in ASP:IA, 307-08.  There was, in fact, a trade in goods specifically intended for distribution to Indians, most 
of which were imported from Europe.  Two observers noted that the “Goods suitable for the Indians are of a particular kind,” and 
usually arrived in ships during the spring.  Samuel Holden Parsons and James Davenport to Samuel Huntington, April 6, 1789, Ayer 
MS 687, Newberry Library. 
45James Robertson to William Blount, October 12, 1792, in TP: Vol. IV, 197-98; “Talk of the Chickasaw Chiefs at the Bluffs, 
Represented by Wolf’s Friend Ugalayacabe, to Cammandt. Balshase,” 1797, in Box 2, James McHenry Papers, Clements Library, 
University of Michigan.  For the context of this particular speech, see Charles A. Weeks, “Of Rattlesnakes, Wolves, and Tigers: A 
Harangue at the Chickasaw Bluffs, 1796,” The William and Mary Quarterly 67, no. 3 (2010): 487–518. 
  394 
feeding and clothing local Natives who came to the settlement precisely “on Account of 
the weak Situation of the Country.”46 
Of course, federal officials sought to conceal these facts from Natives, offering 
their presents as a testimony to the strength and wealth of the United States.  Yet many 
Anglo-Americans feared that the Natives were not fooled.  The Indians, they knew, were 
just as capable as assessing the situation as Anglo-Americans, and could recognize that 
the federal government’s “large presents and annuities” demonstrated weakness rather 
than strength.  “[I]nstead of viewing such conduct on the part of the United States, as an 
evidence of friendship towards them [the Indians],” the legislature of the Southwest 
Territory reported to Congress, “they have considered it as an evidence of fear, or as a 
tribute paid to their superior prowess in war.”47 
Though these legislators had their own agenda in urging the abandonment of 
diplomacy, they were right: judged by their behavior, many Native leaders understood all 
too well the bargaining power they held.  Federal officials frequently complained that 
Native leaders, rather than behaving like supplicants, expected federal goods as a “Matter 
of Right.”  This was particularly true for those leaders who had long been courted by 
federal officials.  The influential =Cherokee leader John Watts and his entourage, for 
instance, reportedly burned the government-supplied beds they slept on during a 
diplomatic visit after officials refused to permit them to take the beds with them.  
Similarly, during a 1795 Chickasaw visit to Philadelphia, Secretary of War Timothy 
Pickering worked hard to secure the loyalties of their leader Major Colbert and his 
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entourage.  Pickering not only promised Colbert and his companions clothing for them 
and their entire families, but even gave Colbert four hundred dollars to purchase “an 
elegant Stallion.”  But Colbert “seemed to consider this sum hardly sufficient”; the 
Chickasaw leader, Pickering complained, “was singularly difficult to please.”48   
Such demands were not limited solely to Native leaders, however.   Time spent 
among the Creeks and Cherokees led Benjamin Hawkins, southeastern superintendent of 
Indian affairs, to denounce all Indians as a “proud lying spoiled untoward race.”  Years of 
presents from Britain and Spain, he lamented, had accustomed them to receive goods 
“sufficient to clothe all the Idlers in the Nation.”  Now the Natives he encountered 
“demand any thing they want, from a whiteman, and feel themselves insulted, when 
refused, they think they confer a favour on the donor if they accept of clothes from him 
when naked or provisions when hungry.”49 
Alongside complaints about Natives’ lack of humility, federal officials attacked 
their seeming lack of gratitude.  The one thing that the federal government’s 
extravagance was supposed to purchase—Native allegiance—proved fickle.  “The very 
Indians, who no longer ago that the last autumn were prevented from suffering the 
extremes of hunger by the bounties of the United States,” Daniel Smith reported to Henry 
Knox, “have recently been either stealing horses, or murdering defenceless women and 
children.”  Reports from a council held within the Cherokee nation in 1792 indicated that 
many of the chiefs who had been fed and clothed by William Blount had quickly turned 
face and advocated for war.  Bloody Fellow did point to the expensive goods he received 
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from Blount—the silver medal, and coat with silver epaulettes, and scarlet coat with 
silver lace—in advocating for peace.  But in the end, he, too, felt constrained to support 
the war.  By contrast, one of the foremost leaders of the push for war, John Watts, had 
also always received “the attention [of] Governor Blount and the White People . . . 
whenever he came among them.”  Reportedly, even Watts’s own brother, Unacata, 
mocked his changeable loyalties.  “[T]he Whites had given him (Watts) a great many fine 
Clothes and he grown saucy,” Unacata stated, even as he refused to join Watts in his call 
to take up arms.50 
It is important to interpret federal complaints of Natives’ sense of entitlement 
critically.  Federal officials’ anger about Native behavior reflected their own racialized 
biases.  Accounts of proud and spoiled Natives represented the converse of the tropes of 
Native poverty and dependency that surrounded federal largesse; by refusing to mouth 
the words of supplication and distress that federal officials expected from such “beggars,” 
Native leaders seemed to be violating the diplomatic script around Indian “presents.”  In 
condemning Natives for insufficient gratitude for governmental liberality, federal 
officials’ disdainful reaction mirrored wider denunciations of the era about the unworthy 
poor.51 
But, just as Native poverty was more than a mere rhetorical artifact, so too the 
entitled behavior of Native leaders likely reflected more than simply the projections of 
federal officials.  It represented, rather, a hard-headed recognition by Natives of the 
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power that they held in the particular historical moment, when the federal government 
was arguably far more dependent on Natives than vice versa.  Natives, it turned out, were 
just as adept at using what leverage they could under constrained circumstances as were 
the federal officials they encountered.     
In looking to the new federal government to pursue the “sweets of Emolument, 
which now offer,” as one observer described it, Natives were hardly alone.  As the venal 
machinations of legislators, land speculators, and financiers suggest, early Americans’ 
deep anxieties over corruption and abuse were often well-warranted, and the national 
treasury undergird many great fortunes.  If Natives were distinctive in this general 
“Scramble . . . for the Loaves & Fishes,” as one officer-seeker described this grab for 
federal patronage, it was perhaps only in the size and scope of their success in using their 
bargaining power to secure federal largesse. 52  
* * * 
Whether the federal government was spending a lot or a little on Natives is a 
matter of perspective.  Viewed in hindsight, the federal government got off cheap.  As 
existing literature emphasizes, the federal government bought Native land for much less 
than it was worth on the open market.  Between 1790, when it entered the Treaty of New 
York with the Creeks, and 1800, the federal government spent $122,000 on treaty-
stipulated annuities for Native nations.  During the same period, the federal government 
obtained a minimum of nearly 12 million acres of land through federal Indian treaties, a 
price that works out to around one cent per acre.  Since, over this period, the federal 
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government sought to resell the land for prices ranging from 30 cents to two dollars per 
acre, it was substantially undercompensating Natives for their lands.  Even Henry Knox 
acknowledged that the federal government was “taking away [Indian] lands” for “pitiful 
considerations.”53   
But if Knox acknowledged that the federal government was obtaining Native land 
cheaply, he nonetheless did not feel that the federal government was spending too little 
on Indians.  On the contrary, he was the most vocal of a bevy of federal officials 
bemoaning what they regarded as the inordinate expenses of the Indian Department.  
These protestations reflected the standard carping of public officials about spending 
funds, especially during the cash-strapped early republic.  But, particularly from the 
standpoint of the 1790s, the assertion that Indian affairs cost the federal government a 
great deal of money rang true. 
 For one, despite rosy-eyed expectations about sales of western lands, there was 
tremendous uncertainty over the future of how the public domain would be distributed, as 
earlier chapters recount.  In the 1790s, income from the land purchased from Natives was 
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largely hypothetical, and many feared it would it never materialize.  In fact, federal land 
sales over the decade did not even equal federal expenditures on treaty annuities.54  
More broadly, fixating on federal annuities has the ironic effect of construing the 
treaties as nothing more than a land sale, in which all the terms appeared within the four 
corners of the document.  Federal officials may have aspired to transform treaties into 
such simple exchanges, but in practice, neither Natives nor federal representatives viewed 
treaties this way.  Though they concluded with formal written documents, treaty sessions 
were also grand diplomatic affairs where Natives reaffirmed their relationship with the 
United States.  They resembled nothing so much as an elaborate weeks- or months-long 
conventions in the woods, usually held in the borderlands distant from Anglo-American 
settlements, attended by scores of federal officials, soldiers, interpreters, and clerks, as 
well as hundreds or even thousands of Natives.55 
For federal officials, all these aspects of treaty sessions required one thing: 
money.  It was the treaty sessions, not the annuities, that led one federal superintendent to 
bemoan “the great expence attending Indian Treatyes.”   Federal officials had to feed, 
clothe, and house all the Natives who showed up, as well as supply them with gifts, at 
federal expense, in addition to providing provisions and salaries for the scores of staff 
treaties required.  Natives also had an annoying habit of failing to stick to federal 
timelines: Blount complained that the Chickasaws and Choctaws showed up “many days” 
early to 1792 treaty session, “which made expenses much higher.”    Federal 
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representatives futilely tried to keep down costs by limiting the attendees to only 
“headmen,” but “common Indians,” as they called them, came anyway, often in 
enormous numbers, expecting to be housed and fed.56   
Despite officials’ best efforts, then, treaty sessions were elaborate affairs that ate 
up, quite literally, public resources.  At the small treaty that Rufus Putnam held at 
Vincennes in 1792, which only seven hundred Natives attended, Putnam estimated that 
40,000 rations would be required as a “moderate calculation.”  For a proposed meeting 
with the Cherokees, federal officials purchased 8,000 pounds of flour, one ton of lead, 
and 900 gallons of whiskey.  In addition to food, federal officials carried all manner of 
goods.  To his treaty session, Putnam carried coats, hats, suits, kettles, blankets, shirts, 
hatchets, knives, and ribbons.  Most of these items had to be transported from 
Philadelphia—prices in the territories were, federal officials complained, usurious—
which required salaries for wagoneers, boatmen, and storekeepers.57   
The result of all these expenses was that a single treaty session ended up costing 
many multiples of the annuities enshrined in the written treaties as the formal 
consideration for ceded lands.  A conference with the Chickasaw and Choctaw Indians—
a peace conference, where no lands were to be purchased—ran an estimated $6,754.50.  
The goods alone for a proposed treaty with the Cherokees cost $4,743.25.   In 1789, 
Arthur St. Clair estimated that a treaty along the Mississippi would cost an estimated 
$10,250 in goods, transportation, and salaries, and another $5,000 for 30,000 rations.  St. 
                                                
56 Richard Wynne to John Steele, February 19, 1789, Box 1, Folder #4, John Steele Papers, Southern Historical Collection; John 
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57 “Schedule of Goods Delivered by Joseph Baird at the Indian Treaty,” September 1792, Folder 4, RPP; “Invoice of Items Purchased 
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Clair would know: the Treaty of Fort Harmar that he had just concluded had cost over 
$18,000.  One congressman’s extreme estimate put the cost of the Treaty of New York 
with the Creeks at $61,000 in presents, and a subsequent meeting at $150,000.  Little 
wonder that the inhabitants of Cumberland feared that the expense of holding an Indian 
treaty from their own funds would “reduce them to the Greatest Poverty and Distress.”58 
Treaties were merely the most concentrated instances when federal moneys went 
to house, cloth, and feed Natives.  Precisely because treaty sessions represented a 
relationship rather than a single transaction, the underlying logic—that the federal 
government had to continually supply Native peoples to secure their allegiances—meant 
that much of the federal government’s Indian Department expenditure was entirely 
unconnected with land sales but intended merely to maintain Native goodwill.  This was 
particularly true for the Chickasaws and Choctaws in the Southwest Territory.  Since 
neither nation had sold land to the federal government, neither received an annuity, but 
their strategic location in the southeast borderlands, and the constant fear of Spanish 
influence, quickly directed federal largesse their way.  In 1793, William Blount, who 
hoped to use the Chickasaws to counter what he saw as the threat from the Creeks, 
proposed that a staggering $97,500 in goods be supplied to the Chickasaws and Choctaws 
annually—including 16,000 blankets, 70,000 yards of cloth, and 15,000 pounds of 
ammunition.  The actual amount they received was less dramatic, but still significant: the 
federal government provided them with $16,000 worth of goods, including gunsmithing 
and blacksmithing tools, as well as paying the salary of a blacksmith from Knoxville for 
                                                
58David Allison, “Estimate of the Supposed Expense of the Chickasaw and Choctaw Indian Conference to Be Held at NashVille 1st. 
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the United States 4 (June 6, 1794): 774–79; “Cumberland District Ct. Records,” R6, 1783-87, Reel 224, Tennessee State Library and 
Archives. R6. 
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their use.  Another $3,000 worth in goods followed based on the President’s promise a 
few years later. Federal officials also supplied the Chickasaws with 1500 bushels of corn 
after a poor harvest.59 
Natives, though, did not simply wait for the federal government to provide goods.  
Instead, throughout the 1790s, they constantly showed up at federal forts in both the 
Northwest and Southwest Territories, expecting to be fed.  Commanding officers, in vain, 
tried to refer Natives to the governor, which only “excite[d] their indignation.”  The 
Natives insisted that “in all their intercourse with white people, [they had] been 
accustomed to do business with military Chiefs.”  Hesitant to allow Natives to return 
their nations empty-handed—where the officers feared they would report, “We have 
nothing to expect from the United States”—the officers issued the rations the Indians 
demanded: 3,154 pounds of flour, 2,196 pounds of beef, 220 gills (5 ounces) of salt, and 
294 gills of whiskey at Fort Defiance in 1798; 2556 pounds of beef in a single month in 
1796 to support ninety Indians “who have altogether been victualled by the Garrison” at 
Fort Wayne; 688 rations of liquor in a single month in 1801 at Fort Washington.  The 
costs mounted.  In Vincennes, Captain Prior spent $1600 in a single year on the Indian 
Department; other officers referenced the “incredible expence to government” of feeding 
Natives.  Complaining that the “provisions to Indians distributed at military posts far 
exceed in value the amount of their annual Stipends [and] encourage the Indians in 
idleness,” the Secretary of War attempted to have the practice “absolutely terminated” 
except in instances of “indispensable charity.”  But the “incidental expenses” of the 
                                                
59 William Blount and Andrew Pickens to Secretary of War, August 1, 1793, in TP: Vol. IV, 291-93; Timothy Pickering to David 
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Indian Department—including the “rations issued to Indians”—only continued to rise, 
going from thousands to tens of thousands of dollars every year.60 
 Federal officials did not have to travel to remote borderlands outposts to 
encounter importuning Natives, however.  Throughout the 1790s, groups of Cherokees, 
Choctaws, and Chickasaws, bedecked in federally provided attire, could be found 
strolling the streets of Philadelphia.  Their presence was the result of what were termed 
“Indian visits,” where groups of Native leaders journeyed thousands of miles to meet 
directly with the President and Secretary of War in the capital. Throughout the decade, 
Cherokee leaders John Watts and Bloody Fellow and the Chickasaw leaders Piamingo 
and Colbert traveled to Philadelphia nearly yearly. One congressman joked that Henry 
Knox would soon learn Cherokee “by keeping continually whole tribes of indians at this 
place.”61 
Both high-level federal officials and Native leaders saw advantages in such visits. 
Successive Secretaries of War encouraged trips to Philadelphia as an opportunity to 
impress Native leaders with the size and power of the United States as well as to provide 
evidence of nation’s goodwill toward Natives; the officials believed that Natives who saw 
“the population of the country, and the improvements of all sorts” would quickly realize 
the “futility” of war against the United States.  For their part, Natives embraced the visits 
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as an opportunity to conduct diplomacy unmediated by Indian agents, who were 
predictably wary of these trips.  “Indian visits to this place [Philadelphia] ought to be 
prevented,” one close associate of William Blount complained.  “[A]fter the agreement 
made in Treaty the Indians had only to say we are dissatisfied with the Superintendant we 
will go to Congress, this they do and get what they want.”  This observation helps explain 
why so many Natives eagerly made the long and occasionally dangerous journey and 
why they often organized their trips unbidden by federal officials in the territories, who 
gave them their support only reluctantly and often only after receiving direct orders.62 
  Indian visits were expensive.  Natives who traveled on these trips were housed, 
fed, transported, and clothed at federal expense, and escorted by translators and agents 
paid from the federal treasury.  Upon arrival in Philadelphia, Native leaders were 
“abundantly supplied with goods,” with the obvious intent that their allegiance would be 
secured and they would be able to report back to their nations on the nation’s generosity.  
William Blount, who accompanied the Chickasaws on a 1793 visit to Philadelphia, hoped 
that the chief Piamingo would “give occular demonstration of the liberality of the United 
States” on his return. Such “liberality” meant that the costs of these Indian visits often 
equaled those of treaty sessions: Blount estimated a single Cherokee visit in 1792 ran 
about ten thousand dollars. 63 
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 In sum, satisfying Native demands through elaborate treaty sessions, provisions, 
“presents,” and Indian visits was a costly undertaking.  Tallying up the precise figures is 
difficult given the poor state of early federal recordkeeping, but one calculation—pieced 
together from various records in 1820 and likely an underestimate—stated that the federal 
government spent $722,393 in the Indian Department throughout the 1790s, nearly 2% of 
the federal government’s non-debt expenditures during the period.  The expenditures 
continued to rise, precipitously, in the following decades.64 
 Though these numbers vindicated those who saw placating Native wants as 
cheaper than warfare, they nonetheless dramatically exceeded the $15,0000-20,000 
annually that most of these prognosticators believed even the most generous presents 
would cost. By the early 1800s, Indian Department expenditures routinely exceeded 
$100,000 a year.  These were especially large sums of money in the territories, where 
hard currency was scarce; Ohio, for instance, brought in a little less than $40,000 in taxes 
in 1798-99, while Tennessee supplied just over $13,000 in the same period.  The Indian 
Department expenditures look quite large, too, when set against the $972,000 the federal 
government spent on compensation and pensions for Revolutionary War veterans during 
the same period.65 
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 These expenditures certainly seemed enormous to those outside of the federal 
government.  In the Knoxville Gazette, William Cocke complained of “half the wealth of 
the union presented to the enemy”; an ordinary citizen from Georgia, writing to President 
Washington, bemoaned the “enormous sums of money” expended “yearly” on Indian 
“presents.”  Some drew explicit comparisons to federal spending on veterans.  If 
Congress “has any bounty to spare,” Tennessee’s first governor John Sevier argued, it 
should grant its “charity” to “the lame, the halt, and the blind soldier” who sacrificed for 
their nation, rather than “giving thousands to those who dispise it.”66   
The response in the Northwest Territory was even more extreme.  Some of the 
inhabitants of Vincennes argued that, instead of “receiv[ing] any Indians into the Village, 
[] we ought to kill them.”  Perhaps the clearest evidence of the frenzied response of many 
frontier settlers to federal support for Natives comes from the 1794 riot in Cincinnati, 
discussed in the previous chapter.  As the inhabitants whipped themselves into a 
genocidal fury against a group of Choctaws aiding the U.S. army, they “Observed that 
those Indians were a Considerable Expence to the US--that it would be Serviceable totaly 
to destroy them (and that Instantly) than that they should receive any further Support.”67 
 Underlying this rage was a deep-seated sense that the federal government was 
coddling Natives at the same moment that the nation’s own citizens were left to suffer the 
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fury of Native attacks unaided.  “While [the Cherokee chief] Double Head . . . and his 
sanguinary Brothers are received and caressed at Philadelphia,” the inhabitants of the 
Southwest Territory reportedly complained, “we are daily Suffering at the Hands of their 
Associates in Iniquity.”  Biased in favor of Natives, the federal government seemed to be 
forgetting its obligation to its own citizens.  The “present measures of the Federal 
Government,” one observer reported, led many people to believe “they are neglected, and 
the interest of the indians only consulted.”   Returning to the paternalist metaphors that 
frequently framed Indian affairs, one inhabitant of the Southwest Territory complained 
that Congress “are more favourable to their savage, adopted, and illegitimate, than to us 
their legitimate children.”68  
* * * 
 Territorial citizens’ narrative of federal neglect was misleading.  Their attacks on 
Natives as the undeserving beneficiaries of federal largesse ignored the extent to which 
much of this westward flow of funds ended up in their, rather than Native, hands.  Towns 
like Vincennes, Detroit, Knoxville, and Nashville were full of inhabitants dependent on 
the Indian Department for their livelihood. Some, like Indian interpreters and agents, 
were directly on the federal payroll.  But federal spending enriched a larger circle than 
simply federal employees.  Territorial merchants provided the rations, horses, and 
wagons the department needed, often at high markups; wagoneers and boatmen 
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transported goods up the rivers from Philadelphia into Indian country; craftsmen built the 
boats, trading posts, and warehouses the Department called for.69 
Beyond these legitimate opportunities, minimal oversight meant that it was easy 
enough to divert some of the stream of federal monies flowing through the territories 
away from their intended recipients.  In Vincennes, the local commander, Captain Prior, 
reportedly dubbed himself “agent for Indian affairs on the Wabash,” and operated the 
department as a “system of job-making” for the “sole benefit” of him and his 
confederates--at “very Enormous” expense.  In Nashville, local Indian agent James 
Robertson allegedly organized a cartel of local merchants, to whom he directed business 
supplying Indians in return for kickbacks—discounts on items for personal use, a wink 
and a nod when Robertson took items for himself and billed them to the Indian 
Department. In order to make the prices billed the government seem reasonable, an 
informant asserted, Robertson and the merchants then delivered the Indians only half the 
goods contracted for.  Such venality allegedly included the territorial governors 
themselves: rumors circulated that William Blount employed moneys sent for treaties to 
buy slaves, which he later traded for the required provisions at a tidy profit, pocketing the 
difference.  Little wonder that Secretary of War Timothy Pickering bemoaned the “great 
abuses existing in the conduct of affairs in the Southwestern Territory.”70 
                                                
69 For examples of local financial connections to the Indian Department, see “Articles of Agreement Between John Chisholm and 
David Moore,” September 21, 1795, William Blount Papers, McClung Historical Collection, Knoxville Public Library, Knoxville, 
Tenn.; William Blount to David Henley, July 23, 1795, William Blount Papers, McClung Historical Collection; Hamtramck to 
Sargent, August 9, 1792. 
70 Winthrop Sargent to Secretary of War, July 6, 1792, TP: Vol. II, 404-05; Judge Turner to Gov. Arthur St. Clair, June 14, 1794, in 
SCP325; Oliver Wolcott to David Henley, May 30, 1795, Box 16, Folder 9, Oliver Wolcott Papers, Connecticut Historical Society; 
“Deposition of Samson Williams,” July 7, 1795, Documents, Box 1, Folder 3, David Henley Papers, Tennessee State Library and 
Archives; Timothy Pickering to David Henley, July 22, 1795, Folder 12, Timothy Pickering Letters, Ayers 926, Newberry Library. 
  409 
But there was also a deeper and more significant irony to territorial protests over 
Natives’ dependence on the federal government.  In a formal constitutional sense, it was 
the territories, not Native nations, that were “dependent.”  At the time, the term conveyed 
a political meaning that indicated a lack of autonomy, the opposite of independence.  It 
was this meaning that Arthur St. Clair invoked when he described territories as the 
“dependent colon[ies]” of the United States, in contrast to sovereign participants in the 
nation.  But St. Clair did not use dependence purely as a technical term; he also argued 
that this position mandated citizens’ subordination to the dictates of the national 
government.  When the territorial inhabitants grew too demanding, St. Clair insisted that 
they be “put in Mind that they are not yet a part of the Union, but dependent upon it.”71 
This category of dependence led some to view the territories through the same 
lens of paternalism that federal officials had tried to thrust on Native peoples.  This 
metaphor cast the territories as the growing children of a benevolent and caring nation-
father.  Unsurprisingly, St. Clair particularly embraced this rhetoric: he described the 
territories as “in a State of Infancy,”  and related his feelings on viewing the development 
of the Northwest Territory to “those of a father” who had watched his son grow up and 
was about to venture out into a dangerous world.  But some of the territorial inhabitants 
adopted this rhetoric, too, expressing “gratitude to the Federal Government for the 
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paternal care which they have exercised over the colony” and describing the territory as a 
“Child . . . nursed with such tenderness by the United States.”72 
But if the citizens of the territories were children, they were willful and 
disobedient children who seemed to have little love for their parents, or so federal 
officials felt.  In fact, many territorial inhabitants would have rejected the infantilizing 
metaphor; their view of their relationship with the United States was less sentimental and 
more transactional.  Like Natives, their loyalties and allegiances seemed fickle and 
changeable.  “They are too far removed form the seat of government to be much 
impressed with the power of the United States,” St. Clair reported to a congressman in 
Philadelphia of the residents of the Northwest Territory.  “Fixed political principles they 
have none, and though at present they seem attached to the General Government, it is in 
fact but a passing sentiment, easily changed or even removed.”  Earlier, St. Clair told 
President Washington that the “Ligature that binds together” the territories and the United 
States “is a weak one.”73 
Also like Natives, frontier settlers used their strategic position in the borderlands 
to their advantage, flirting with Spanish and British patronage to possibly secure some 
sort of autonomous status.  Throughout the 1780s and 1790s, much of the western United 
States was aflame with secessionist sentiments: Rufus Putnam described this vision of a 
“separate, independent Govrnment” as a “maggot . . . in the heads of some people.”  
Though the most active advocates for secession were in Kentucky, the idea infected the 
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territories, too.  In the Northwest Territory, federal officials were highly uncertain of the 
loyalties of the French in the Illinois Country and in Detroit, who had only recently 
become U.S. citizens.  In the Mero district around Nashville—itself named in honor of 
the Spanish governor of New Orleans—inhabitants could not quite decide whether they 
wanted to join Spanish Louisiana or invade and take it over; plans for both seemed to 
emerge every few years.  Federal officials believed that the Spanish and British 
encouraged these secessionist sentiments, hoping to check American power.  “Spain on 
the one hand is certainly at Work for that purpose,” St. Clair reported, “and on the other 
hand I have reason to believe that Great Britain is not Idle.” Throughout the period, 
territorial officials occasionally received panicked letters from Philadelphia over alleged 
Spanish, British, and French agents working their way through the territories, reportedly 
sowing secessionist allegiances in their wake.  In fact, many of the locals who engaged in 
the most elaborate intrigues were also the ones that the federal government had to rely on 
to implement its policies—James Wilkinson, later federal commander of the U.S. army in 
the Northwest Territories; Harry Innes, later a federal judge, in Kentucky; James 
Robertson, later a federal Indian agent.74 
The alarmism over secessionism, especially in Philadelphia, ignores the extent to 
which many in the territories were posturing, at least in part. Like Native nations, they 
were engaged in a playoff system of their own, using the prospect of disloyalty to secure 
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ever-greater concessions from the government.  The threat of secession was in line with 
inhabitants’ preferred interpretation of their relationship to the federal government, which 
was contractual, not familial; they viewed their loyalty to the national government as 
contingent on the federal government fulfilling its obligations to its citizens, just as the 
Declaration of Independence suggested.   
Above all, they expected one thing from the federal government: “protection,” a 
keyword that, as Patrick Griffin has demonstrated, reverberated throughout the 
borderlands during this period.  “[P]rotection,” in the words of Virginia governor Patrick 
Henry, “is the best & grand object of social compact.”  Henry interpreted the federal 
government’s failure to adequately defend Kentucky against Native attacks in this frame.  
“[I]f it is found that no reliance can be placed in Congress for protection, are not all the 
Western people driven into a separation from us?” Western settlers took such thinking to 
heart, insisting that the federal government had failed to fulfill its duties. “America ought 
not to exist as a nation,” one Kentuckian observed, “unless she chastises . . . her hostile 
enemies.”  One writer in the Knoxville Gazette put it baldly.  “Allegiance and protection 
are reciprocal in their nature,” the pseudonymous “Fellow Citizen” wrote, “and the one 
may of right be refused when the other is withdrawn.”75   
As this statement suggests, the attack on the federal government for inadequate 
protection was a particular hobbyhorse of the inhabitants of the Southwest Territory, 
who, as we have seen, believed they were the “most easy prey & the most out of 
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protection” of any part of the United States.  They especially resented that their pleas 
were neglected, they believed, because of their political powerlessness and remote 
location.  “We are part of the united government, and from them we have a right to 
expect protection,” a grand jury in the Hamilton District pronounced in 1793.  Pointing 
out the defense afforded the victims of the Algerine pirates, the Territory’s legislature 
reminded Congress “that the citizens who live in poverty on the extreme frontier are as 
much entitled to [be] procted [sic] in their lives, their families, and their little property, as 
those who roll in luxury, ease, and affluence, in the great and opulent Atlantic cities.”  An 
author in the Knoxville Gazette expressed this sense of neglected grievance, writing of 
recent attacks: “Had THESE DEPREDATIONS been committed in PHILADELPHIA                 
the reader can fill in the blank.”  An anonymous reader actually did so, writing in: “there 
would have been provisions made to punish those savages.”76 
The extravagant rhetoric of the territorial citizens should not obscure the 
genuineness of their sufferings.  Cherokees and Creeks killed over two hundred territorial 
citizens in a population of several thousand; representatives in the territorial assembly 
asserted that nearly all of them had lost a “dear wife or child, or aged parent, or near 
relation” to Native attacks.  (Of course, they made no acknowledgment that the 
Cherokees and Creeks shared this experience of loss because of whites’ attacks.)  But the 
territorial citizens’ claim on protection was also an attempt to wring federal resources 
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from a reluctant government.  “Does not Congress consider the lives of their people of 
more value than money?” wrote one western settler pleading for military action.77   
Many in the federal government well understood this linkage between federal 
military expenditures and territorial loyalties.  Expending money on the military, Henry 
Knox reported, was the means most likely “to attach the people of the frontiers to the 
government of the United States.” Massachusetts congressman Fisher Ames echoed 
Knox’s link between federal money and territorial loyalties.  “Congress has little 
occasion to make itself known to [the frontier settlers] except by acts of protection,” he 
told Rufus Putnam. “The most successful way to banish the ruinous idea of the future 
independency of the western country is, doing good to the settlers, to gain their hearts.”78 
In the Northwest Territory, such rhetoric by ordinary citizens and federal officials 
alike was successful, helping drag the reluctant national government into the lengthy and 
costly war against the Northwest Indian Confederacy.  “To obtain protection against 
lawless violence, was a main object for which the present government was instituted,” 
Henry Knox wrote in his public declaration of the war’s causes. Echoing the constant 
refrain from the territories, he continued: “A frontier citizen possesses as strong claims to 
protection as any other citizen.”  Privately, he wrote to Arthur St. Clair to use the 
federally supported expeditions into Indian country as an opportunity to “impress the 
frontier Citizens, of the entire good dispositions of the General government towards 
                                                
77 “To the Congress of the United States”; Thompson to Madison, June 1, 1790.  William Blount put the number killed or taken 
prisoner by Creeks and Cherokees at “upwards of two hundred,” while the residents of the Mero District alone presented President 
Washington with a list of 117 killed and wounded in the region since the Treaty of Holston.  William Blount to James Seagrove, 
January 9, 1794, in TP: Vol. IV, 320-23; Citizens of the Mero District to George Washington, August 13, 1793, in PGW:PS, 13:440-
42.  In 1791, there were a little over 7,000 residents around Nashville, and 35,000 in the Territory as a whole.  Walter T. Durham, 
Before Tennessee: The Southwest Territory, 1790-1796 : A Narrative History of the Territory of the United States South of the River 
Ohio (Rocky Mount Historical Association, 1990), 53. 
78Henry Knox, “A View of the Present State of the Military Force of the United States” March 19, 1791, NWTC; Fisher Ames to 
Rufus Putnam, February 22, 1791, in MRP, 250. 
  415 
them.”  He gave St. Clair what amounted to talking points to quiet the frontier 
complaints: “The United States embrace with equal care all parts of the Union, and in the 
present case are taking expensive arrangements for the protection of the frontiers.”79 
These “expensive” arrangements proved highly important to the Northwest 
Territory’s economic development—not only in encouraging settlement by removing 
perceptions of Native threats, but because the U.S. army soon became one of the most 
important drivers of the territorial economy.  The money that cascaded westward as a 
result of the war against the Northwest Indian Confederacy proved a particular boon for 
Cincinnati, where the army was stationed.  “Inhabitants have doubled here within nine 
months past,” John Cleves Symmes reported from the city in 1790, “owing to two 
reasons principally—the residence of the army here, and great demand for labour on 
buildings is such to give employment to every class.”  An inhabitant of Marietta later 
recalled how all “the Yong & interpriseing men follow[ed] the Armey to catch the 
Government’s money & Make to themselves Fourtains [fortunes].”  Embittered, he 
complained, “"The Indian War Built up Cincinaty & the adjacent Countrey at the 
expence of the Ohio Companeys Settlement.”80 
The army proved financially essential to other places in the Northwest Territory 
as well.  When the United States took possession of Detroit in 1796, many of the firms 
that had long made a living from the fur trade began providing the military with the 
enormous quantities of alcohol, beef, and especially flour needed to support the soldiers.  
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The town was so dependent on military money that its judges protested when the army 
attempted to limit soldiers’ leave, as it would deprive the “the Citizens [of] the benefit of 
the free circulation of Cash.”  There was a similar effect wherever soldiers were 
stationed: citizens in the Illinois country began building flour mills to supply the army 
when soldiers were posted downriver.  Federal officer John Hamtramck estimated his 
soldiers in Vincennes had consumed one-third of all the flour produced in the village. 
William Blount observed that the lands to the north were “more full of Money arising 
from . . . the army North of Ohio than any other Part of America.”81 
The Southwest Territory ostensibly fared differently, as Blount’s jealousy 
indicates.  As we have seen, despite Blount’s zealous advocacy and citizens’ impassioned 
pleas, Congress refused to authorize punitive expeditions there akin to the campaign 
north of the Ohio. Andrew Cayton has argued that this failure helped sour territorial 
inhabitants against the federal government, creating long-standing regional divergences 
in attitudes toward national authority.82 
The claim that the federal government neglected the Southwest Territory, though, 
gives too much credit to the bitter complaints of the most vocal territorial citizens.  In 
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fact, the authority and legitimacy of the federal government was the subject of fierce 
contention within the Territory.  Even as many argued that the national government had 
failed to fulfill its most fundamental obligation of protection, others sharply disagreed.  
“If ever a people lived under a desireable Government,” Territorial Judge Campbell 
observed in a grand jury charge, “it may truly be said to be the people of the [Southwest] 
Territory . . . We experience all the Advantages of Government without feeling any of its 
burdens.”  Another argued that the Territory had flourished under federal rule, which had 
“establish[ed] things greatly beneficial to the people collectively.”83   
This view was credible because, notwithstanding the protests, the federal 
government heavily subsidized the territories.  Though local taxes and fees underwrote 
some infrastructure and parts of the judicial system, the heaviest expenses were paid from 
the federal treasury.  The largest expense of all, protecting the territories, was born 
entirely by the federal government, which paid the substantial costs of the territorial 
militia. 
The militia was a deeply local institution that required all male citizens to serve to 
protect the community.  Military men like St. Clair and especially Henry Knox had little 
respect or confidence in the militia, whom they viewed as disobedient, ill-trained, and 
unreliable.  But territorial citizens insisted that local militia, being accustomed to Native 
methods of warfare, were far more effective against Native attacks.  And so, in both the 
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Northwest and Southwest Territories, Congress used its constitutional power to authorize 
the President to call out the militia to supplement the minuscule national military.84   
As an institution, this federalized militia was an odd amalgam of local and 
national authority. Though the militia ostensibly fell under the formal control of federally 
appointed military commanders like Arthur St. Clair, in practice the militia had little 
respect for the regular army.  The army did not select militia officers; localities did.  Even 
in the territories, where the federal governors appointed militia leaders, they felt 
constrained to pick local notables based on their stature in the community.  Whenever the 
militia and regular army fought alongside each other, as they did during the Northwest 
Indian War, there were incessant disagreements over rank and command.85 
 Federal officials held the formal authority to decide when and how to call out the 
militia. Yet distance required placing much of this authority in influential locals or in the 
so-called county lieutenants, the militia’s local commanders. Federal officials’ discretion 
was also heavily constrained by demands from local inhabitants: they were “teazed to 
death by rumours of persons killed, strong assertions & persuasions of the necessity of 
establishing posts at this that and the other place.”  Westerners had strong views, based 
on experience, about what “adequate” protection required—not just large numbers of 
general militia, but also specialized scouts, rangers, and mounted militia.  Federal 
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officials fulminated that localities were always calling up more militia than needed, and 
to little effect.  The counties, Arthur St. Clair observed, did “not ma[k]e a very discreet 
use of the powers they were invested with, as to numbers.”86 
 In practice, then, federal officers exercised little control over either the personnel 
or the service of the “federal” militia.  What the federal government did provide was 
financing.  While in federal service, the militia received the same pay as regular soldiers 
in the federal army, from the same source—the national treasury.  They also received pay 
for subsistence and supplies, which made the mounted rangers and scouts, with their 
horses, especially expensive. Henry Knox fruitlessly appealed to the militia commanders 
to observe the “highest oeconomy.”  Instead, he lamented, the militia made “unlimited 
expences” and were “exceedingly inattentive to public Stores of every kind.”  The pay 
afforded to the scouts and rangers the frontier settlers so favored was especially 
outrageous.  “Were it carried to a considerable extent,” Knox complained, “no 
Government on earth could support it.”87    
 The numbers supported Knox’s complaints.  As Native attacks escalated in the 
early 1790s, the federal government expended tens of thousands of dollars monthly on 
militia defense.  In early 1791, Henry Knox predicted that militia protection for all of 
Virginia and Kentucky would cost $50,000 for the year.  By 1792, the Southwest 
Territory had an estimated 1500 militia under arms—at a time when the Territory’s 
population was only 35,000—at a cost for an estimated $20,000 for three months 
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protection.  By 1793, the Territory spent $37,517.69 on militia for protection against 
Cherokees and Creeks during October and November alone; Henry Knox feared that 
costs would top $100,000 by February. Expenses in the isolated Mero District, around 
Nashville, were especially heavy: Blount calculated that they were four times greater than 
those elsewhere in the Territory.88 
 To pay these claims, literal chests filled with tens of thousands of dollars made 
their way to the office of David Henley, the army’s paymaster in Knoxville.  Henley later 
recounted being completely overwhelmed, as he had to process hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in claims and payments almost single-handedly (his ineffectual assistant, an 
untrained army officer, later vanished, leaving his accounts $50,000 in arrears).89   
 Though many territorial inhabitants regarded these measures as inadequate, others 
recognized that the Southwest Territory received a double benefit from these federal 
expenditures, as the writer LM. observed in the Knoxville Gazette.  For one, “the citizens 
have been protected . . . the force of the Territory has been called out.”  For another, “for 
these services they are and will be paid, in money, a medium of trade, general and 
efficacious.”  L.M. noted that under North Carolina’s rule, the only currency in 
circulation was near-worthless state paper, which was nonetheless in short supply.  Now, 
thanks to the federal government, “a medium of commerce, viz. gold and silver, has been 
introduced,” leading, in L.M.’s view, to the “rise and growth of every little town.”90 
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Inhabitants soon came to see militia claims as nearly as central to the local 
economy as land rights—like title, “the [militia] Certificates became as it were a 
circulating Medium thro’ out the Territory.”  Militia claims also presented the same 
hazards as land ownership in the Territory.   Just as North Carolina had attempted to halt 
fraud through bookkeeping, the War Department outlined an elaborate payment 
procedure involving extensive paperwork, stipulating that militia commanders provide 
triplicate receipts, to regulate the massive flow of funds. But this failed to stop abuse.  In 
one instance, a muster master allegedly skimmed four dollars from the pay of every 
officer.  In another, commander reportedly mustered more men than really served; he 
then distributed the pay for these phantom soldiers among the actual militia.91 
 More common than outright fraud, however, was a complicated system of 
speculation in militia claims.  Because of the delay in federal payment, and because of 
the shortage of specie in the Southwest Territory, soldiers entitled to militia payments 
routinely assigned them at a discount to other parties, who then passed them along as 
currency; storekeepers frequently accepted militia vouchers as payment. Many of these 
assignments were done informally, often lacking the name of the attorney, witness, or 
even party involved in the transfer, but nonetheless securing the required endorsement of 
a justice of the peace.  Territorial citizens were, in essence, trading and gambling on 
federal credit, a practice that Secretary of War Timothy Pickering complained was 
“unauthorized” and pernicious.  His fear was that those who had actually served would be 
“injured” while “persons who have speculated on their claims” would receive “unjust 
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emolument.”  Once again, Pickering fretted, local practices wrested ostensibly federal 
authority out of the hands of federal officials, even as territorial citizens would blame the 
federal government for its inattentiveness to their needs.92 
 But if territorial citizens proved remarkably effective at repurposing federal funds 
to their own ends, the federal government also received an ostensible benefit from the 
seemingly ceaseless flow of federal funds to pay the militia.  If nothing else, federal 
finance was a source of federal power that gave federal officials authority over a militia 
otherwise largely outside meaningful federal control.  Federal officials could, and did, 
refuse to pay expenses that they regarded as unauthorized.   
A particularly fierce controversy raged around the Beard and Ore expeditions of 
1793 and 1794.  As discussed in the previous chapter, these expeditions flagrantly 
violated federal law, but efforts to hold the perpetrators legally accountable failed.  
Territorial citizens brazenly argued that not only were the expeditions legally justifiable, 
but that Congress was obligated on “equitable” grounds to repay their expenses from the 
public treasury.  For Ore’s expedition, James Robertson even signed off on the muster 
rolls required for federal reimbursement.  William Blount was shocked at the audacity.  
There was not “the most distant hope that the Perpetrators of such lawless unauthorized 
acts could expect the least Pecuniary Reward for their trouble, for services I cannot call 
them.” Blount told Robertson. “I know not the price I would take to report such an order 
to the War office.”93         
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 In the short term, Blount’s predictions were right: successive Secretaries of War, 
in authorizing the Territory’s militia payments, refused to pay the costs of the offensive 
military operations, even going so far as to instruct the paymaster to parse out which 
militia companies had remained within territorial boundaries.  Blount noted that this 
refusal was a “great Disappointment” to many speculators, who were “deeply interested . 
. . holding many of the claims.”  One territorial resident complained that his “whole time” 
was taken up trying to obtain reimbursement.  Another stated that, as a consequence of 
this refusal, the inhabitants’ “Confidence in the General Government [was] lost.”  When 
a grand jury in Hamilton District presented its grievances against the government in 
1795, two of its four complaints stemmed from frustration that the national executive 
refused to pay these expenses under the “pretence” that they were offensive operations.94 
The jury offered an implicit theory for this apparent failure: states that had 
representatives, they noted, had received both payment and protection from the federal 
government.  This explanation for the Territory’s seeming mistreatment by Congress held 
widespread currency.  Increasingly, citizens concluded that the Territory’s political 
problems stemmed from its constitutional status: as one writer observed in the Knoxville 
Gazette, “All dependent governments are deficient as to form.”  Were the Territory 
represented in Congress, another Gazette writer opined, the relation of their sufferings 
would wring tears from the walls themselves, if not from the unfeeling congressmen. 
William Blount himself hinted that Ore’s expedition would have been warranted in 
“states who have Senators and Representatives in the Public Councils.”  But there was 
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also a remedy: the Territory held the power to cast off their territorial status and assume 
statehood.  Anxiety over Indian affairs led multiple voices to argue that the Territory 
should seek admission as a “member state of the federal union” as “speedily as 
possible.”95  
In some ways, these calls proved prescient.  After Tennessee’s admission to 
statehood, disgruntled militia members submitted petitions to Congress requesting 
payment, first for Beard’s 1793 expedition and later for Ore’s 1794 attack.  Congress 
referred the petitions to Secretary of War James McHenry, who urged that Congress not 
pay the costs of either expedition, which had flouted federal law.  He provided especially 
lengthy documentation on the illegality of Ore’s attack.  But Tennessee’s newly elected 
congressman, Andrew Jackson, who himself had served as a private in Ore’s brutal 
expedition, agitated strongly for payment of the 1793 expedition by employing the 
overwrought anti-Indian rhetoric of the era—“the knife and the tomahawk,” he recounted 
for Congress, “were held over the heads of women and children.”  When the petition was 
referred back to committee, Jackson secured a position as chairman, producing a report 
that once again stressed Indian perfidy, suggested that the President’s militia 
authorization had legitimated the attacks, argued that the Territory enjoyed a separate 
right under the Constitution to repel attacks, and insisted that the militiamen were simply 
following orders.  Without much discussion, Congress authorized payment as part of the 
yearly military appropriation, an action that a correspondent told Jackson “has hightened 
the esteem of the people, for the General Government, and secured to yourself a 
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permanent interest.”  Jackson’s successor in office, William Clairborne, soon 
accomplished the same feat with Ore’s even more dubious expedition.  Like Jackson, 
Clairborne focused on the individual militiamen; how were they to know that their 
commander lacked legitimate authority?  Congress agreed to the payment without 
opposition.  Perhaps the earlier heated debates on unauthorized expeditions had 
exhausted them, or they were apathetic about a retroactive issue.  But Jackson and 
Clairborne cared deeply, and their passion prevailed.96 
There was, of course, an irony about the newly “independent” state proving its 
autonomy by lapping at the federal trough.  But it in many respects, it was entirely 
consistent with the territories’ creation and development.  Territorial citizens may have 
viewed themselves as dependent in name only, but in many respects they were wards of 
the national government in practice as well as in theory.  Federal officials recognized this 
reliance: “[T]he expence of protecting such distant settlements greatly exceeds the value 
of them,” Henry Knox wrote.  Nonetheless, the funds kept flowing despite this 
assessment, demonstrating how frontier citizens proved even more effective than Natives 
at using some of the same sources of leverage—their dubious allegiances in a competitive 
and unsettled borderland—to wring cash from the federal government.  In the process, 
federal expenditures buoyed and expanded an often marginal economy.  “All the Stirrings 
of Industry” had been “set in Motion by the circulation of [federal] Money,” Arthur St. 
Clair reported from the Northwest Territory, in urging that yet more funds be expended 
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there.  Such money “like a gentle stream fertilize[d] and beautif[ied] the whole Country 
through which it flowed.”97 
Some territorial citizens recognized that they benefitted from these expenses, but 
they viewed such payments as nothing more than their due—merely the fulfillment by the 
federal government of its obligation, under the “social compact,” to protect all parts of 
the federal union.  It did little to alter the tendency of territorial residents, especially in 
the Southwest Territory, to view themselves as abandoned by distant politicians 
untroubled by their destruction, and to view their survival as largely thanks to their own 
self-reliance rather than government aid.  Thus it was that those in the territories could 
describe themselves, without any apparent awareness of irony, as of that “class of men, 
that earn their scanty living by hard labour, and who do not seek in the sweets of the 
general Government, to their aid.”98   
* * * 
 In 1807, Joseph Buell wrote to an unknown correspondent on “business of trifling 
consequence.”  Buell, from Marietta in the new state of Ohio, wanted to know what he 
should do with a small cannon given the town by the federal government during the 
Indian war, “in our former stage of government.”  Now, he reported, the gun’s “principal 
use” was the “discharging of it on the 4th of July, Reechoing the toasts drank in contempt 
to the Genl Government.”99 
The “small field piece” Buell described was part of the stream of federal largesse 
that had flowed into the territories throughout the 1790s.  The national treasury had paid 
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the extravagant costs of the national military campaign against the Northwest Indian 
Confederacy, but it had also paid for corn for the Chickasaws, ruffled shirts for Cherokee 
leaders, goods to compensate relatives of murdered Haudonesaunees as well as white 
owners of horses stolen in the Southwest Territory, and the costs of the territorial militia.  
For all their insistence on economy, federal officials were quick to turn to federal funds to 
try to placate the repeated and competing demands placed on them by both Native and 
non-Native inhabitants of the territories. 
 Such largesse reflected an amalgam of federal constraint and power.  Federal 
officials turned to money when law failed: compensation made up for the federal 
government’s inability to control and punish Natives and white settlers.   They also used 
money to try to secure the fickle allegiances of both groups.  But even these generous 
expenditures proved a blunt, and often ineffective, method of making policy.  Much-
courted Native leaders like John Watts commanded attacks on the Southwest Territory, 
while the territorial militia secured federal funds for expeditions in flat contravention of 
federal orders and at odds with federal goals.  In part, this seeming failure stemmed from 
democracy: federal officials could not always rely on Congress to support them, 
especially after statehood gave former territories much more voice in national councils.  
But it also reflected the broader challenge of governing the borderlands, where there were 
multiple centers of power, and authority, allegiance, and identity all proved fluid. 
 Yet in the long run, federal largesse proved a potent tool in securing at least some 
of the fickle allegiances of territorial inhabitants, both Native and non-Native, to the 
national government.  Many early Americans had a hard-headed understanding of the 
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role of self-interest in governance.  “[M]ankind are every where governed by their 
Interest however variously modified,” the venal James Wilkinson argued.  “To select, 
seize, & turn to advantage the predominant passion is the depth of political science.”  
Others extended this interest-based theory of politics to Indian affairs.  “The great object 
in managing Indians, or indeed any other men, however enlightened, is to obtain their 
confidence,” Henry Knox instructed William Blount (who presumably well understood 
the role of self-interest in creating attachments). “This cannot be done but by convincing 
them of an attention to their interests.”  Many Tennesseans and Natives, of course, 
remained deeply skeptical of the federal government.  But secessionist sentiments in the 
West waned, and federal patronage produced powerful pro-American factions within 
many Native nations; future Native struggles against the United States quickly became 
civil wars.100 
 For both Natives and territorial citizens, the concept of dependence played a 
central role. As scholars have noted, concepts of dependency were first applied to people 
of color, including Natives, before being transferred to certain recipients of state aid more 
generally. Anglo-Americans increasingly employed dependence as a term of art to 
describe both the purported reality and the legal status of Native nations within the 
United States.  Over time, Native “dependence” became a free-floating justification for 
federal authority over all Indians.101 
                                                
100 Gen. James Wilkinson to Diego Gardoqui, January 1, 1789, James Wilkinson Letters, Beinecke Library, Yale University, New 
Haven, Conn.; Secretary of War to William Blount, April 22, 1792, in TP: Vol. IV, 137-42.  On the role of federal patronage in 
producing divisions within Native societies, especially in the Southeast, see Claudio Saunt, A New Order of Things: Property, Power, 
and the Transformation of the Creek Indians, 1733-1816 (Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Gregory Evans 
Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815 (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1992), 117-90. 
101For the history and development of the concept of dependence in American history, see Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, “A 
Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State,” Signs 19, no. 2 (1994): 309–36.  On Native economic 
  429 
  The history traced here suggests that the linkage of dependency between Natives 
and the people who would later be termed “welfare recipients” was more direct than 
historians have recognized: the federal “bounty” bestowed on Natives made them among 
the first creators and beneficiaries of what would later become scholars have dubbed “the 
national welfare state.”  Though most work on the welfare state’s early antecedents has 
focused on pensions and payments to veterans, Natives presented a different case, as their 
claim of national resources stemmed not from service or merit, but, at least ostensibly, 
from poverty and humanitarian impulses. The federal government’s authority over Indian 
affairs also meant that supplying Natives was a national project, unlike the deeply local 
schemes of poor relief that operated within Anglo-American society.  Already, by the late 
eighteenth century, neighboring Anglo-Americans had come to view Natives as the wards 
of a paternalist federal government.102 
 The deep irony was that it was precisely because the Shawnees, Delawares, 
Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Choctaws were “independent tribes of Indians,” in Henry 
Knox’s words, that they were able to extract such concessions.  Even if Natives’ white 
neighbors attempted to thrust the two together, Indian affairs and “welfare” were 
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different, and neither Native peoples nor federal officials, at least in their more candid 
moments, regarded Native nations as dependents.  Strategically positioned in the 
borderland between the United States, Spanish Louisiana, and British Canada, these 
nations were outside the control of any Euro-American power, which made them all 
compete to secure Native allegiances.  Both Natives and federal representatives, then, 
interpreted federal gifts through the lens of allegiance and diplomacy, as the price of 
Native friendship.  But this history of empowered Natives and conciliatory, even 
obsequious, federal officials was forgotten, leaving behind a narrative in which the 
continued flow of hundreds of thousands of federal dollars into Indian country was a 
symbol of Native weakness rather than strength.103 
  Another irony was that the territorial inhabitants, for all their disdain for Natives’ 
reliance on federal goods, were also “dependent” on the United States.  This was true not 
just in the term’s formal political meaning but also in an economic sense, as federal 
money was a primary driver of the territorial economy.  But, just as recipients of national 
funds would later be distinguished based on the contrast between “needs” and “rights,” 
territorial inhabitants did not see themselves as equivalent to Natives; they regarded 
themselves as entitled to the largesse they received.  They saw the federal government’s 
enormous expenditures on defense and particularly the militia as merely their due, part of 
their “right” to receive protection from the national government.104 
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 In the long run, this rhetoric of entitlement proved remarkably effective.  Native 
“dependents” of the federal government ultimately received its benevolence through their 
forcible eviction from their homelands.  This process destroyed the wealth Native nations 
had assembled—farms, plantations, livestock, and slaves, much accumulated as a result 
of conscious federal efforts to use gifts to encourage the adoption of American modes of 
agriculture—and forced Natives to places where they truly did rely on meager federal 
rations for survival.  Meanwhile, the citizens of the former territories, now risen to the 
“independent” status of statehood, prided themselves on their autonomy and self-reliance, 
firing off federal cannons to condemn the national government.105  
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Chapter 7: Statehood, Precedent, and Federal Power 
In 1796, the Southwest Territory became the first U.S. territory to seek admission 
as a state.  The Northwest Ordinance provided some guidance on admission: it stipulated 
that the territories would be admitted once they had 60,000 free (non-Native) inhabitants, 
though they could be admitted earlier at Congress’s discretion.  But the Ordinance left 
many other questions unresolved.  As a result, Congress debated the Territory’s statehood 
at length, focused less on the new state of “Tennessee” than on the future.  “Other States 
would be rising up in the Western wilderness, and claiming their right to admission,” 
Representative Smith of South Carolina observed at the outset of the debate, “and 
therefore the precedent now to be established, was of very considerable importance."1 
In admitting Tennessee and, six years later, the eastern portion of the Northwest 
Territory, “Ohio,” Congress began to clarify these undetermined issues.  Some questions 
concerned process: could Tennessee claim admission as of right, or did it require a 
special act of Congress?  But other issues centered on the long-term division of authority 
between the United States and the newly admitted states.  People in the territories-cum-
states, as well as in Congress, had to work through the tangle of property, jurisdiction, 
and sovereignty that lay latent, and unresolved, in much territorial practice.  In particular, 
with the end of direct federal sovereignty, early Americans had to determine how much 
of the deep federal involvement in governance throughout the territories would be 
similarly unspooled. 
Unsurprisingly, these controversies came to turn on land and Indian affairs.  In 
part, this was because federal power over both the public domain and Indian affairs rested 
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on constitutional sources other than federal authority over the territories.  But even more 
meaningfully, as we have seen, administering land and Indian affairs was the bulk of 
what federal territorial governments did.  The result was a robust federal administrative 
structure of Indian agents and land offices independent of the territorial executive, 
judicial, and legislative branches that passed from federal to state control.  At the time, 
precisely because these issues mattered so much for daily governance, newly admitted 
states, especially Tennessee, were anxious to claim authority in these areas.  Defying the 
federal government, they sought to assert jurisdiction over both the public domain and 
Native diplomacy. 
 The confrontations that followed were framed in era’s high rhetoric of 
federalism—as a clash over the meaning of sovereignty, territorial jurisdiction, and the 
Northwest Ordinance’s promise that the new states would be admitted “on an equal 
footing with the original States in all respects whatsoever.”  But underlying these broad 
struggles over constitutional meanings lay more immediate controversies in which 
interests loomed just as large as ideology.  In these conflicts, the states and the federal 
government served as the proxies for rival claimants.  This was particularly true in 
Tennessee, where issues of the public domain and Indian affairs swirled together in a 
struggle over Cherokee land rights.  As quasi-legal settlers turned to state jurisdiction 
while the Cherokees sought federal vindication, the dispute demonstrated the stakes at 
issue in determining which sovereign would arbitrate property and jurisdictional 
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conflicts.  In this sense, the constitutional struggles over federalism on state admission 
represented a fight over adjudicatory authority.2 
 In Tennessee, the federal government ultimately gained what seemed a Pyrrhic 
victory: it maintained its authority in principle even as it ceded Tennessee the power the 
state sought, leaving the Cherokees to bear the costs of this capitulation.  But, because of 
precedential stakes, even this limited success had important consequences.  In particular, 
when Ohio subsequently sought admission, the federal government asserted its authority 
by forcing the state to disclaim its rights to the public domain.  Because of the unique 
political circumstances of Ohio’s statehood, the state acquiesced.  The result was that the 
practice became entrenched part of constitutional practice.  In this sense, the federal 
government’s brief moment of sovereignty in the territories resulted in a durable 
expansion of federal power. 
This process also offers a corrective to the predominant scholarly narrative, which 
interprets the structure of dual sovereignty created by early American federalism as an 
embrace of localism and diversity.  Yet, as we have seen, these values flourished in the 
territories even when sovereignty, jurisdiction, and ownership were formally all united 
under the federal government.  This was because foreign jurisdictions, secessionist 
movements, and wild-eyed plans for self-sovereignty all contended with the United States 
for authority.  Statehood collapsed these contentions into the overarching divide between 
federal and state sovereignty, thereby channeling preexisting conflicts such as the 
struggles between the Cherokees and their neighbors into a structural contest between 
state and federal authority.  The vision of state territorial sovereignty that Tennessee and 
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other states came to champion offered more homogeneity, not less; it sought to transform 
the borderlands into the “ordinary jurisdiction” of state control.3 
* * * 
That federal land ownership of public lands became a question at all was 
surprising given the text of the Northwest Ordinance, which provided that the 
“legislatures of . . . [the] new States shall never interfere with the primary disposal of the 
soil by the United States in Congress assembled.”  But Ordinance’s continued status after 
statehood was an open question.  Although most regarded the Ordinance as a 
constitutional document, its status as a compact meant that, upon statehood, the former 
territorial residents were arguably entering a new and different agreement with the federal 
government.4 
The first test of this provision came in the Southwest Territory, where frustration 
with federal rule made the desire for statehood nearly unanimous.  “People here almost 
without Exception are for a State,” territorial governor William Blount wrote.  In late 
1795, Blount commissioned a census that reported that the Territory had 77, 262 free 
inhabitants, well over the 60,000 inhabitants required for statehood under the Ordinance.  
Blount, concluding that this now made the Territory “a State of Right,” accordingly 
issued a proclamation calling for a constitutional convention.5  
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Although Tennessee was the first state created from the U.S. territories, the process of its statehood has received little scholarly 
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The convention met in January 1796, in the office of War Department paymaster 
David Henley, the War Department’s paymaster, one of the few public buildings in 
Knoxville.  Over next two and a half weeks, the convention drafted a proposed 
constitution similar to other state constitutions of the time.  What made the draft 
constitution exceptional was the attention it devoted to land.  One article of the 
declaration of rights specifically guaranteed the right of preemption to the settlers south 
of the French Broad River.  The initial draft of the proposed constitution also outlined the 
boundaries of the new state and enshrined the state’s “Sovereignty and right of Soil” 
within the borders.  But a somewhat confusing qualifier was subsequently added that the 
state claimed the right of soil only “so far” as consistent with the U.S. Constitution, the 
North Carolina Bill of Rights and Constitution, the Northwest Ordinance, and North 
Carolina’s act of cession; this provision also stipulated that nothing in the State 
Constitution would affect individual claims guaranteed under the Cession Act.  It was this 
ambiguous version that secured approval from the Territory’s inhabitants.6   
As adopted, then, Tennessee’s Constitution merely acknowledged the confusing 
muddle of federal, state, and individual claims that had characterized the Tennessee 
country from the beginning.  Noticeably absent were Native land rights, even though 
federal treaties guaranteed Cherokee and Chickasaw ownership of most of the land within 
state’s new boundaries.  One commentator, writing to President Washington, found “the 
Instrument called a Constitution” defective, reflecting its hasty drafting.  At the very 
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least, he urged, an article should be added “recognizing the right of the United States to 
dispose of the lands occupied by the Indians, and also the vacant lands within the limits 
prescribed by the Treaty of Holstein [Holston].”7   
When Congress received a copy of Tennessee’s Constitution, its response was 
mostly astonishment at the seeming effrontery of the would-be state: Tennessee had 
conducted the census and drafted its constitution on the strength of its own authority 
alone, without any congressional authorization.  An intense debate followed over the 
quasi-metaphysical question of when, exactly, Tennessee had become a state, and 
whether Congress had a role in deciding statehood.  Representative Albert Gallatin, from 
western Pennsylvania and a supporter of the nascent Republican Party, argued that the 
Southwest Territory “became ipso facto a State the moment they amounted to 60,000 free 
inhabitants,” and that Congress was obliged to recognize this fact under the terms of the 
Northwest Ordinance.  Others insisted that residents could not “at their own mere will 
and pleasure” simply declare themselves a separate state, which required congressional 
approval.  Some saw politics at work in this opposition: William Blount, for instance, 
suspected that the delay was due largely to fears that Tennessee would join other southern 
states in opposing John Adams’s presidential campaign.  But letters from territorial 
citizens indicated that they, too, held divergent views on this question.8 
 Another line of debate focused on the seeming deficiencies of Tennessee’s 
Constitution.  Several congressmen wished that the conditions and restrictions of the 
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Northwest Ordinance had been explicitly written into the document.  In particular, the 
issues of lands, both Native and federal, loomed large, just as they had for the 
Tennesseans. James Hillhouse of Connecticut, long the House’s leading defender of 
Native title, expressed concern over the breadth of the state’s territorial claims and 
advocated redrawing the state’s borders to exclude Indian lands, a proposal echoed by 
other northern congressmen.  Proponents of Tennessee’s statehood responded by insisting 
all the laws of Congress would still apply, obviating the need for further guarantees of 
title.  The ordinance would remain “paramount” to the state’s constitution, the Trade and 
Intercourse Act barring settlement on Indian lands would provide security for Native title, 
and North Carolina’s still-valid cession ensured that all unappropriated lands would 
belong to the United States.  In the end, statehood ultimately prevailed, though Congress, 
seeking to affirm its authority over the process of admission, lamely enacted a statute 
retroactively authorizing Tennessee’s actions.9 
Yet what seemed like settled law when viewed from Congress turned out to be 
much more open in the minds of Tennesseans, producing what one congressman had 
accurately predicted might be “disagreeable discussions.”  In particular, weeks into its 
first sitting and only two months after official statehood, the Tennessee Assembly raised 
the question of ownership of the public lands in a remonstrance to Congress.  Though the 
Assembly limited its claim to an insistence that Congress honor its obligations under the 
North Carolina cession by satisfying North Carolinian land grants, the remonstrance’s 
language swept more broadly, insisting on the state’s “equal footing” and emphasizing 
the guarantee of each state’s “right of soil and sovereignty” implied by the Treaty of Paris 
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and congressional actions during the American Revolution.  In forwarding the petition to 
Andrew Jackson—Tennessee’s new congressional representative—John Sevier, the 
newly elected governor, made the implied link between property and sovereignty explicit.  
In his view, “the state of Tennessee is reinvested with all the right of domain [i.e., 
ownership]” that North Carolina had held prior to cession.  Otherwise, the promise in the 
federal statute admitting Tennessee “on an equal footing with the original States, in all 
respects whatever” would be violated, since Tennessee would “not equally stand 
possessed of those free and independant rights the original States enjoy.” 10 
Jackson strongly agreed with Sevier’s position.  Tennessee’s sovereignty, he 
stressed, was enshrined in both the federal constitution and in the act of admission, and 
ownership was an integral aspect of sovereignty.  “[T]he right to the Soil,” he told Sevier, 
“is so firmly invested in the sovereignty of the State, both by Constitutional principles 
and by the law of nations added to that . . . that nothing but the act of the Strong hand of 
power itself, can divest us of that right.”  The United States, he emphasized, had “no solid 
Legal ground” for its claim to land within the state; he seconded Sevier’s reliance on the 
equal footing doctrine, since otherwise “the right of Domain is not a right which must be 
preposterous and perversion of the English Language.” A year later, Jackson reported 
rumors that Alexander Hamilton concurred with their position: the former Secretary of 
the Treasury supposedly opined that “the vacant soil belongs indubitably to the 
sovereignity of the State.”11 
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In crafting their arguments from sovereignty, Jackson and Sevier passed over in 
silence the question of the Northwest Ordinance and its guarantee of federal title.  But 
their claims represented less a repudiation of the Ordinance than an emphasis on its 
contradictions.  The equal footing doctrine and the codification of federal land ownership 
were only reconcilable based on a highly formalist divide between state jurisdiction on 
the one hand and property on the other hand.  But as Jackson and Sevier convincingly 
argued, this dichotomy was untenable in either early American law or, even more 
meaningfully, practice.  As Jackson and Sevier knew from first-hand experience, 
governing the public domain and its distribution was perhaps the most significant form of 
sovereignty in the Tennessee country.  
 
Related to their anxieties over land were Sevier and Jackson’s concerns about 
federal overreach in Indian affairs.  “In you alone is Constitutionally invested the 
authority and power of protecting the State,” Jackson informed Sevier after the governor 
told him of state plans to try to prosecute Natives for crimes against the white citizens.  
Authority over such matters, Jackson emphasized, “are powers, that Consistant, With the 
Sovereignty retaind. by the States, properly belong to Each Individual State, which never 
ought on any account to be Surrender to the General Government.”  This led Jackson to 
an extended attack on the President for “Grasping after power” he did not constitutionally 
enjoy and threatening to “overwhelm[]” the “Sovereignty of the Individual States.”  
Jackson singled out for attack the federal officer David Henley, who remained in 
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Tennessee as army paymaster and was now invested with authority to “superintend[] the 
Indian affairs.” This position, Jackson complained, was unsanctioned by “any law that I 
can find.”12 
 Consistent with this theory, Sevier conducted his own diplomacy with the 
Cherokees and Creeks.  As authorized under federal law, he issued passports permitting 
U.S. citizens to travel into Indian country.  But he went further, routinely corresponding 
with Native leaders and dispatching his own representatives into Indian country, and 
seemingly arrogating to Tennessee the right to determine whether the state would honor 
federal Indian treaties.  To justify this seeming usurpation of federal law and prerogative, 
he contrasted his own “extensive acquitance with several Indian tribes upwards of thirty 
years” with the callow and ignorant young men the federal government employed as its 
agents.  Moreover, he told Secretary of War McHenry that, “notwithstanding the [federal] 
Agents resident among them,” much of the Cherokee nation lay “within our territorial 
limits,” which required that the state government be “constantly engaged, and much time 
taken up, in the transaction of indian business.”13 
 The boldest challenge to federal authority over Indian affairs, however, came 
from William Blount.  The former territorial governor had a new position as one of 
Tennessee’s new U.S. senators.  But this recognition did not seem to satisfy Blount, who 
                                                
12 Andrew Jackson to John Sevier, February 24, 1797, in PAJ, 1:126-27;  
13 John Sevier to Secretary of the Department of War, July 20, 1796, in “Executive Journal of Gov. John Sevier,” 111-14.  For Indian 
country passports issued by Sevier, see Folder 4, Box 5, John Sevier Papers, 1796-1801, First Administration, Governor's Papers, 
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Dog Warrrior & Mad Blew and All the Principle Chiefs of the Creek Nation” October 1796, Box 2, Folder 1, John Sevier Papers, 
1796-1801; John Sevier, “Talk to the Indians at Tellico,” September 1798, in Sevier Family History, with Collected Letters of Gen. 
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federalism”—that is, arrogating seemingly federal power over Indian affairs to the state.  Cynthia Cumfer, “Local Origins of National 
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felt neglected and betrayed by his former superiors, especially in the War Department: in 
the waning days of the territorial government, he and Secretary of War Timothy 
Pickering had had an acrimonious correspondence in which Pickering suggested that 
Blount’s handling of Indian affairs was suspicious and self-serving.  This mortified 
Blount.  “[H]e had taken great pains to settle that state, and to render it important,” one 
conversant reported of a discussion with Blount soon after Tennessee’s statehood.  Yet 
“he been treated very ill by the President . . . [and] the executive officers of the United 
States.  The conversation indeed became so affecting to him, that he wept.”14 
 The lachrymose Blount soon became involved with a dubious scheme put forward 
by his close associate, John Chisholm, who had served as Blount’s errand man into 
Indian country.  Chisholm, apparently an arrant boaster— a “windy blasty fellow,” as 
Blount himself once described him—concocted a plan to attack and capture Spanish 
Pensacola.  Blount fixed on the proposal and expanded it into an ambitious project to 
seize all of Spanish Louisiana and transfer it to the British.  Blount’s motivation seemed 
to be to preserve his stature and reputation in the wake of statehood.  “[P]eople about 
here thought it was all over with Governor Blount,” one of Blount’s co-conspirators 
reported back in Tennessee, “but he would rise yet.”  Blount himself indicated that he had 
“high expectations of emolument and command” upon a successful outcome.15 
                                                
14 “Deposition of Doctor Nicholas Romayne,” July 15-20, 1797, in Report of the Committee of the House of Representatives of the 
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the Federalists.  William H. Masterson, William Blount (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1954), 271-75. 
15 “Deposition of James Carey” September 29, 1797, in Report of the Committee of the House of Representatives, cxiv-cxxi; 
“Examination of James Carey” July 8, 1797, in Report of the Committee of the House of Representatives, cvi-cxii; “Deposition of 
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 Blount believed success hinged on his influence among the Natives; his nebulous 
plans seemed to envision leading an Indian army into Spanish territory.  He thus obsessed 
about his reputation among the Indian nations, which he feared was diminishing now that 
he no longer held official status; he needed, he insisted, to “hold[] his importance among 
them.”  To that end, Blount wrote to the federal Indian interpreter James Carey, with 
whom he had worked closely, to secure him and the Indians to the conspiracy.  “If I 
attempt this plan,” Blount told Carey, “I shall expect to have you and all my Indian 
country and Indian friends with me."16 
 As he conveyed to Carey, Blount believed he was in competition to preserve his 
influence against the men who had replaced him in administering southeastern Indian 
affairs.  Receiving flattering accounts that the Cherokees, “much dissatisfied” with the 
new regime, “were calling out for their old friend Gov. Blount,” Blount worked hard to 
undermine Indian Department officials at every turn.  When, for instance, the Cherokee 
John Watts complained that the Secretary of War had refused provide alcohol, Blount 
mocked the Secretary and promised the Cherokee leader two kegs of whiskey in 
Knoxville instead.  Blount had an especial dislike for his replacement as superintendent 
of Indian affairs, his one-time friend and political ally Benjamin Hawkins, who had 
previously served as a senator from North Carolina.  Blount instructed Carey to damage 
Hawkins’s authority among the Creeks and Cherokees.  “[A]ny power or consequence he 
                                                                                                                                            
Republic,’” in Launching the “Extended Republic”: The Federalist Era, eds. Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1996), 157-89.  Consistent with his broader interpretation of the contrast between the Northwest and 
Southwest Territories, Cayton argues that Blount’s Conspiracy stemmed from an effort to fill the “vacuum” that purported federal 
inaction had produced in the Southwest.  I discuss this interpretation, and possible corrections to it, in Chapter 6.  Older discussions 
and materials appear in Frederick J. Turner, “Documents on the Blount Conspiracy, 1795-1797,” The American Historical Review 10, 
no. 3 (April 1, 1905): 574–606; Alfred Byron Sears, The Blount Conspiracy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1928).  A 
contemporaneous account of the conspiracy, possibly written by Blount himself, “A Short Account of the Origin and Progress of a 
Speculation That Terminated in a Project That Was Called Blounts Conspiracy,” N.D., Undated Material, WBP:LC. 
16 “Deposition of Doctor Nicholas Romayne,” July 15-20, 1797; William Blount to James Carey, April 21, 1797, in Report of the 
Committee of the House of Representatives, xlvi-xlviii. 
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gets,” Blount warned, “will be against our plan.”  Blount also counseled Carey to prevent 
word of the plan from reaching Silas Dinsmore, the federal Indian agent among the 
Cherokees, or anyone else in Spanish or U.S. employ; he further told the interpreter that, 
if the Cherokees were upset about the line of the Treaty of Holston, then being run, Carey 
should cast all responsibility for any dissatisfaction away from Blount onto former 
President Washington.17  
 Blount’s letter to Carey proved his undoing.  Rather than following Blount’s 
instructions to burn the letter, Carey determined that his oath to the federal government 
required that he report it.  The letter quickly traveled through the ranks of the federal 
bureaucracy in Tennessee’s Indian country, ending up in the hands of David Henley, 
Silas Dinsmore, and Benjamin Hawkins, who soon dispatched word to Congress.  A 
political scandal followed, much of which focused on the fraught relationship between 
the United States and Britain, which, because British officials had briefly entertained 
Chisholm’s proposal, was seen to be involved in a conspiracy that affronted U.S. 
sovereignty and autonomy.  Blount was expelled from the Senate, but the House of 
Representatives impeached him nonetheless, for violating, among other laws, the Trade 
and Intercourse Act and the Treaty of Holston, as well as for attempting to “seduce” 
James Carey from his official duties.   Ultimately, in the first impeachment trial under the 
                                                
17 James Grant to William Blount, May 24, 1797, in Report of the Committee of the House of Representatives, liii-liv; “Examination of 
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Constitution, the Senate determined it lacked jurisdiction over Blount.  Blount returned to 
Tennessee and suffered no further punishment.18 
 Blount’s Conspiracy, as it came to be called, fit oddly within a federalist frame.  
Though some Tennesseans argued that Blount’s plan “would have promoted the interest 
of the State,” his actions were less a defense of Tennessee’s sovereignty than a quixotic 
effort at self-aggrandizement.  In this regard, Blount’s cockamamie scheme bore a 
striking resemblance to the grandiose dreams of Zachariah Cox, with whom, in a striking 
and ironic reversal, Blount was now “upon the best of Terms.”  Governor Sevier in fact 
disapproved of Blount’s actions, calling them “imprudent[].”  But Sevier’s defense of 
state autonomy and independence provided a flag of convenience for all those who, like 
Blount, had soured on federal authority.  After his scheme collapsed, Blount began to 
identify as an ever-more ardent Republican and adopt the party rhetoric.  “The State of 
Tenessee is affected to the federal Government as it ought to be,” he later wrote, “alive to 
their Duties & their Rights, ready to perform one and defend the other.”  Notwithstanding 
his national disgrace, Blount secured election to the Tennessee Senate, where he became 
speaker.  There, he and Governor Sevier soon made common cause in their struggle 
against federal authority within Tennessee.  Whether motivated by principle or personal 
animosity, the two politically prominent men sought to rid the state of what they regarded 
as the pernicious remnants of federal rule.  Blount’s conspiracy thus serves as an 
                                                
18 On Carey’s actions, see “Deposition of James Carey,” September 29, 1797; on Hawkins’s response, see Benjamin Hawkins to 
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excellent example of how federalism channeled the intensely personal, occasionally 
bizarre, and often-venal politics of the borderlands into the frame of dual sovereignty.19  
 
Though the Tennesseans sometimes spoke about federal land ownership and 
federal supremacy over Indian affairs as separate questions, they were in fact closely 
interrelated.  Underneath the abstract rhetoric about state sovereignty was the state’s most 
pressing political issue, one that united issues of title and federal diplomacy: the property 
rights of Anglo-American settlers living within disputed Cherokee territory under the 
Treaty of Holston.  These settlers had legal title to their lands, derived from the North 
Carolinian grants protected under North Carolina’s act of cession.  But, by living within 
lands guaranteed the Cherokees under the Treaty of Holston, the settlers were also 
violating the federal Trade and Intercourse Act.  These settlers’ legally tenuous position 
dominated politics in early Tennessee.  Their petitions preoccupied the early sessions of 
the state legislature; their plight appeared in Governor Sevier’s Inaugural Addresses; 
securing their relief was the “chief[]” and “grand object” of the new state’s congressional 
delegation.20 
At stake, then, in the ownership of Tennessee’s lands was which sovereign would 
weigh the equities of the settlers’ and the Cherokees’ respective claims.  The Assembly’s 
early congressional petition made this linkage clear by moving quickly from the abstract 
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language of sovereignty to a discussion of Cherokee lands under the Treaty of Holston.  
The Assembly’s positions on the merits of the respective claims was equally clear.  If the 
Indians held any land claim at all, the Assembly insisted, it was as “tenants at will,” while 
the claimants under North Carolina’s grants deserved “every right, privilege, and 
advantage, which they are entitled to by constitutional laws.”21 
As Tennesseans knew and feared, Congress was much less sympathetic to the 
legality of the settlers’ claims.  In early 1796, mere months after Tennessee drafted its 
constitution, Congress revisited the Trade and Intercourse Act, which criminalized 
settlement on Indian lands; the statute had a sunset provision that required frequent 
reauthorization.   The Washington Administration, frustrated by flagrant violations of 
treaty boundaries, urged Congress to enhance the Act’s penalties.  In the freewheeling 
debate over Indian property rights that followed, the House of Representatives focused 
exclusively on the Southwest Territory and the problem of settlers claiming under North 
Carolina’s grants, the Act’s national reach notwithstanding.  North Carolina’s 
representatives echoed Tennessee’s arguments that the Indians lacked ownership rights, 
but most in Congress, especially New England Federalists, adopted the view that North 
Carolina’s grants provided a right to enter and take possession only once the federal 
government had purchased the land—a preemptive right entirely consistent with Indian 
ownership.  Confirming this view, the final version of the Act significantly bolstered the 
penalties for illegal settlement on Indian lands.  It authorized the President to expel illegal 
settlers using military force, and, in one of the law’s most controversial aspects, provided 
that any claimants who sought to settle or survey beyond the boundary would forfeit any 
                                                
21 “Address and Remonstrance of the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee,” [August 9, 1796]. 
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property rights in these lands.  This provision targeted the Tennessee settlers in particular; 
it was hoped that stripping them of rights under North Carolina’s grants if they violated 
the Treaty of Holston would remove the incentive to seize Native lands.22 
The renewal of the Trade and Intercourse Act also made the position of 
Tennessean claimants precarious because the statute called for the President to survey 
and clearly mark treaty boundaries with Native nations.  Many Tennessee settlers could 
only guess at their status, because, even though the Treaty of Holston had been concluded 
six years earlier, its boundary had never been officially surveyed and marked, for reasons 
common for Indian treaties of the time.  After signing the treaty, William Blount and the 
Cherokees had agreed to each send commissioners to run the line, to meet in late 1792.  
According to commissioners selected by Blount, the Cherokees never arrived, and so they 
proceeded to run what they called a “line of experiment,” although they did not formally 
mark the boundary.  But there was another version of the process, supposedly conceded 
by one of the commissioners in a moment of weakness.  In this account, the 
commissioners ran the line “secretly” before the Cherokees arrived, and, when they met 
the Native representatives in the woods, the commissioners sought to hide their surveying 
equipment.  Whatever the reason, the result was that no formal boundary separated 
Cherokee and U.S. lands.23 
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In 1797, President Adams dispatched Indian superintendent Benjamin Hawkins to 
survey officially the boundary established under the Treaty of Holston.  Determined to 
avoid any appearance of bias, Hawkins ran the line anew, insisting that it be based on the 
text in the “instrument itself,” not on “interested reports” by either Cherokees or Anglo-
American settlers.  He and his assistants concluded their survey in late summer 1797 and 
dispatched a report to the Secretary of War.  Neither Cherokees nor settlers were 
contented with the result.  As one Cherokee leader reported, “[T]here was much talk in 
the nation about the line.”  Hawkins’s actions reopened long-standing Cherokee 
complaints about the boundaries drawn at Holston, which Cherokee leaders reiterated in a 
dispatch to President Adams.  Nonetheless, while insisting that they never assented to the 
treaty, the Cherokees acquiesced in Hawkins’s efforts, likely hoping for the removal of 
illegal settlers across the boundary.24 
The Cherokees’ mild resistance paled compared to the overheated and 
vituperative rhetoric of the Tennesseans.  Hawkins, who had expected “much 
opposition,” still found the resistance “more powerful than I expected.”  Though thronged 
by anxious settlers, Hawkins discovered that the loudest complaints came not from those 
affected by the line but from Tennessee state officials.  The state legislature dispatched its 
own commissioners to retrace and find fault with Hawkins’s route, informing Congress 
that the Tennesseans had “less confidence” in Hawkins “than in the Indians themselves.”  
Much of this opposition stemmed from the continued influence of William Blount, whose 
earlier dislike for Hawkins had hardened to hatred for his role in unmasking Blount’s 
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Indian country plottings.  It was Blount, though at this point still out of office, who had 
drafted Tennessee’s complaint to Congress. Blount scrawled even harsher views on his 
personal copy.  “Never was Man more execrated in any Country than Hawkins in this,” 
Blount stated, accusing Hawkins of weeping “Crocodile tears” over the settlers’ 
situation.25 
Undaunted, the Adams Administration moved to enforce the newly surveyed 
boundary line.  On August 19, 1797, Col. Thomas Butler, the commander of the federal 
soldiers in Tennessee, issued a proclamation ordering all white settlers within the 
Cherokee lands—an estimated 2,500-3,000 people—to remove by October 25 or face 
military expulsion.  He attempted to reassure the settlers that their land titles would be 
unimpaired and would have full force whenever the Indian title had been purchased.26 
 Butler’s proclamation transformed the simmering controversy over Indian title 
into a full-blown constitutional crisis.  The struggle was not between customary frontier 
legal practices and formal law.  As Hawkins acknowledged, the purported violators of the 
Trade and Intercourse Act had legal justification for their actions: “Heretofore,” he 
observed, “intrusions [onto Indian lands] were always countenanced by the government 
in the provision made to give [the settlers] a preference in all the land laws.”  The 
settlers’ champions in fact urged them, in their resistance, to “depend principally on the 
legality of your claims: they are founded on . . . laws which cannot be controverted.”  Nor 
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was the dispute at root a controversy over the nature of Indian ownership.  Even as they 
suggested that the Cherokees were not the lands’ true owners, Tennessee officials 
implicitly acknowledged Cherokee sovereignty by alleging (albeit on thin evidence) that 
the Cherokees had subsequently given authorization for the illegal settlers to remain.  By 
enshrining Native title in federal law, Congress transformed a legal struggle over Native 
land tenure into a federalist controversy over legal supremacy.  As a result, even though 
the seemingly inescapable issue of Native rights once again served as the impetus for the 
confrontation over sovereignty, federal and state actors fixated on the struggle as a 
conflict between federal and state law to govern Tennessee’s territory, relegating Natives 
to mere backdrop.27 
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution ostensibly resolved this question, 
mandating that the Trade and Intercourse Act prevail over North Carolina’s land grants.  
Many Tennesseans, however, rejected this conclusion.  In the pages of Tennessee’s only 
newspaper, The Knoxville Gazette, a series of pseudonymous writers spun out a legal 
theory that insisted the federal statute was unconstitutional.  The Tennesseans’ arguments 
reflected the promiscuousness of early American constitutional culture, drawing on the 
“law of nature, of nations, the statutes of North Carolina . . . [and t]he Constitution of the 
State of Tennessee” for vindication.  But their fundamental attack on the constitutionality 
of the federal actions rested on two interrelated claims, both of which relied less on 
specific legal provisions than on structural principles.  First, they insisted that the federal 
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law was “unconstitutional, because they deprive us of property, for which we had a legal 
right before the Treaty of Holston.”  Despite a brief reference to “just compensation,” this 
argument did not seem to rest primarily on the Fifth Amendment but rather on an 
“unalienable right[]” to property that the Trade and Intercourse Act violated.  In this 
reading, the Treaty of Holston had the nature of a ex post facto law: “The treaty of 
Holston was made subsequent to our claims,” one commentator wrote, “and the rights of 
our property no power on earth can justly violate.”28 
Second, the Tennesseans questioned the legitimacy of the exercise of federal 
power over lands within the state of Tennessee.  “We ask from whence does the Federal 
Government derive the power to exercise legal jurisdiction over the land on which we are 
settled, in any other than the general mode in which other states of the union are 
governed[?]” wrote an author writing on behalf of the “Frontier People of Tennessee.”  
“It is a distinction new and incomprehensible to us, that a grant from a sovereign and 
independent State, can convey a right without the power to enjoy it.”29   
David Campbell, a judge on Tennessee’s highest court writing as the barely 
disguised “Campbell,” offered the most legally sophisticated argument on this aspect of 
the “dispute . . . betwitxt the general and state governments.”   Campbell had a 
paradoxical role in the controversy: as a federal territorial judge, he had urged upholding 
the Treaty of Holston, but privately he defended the “right of intrusion,” and had long 
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lived illegally on Cherokee lands.  In the Gazette, he framed his argument in federalist 
terms.  In his view, because the Treaty of Holston “dismember[ed] the state of 
Tennessee,” it represented an effort by the federal government to “arrogate . . . the 
barbarous right of alienating . . . any part of an individual state.”  Citing diverse 
constitutional provisions—among others, Article III’s provision extending the judicial 
power of the U.S. over cases and controversies, the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, the 
Enclave Clause of Article I—Campbell argued that “the constitution of the United States, 
does not authorize military force, or diplomatic authority to decide the right of property,” 
and insisted that the controversy could only be resolved by trial, in state court. “The 
Frontier People of Tennessee” likewise insisted that only a “jury of our country” could 
resolve the respective rights as the sole “tribunal which in our governmental compact we 
have made the arbiter of right and wrong.”30   
These heated legal claims did not deter the Administration from enforcing the 
Trade and Intercourse Act.  Secretary of War McHenry mocked these “repeated 
publications” and disdained their legal theory as the claim that the “United States alone 
were wrong in every proceeding that respected [the settlers].”  In early 1798, his officers 
began forcibly removing settlers on the Cherokee side of Hawkins’s line.  Violence 
ensued, as settlers killed several army horses and wounded a federal soldier. Predictably, 
federal actions also outraged Tennessee state officials.  The state’s assembly denounced 
the removals as “an act of violent oppression”; Governor Sevier excitedly exclaimed, 
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“[S]urely there never was an instance of such mistaken policy, in any other government, 
since governments had an existence.”31 
 The conflict reached its climax when, on 10 p.m. on the evening of February 3, 
1798, two army officers arrested Judge Campbell, detaining him in a military camp 
overnight. For state officials, this arrest of a state officer was an explicit affront to the 
state’s dignity, provoking angry missives to President Adams.  “Representing as we do, 
the Sovereignty of the State of Tennesee,” the state’s congressional delegation wrote, 
“[we] Consider that Soveriegnty as haveing been Outra'd, by the Conduct of Colonel 
Butler, on the person of one of the Supreme Judges of the State, as also the rights of Civil 
liberty, most unwarrantably Violated.”  The congressmen demanded an investigation into 
this “Military Tyranny,” which they received: the Secretary of War promised to explore 
Butler’s conduct.32 
 Campbell’s arrest underscored that rigorous enforcement of the Treaty of Holston 
boundary was becoming too politically costly for the Adams Administration.  With the 
state’s entire congressional delegation constantly agitating on the subject, abandoning the 
Treaty of Holston, and its protection of Cherokee land rights, proved easier.  President 
Adams authorized another treaty with the Cherokees to purchase the illegally settled 
lands; the Secretary of War deemed the right for settlers to return to be the treaty’s “first 
stipulation,” to be obtained even before negotiations began in earnest.  Not content to rely 
on federal officers, Governor Sevier sent state representatives to the treaty negotiations, 
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with instructions to challenge the “constitutionality” of the Treaty of Holston as a 
measure “that prostrated the guaranteed rights of the whole state.”  Sevier also dispatched 
a state agent into Cherokee territory.  The agent pretended to be another Indian trader, but 
the true object of his mission was to convince the Cherokee leaders to sell their lands.33 
 But even with the federal and state governments united in their aim to secure 
rights to the settlers’ lands from the Cherokees, they nearly failed.  At the first meeting in 
July, the Cherokees “would not relinquish or sell one inch of land.”  The commissioners 
convened another meeting in September, where they succeeded in inveigling the 
Cherokees to cede the contested territory for an immediate payment of $5,000 in goods 
and a $1,000 annual annuity.  Why the Cherokees changed their mind is unknown (the 
record of the treaty negotiations was later destroyed).  There are hints in the letters from 
Sevier’s agent of internal power struggles between the Cherokee chiefs and warriors, 
which he believed the state could exploit.  What is clear is that the Cherokees secured a 
considerably larger compensation, for a much smaller tract of land, than they had at the 
Holston negotiations.34 
 Despite this limited Cherokee success, the Treaty of Tellico represented a greater 
victory for Tennessee, as it secured federal support for its aims and legitimated the 
settlers’ property rights.  Yet even this triumph failed to quell controversy over the 
settlers, which continued to convulse Tennessee politics even as the debate shifted from 
the treaty ground to the courts.  The very first cases in the Nashville district of 
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Tennessee’s new federal court were two prosecutions against Archibald Lackey and 
Robert Trimble for crossing into Cherokee territory without a passport, thereby violating, 
as the indictment recounted at length, Treaty of Hopewell and the Trade and Intercourse 
Act.  William Blount observed that two men’s “cause” had received “serious attention” 
from the “people in general,” who felt that their “civil rights” were at stake in the case.  
Defense counsel was Lachlan McIntosh, a recent Georgia transplant who had served on 
Sevier’s commission to redraw Holston boundary and who was also heavily involved 
with Zachariah Cox and Tennessee Company.  Based on his “thorough knowledge” of the 
law, Blount predicted the two men would go free.  Defying this prediction, the jury 
convicted and fined both men, though the federal judge’s refusal to admit evidence of the 
supposed “line of experiment” produced predictable howls of outrage from the Tennessee 
bar.35 
In the meantime, William Blount sued Elisha Hall, the secretary of the federal 
treaty commissioners, in state court for slander for alleged statements that western leaders 
wished the treaty to fail.  Judge David Campbell—the same man who had attacked 
federal authority over Indian affairs in the Gazette and been arrested by federal officers—
dismissed Blount’s complaint on the ground that Hall was a federal ambassador, immune 
from state suit under the law of nations and the federal Judiciary Act.  Blount, now 
serving as Speaker of the Tennessee Senate, initiated impeachment proceedings against 
Campbell, arguing that Campbell’s action violated the provisions of the state constitution 
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concerning writs.  Yet even as he was suffering political retribution for defending federal 
authority, Campbell was formally accused of being too zealous in his advocacy for the 
frontier settlers.  The charges against him included failing to hold a court session because 
he had been away supposedly inveigling with the federal commissioners to secure 
Cherokee lands at the Treaty, and maligning Governor Sevier by asserting in a grand jury 
charge that, had Sevier done his duty, “the people would not have been removed from 
their lands” by federal soldiers.  With Blount both prosecuting and presiding over the 
trial, Campbell nonetheless escaped removal from office by a single vote.36    
            
 The swirling political controversies provoked by the question of the Holston 
boundary—accusations of federal military tyranny, Campbell’s impeachment, the 
constitutionality of the Trade and Intercourse Act—may all seem remote from the 
abstract question of sovereignty and ownership of Tennessee lands through which Sevier 
and Jackson framed the original dispute.  But even as these issues of federalism refracted 
oddly and unpredictably through the complicated personal politics of early Tennessee, 
many officials retained their focus on freeing Tennessee’s lands from federal control.  In 
this view, the Treaty of Tellico vindicated Tennessee’s claim that the state’s sovereignty 
granted it ownership of all the land within the boundaries.  “It is time for this government 
to assert her just rights & claim of domain of country included in her chartered limits,” 
Governor Sevier told the Tennessee legislature shortly after the Treaty.  The legislature 
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responded to Sevier’s call, within a month enacting a statute to open state land offices on 
the North Carolinian model.37 
Congress, however, did not back down.  Learning of Tennessee’s law, the House 
and Senate appointed a committee to investigate the state’s claims.  The committee, 
which consisted of two Federalist senators from Kentucky and Vermont as well as the 
Republican Senator Anderson of Tennessee, issued a report thoroughly rebuffed the 
arguments advanced by Sevier and Jackson.  It began with the act of cession, which it 
insisted unambiguously granted title to the unappropriated lands to the United States.  To 
challenge North Carolina’s right to transfer title, the committee observed, “is to question 
the title of every man in Tennessee who holds the soil by deed from North Carolina.”  
But the report’s main target was Tennessee’s equal footing argument.  “The right of 
jurisdiction, and the right of soil, are distinct rights, and may be severed,” the committee 
insisted against Tennessee’s effort to conjoin them.  Indeed, prior to cession, North 
Carolina had retained jurisdiction over the land even as it alienated large portions of the 
territory.  Because of this distinction, when the Southwest Territory attained statehood on 
equal footing, “in the opinion of the committee, the State of Tennessee acquired 
jurisdiction over, but not the right of soil, within the said territory.”  By virtue of North 
Carolina’s original cession, “the right of soil remained in the United States.”38 
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In addition to this sharp distinction between jurisdiction and ownership, the 
committee also adopted a subtler argument against Tennessee’s position.  Tennessee had 
claimed the right of ownership “on the principle that a grant of jurisdiction over territory 
possesses the right of soil therein.”  As we have seen, this reasoning had a strong basis in 
earlier practice and law: the colonial charters had conjoined jurisdiction and ownership, 
as had the state cessions to the federal government.  But the committee rejected this claim 
on the ground that the “State of Tennessee does not derive even her jurisdiction from the 
Government of the United States, but has it by operation of the act of cession from the 
State of North Carolina.”  In other words, according to the committee, the federal 
government had acted purely as a trustee, exercising “only a limited and temporary 
jurisdiction over the said territory” that had transferred “of right” to Tennessee once it 
had satisfied the population requirement.  This argument elegantly employed Tennessee’s 
own insistence that its admission was a legal entitlement beyond congressional control to 
undermine the state’s claim to land ownership.  Downplaying formal federal authority, in 
this instance, served to expand the federal government’s effective power.39 
The report’s recommendations, however, did not match the firmness of its legal 
conclusions, which perhaps explains why Senator Anderson seems to have endorsed it.  It 
did urge opening a land office for the only unappropriated lands in the state that were 
outside Indian country, the contested French Broad lands, but it also recommended 
codifying the existing settlers’ right to preemption.  And it requested that the attorney 
general gather all laws related to the land claims, and it urged that a report be sent to 
Tennessee’s governor, inviting a response. Congress did none of these things; it dithered, 
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perhaps because of the Republican ascendency but more likely because congressional and 
executive attention were fully occupied resolving Georgia’s western land rights, 
especially the extremely complicated aftermath of the Yazoo debacle.  Over the next few 
years, a near-unanimous Congress, with the sole exception of Tennessee’s delegation, 
agreed to create new committees that gathered voluminous evidence of Tennessee’s and 
North Carolina’s land laws, even as Congress continued to receive, and defer, alarmist 
petitions on ongoing conflicts between Cherokee lands and North Carolina grants in 
Tennessee.40 
 The dispute dragged on in large because there was no neutral arbiter to resolve it.  
Despite his confidence in Tennessee’s claim, Sevier believed that a resolution by the 
“supreme judiciary of the united States” would likely prove “very problematical.”   That 
left only Congress, where the “United States were, in this case, made a judge in their own 
cause,” as one congressman had put in an earlier dispute over Tennessee lands.41 
Yet Tennessee did not accept that conclusion, refusing to passively accept 
Congress’s verdict.  Writing to Governor Sevier, citizens around Nashville who had 
evidently followed the debate “with some concern” pressed the governor to make some 
response to Congress, anxious that silence would be interpreted as a “virtual 
acknowledgement of the right of the General government and a final relinquishment.”  
This, they feared, would be disastrous, echoing earlier anxieties that the federal 
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government was insufficiently solicitous of their property rights.  A federal land office 
would, they anticipated, fail to make “necessary provision for individual claims,” 
presumably preexisting preemption and land grant rights, “thereby involv[ing] us in 
lasting difficulties.”42   
Though it probably did not require urging, the Tennessee legislature acted to 
protect its constituents’ interest.  Its preferred method to resolve the dispute was 
negotiation: it appointed its senators and representative as “agents” with “full power and 
authority” to assert the state’s “absolute right of disposing of [its] vacant and 
unappropriated soil.”  These agents were given discretion to have the respective claims 
“examined and determined,” and allowed to determine terms and manner of an agreement 
that would secure some sort of federal “relinquishment of [the U.S.] claim.”  In proposing 
a negotiated settlement with the federal government, Tennessee’s legislature was 
following earlier precedent, since such bilateral contracts between states and the national 
government were how state cessions had been worked out.  But it was also a presumption 
of equality—an assertion of Tennessee’s independence in which disputes between state 
and national government were to be resolved through agreement on both sides rather than 
by fiat.43  
As legal theory, Tennessee’s view was increasingly seen as dubious: as one 
congressman observed during the debate over Tennessee’s admission, “all compacts 
between a nation and a part of its citizens” were not legally binding, since the two parties 
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were not equal: there was “no other security for the other contracting but the obligations 
of good faith and the ingregity of the Government.”  But perhaps equally significantly, 
Tennessee was reliant on congressional power even as it denied it.  This dependence 
stemmed from the reality that Tennessee and the federal government were not the only 
claimants to sovereign ownership of Tennessee’s land: North Carolina cited the act of 
cession to claim the authority to continue to issue grants to military bounty lands located 
in Tennessee, an action that angered Tennessee officials nearly as much as the federal 
claims.  Governor Sevier now turned his equal footing argument against North Carolina: 
its purported authority over the “most important business in the state of Tennessee” 
violated the principle that Tennessee enjoyed “every power, privilege, sovereignty and 
jurisdiction that any of the original states in the union enjoy.”  This dispute manifested in 
a bizarre tussle over control over the state land grant records, which a group of 
Tennesseans attempted to steal away from an armed North Carolinian escort.  In 1804, 
the two states concluded an agreement, under which North Carolina could continue to 
issue military land warrants but Tennessee would fulfill them, without showing any 
preference to its own citizens.  Yet under the U.S. Constitution, this agreement could only 
be valid with congressional consent.44 
In 1806, Congress at last brokered an agreement between the three claimants to 
the land—the federal government, Tennessee, and North Carolina.  The statute ratified 
the 1804 agreement between North Carolina and Tennessee.  The law also split the 
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difference between the federal government and Tennessee, drawing a line in west-central 
Tennessee.  Lands west of the line became part of what was known as the “congressional 
reserve,” to which Tennessee relinquished all “right, title, or claim” and agreed that these 
lands would be “at the sole and entire disposition of the United States.”  In return, 
Congress ceded and conveyed Tennessee “all right, title, and claim” to lands east of the 
line, granting the state the same power to issue “perfect titles” within this district “as 
Congress now have.”  The cessions contained a number of provisos that secured both 
federal and state aims.  Even as the statute guaranteed the preemptive rights of settlers 
south of the French Broad, it promised that nothing in the statute “shall be construed to 
affect the Indian title, or to subject the United States to the expense of extinguishing the 
same”; it also stipulated that Tennessee use portions of the public lands to support 
education.45 
The 1806 statute largely settled the contested question of the formal ownership of 
land within Tennessee.  As a capstone to the saga of  “federal” lands in Tennessee, it 
reflects, in one sense, federal weakness when confronted with state intransigence.  In 
principle, both the Constitution and the Northwest Ordinance enshrined the supremacy of 
federal land ownership.  In practice, federal officials found their power of ownership 
significantly limited: by the intricacies and breadth of North Carolina’s cession; by their 
political inability to use raw force to enforce federal law; and by the rhetorical potency of 
appeals to state sovereignty, especially alongside the equal footing doctrine. 
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Yet reading the 1806 statute as a hollow victory for the federal government 
ignores the significance of formal law in constructing early American federalism, which 
was still deeply unsettled.  In fact, proponents of state sovereignty had little to be 
satisfied about the resolution.  The 1806 law was, after all, a statute, not a contract, 
though nearly a year after its enactment Tennessee’s representatives filed a vestigial and 
meaningless “consent” with Congress.  Moreover, Tennessee had proved dependent on 
the federal government to determine the scope and nature of its land rights; in the end, 
Congress was the sole judge in its own cause.  Subsequent events only further entrenched 
the statute’s supremacy.  When disputes over the ownership of Tennessee lands recurred 
in later years, as when North Carolina in 1818 sought to seize on an ambiguity to once 
again assert the right to grant state lands, the U.S. Supreme Court rebuffed these efforts 
by citing the 1806 compact.  Tennessee, in other words, now needed the federal authority 
it had earlier spurned to safeguard the integrity of its land ownership.  Like other land 
claimants, it, too, had come to rely on the federal government as the legitimate and final 
arbiter of claims of land ownership.46 
 
* * * 
 
As Congress and Tennessee tussled over the state’s public lands, the eastern 
portion of the Northwest Territory itself sought admission as a state, in a process that 
culminated in 1802.  But the path to statehood for what became known as “Ohio” differed 
sharply from Tennessee’s.  In Tennessee, statehood had been a shared political project 
and the aim of nearly all territorial citizens; disagreements emerged only at the national 
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level.  By contrast, Ohio’s admission was, from start to finish, a partisan affair that 
divided both territorial citizens and Congress into antagonistic camps based on affiliation 
with clearly defined political parties.47 
 Ideology and interest were complicatedly entangled in the rise of partisanship in 
the Northwest Territory.  As we have seen, many citizens had chafed under what they 
perceived as the heavy-handed practices of St. Clair and Sargent.  But these 
disagreements did not harden into clear political factions until the rise of a number of 
transplanted Virginians within the Virginia Military District.  These men grew rich from 
the property chaos that existed within the District; St. Clair despised them as having 
“suddenly raised fortunes by speculations in lands, and many of those not the most 
honorably.” Led by Thomas Worthington, these men were ideologically “democrats,” in 
St. Clair’s view, but they also resented St. Clair’s stranglehold on territorial patronage, as 
well as his refusal to move the territorial capital to their new county town of 
Chillicothe.48 
Although not the cause of hostility, the federal land system quickly became the 
focus for much of this contention.  In 1800, Congress had amended the abortive 1796 
land sale statute and adopted the Harrison Land Act, named for William Henry Harrison, 
the Northwest Territory’s non-voting delegate who had largely crafted the statute’s 
provisions. The Act occasioned very little of the lengthy debate that marked the 
enactment of its predecessor.  The only substantive discussion occurred when 
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Tennessee’s representative William Claiborne proposed an amendment that would have 
granted preemption rights to the “intruders”; his fellow Republicans, led by Albert 
Gallatin, quickly rebuffed him.  Otherwise, the lengthy contentions that had marked all 
previous discussions of federal land sales had seemingly settled into a rough and tenuous 
consensus on the basic structure of governing the public domain.49  
The Act’s most important provision was to open, at long last, federal land offices.  
The earlier plan to sell large plots of land in Philadelphia, never realized, was abandoned.  
Instead, offices located in four towns in the Northwest Territory—Cincinnati, Chillicothe, 
Marietta, and Steubenville—would sell to the public the lands that Rufus Putnam and his 
assistants had furiously surveyed into rectangular plots. In a concession to small 
purchasers, lands were to be sold in sections and half-sections of 640 and 320 acres, 
respectively.  Available sections would be sold first in three-week-long “public 
vendue”—land auctions—with all unsold lands thereafter available at the land office for 
“private sale.”  The minimum price for all sales, public and private, was $2.00 per acre, 
with yearlong credit terms available; after a year, unpaid lots would be resold.  The land 
offices were to be staffed by registrars, who were supplied with careful and elaborate 
instructions on how to record land sales in the public ledgers, and required to send 
detailed quarterly reports to the Secretary of the Treasury.50 
 Soon after it opened, the Chillicothe land office became the center of a power 
struggle between Thomas Worthington and his cronies on the one hand and Governor St. 
Clair and his allies on the other.  Thanks to the election of 1800, a Republican 
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administration headed by Thomas Jefferson now controlled the land office, with Albert 
Gallatin now serving as Secretary of Treasury.  Due to his impeccable Republican 
credentials, Worthington secured a position as the superintendent of public land sales and 
registrar of the land office.  Since the law creating the offices had only just been enacted, 
much remained uncertain, including when and how the fees should be levied.  St. Clair 
alleged that Worthington had been unlawfully charging fees for public land auctions that 
properly applied only to private sales. Worthington, angered by this attack on his 
character by a man he thought had “no concern Whatever in the regulation of My 
Office,” sought absolution from the Secretary of Treasury.  Unfortunately for 
Worthington, the Attorney General sided with St. Clair, and a lawsuit proceeded against 
Worthington in the local courts.  In the end, though, both the county and General Court 
disagreed with the Attorney General and vindicated Worthington.  Yet St. Clair remained 
unsatisfied.  He later alleged that Worthington was colluding with private purchasers at 
the land auctions, tamping down bidding on choice lands in return for kickbacks.51    
 The bitter antagonism between St. Clair and the Chillicothe Junto led 
Worthington and his allies first to attempt to secure the governor’s removal and, when 
that failed, to press for the Territory’s admission as a separate state.  For their part, St. 
Clair and his Federalist supporters managed to forestall statehood, at least temporarily, by 
obtaining the division of the territory in the waning days of the Adams Administration.  
The western portion containing the Illinois and Wabash Countries became the newly 
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created Indiana Territory, leaving only the eastern portion as the Northwest Territory, 
with fewer than the 60,000 inhabitants stipulated by the Northwest Ordinance for 
admission.52 
 Worthington and his allies pressed for the Territory’s admission anyway, 
confident of the support of President and Congress, who they believed would welcome 
the additional Republican senators and representative.  But the legal situation was more 
tangled.  Regardless of whether a territory could, as Tennessee had attempted, claim 
admission of right with sixty thousand inhabitants, it was clear that the Northwest 
Territory, still shy of the required population, could be admitted only through act of 
Congress.  A Republican-dominated committee duly met and drafted a bill that would 
authorize the Northwest Territory to draft a constitution and seek admission.53 
 In the course of drafting the enabling act, the committee consulted with Secretary 
of Treasury Albert Gallatin.  As congressman, Gallatin had been the foremost advocate 
for permitting the Southwest Territory to achieve statehood of right, without any 
involvement from Congress other than acknowledgment.  But now that he was charged 
with administering the public lands, Gallatin, writing at the exact same moment when a 
congressional committee was addressing the issue of land title in Tennessee, emphasized 
“fervently” the need to enact “effectual provisions” to “secure to the United States the 
proceeds of the sales of the Western lands.”  One provision in the draft Enabling Act 
explicitly provided that Ohio could not enact laws repugnant to the provisions of the 
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Northwest Ordinance.  But Gallatin urged, and the committee adopted, additional 
conditions to the Territory’s admission, intended to ensure that the newly admitted state 
could in no way “interfere with the regulations adopted by Congress for the 'primary 
disposal of the soil.’”  The draft Enabling Act thus further required that all lands sold by 
the federal government would be immune from state taxes for five years, on the grounds, 
Gallatin claimed, that state foreclosure proceedings for non-payment would interfere with 
federal authority over the land system.  The bill attempted to sweeten this sweeping 
restriction on state authority by promising the new state ten percent of the proceeds of 
federal land sales towards internal improvements—which was later reduced to five 
percent, instead of accepting the proposal of the Territory’s delegate that half the 
proceeds go toward road-building.54 
 The parties argued over whether Congress held the right to thus condition 
admission.  To avoid colliding with his earlier position against congressional authority, 
Gallatin argued, and the other Republicans agreed, that the conditions were mere 
proposals to the Territory’s constitutional convention for their “free acceptance or 
rejection.”  But Federalist opponents of statehood argued that the Enabling Act 
represented an unconstitutional interference with the Northwest Territory’s right of self-
government through their own legislature.  The most sustained attack came from Arthur 
St. Clair, reluctantly permitted to speak before Ohio’s Constitutional Convention held in 
late 1802.  In a striking reversal, St. Clair, long the Territory’s leading advocate of 
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submission to federal authority, offered a defense of local autonomy against 
congressional interference that could just as easily have come from Sevier or Jackson.  
Congress’s enabling act, he argued, was a “nullity,” since the Territory could no more be 
regulated in its internal affairs by Congress “than we would be bound by an edict of the 
first consul of France.”  He continued to attack the attachment of conditions to a “right 
which is ours by nature and by compact.”  Conditions, he observed, were unprecedented, 
an “odious distinction” reserved for the Territory alone: “Were conditions imposed upon 
Vermont, or upon Tennessee, before they could be admitted into the Union?  There was 
none attempted.”  The whole reason that Congress had hurried along the Territory’s 
statehood, he argued, was that it was the “only time to saddle us with conditions,” since, 
once they had the requisite numbers, “it would be no longer in their power.”55 
       The Convention ignored St. Clair and approved a constitution for the new state of 
Ohio that accepted Congress’s stipulations.  “The poor old man has made his last speech 
and will very soon die politically,” Worthington gleefully reported to his allies in 
Congress.  Yet St. Clair’s speech touched a nerve in the Jefferson Administration; 
Gallatin reported on its details to Jefferson, accusing St. Clair of misusing the precedent 
of Tennessee.  Even though St. Clair’s post would expire in mere weeks when Ohio 
assumed statehood, the President, through Secretary of State James Madison, 
peremptorily dismissed St. Clair anyway, citing his “intemperance and indecorum of 
language towards the Legislature of the United States.”  St. Clair thanked the President 
                                                
55 Annals of Congress, 7th Cong., 1st Sess., 1097-1126; Arthur St. Clair, “Remarks of Governor St. Clair Before the Constitutional 
Convention,” November 3, 1802, in SCP, 592-97. 
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for “discharge[ing] me from an office I was heartily tired of” six weeks sooner than 
planned.56 
 The Jefferson Administration’s touchy response to St. Clair’s speech likely 
reflected some unease over their political position.  In insisting on conditions to 
admission, the Republicans had seemingly proved no more principled than St. Clair, 
readily jettisoning their ideological commitment to state sovereignty and autonomy for 
expediency’s sake.  The argument that Gallatin advanced—that a constitutional 
convention that still required congressional approval would “freely” determine whether to 
accept Congress’s proposal—was, perhaps, too much of a legal fiction to be entirely 
comfortable.  So many Republicans adopted another, less tortured defense of the 
attachment of conditions: they were, they argued, merely “explanatory” of Northwest 
Ordinance’s preexisting protection of federal property rights.  Or, as the enabling act’s 
drafter argued on the floor of Congress against suggestions that “mystery and disguise” 
surrounded the bill, the conditions were simply “additional securities for the national 
property.”  They would obviate the fears expressed by some representatives—who were 
considering Tennessee’s land claims nearly simultaneously—that “the Territory, when 
formed into a State, actuated by the inordinate possession of power, will be likely to 
grasp at our lands.”57 
 Irony abounded in the political posture of Ohio’s admission: the Jeffersonians 
became the unlikely champions of federal authority over the states, while men like St. 
                                                
56 Journal of the Convention, of the Territory of the United States North-West of the Ohio, Begun and Held at Chillicothe . . . 
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57 11 Annals of Cong. 1115, 1119-26 (1802); Onuf, Statehood and Union, 76-85.  This discussion over Ohio’s admission occurred on 
March 31, 1802; in January, the House had taken up, and referred to committee, the question of Tennessee’s land rights, while the 
Senate discussed the question beginning on April 7, 1802.  11 Annals of Cong. 255-56, 259-62, 263-64, 426 (1802). 
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Clair converted into improbable acolytes of local sovereignty against Congress.  But the 
consequence of these uncomfortable contortions was to prevent a rehashing of 
Tennessee’s arguments over whether the federal public domain could be reconciled with 
the equal footing doctrine.  It helped, of course, that the Territory’s foremost advocate of 
statehood, Worthington, was also a bureaucrat in the public land office.  But it was even 
more significant that, because of the partisan alignments of Ohio’s admission, 
Republicans both in Congress and in Ohio became staunch defenders of the federal 
government’s land rights within state boundaries.  In the process, the congressional right 
to regulate and condition state entry into the union—uncertain and contested when 
Tennessee had sought statehood as of right—was now codified into precedent. 
 Ohio’s statehood differed sharply from Tennessee’s in another way, as well: there 
was no discussion of Natives and their lands.  In part, this reflected the consequences of 
the Northwest Indian War and the Treaty of Greenville.  Unlike in Tennessee, where 
most of the state’s territory legally remained Indian country, only Ohio’s northwestern 
corner was still owned under federal law by the Wyandots and Miamis.  Moreover, the 
comparative success of the federal land system avoided the problem of two overlapping, 
legally valid sources of title, as happened in Tennessee’s Indian country.  A federal 
infrastructure of forts, Indian agents, and annuity payments still dominated Native 
territory within Ohio, but Ohioans seemed relatively content with this division of labor.  
As a federal circuit court observed when the question of jurisdiction over Indian country 
in Ohio finally came to court thirty years later, “Within this state no collisions on this 
important subject [of state and federal jurisdiction over Indian country] have occurred.”  
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Through subsequent treaties and cessions, the federal government slowly whittled away 
at Natives’ land base, until only a single portion of Wyandot territory twelve miles square 
remained as Indian country.  In 1842, the federal government extinguished Native title to 
these lands and removed the Wyandots to Kansas.58   
* * * 
 The Southwest and Northwest Territories had been created, in large part, to 
resolve the seemingly interminable struggles over sovereignty, jurisdiction, and property 
in the early American West.  These questions did not vanish under territorial governance, 
but they were flattened and submerged into administrative politics, as territorial citizens 
argued with territorial officials, who in turn debated with cabinet officials and with 
Congress.  Tennessee and Ohio’s admissions as states reopened these long-standing 
issues, albeit it with an altered inflection.  The earlier contentions had been polyvocal, as 
secessionist movements, Native nations, land companies, and multiple states all 
competed among and with each other for jurisdiction and ownership over the same lands. 
An echo of these struggles recurred in Tennessee’s land struggles with North Carolina.  
But as even that dispute demonstrated, these confrontations were now framed and 
resolved not through the horizontal fights among sovereigns, but in the vertical clash 
between national and state sovereignty.  As a result, the burning issue upon the states’ 
admission was how much of the federal government’s expansive authority would survive 
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now that Tennessee and Ohio were no longer federal dependencies but independent and 
co-equal states. 
 In one sense, statehood settled nothing, despite the hope that it would provide 
definitive precedent.  In Indian affairs, although there was no dramatic rupture as had 
occurred in 1797 and 1798, Tennessee and the federal government continued to tussle 
over authority well into the nineteenth century.  Given the tangled history, many 
Tennesseans conflated federal and Native sovereignty, viewing both as an intrusion of a 
foreign jurisdiction within the state’s sovereign borders.  In the 1820s and 1830s, 
Tennessee Supreme Court, echoing courts elsewhere in the South, affirmed state 
jurisdiction over Indian country.  At the same time, federal courts in Tennessee and Ohio 
nearly simultaneously issued the two most important decisions on the meaning and scope 
of the Trade and Intercourse Acts.  Both courts sharply limited federal criminal law’s 
reach and endorsed state jurisdiction, even as the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed federal 
supremacy in the Cherokee cases.  Yet few in Tennessee objected to federal power over 
Indian affairs when their former congressman Andrew Jackson employed it to secure the 
long-sought-after removal of the Cherokees and Chickasaws from within the state’s 
borders.59 
 In land, too, federal supremacy proved uneven, particularly in Tennessee.  Even 
the 1806 statute’s solemn guarantee of federal title in southwest Tennessee proved moot.  
After a fierce thirty-year battle in Congress, in which Representatives James Polk and 
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David Crockett played leading if contending roles, the Tennesseans finally overcame 
eastern Whig opposition.  In 1841, Congress made the state the agent for the sale of the 
“Congressional Reserve”; in 1846, it simply ceded the lands to Tennessee outright.  As a 
result, formal federal ownership notwithstanding, Congress never created a federally 
administered land system in the state, and was forced to accede to Tennessee’s policy 
goals.  In the half-century long struggle for the “right of soil,” Tennessee gained the 
authority and control over the lands within its borders it had long sought.60 
 Tennessee’s success emboldened other states.  In the 1820s and 1830s, as 
proponents of state sovereignty grew more aggressive, Ohioan, and later representatives 
from Illinois, Indiana, and other public land states carved from the Northwest Territory, 
began demanding retrocession of the public domain to the states.  Their rhetoric echoed 
nearly verbatim the arguments first advanced by Sevier thirty years earlier: the provisions 
of the Northwest Ordinance were no longer binding on the states once they were admitted 
to the Union, and denying states authority over their own lands violated the promise of 
equal sovereignty and independence pledged under the equal footing doctrine.61 
 In 1796, these arguments might have prevailed—as they did, in a sense.  But the 
federal government’s stubborn refusal to concede the principle, in what seemed a merely 
symbolic victory, worked toward establishing federal ownership as precedent.  Yet, given 
the continued uncertainty produced by Tennessee’s confrontation with the federal 
government, the argument from state sovereignty might even have produced results in 
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1802.  Instead, Congress, seemingly anxious to avoid the controversies that had occurred 
with Tennessee, attached conditions to Ohio’s entry, which the proponents of Ohio 
statehood, eager to avoid any hint of challenge to congressional authority, blithely 
accepted.  This created an even more durable precedent.  After Ohio, every state admitted 
to the union had “voluntary” conditions attached to their entry, even when they had the 
requisite population of 60,000.  No state ever rejected Congress’s terms.  Nearly all of the 
conditions related to the public lands; some explicitly required that the states renounce all 
title to unappropriated lands and acknowledge that they remained at the “sole and entire 
disposition of the United States.”  Much later, the federal government would require that 
western states disclaim all jurisdiction over Indian country as well.62   
The result was, by the 1820s, it was much harder to challenge the constitutional 
settlement that Tennessee and Ohio’s admission represented, and the arguments for state 
title failed.  Abstractly, these arguments had a compelling logic that reflected how 
entwined property and sovereignty had been in the territories from the beginning.  States 
had ceded the federal government jurisdiction with the express provision that it would 
exercise that authority only temporarily; it was anomalous that title was not similarly 
ceded to the new states.  But thirty years on, this argument was largely foreclosed.  As 
their interlocutors frequently reminded them, the opponents of federal title now 
confronted decades of entrenched precedent, codified under the fiction of state consent in 
the enabling acts. 
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The irony was that the critics were right: the new states were not on an equal 
footing.  The territorial system was built on the myth that the federal government would 
temporarily control all aspects of governance within the territories, but that, upon 
statehood, this authority would recede, leaving behind a fully independent and coequal 
sovereign state.  But the newly admitted states were not equal to the preexisting states 
with respect to federal authority and presence within their borders.  Instead, the federal 
authority that had accreted under territorial governance remained, especially over land 
and Indian matters, forcing the newly admitted states to routinely grapple with federal 
officials.  The result was that the territories—more particularly, the transition from 
territory to state—became arguably the most important site for the controversies over 
federalism that consumed the early republic and the antebellum United States.  And the 
federal government retained an outsized presence in the West even after former territories 
ascended to statehood.63 
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Conclusion 
In 1804, David Campbell—former territorial judge of the Southwest Territory, 
advocate for the intruders on Cherokee lands, and arrestee at the hands of the U.S. 
army—wrote to President Thomas Jefferson.  The primary subject of his letter was the 
lands of the Cherokee Nation.  “I will yet call them a Nation,” Campbell observed, 
“though they are not all together independent in reality, but so in form.”  Campbell 
described the prospects that the Cherokees might exchange their lands within Tennessee 
for new “hunting grounds” beyond the Mississippi River; currently, he noted, they were 
resistant, but he believed that this goal could be accomplished “with time.”  Such a 
cession was warranted, he argued, as it would “secure the immediate occupancy of all the 
lands granted to individuals by the State of No. Carolina before she ceded this part of the 
Country to the General Government.”  This would “silence discontented Citizens,” who 
were complaining that they were “unjustly deprived from the enjoyment of property.”1 
 Campbell’s remarks, looking forward to a time when Native jurisdiction would no 
longer interfere with Tennessee’s exercise of its territorial rights, were one of the first 
discussions of a project of removal that would take thirty years to reach fruition.  But 
they also demonstrated the long-lasting legacy of the debates over sovereignty and 
ownership that had occasioned the creation of Southwest and Northwest Territories and, 
later, the states of Tennessee and Ohio.  In 1783, citizens of the newly created United 
States had often spoken of the newly acquired trans-Appalachian West as a vacant land of 
latent states-in-waiting to be shaped by national policy.  What the new nation discovered 
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instead was land thickly settled with both people—Natives, long-standing French 
habitants, itinerants from Kentucky, North Carolina, and Virginia—and their varied 
claims to ownership, governance, and protection.  Resolving these conflicting rights had 
consumed federal territorial governance, as the diverse claimants had pressed federal 
officials to honor and codify their rights. 
 As Campbell’s remarks indicated, uncertainty—over federal authority, property 
rights, and Indian affairs—persisted through, and well past, statehood.  With respect to 
land, the significance and durability of property claims meant that it took the better part 
of a century to unspool the tangle of title created in the 1780s and 1790s.  Preemption 
rights to lands south of the French Broad River; Symmes’s loose land practices; the 
vague boundaries of lands in the Virginia Military District; the confusing titles granted by 
St. Clair and Sargent in the Wabash Country; rights to U.S. military bounty lands; the 
Ohio Company’s finances—they all produced endlessly complicated histories of lengthy 
reports and interminable litigation that lasted well into the nineteenth century.  The post-
revolutionary schemes spawned lawsuits that filled the dockets of state supreme courts.  
In the U.S. Supreme Court, real property cases, many of them disputes arising under the 
systems of indiscriminate location from Ohio, Tennessee, and Kentucky, constituted 
nearly a quarter of the nonconstitutional cases decided between 1815 and 1835.2 
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  But the legacy of the late eighteenth-century land experiments in the territories 
extended beyond the confusion they left in their wake in Ohio and Tennessee.  In leaping 
straight from the Ordinance of 1785 to the Harrison Land Act of 1800, historians 
naturalize these statutes’ neat framing of the issues—parcels’ size, price, credit terms—
that would dominate the public lands’ contentions of the following centuries.  But the two 
land laws were built on a fundamental fiction of vacant lands.  This vision of empty, 
saleable parcels, divided by neat gridlines into tidy sections, that could be sustained only 
once preexisting land rights had been clarified, defined, and, if necessary, extinguished.  
Through the 1790s, federal officials, along with thirteen of the fifteen land statutes 
enacted by Congress during the decade, had created this “empty” land by arbitrating the 
claims of Natives, earlier European settlers, and intruders.  Only after fifteen years of this 
administrative toil could a federal land office come into existence.    
But the work did not stop in 1800.   The land laws’ underlying fiction remained a 
fiction: as the United States expanded westward across the continent, incorporating new 
regions obtained through purchase and through force, Anglo-Americans never found the 
vacant land of their imagination. Everywhere they went, federal officials discovered that 
the lands they now claimed were part of the United States already had owners—Natives 
asserting complicated rights under Native law, but also landholders and purchasers whose 
title traced to a snarl of law and custom established under the continent’s earlier Spanish, 
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French, British, and Mexican sovereigns.  The tangle of these rights in places like 
Mississippi, Louisiana, Missouri, Arkansas, let alone California and New Mexico, far 
eclipsed the challenges that had baffled St. Clair and Sargent in Vincennes.  But these 
land rights were ultimately resolved the same way: through the precedent of federal 
administrative adjudications first adopted, almost thoughtlessly, in the Illinois Country.3 
There was also another, more abstract legacy of the struggles over the territories.  
The state cessions had started, but did not finish, the process of creating the federal public 
domain.  As the history of the 1780s and 1790s shows, there was nothing inevitable or 
natural about federal control over western lands.  In taking the vague promises of the 
Northwest Ordinance as clear consensus, historians have ignored how deeply rooted state 
ownership of the public domain remained for many in the early republic.  “The lands 
within the United States are holden of the individual states, and not of the United States,” 
Representative Giles of Virginia, later a key architect of Ohio’s admission, stated in 
Congress in 1791.   And in fact, whether formally, as in the Virginia Military District, or 
de facto, as with all of Tennessee, state ownership of ostensibly federal lands was 
common.  This precedent could, and nearly did, become the model that governed 
westward expansion.  Instead, the federal government met at least partial success in 
beating back arguments for state ownership when Tennessee and Ohio gained statehood.  
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Nothing was definitively settled: there was a good deal left to fight about, as the later, and 
ongoing, contentions over sovereignty and title attest.  But the precedents and law created 
by Tennessee and Ohio’s admissions helped doom efforts to undo the constitutional 
settlement that had evolved in the 1790s.4 
Struggles continued in Indian affairs as well, as Campbell’s letter indicated.  
Knox and others had hoped that the federal government would serve as a neutral arbiter 
in the seemingly intractable disputes between Natives and their non-Native neighbors in 
the territories.  The attempt to fulfill that promise spawned an infrastructure of 
superintendents, Indian agents, interpreters, and military and trading posts to stand 
between the two groups.  The considerable flow of federal funds and Indian “presents” 
westward also had some effect.  Ironically prompted by Native power, this largesse, 
though a blunt and often ineffective implement of federal policy, worked to make 
formerly “independent” Native nations like the Cherokees seem dependent on the federal 
government, at least to the eyes of outsiders like David Campbell.  As Natives found 
themselves an increasingly administered, they became arguably the first people within the 
United States to confront the thicket of federal bureaucrats that would later develop into 
the administrative state.  In the process, Native and federal authority became inextricably 
entangled; though Natives understood the divide all too well, it was increasingly hard for 
people like Campbell to separate Native and federal sovereignty.5 
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The federal government’s attempt to use law and finance to control its own 
citizens proved less effective.  Even while the national government controlled the 
territories, it could not fully restrain the inhabitants.  Notwithstanding their self-serving 
denunciations of federal officials’ “improper leanings” in favor of Natives, territorial 
citizens proved quite adept at twisting federal power, and securing federal patronage, to 
serve their own ends.  And, in the Southwest Territory, the prospect of increased power 
for local citizens over Indian affairs was a major impetus toward statehood: territorial 
citizens had rightly predicted the political influence that an autonomous government and 
representation in Congress would grant them. 
It was arguably the growing clout of the rising western states, as much as the shift 
to the Jeffersonians, that eroded the Washington Administration’s paternalist 
humanitarianism in Indian policy over the first half of the nineteenth century.  Just as 
federal power and Native autonomy became intertwined, states’ rights and Indian 
dispossession similarly fused, constituting the core principles of an ascendant Democratic 
Party centered in the Old Southwest.  By the 1830s, as Daniel Walker Howe observes, 
votes on Indian affairs were the strongest predictor of partisan affiliation.  As a result, 
though the rhetoric and ideas exemplified by Knox never vanished—finding substantial 
echoes, for instance, in Marshall’s Cherokee cases—Knox’s successors found themselves 
stymied when they sought to follow his precedents.  There were simply too many barriers 
to enforcing Knox’s legal legacy: hostile and uncooperative state governments, a partisan 
and divided Congress, and ultimately a Presidency held by a former federal official from 
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the Southwest Territory—Andrew Jackson—who had fought Knox’s program from the 
beginning.6 
There was a lot more at work here than simply the long shadow of the fights of 
the territorial period.  Controversies of federal power over land and Indian affairs, though 
fierce in former territories like Tennessee, Alabama, Indiana, and Michigan, also raged 
hotly in Georgia, which had never been a territory at all.  But these struggles also 
reflected legacies of the territorial period, particularly in the lingering footprint of a 
federal state that had come early and, despite the promises of equal footing with the 
original states, never quite left.  “[H]appy it would have been for the people of this 
Country,” John Sevier told the Tennessee legislature in 1804, in the thick of the fight 
over Tennessee’s lands, that “after conquering the savages and supporting our 
independence without the aid of the parent,” Tennesseans might have been allowed to 
realize “the fruits of our labour.”   Instead, the federal government sought to deny the 
state “our justly acquired rights,” even as “other States in similar circumstances” received 
“without molestation the benifits and rewards of their struggles.”7 
Sevier’s rhetoric of self-reliance was a fantasy version of Tennessee’s history, but 
one with considerable power: it helped secure Tennessee both ownership and eventually 
sovereignty over its lands, once the Cherokees and other Native groups that the 
Tennesseans no longer considered nations were removed from the state’s territory.  That 
both these processes occurred through federal law was irrelevant: a state arguably 
                                                
6Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 357.  On the Marshall cases, see ibid., 413-21; Jill Norgren, The Cherokee Cases: The Confrontation of Law and Politics (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1996).    
7 John Sevier, “Legislative Message,” July 23, 1804, in Messages of the Governors of Tennessee, ed. Robert H. White (Nashville: 
Tennessee Historical Commission, 1952), 182-84.  Interestingly, in using the term “parent,” Sevier seemed to be referring to North 
Carolina as well as to the federal government. 
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spawned by the federal government proved a willful and disobedient child, eager to cast 
out “the parent” that had nurtured it. 
 
* * * 
 
In 1940, Tennessee marked the sesquicentennial of the Southwest Territory.  It 
was a respectable affair, a gathering at Rocky Mount in eastern Tennessee with an 
address to two thousand attendees.  But it was far outshone by the Northwest Territory’s 
sesquicentennial three years earlier.   For those celebrations, a “pioneer caravan” of re-
enactors retraced Rufus Putnam 1787-88 route to found the Ohio Company’s settlement. 
Beginning with services at Manasseh Cutler’s church in Ipswich, Massachusetts, they 
journeyed in a wagon train to western Pennsylvania, where they chopped down trees to 
construct a raft, and, in the spring, they began to float down to the Ohio.  En route, the 
caravan stopped at towns to perform a pageant entitled “Freedom on the March,” which 
depicted eight scenes including the Treaty of Fort McIntosh and the enactment of the 
Northwest Ordinance.  On April 7, 1938, the convoy reached Marietta, 150 years after 
Putnam and his men, where they were reportedly met by Delaware Indians.   Everywhere 
it went, the caravan caused a tremendous sensation.  National radio broadcast updates on 
their progress, and hundreds of thousands of people turned out to see the caravan: in the 
end, an estimated two million people had come to see the caravan as it passed from 
Massachusetts to eastern Ohio.8 
                                                
8 For the sesquicentennial celebration of the Southwest Territory, see Russell Cherrington Driver, Leslie Rowles Driver: The Fruitful 
Prince (Maryville, Tenn. Script Press, 2002), 300 n.839.  Letters from the college students serving as re-enactors in the pioneer 
caravan appear in Northwest Territory Celebration Letters, 1937-1938, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan.  For 
accounts of the pageant and caravan by the organizers, see Northwest Territory Celebration Commission, Final Report of the 
Northwest Territory Celebration Commission . . . (Marietta, Ohio: Federal Writers’ Project, WPA in Ohio, 1938).  An overview of the 
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The contrast between the two celebrations reflected how central the Northwest 
Ordinance and the Northwest Territory had become to national and regional identity, 
even as Tennessee turned its attention from its territorial interlude to the later illustrious 
career of native son Andrew Jackson.  But the focus of Northwest Territory Celebration 
was not the men in Congress who had crafted the Ordinance, nor the leaders of the Ohio 
Company.  It was a celebration of the pioneers—the “plain American citizens . . . who 
pushed [democratic] government westward across a continent and to eminence among the 
nations of the earth.”  Amid the speechifying at Marietta was an embrace of the local 
pioneer values against the encroaching reach of the New Deal.9 
In its celebration of the common man, the “pioneer caravan” reflected the times, 
although it differed sharply from the original Ohio Company, whose leaders like 
Winthrop Sargent had lacked the common touch.  But there was nonetheless an important 
parallel between the two.  The sesquicentennial celebration of autonomous, democratic 
expansion was organized by the Northwest Territory Celebration Commission, 
established by congressional resolution.  Congress also foot the bill, appropriating 
$100,000.10
                                                                                                                                            
celebration appears in John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century, 
Reprint edition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 126-34. 
9 Bodnar, Remaking America, 126-34. 
10 Joint Resolution of August 2, 1935, ch. 429, 49 Stat. 511. 
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